






Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2008 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation









International

University

Lectures



# INTERNATIONAL --- UNIVERSITY LECTURES

Delivered by the Most Distinguished  
Representatives of the Greatest  
Universities of the World

---

At the Congress of Arts and Science

Universal Exposition, Saint Louis

---

VOLUME X.

---

NEW YORK

UNIVERSITY ALLIANCE, Inc.

1909

COPYRIGHT, 1909  
BY  
UNIVERSITY ALLIANCE, Inc.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

## VOLUME X.

---

	PAGE
<i>Relations of Municipal Administration</i> .....	1
BY ALBERT SHAW, Editor <i>Review of Reviews</i> .	

### MUSIC, INSTRUMENTAL AND VOCAL.

<i>Style in Musical Art</i> .....	23
BY SIR CHARLES H. H. PARRY, Professor of Music, University of Oxford.	

<i>Singing as an Art</i> .....	38
BY WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Professor of Singing, Royal Academy of Music, London.	

<i>Bibliography—Department of Music</i> .....	59
---	----

<i>Poetry, the Idea of Law in</i> .....	61
BY WILLIAM J. COURTHOPE, Professor of Poetry, University of Oxford.	

<i>Bibliography—Department of Poetry</i> .....	86
--	----

<i>Modern Painting</i> .....	89
BY RICHARD MUTHER, Professor of History of Art, University of Breslau.	

### THE DRAMA.

<i>The Modern Drama</i> .....	105
BY HENRY ARTHUR JONES, Dramatic Author.	

<i>The Idea of Tragedy</i> .....	131
BY WILLIAM M. COURTNEY, Editor <i>Fortnightly Review</i> .	

## CONTENTS—Continued.

	PAGE
<i>The Plays of Henrik Ibsen</i> .....	159
BY PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, University Extension Lecturer and Author.	
<i>Bibliography—Department of the Drama</i> .....	193
<i>Telepathy</i> .....	195
BY SIR WILLIAM CROOKES, Scientist, and Editor <i>Quarterly Journal of Science.</i>	
<i>The Theory of Serum Treatment</i> .....	207
BY ROBERT KOCH, Bacteriologist.	

## MENTAL THERAPEUTICS.

<i>Christian Science—Its Healing Ministry</i> .....	221
BY BLISS KNAPP, Lecturer and Practitioner.	
<i>Psychotherapy—The Emmanuel Movement</i> .....	241
BY ROBERT MACDONALD, Minister and Author.	

# FULL PAGE PHOTOGRAVURE PLATES

---

## VOLUME X.

---

ILLUMINATED SYMBOLIC FRONTISPIECE.

	PAGE
MUSIC IN THE MONASTERY.....	25
A TRAGEDY IN THE HAREM.....	91
THE DEATH OF CAESAR.....	169





# RELATIONS OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION

BY ALBERT SHAW.

[ALBERT SHAW, Editor of *American Monthly Review of Reviews*. b. Shandon, Butler County, Ohio, July 23, 1857. A.B. Iowa College, 1879; A.M. *ibid.*, 1882; Ph.D. Johns Hopkins University, 1884; LL.D. University of Wisconsin, 1904; Post-graduate of Johns Hopkins University and universities of Europe. Editor of the *Minneapolis Tribune*. Member of Academy of Political Science, American Statistical Association, American Historical Association, American Forestry Association, and many others. Author of *Icaria, A Chapter in the History of Communism*; *The National Revenue*; *Coöperation in the Northwest*; *Municipal Government in Great Britain*; *Municipal Government in Continental Europe*.]

THE century whose progress this Exposition celebrates has been for nothing else more remarkable than for its creation, not merely in this new world, but also in the old world, of the modern urban community. Speaking broadly, the cities of Great Britain and Germany in their present characteristics are as recent phenomena as the cities of this Louisiana Purchase region itself. Where five million people live under urban conditions as a part of a great community adjacent to New York Harbor, there were not one hundred thousand people when the Louisiana Purchase was consummated. London and Paris were ancient cities, with their splendors of old architecture and their pride of municipal and local tradition. But all that vast and complex development of the metropolis that London and Paris, Berlin and Vienna, have to deal with to-day, is of as late emergence as Buenos Ayres or Chicago. The modern city, whether of cosmopolitan character or merely commercial and industrial, is in all its larger aspects, for political and social purposes, the outgrowth of new conditions which began to make themselves powerfully effective only in the nineteenth century. Those conditions were brought about chiefly by

the utilization of steam power for manufacturing and for locomotion. In the economic world the predominant modern factor has been the creation of productive capital. Capital has aggregated itself principally in machines and instruments of transportation. The result has been that we live under material conditions that have become more profoundly transformed since the days of Napoleon and Jefferson than during any previous ten or twenty centuries of the world's history.

The new economic efficiency resulting from the creation and employment of productive capital has multiplied the population of all civilized countries. It has placed a premium upon intelligence, moreover, and has been the most potent agency in the banishment of popular ignorance. Its inevitable concomitant, moreover, has been the wide diffusion of the means of subsistence and the steady reduction of the domain of poverty.

Not only, however, has the modern system of economic production multiplied population and lifted the people up in the scale of physical well-being, but it has had a most striking and even sensational effect upon the re-grouping of population. It is this re-grouping that has created the modern conditions of industry and of transportation, and that has concentrated the steadily increasing surplus of the population in centers of manufacturing and trade.

The growth of capital and the average increase in wealth have created many new wants, which in turn have been supplied by the products of new forms of trade and industry. And these differentiations have in turn increased the town population and added to the complexity of town life.

The same conditions of industry and transportation which have created our modern cities and multiplied their population have had a striking though not revolutionary effect upon agriculture and the rural industries. They have tended

to bring about the opposite condition of a relative sparsity of rural population. This has been due to two principal facts: first, the introduction of machinery, which has made possible the cultivation of a given area of land by a smaller number of people; second, and more important, the new prevalence of extensive, as opposed to intensive, methods in agriculture, as a result of the opening up of vast areas of new and virgin soil through the construction of railways.

The competition of the new soils, with their access to markets, will continue for some time to come to keep the older lands depressed in value and subject to extensive rather than intensive methods of culture. So long as this condition remains, surplus population will continue to flow from the agricultural to the manufacturing neighborhoods, that is to say, from country to town. These tendencies can be amply illustrated by facts derived from every country within which Occidental civilization prevails. Even here in the states which have been built up upon the soil of the Louisiana Purchase,—in all the older parts of states like Missouri, Iowa, or Minnesota,—the agricultural population has been a fixed or slightly diminishing factor for two or three decades past, while the town population has been increasing by leaps and bounds.

The general statistics showing the growth of urban population in Europe and America are accessible and familiar, and it would be needless to cite them at this point in evidence of a tendency that could not have been different under existing conditions and that cannot be changed for a considerable time yet to come. In the older parts of the United States, as in Great Britain and the more highly developed industrial parts of the Continent of Europe, the urban population already far outnumbers the strictly rural population.

Modern municipal government, which forms the topic of our conference this afternoon, has to deal with a variety of

political and social problems that arise from this modern growth and radical re-grouping of population. These problems relate, on the one hand, to forms of organization,—that is, to the framework and method of the machinery of municipal government; and, on the other hand, to the objects and scope of the government of urban communities, that is to say, to the functions, political and social, that pertain to the municipal authority.

During the first half or even three quarters of this century of urban development now under consideration, the typical new industrial community was enormously hampered through the existence of evils that for a long time were not clearly understood to be curable. With the creation of factories and the concentration of industry in towns, rural hamlets were depopulated by the decay of old handicrafts, and a rustic population crowded into towns that were in no manner prepared to receive such accessions.

The results were painful and seemingly disastrous. There was overcrowding to an extent now almost incredible. So unwholesome were the surroundings that epidemics were the rule rather than the exception. Invalidism reduced the economic effectiveness of the workers; the average expectancy of life was very low; infant mortality was so sweeping that only a small percentage escaped; and thus, as a net result, the death-rate of every considerable urban community was to a marked extent higher than the birth-rate, and town life and industrial progress could only be maintained by the influx of surplus population from the country districts for fresh sacrifice on the altar of modern industrialism.

It is true enough that there had been an earlier phase of urban life which had also to some extent produced overcrowding and distress, and intramural life in wall cities in the Middle Ages had been frequently characterized by unwholesome conditions and decimating infections. But in

those days the overcrowding in its worst aspects was usually a temporary condition due to war or to disorders which obliged the country folk to seek shelter within fortified walls. Generally speaking, no European countries were very densely populated. The town dwellers were in a very small minority. Epidemics were regarded as divine visitations. Political economy, social science, and bacteriology had not entered the vital consciousness of men. And thus the conditions with which municipal activity in our time has been most deeply concerned were in those periods for the most part disregarded.

There were, to be sure, other aspects in which towns and their life were of much significance. The seaport towns were the centers of maritime trade, and many of them became rich and famous through traffic and merchandise. Witness the Hansa towns, Venice, and many another. Other cities, as centers of governing activity and as capitals of kings or of princes or grand dukes, had distinctions and splendors that have furnished them with a continuity of life very dignified and ennobling. Most or all of the old-time towns had their organizations or guilds of handicraftsmen, these in the aggregate constituting a free citizen or burgher body, which body in turn had secured from the reigning authority a charter or grant of communal privilege and corporate self-direction.

The municipal corporations thus formed almost invariably had their old town halls centrally placed on the market square and of imposing and beautiful civic architecture. The survival of great numbers of these old buildings as centers of a wholly new kind of municipal corporate activity helps not a little to carry the mind in imagination over the chasm that separates medieval from modern ways of life, thought, and action. But, although in the case of many towns there has been unbroken use for several centuries of town halls

and other appurtenances of the *Gemeinde*, or organized community, and although also in many cases there has been legally no break in the continuity of the incorporated municipal body, there has in reality come about a change not merely profound, but altogether revolutionary in the characteristics of town life and in the aims and methods of the municipal corporations themselves. It is in this sense that Vienna is new rather than old, and that the thriving urban communities of the Rhine Valley are of as recent development as those in the Mississippi Valley.

For a considerable time, as I have said, after the development of the factory system and the building of railroads had brought us fairly into the midst of present-day conditions,—in which population is everywhere forming in the new urban groups with which we are now concerned,—for a considerable time this re-grouping was regarded, even by those who extolled the new agencies of production and the new implements of exchange, as a thing deeply to be deplored by reason of attending ills that seemed beyond remedy. Those ills went farther than the physical maladies that invalidated the workers and crowded the cemeteries. Town life seemed to foster every sort of crime and vice, and to threaten the swift decay of civic character and private virtue. Thus, looking into the future, one seemed to face the paradox that the very methods which were multiplying wealth, diffusing comfort, gradually shortening hours of brutalizing toil, and promising, theoretically at least, to emancipate and elevate the masses, were so working themselves out in practice as to devitalize and degenerate whole nations through the many-sided and incurable evils under conditions of life prevailing in the densely inhabited centers of new industry. This seeming paradox confused and alarmed many minds until a very recent period.

The paradox disappeared with the great discovery that,



after all, the evils of city life cannot only be abated, but so fully removed as to make conditions in populous towns both enduring and advantageous. The remedial measures have been worked out along many lines at the same time, all having to do with the growth of intelligence, the application of science, the improvement of the mechanism of public administration, and last, but not least, the achievements of modern commerce and industry in creating masses of wealth that can be drawn upon in a large way for the common welfare.

The recognition of the possibility of making city life positively desirable has in some places been tardy, and even now the political reformer and the social worker sometimes doubt and sometimes despair; but hope and confidence have everywhere triumphed, the best evidence of which is found in the dazzling array of public improvements and ameliorations of the general welfare that every important urban center of Europe and of America has accomplished within the past fifteen or twenty years. For every serious malady that continues to afflict any given community, the remedy has been discovered and successfully applied in one or another great town elsewhere under analogous conditions.

As respects the application of the different forms of remedy, we must, in a general way, assign the first place to British municipal life. The various phenomena of modern industrialism had an earlier and a more pronounced development in Great Britain than anywhere else. The rapid upbuilding and over-population of factory towns compelled the attention of English and Scotch reformers to the new conditions as requiring public treatment. It might be more logical to take up first the progress that has been made in the application of these remedies,—in other words to discuss the growth of municipal functions. But since I must also speak somewhat of reforms in municipal structure, it may

be well to allude first to those questions having to do with the forms of town government.

The reconstruction of English municipal government belongs to the reform period of seventy years ago. It was that same re-grouping of population which had by that time created the factory towns that had compelled the reform of representation in Parliament. The enfranchisement of the populous new boroughs for parliamentary purposes was attended by inquiries and discussions which showed the necessity of reforming the inner or municipal structure of these new communities. Some of these were without any form whatever of municipal government, while others were subject to serious abuses under outgrown medieval charters, which practically excluded the people themselves from a share in the control of their own local affairs.

The Municipal Government Act of 1835 is the great legal landmark in the development of modern town organization. Its lines were so broad and so simple that its essential features have sufficed for nearly three-quarters of a century, and will undoubtedly continue through the new century upon which we have entered. Many old forms and old terms were retained, and the chartered life of the county cities and the medieval boroughs seemed to go on without a shock or a break. Nevertheless, the Municipal Government Act brought new life into the old forms, while it cut off unjust privileges and monopolies, and enlarged the conception of the municipal corporation from a narrow, close, self-perpetuating body to a body made up of all the resident householders and occupiers.

Under this elastic common framework it has been possible from time to time to enlarge the municipal electorate as English life has grown more completely democratic. The central fact in the administration has been and will continue to be the popularly elected municipal council, sitting in one

chamber, acting as a board of directors for the conduct of municipal affairs, and carrying on the various departments of executive work under the supervision of standing committees.

Each working department is carried on under the direction of an employed expert head, whose tenure is presumably permanent, and who has in a large measure the authority to appoint and dismiss as well as to direct all the subordinates in his branch of the municipal service. The municipal or town council is a financial as well as an administrative body, and, under parliamentary authority and a certain measure of central supervision, it levies local rates and taxes, contracts interest-bearing loans, and in general carries on the work of municipal administration very much as the directors of a railway company, or of any other large industrial or financial enterprise, carry on the business with which they have been intrusted by the shareholders.

In this British system, the mayor is simply the presiding officer of the municipal council, is selected by the council itself, and is almost invariably one of its oldest members. By way of exception, the administration of the schools falls to a separately elected school board, and the care of the poor in like manner devolves upon a separately organized administrative group. In sound logic, there is no important reason why the schools and the department of public relief should not also come under the control of the municipal council, and the oversight of its standing committees. But in both instances there have been reasons of history and tradition for the separate control of these two functions.

Speaking in general, the enormous demands of an expanded and ever-improving municipal life have constantly added to the volume and the variety of the work intrusted to the British municipal councils. Yet these boards of directors have been fully equal to the new task imposed upon

them, and it will be generally agreed that from the standpoint of the framework or organization of municipal government, the British cities have no serious problems remaining to be solved. As science and the arts of civilized life point out new and better ways to promote the well-being of the people through municipal effort, the British town councils show themselves fully competent to initiate and to administer the new services.

Similar though less acute and less aggravated conditions of urban growth had required municipal reorganization in other countries. Those most important for our present purposes are the municipal codes of France and of Prussia. It was characteristic of the law-giving work of the Napoleonic period that it should have been at once drastic and of uniform and logical character. Making an exception of Paris, —as the English system has made an exception of London, —the French communal and municipal code of the early part of the nineteenth century created a system which was made applicable to the entire territory of France. The central feature of the system was the communal council. The number of members of the council varied in the ratio of population of the communes. As the rural commune grew into the urban community or municipality, its organization became more elaborate, but all upon a sliding-scale plan prescribed in the terms of a universally applicable statute.

In the long struggle between centralized authority on the one hand and the spirit of local self-government on the other, this municipal mechanism has sometimes been administered by the higher authorities through a system of central appointments, quite as bureaucratic as the institution of Russia itself. At other times, this mechanism has worked with something like English local freedom. In either case, however, its outer forms have changed very little.

The most important thing about this legislation was its

scientific character, its thoroughly modern aspect, and its well-nigh incredible achievements in sweeping away the anomalies which had grown up through the centuries. Thus, the Napoleonic administrative laws prepared the way for the municipal growth of the nineteenth century, and French urban life has, accordingly, developed under orderly forms with a system elastic enough to meet changes, and in accordance with the genius of modern French life.

Prussia was hardly less fortunate in the opening part of the last century in its great administrative reformers, which created a system for provincial, municipal, and local government that in the main has stood the test of time and has served for the exigencies of a wholly unforeseen growth of industry, population, and urban life. Saxony and the other German states, meanwhile, had also provided themselves with reformed systems of municipal and local government, different in details, but in a general way similar to the system of Prussia. Belgium, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, and the Latinic countries in general, followed sooner or later the model of France in shaping for themselves uniform codes of administrative law for the organization of local and municipal corporations. Austria and the eastern part of Europe have more generally followed the German model.

The keynote of the German system is to be found in a very highly organized, well-trained, non-political, permanent civil service. Every department of municipal administration is in the hands of expert functionaries, each man holding his place as a life career. At the head of the municipality is the burgomaster, himself the most highly trained administrative functionary of all. His position is wholly different from that of the non-salaried English citizen, who holds temporarily the honorary rank of Lord Mayor.

In like manner, the headship of the police department, of the legal department, of the education department, and of

the various services concerned with the supply of water, the maintenance of streets, the sewer system, the public cleansing, the administration of the health services, and so on, is vested in a permanent professional expert administrator under whom are many other permanent and specially trained experts, who hold their places for life on condition of efficiency and good behavior.

The burgomaster and the head officials of the principal departments constitute a body known as the council of magistrates. The citizenship of the community is represented in another body known as the *Gemeinderath*, or common council. This council is popularly elected, and is a body of great authority. It sits in one chamber, but is elected upon a plan which recognizes the large taxpayers as entitled to much more consideration than those who pay small taxes. With the development of democracy, these property distinctions will probably be modified and in the course of time they may be abolished.

Meanwhile, however, admission to the trained civil service is open upon merit to the very humblest, and promotion in the civil and municipal services also goes without favor upon merit. The selection of the burgomaster and of the other chief functionaries, at those rare times when vacancies occur, devolves upon the elected council, which also has general budgetary power and coöperates with the magistrates' council in matters of municipal policy.

The permanence of the municipal service makes it possible to carry on with patience and unbroken effect every sort of public improvement and also renders it comparatively easy to imbue German municipal administration with the spirit of scientific progress. Thus, while from the point of view of French, British, or American democracy, German municipal government is unpopular and reactionary, it is, nevertheless, in the very forefront of progress as respects the ap-



plication of scientific knowledge to the public services. It is a municipal government whose standards are prescribed by the bacteriologist, the electrical and civil engineer, the sociologist, the financial and legal expert, the trained architect, the botanist, and the man of technical equipment in a hundred different directions.

It is at least open to question whether or not a community may not be regarded as governing itself as truly where its civil service is perfectly organized and dominated by scientific and humane ideas, though its electorate be restricted and non-democratic, as a community which, like those of the United States, throws its electorate open without conditions even to the vagrant, but which denies itself the benefit of a thoroughly efficient and highly enlightened civil service.

The United States is the only country which has not worked out for itself a fairly uniform system of municipal government. There are in this country to-day more varieties, not merely in the details of organization, but in the fundamental features of the framework of municipal government, than in all the countries of Europe taken together, from Scotland to Bulgaria and Greece.

I cannot deny the opinion that it has been unfortunate for the best development of civilized life in American cities that there had not been devised before the middle of the nineteenth century some simple standard system of organization for American municipal corporations. Along with many advantages, our federal system has had some grave disadvantages. To that system undoubtedly must be attributed many of our difficulties in dealing with the city problem, and especially those difficulties that arise from defective legislation.

Our cities are scattered through a large number of states and derive their forms of administration and their various powers from as many legislatures. Some of the states have

worked out uniform systems, while others have followed the practice of granting individual charters to each incorporated town or city. Almost every city in the country can show an experience of charter change, revision, and renewal, so bewildering and so capricious in frequency of repeal and in violence of sudden resort from one device to another, totally different, that it becomes more difficult in many instances to follow the structural changes of government in a moderate-sized American town than to grasp the whole administrative history of municipal corporations for England or for France.

In theory, the municipal corporations are minor divisions or entities of the state, but in many cases their relative importance is so great that they are not held in proper subordination. Under these circumstances the state lacks power to legislate wisely and on stable and permanent lines for its growing and assertive municipalities. On the one hand, the great town disturbs the even tenor of the life of the commonwealth; on the other hand, the rural commonwealth fails to understand the needs of the great town, and attempts in futile and vexatious ways to hamper it and circumscribe its powers.

Thus to meet local or temporary exigencies, rather than to serve the abiding ends of good administration, there is constant meddling with charters and change of method and system. All American cities, however, have some form of an elective municipal council. In a few instances these councils have power almost as complete as in England, in most others much less power, and so on to the vanishing-point. Nearly all American cities have been at one time or another the complete victims of an attempt to separate the so-called legislative from the executive function, in oversight of the fact that practically the whole work of a municipal corporation is administrative, and that the enactment of by-laws is a very minor detail.

Practically everywhere throughout the United States the cities provide themselves with a mayor elected by the whole voting body. In many cities the mayor has very small actual power; in many others he appoints and removes all heads of departments, controls the police system, and runs a sort of periodic autocracy. In many American cities, the different departments of administration are farmed out to boards and commissions. In some places these boards are elected by the people, in others they are appointed by the mayor. In still others they are chosen by the municipal council. Yet more frequently they come into being through ingenious combinations of all these methods.

It is useless to try to generalize, or to attempt, for purposes of description, to work out of all our varying forms some average sort of arrangement that we might call the American system. Yet some creditable attempts have been made in this direction, and a body of excellent theoretical, legal, and practical students of the subject, organized as the National Municipal League, has worked out a so-called model charter, which is having no slight degree of influence upon charter-framers and legislatures, as from year to year they go on prosecuting this ceaseless American industry of making and unmaking municipal charters.

Most municipal reformers in the United States have, however, openly or tacitly agreed to give over for the present all very strenuous attempts to secure their ideals in the matter of charters. They are working, rather, for good practical results under any sort of mechanism, however complicated or arbitrary. They recognize the fact, nevertheless, that the innumerable so-called checks and balances and the baffling division and dispersion of authority, far from preventing misgovernment, afford the wrong-doers their best opportunities.

It has thus far proved impossible to persuade the charter-

makers that the safest and best plan is to abolish nine tenths of the machinery and provide a simple, direct way by which cities may exercise self-government as respects the range of power granted them by the state.

The earlier powers to be exercised within municipal limits are those of a negative and purely protective sort. The police authority is everywhere recognized as belonging to the higher sovereignty of the state. It has, however, in nearly all countries been found convenient to turn over to the municipal authorities the organization and control of the police work. An exception has generally been made of the great metropolitan cities, in which the whole state has so much concern, that it makes direct exercise of the police authority, and declines to admit the municipal corporation to any share in the maintenance of public order. In some countries, as in England, police standards and methods are national, while organization and ordinary control are municipal. In such cases there is national inspection, and the higher government pays some part of the cost of maintenance.

In the United States many of the most serious disturbances of municipal life grow out of the difficulty of defining properly the sphere of the police administration, and the further difficulty of securing permanent and non-partisan direction. It is highly important that a sharp distinction be noted between the evils in American municipal life that associate themselves with the conduct of the police department and the other very different problems of municipal government that have to do with the raising and expenditure of the corporate revenue, and the management of water-supply, drainage systems, cleansing services, streets, parks, schools, and various other lines of municipal activity. While it is evident that inefficient or corrupt police administration has a tendency to infect and corrupt other departments, it has often been strikingly true that alongside of scandalously bad po-

lice administration there has been found fiscal integrity and efficient management of the health services, the schools, and various public works.

Upon municipal corporations in general, it may be said that the state has devolved not merely the ordinary protection of life and property with which the police department is charged, and such special forms of protection as are illustrated in the fire departments, but also the newer forms of service that relate to the protection of the public health, the older sort of regulation that relates to the preservation of public morals, and the local enforcement of a variety of general statutes. For all these purposes the municipality is in fact the local agent of the state. There is nothing new in the legal or theoretical nature of any of these functions, but there is a vast deal that is new in the manner in which the functions are exercised.

Thus the enormous development of public lighting grows out of the primitive function of the night watchman. The modern development of water-supply is essentially a health protective service. The same thing may be said of the sewer system, the cleansing of the streets, and the removal and disposal of garbage and waste. All these are public functions in the highest sense. In the opinion of most municipal authorities, the question whether or not street-illumination, water-supply, sewers and drainage, street-cleaning, and garbage removal should be exercised as public or as private functions is no longer open to discussion. None of these services can be properly rendered for private profit. They relate too essentially to the public welfare. Fortunately, in all these matters, modern municipal life is making an unexpectedly rapid and fortunate progress, with results that are shown directly in the reduction of death-rates, and indirectly in a score of other ways.

Forty or fifty years ago, as I have already said, epidemics

were frequent in most cities of Europe and America. Now they are of rare occurrence. The cholera, at Hamburg, eleven years ago, resulted in making German municipal government more than ever a matter for the bacteriologist and the high sanitary and engineering authorities. The best American cities are advancing to these German and British standards.

Nothing else has such far-reaching importance in the more recent life of cities in Great Britain and Europe, and even more obviously in America, as the physical changes due to electric transit and the upbuilding of suburban zones. Within the past ten years the extent of electric street railways in America has increased many-fold. This movement is doing a hundred times more to relieve the congestion of population in cities and to make possible an effectual dealing with the evils of overcrowding than has been accomplished by the direct application of remedies to slum conditions.

Fifteen or twenty years ago the word "slum" was of constant recurrence in any discussion of the problems of municipal life. Every city, even the small ones, had its area of overcrowding, of unsanitary conditions, of great infant mortality, of epidemic tendency, of criminal resort, and of degeneracy and decadence. Most people believed that such slum areas were inevitable and could not be wiped out. It was observed that the drastic clearing-out of one slum spot was followed by the rapid creation of another. There has come about, however, a complete change of opinion on this subject. The rapid tide of the better class of families to new and sanitary districts, opened up by trolley lines, is so relieving the pressure upon old residence properties in central districts that demolition can proceed with advantage, and rules against overcrowding can be enforced with good results.

Along with this tendency to annex the suburbs and expand the municipal area are to be observed many hopeful accompanying tendencies. One finds immense progress in the art of street-making. Municipal landscape art, as shown in open squares and in smaller and greater parks, has advanced with magnificent progress since Mr. Olmsted and his associates laid out Central Park in New York. Water-supply, sewers, and all that belongs to the functions of good municipal housekeeping are no longer in doubt. With some mistakes, with some extravagance, and with some reaction, the main victory has, nevertheless, been won all along this line.

The people have grasped the conception of orderliness, beauty, and sanitary safety in town life, and they will work these ideals out without fail in all modern industrial countries where there is prosperity enough to keep the forces of civilization alive and energetic. Thus the opportunities and conditions of the average working-man or mechanic dwelling in our cities have been completely revolutionized within ten or twenty years. The plain man may educate his children in admirable free schools under municipal control. The schools have learned to adapt themselves to the needs of the working-man's family, so that they no longer *unfit* for practical life, but on the contrary contribute to the ability of the boy or the girl to earn a living in his own town, as well as to be a good citizen and an intelligent member of society. The working-man has the best of water, the assurance of good health conditions, admirable opportunities for recreation and instructive amusement, great public libraries and reading-rooms made accessible to him, and a hundred advantages scarcely dreamed of fifty years ago. Thus evil has been turned into good, and where once it was seemingly disastrous for men to be living together under urban conditions in modern industrial communities,

it is now, for the great majority, a source of positive and unquestioned advantage.

I am not unduly optimistic. I do not for a moment ignore the many and grave difficulties that beset the work of municipal government and the task of social reform in the industrial centers. What I hold is that the problems are now defined, the remedies are fairly understood, and the work can progress with good courage. We have, in the United States, made enormous progress since, more than twenty years ago, Mr. Bryce made the studies which are embodied in the chapters of his *American Commonwealth* that relate to our city life. In some respects the very best illustrations of the triumphs and the difficulties of American urban life are afforded by this great city of St. Louis that has grown up as the chief center of the states formed out of the Louisiana Purchase territory. There have been evils and scandals in its municipal governmental career that have of late been widely advertised to the world. I have, on the other hand, known something for years past of other phases of its municipal life, and I must assert that, in the main, it stands not only as a creditable, but as a brilliant, example of modern municipal progress. It has at least managed to make a comfortable and a beautiful dwelling-place for its inhabitants, and to provide for them those facilities that contribute to the safety and enjoyment of life.

Here, as elsewhere in America, just now,—as in Chicago, San Francisco, New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and many another city,—the most important phase of municipal life is the struggle for a higher type of civic virtue. This is coming about in the gradual detachment of what we may call “municipal politics” from the domination of the national and the state politics, which have no proper place in the direction of the corporate activities of towns and cities.

In spite of the difficulties that I have mentioned, there



is some tendency to improvement in the structure of municipal government. There is almost revolutionary improvement and progress in the application of American prosperity and advanced material civilization to the appointments of town life. Finally, there is also unquestionable progress in the direction of civic honesty. It need not be said that with the massing of population in the urban centers it becomes almost a question of life or death for the state itself that the citizenship of the populous communities be at least of as high a grade and standard, as fit for the exercise of the privileges of democracy, as the citizenship of the rural neighborhoods. But for the rapidity with which we have received and enfranchised masses of non-English-speaking immigrants who have for the most part taken up their homes in our cities, I believe we should already have brought the standards of civic life in our towns up to the average of the country at large. As to the future, I have no doubts at all upon this score.

In British, German, and other European industrial centers, the greatest difficulties that now have to be faced grow out of the poverty and degradation of a considerable percentage of the urban population. The remedies for this condition are not exclusively in the hands of municipal authorities. They must be worked out with the progress of economic conditions, and the gradual diffusion of realized wealth.

From the standpoint of the social and political philosopher, as well as of the political economist, it must never be forgotten that the modern city is the creation of those very industrial conditions that have created the whole mass of modern wealth, that have elevated the standards of life, and that are certainly destined in their turn to improve and finally to transform the cities which their own instrumentalities have created.



# STYLE IN MUSICAL ART<sup>1</sup>

BY SIR CHARLES H. H. PARRY

[SIR CHARLES HUBERT HASTINGS PARRY, Professor of Music, University of Oxford, since 1899; Mus. Doc., LL.D. b. in 1848; educated at Eton and Exeter College, Oxford. Director Royal College of Music, 1894. Among his compositions are *Music to the "Birds"* and *"Frogs"* of *Aristophanes*; *Judith*, an oratorio; *Ode for St. Cecilia's Day*; *The Lotus Eaters*; *Job*; *King Saul*; *Magnificat*; *Song of Darkness and Light*. Author of *Studies of Great Composers*; *Evolution of the Art of Music*; *Summary of Musical History*; and *Music of the Seventeenth Century*.]

It must be confessed that one can hardly think of style in man or nature or art without being importunately haunted by a familiar French proposition, which conveys to the superficial mind the view that manner counts for more than man. No doubt the familiar '*Le style c'est l'homme*' compares unfavorably with the more ancient saying 'By their fruits ye shall know them,' but it is probable that it was not intended to attribute so much importance to externals as the aptitude of men for misunderstanding things which are too tersely stated leads them to infer. There are thousands of things by which a man's nature may be gauged besides style. Everything that is part of him may in some sense be a gauge of him. Just as a great naturalist has been said to be able to reconstruct some unknown animal from a single bone, men say you can tell a man's nature by the shape of his nose or his hand, or the expression of his mouth, by his walk, by the tone of his voice. Everything may serve the quick-witted as a basis of inference, though all may not be equally trustworthy. Style is mainly an external attribute—a means to an end, and in no wise comparable to actual qualities of character or action in man, or the thought embodied

---

<sup>1</sup> This lecture was delivered in the regular Oxford University course.


in what is said in poetry, or the idea embodied in art. But it is an essential. It is present in everything which has real vitality, and in every moment of art's existence. And as it is infinitely variable in relation to the conditions in which artistic work is presented, it serves as a very comprehensive means of inferring the genuineness either of man or of artistic work.

Differences of style are the outcome of the instinct for adaptation. In art the most perfect style is that which is most perfectly adapted to the conditions of presentment. Many different factors minister to its development. For instance, material counts for a great deal. If a work has to be executed in stone the particular qualities of the material necessitate a style of art different from that of works executed in iron. The effects which can aptly be produced in one material are quite different from those which can be produced in another. The result of trying to imitate effects which can be produced in one kind of material in another which has quite different properties is either stupid or vulgar in proportion to the dexterity of the worker; and style is either gratifying or repulsive in proportion to its just relation to its conditions. It is the same in life as in art. To take an extreme case: the style of an untutored savage in a very hot climate might be quite picturesque and appropriate in his own country, but if any ill-regulated being were to adopt it in the streets of a cool and civilized city he would probably have to be suppressed. There is a technique of life as well as of art, and the style of every section of society varies in accordance with its conditions; and the outcome of attempts to adopt a style belonging to one branch of society in a branch of society whose conditions of life are altogether different is vulgarity. When we come to apply these considerations to music we find circumstances of the same nature. In music the simplest parallel to the differ-




*MUSIC IN THE MONASTERY*

*Photogravure from the Painting by Edouard Gruetzner*



Studio, 1880





ences of material in plastic arts lies in the varieties of means by which music is to be performed and made appreciable to sense. All music which is worthy of the name must in the nature of things be written to be performed by instruments or voices. And they all have their particular idiosyncrasies. Organs have their special aptitudes and their special inaptitudes; and the music which is written for them, if it is to attain to any degree of artistic perfection, must be based upon the recognition of them. Violins have their special powers of expression and effect, and their limitations; horns have theirs, and trombones theirs. Voices can do certain things that instruments cannot do, and all instruments can do things which voices cannot do. There is, as it were, a dialect appropriate to each instrument and each class of voice; and there are even ideas which can be better expressed in one dialect than another; and the employment of any particular means of utterance, whether violins, pianofortes, organs, hautboys, bassoons, voices, harps or trumpets is only justified when they are used for passages which can exactly be given with fullest effect by them.

If there is a style for each individual member of the orchestra, even more essentially is there a style for the orchestra as a whole. It is capable of almost unlimited complexities of rhythm and figure, of varieties of color which are countless. In power of tone it is tremendous, in depth of expression infinite. To venture to put such an engine of power into motion at all seems to be courting responsibility. And to put it into motion to utter things which would be quite adequately expressed by a pianoforte or a set of voices is like calling the House of Lords together to cook a homely omelet. People do not hear orchestral music often enough to realize what the highest instrumental style is. But any one who has a sense of the adequate adaptation of technique to material or means of performance revolts at choral music

written in the style of a brass band, organ music which is mere pianoforte music, or orchestral music in disguise. But the hurry and lack of concentration of modern life, and the habit of producing for a public which has neither discrimination nor education, and the habit of playing such a vast amount of arrangements all tend to dull people's sense of the essential meaning of style, and to make composers miss the higher artistic opportunities in the urgent desire to gratify ephemeral whims.

But style is far from being regulated only by the essential peculiarities of the instruments by which the music is to be performed. Every detail in the situation for which the music is intended, the attitude of mind to which it is to appeal, and the circumstances under which it is to be performed have bearing upon the methods suitable to be employed, and therefore upon the style. When music is intended for domestic consumption it entails a totally different style from that which would be suited to some great public function. It entails its being pure enough to live with, and rich enough to sustain constant interest, and a level of thought more near to the contemplative than the active. While the music of the public function must be stirring and brilliant, direct and forcible, and it attains its highest standard when it is elevating and noble in diction. Even in characteristic deteriorations the difference of style peeps out. The risks of the domestic style are sentimentality and languorous and unhealthy sensuosity, and the risk of the public-rejoicing style is blatant vulgarity. Of style in relation to attitude of mind and mood that of the old Church music is probably most characteristic. Its contemplative and devotional character, its quietude and inwardness, were partly owing to the limited development of artistic technique before the latter part of the sixteenth century, and to the fact that no other style was sufficiently developed to distract the

minds of composers. The effect of the circumstances and the attitude of submission to the authority of the Church was to produce a style so subtly consistent and so perfectly regulated that hardly anything in the range of modern art can compare with it. The instant true secular music came into being it was doomed. The secular phraseology could not be kept out of it, and in no great space of time submerged the devotional element, and the hybrid which resulted was of the most mixed quality. Sometimes even divinely beautiful, and at others grossly repulsive. Sometimes vibrating with human love and tenderness, and sometimes redolent of the most nauseous vulgarities of the opera. But in either case the style was mainly governed by the attitude of mind to which the composers intended to appeal.

Conspicuous difference of style is induced by different conditions of presentment. This is obviously the case in respect of music which is associated with words, and music intended to be performed without them. In music associated with words it is absolutely inevitable that the mood and expression of phrase and figure and melody and harmony, and even of form, must be in close and intimate relation with the words. The more perfect the instinct of the composer for the musical equivalents of the sentiments expressed by the words, the more perfect will be the style; and the more perfect the invention which can dispose of the ingredients in an effective and original manner, the more complete the work of art. The composer has the moods and details of expression supplied him, and the hearers understand the music through its relation to the words. But in music that is intended to be performed without words the composer is himself answerable for the moods he presents, and he has to find inherent justification for every bar he writes in some artistic, intellectual, emotional, or aesthetic principle. To write music for instruments in the style of

vocal music is doubly fatuous, for it is not only inadequate on the grounds that instruments can do so much more than voices, but that the absence of words leaves it entirely without ostensible reason for existence, when there is little or no intrinsic interest in the workmanship.

Even in the various departments of word-wed and wordless music there are infinite shades of variety of style. The music of the theatre absolutely demands a method and style different from that appropriate to vocal music of the concert room, and from the style of the domestic art song. The dramatic music of the theatre gains both advantages and disadvantages from its associations with scenery and action. For, while the mind is distracted in one respect, and pays no attention to artistic qualities which would be prominent in a quartet or a symphony, it is helped in others which would be out of place in instrumental music. The listener would probably miss the development of figures and the subtleties of abstract design if he attended to the drama, but would be quick to feel the intention and purpose of progressions, harmonies, resolutions, and successions of keys which would be unintelligible without the words, but become vividly effective from the situations with which they are associated and the development of passion which they portray. In songs which are not intended for the theatre, the qualities and methods used in quartets and sonatas are much more appropriate, because the mind is less distracted from the music itself, and has more attention to spare for interesting constructive features and subtleties of detail. In the just apportionment of style for emotional and dramatic effects in theatrical music and domestic music the resources are so different that they can hardly be judged on the same footing. People who judge of what is dramatic in the light of what is histrionic would hesitate to call anything dramatic which was in the true style of a solo song. But indeed, there is a

just way of expressing tragedy, pathos, despair in the style suited to solo song, and a different way of expressing it for the stage. The opportunities of the one are more analytical and subtle, and of the other more direct and sensational. It is by no means essential that a thing shall be in histrionic style in order to justify a claim to being dramatic. The histrionic style is a specialty which I hope to consider more in detail another time. But so is the song style—and both are limited by the more delicate instinct of highly organized artistic beings in such a way that much which would be admirable in one style is positively vulgar in the other.

But if the provinces of two different kinds of vocal music are so strongly distinct, the differences between the style and even the material of operatic music and pure instrumental music are more striking still. The differences of method are so pronounced that the histrionic and the absolute seem to represent distinct territories in the musical art; and most people who call themselves musical live almost entirely in one of them, and make little effort to appreciate the good features of the other. It cannot be said that either party has all the right on their side. It is quite true that people who are very fond of the opera are most frequently not musical at all in any sense. But there are a good many who really take it from the artistic point of view and understand it, and are perfectly justified in objecting to operas written in the style and with the methods belonging to instrumental music.

On the other hand, it may fairly be said that men of high artistic taste and perception, habituated to the purer style of absolute instrumental music, are not altogether liberal in their judgment of operatic music, and are not sufficiently ready to admit what is admirably devised for its conditions. They are apt to fall into the misconception that because certain principles of form and procedure are almost indispensable to instrumental music, any music in which they do not

find them is necessarily bad. In this connection it is impossible not to think of the violent antipathy which Wagner's style produced in men of intelligence and cultivated taste. His mature style was certainly as strongly different from that of composers of instrumental music as it is possible to conceive. It was the product of a disposition more essentially dramatic and poetically imaginative than musical. It repelled musicians who appreciated highly the time-honored methods of art which had been consecrated by the greatest masters of instrumental music, because the composer aimed, with an instinct of genius never before shown in such a degree, at a style which was essentially adapted to the conditions of the stage; with all the distractions of the acting, the scenic display, and the interest of the drama. It repelled, because the composer in the instinctive search after a new ideal of style disregarded all the conventions which had grown up in connection with the only branches of art which had hitherto been really mastered. It disregarded the classical rules of resolution of discords, progressions of chords, conventions of design and clearness of tonality. Yet to the great mass of cultivated people his ideal of style proved convincing. He at all events did not make the mistake of supposing that his principles of procedure were applicable to instrumental music of any kind. That mistake was left to his imitators.

The unsuitableness of the operatic style for instrumental music is obvious to all people of taste and artistic intelligence; but in truth the employment of the style which has been developed for pure instrumental music in operas is just as futile. In both cases it is the employment of resources which have been developed for one group of conditions in conditions to which they are unsuited. And there is no reason why operatic music should not be just as well provided with beauty and interest of detail as instrumental

music. Coarseness and commonness of texture are not confined to operatic music, though found there more frequently than in other branches of art. There is plenty of flabby and conventional instrumental music, which the world has gladly let drop and be forgotten. The difference of style which is entailed by the bestowal of loving care on details or indifference to them is more a question of disposition than a necessary basis of contrast between operatic art and instrumental art. The difference is illustrated in the widest sense by the broad distinctions between the tastes of the southern and the northern races. The southern races seem to delight in what is voluptuous, and in the elements of art which appeal to sense. They set no great store on purity, and enjoy their art with indifferent promiscuity rather than with love and reverence. The northern races treat their art with more respect, and look for qualities of virginal purity upon which they can dwell with constant loving contemplation. The southern delight in broad sweeping effects, in which details are of little consequence. The northerns, without losing anything in general imposing effect, love to make every part of their artistic work vital and interesting, so that nowhere shall commonness and the insincerity of indolence or convention be visible. The effect is shown in a very interesting phase by the story of organ music in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Italians set the ball rolling in grand style with the help of many noble composers, of whom Frescobaldi was chief. But deterioration soon set in when a facile style was adopted, in which the details were merely conventional formulas; and the southern school of organists came to worse than nothing. While the northern organists, putting their whole souls into every part of their work, rose higher and higher; and attained first to the luxury of fancy and richness of appropriate detail which is shown in the works of Buxtehude, and ultimately to the

supreme ideal of the highest possibilities of art in the organ style in the work of J. S. Bach. The work carried out with real love and devotion has a higher and more permanent interest than work done under a more vague and uncritical impulse. The difference in such respects between the southern and the northern attitude is well illustrated in the respective styles of Handel and Bach. Bach's style was evolved in the intense devotion to personal ideals. Though he studied all schools of art and absorbed from all quarters such principles as were available for his peculiar artistic disposition, he always worked with the true northern bias to present his thoughts with perfection of detail as well as of general impression; and the subordinate features of his work are therefore in the highest degree interesting and rich. While Handel, following general public taste, which was mainly Italian, aimed at greatness of general impression, at what have been described as cosmic effects, and was often voluptuous in melody and conventional in phraseology, and presents much less interest in the details. Handel holds his own by sheer weight of greatness, but the works of a great number of composers who work on the same lines and in the same style have deservedly fallen into complete oblivion.

Qualities of style are eminently illustrative of sincerity of intention. The periods in which men wrote half-heartedly, with no genuine personal intensity, prove in the end to be styleless. If the style is not distinctive, the product generally proves to be intrinsically worthless. The truly great individual masters of style are such as we know to have been passionately in earnest, and deeply absorbed in the endeavor to attain an ideally perfect presentation of their thoughts. Beethoven and Bach, who had the most consistent degree of personal style, attained to it by infinite labor in pruning, re-writing, remodeling, and constant self-criticism. The com-



posers who had phenomenal facility are by no means those whose style is most individual. Handel was individual in his greatness, but not in the manner of his diction. Mozart was pre-eminent in his sense of beauty, not in the originality of his manner. The most striking and persistent qualities are such as belong to the adamantine natures, not to those which are most malleable. The rugged manner of Carlyle cost himself and his friends untold misery; and the powerfully distinctive style of Brahms must have cost him extraordinary concentration of faculty, even if he mended and pruned less than Bach and Beethoven. It must be admitted that perfect consistency in style is not to be hoped for. Nothing is absolute in human affairs, and though the greatest men in their greatest moments employ the style which enables them to cover the most ground—in other words, such as is most perfectly adapted to the conditions of presentment—even the greatest are sometimes forced by circumstances to employ traits which are drawn from alien sources. A great deal of the music in Mozart's operas is not essentially either histrionic or operatic, but an outcome of the traditions of the conventional Italian operatic entertainment of the early part of the eighteenth century, which made scarcely any pretense of being a dramatic or a histrionic product at all. Conversely we come across passages with an operatic flavor occasionally in Beethoven's instrumental compositions. But the greater men are less frequently betrayed into such bewilderments than those who take their responsibilities lightly. At the same time there are infinite shades of variety of style from the highest to the lowest. As there is a style for the greatest things, so there is for the least. There is a style for the music hall, which of its kind may be good and consistent, as well as for the grandest works of art. A great deal of the low and repulsive vulgarity to be met with in such quarters arises from

the fact that the true ratio of style has not been found. Even popular comic operas can be admirable when the true style has been found; when they are repulsive it is mainly because the makers of them have no sense of style at all. And it would be absurd to consider the style of light art of no consequence. There must be in all men's lives infinite degrees of mood, from serious to playful. It is a very poor nature that can never be gay; but it is of great importance that the gaiety shall be of good honest quality, and not degenerate into brutishness. And it seems to be even more important in this country than elsewhere. For almost the only English music which has been cordially welcomed by the great mass of intelligent English people throughout the world is the music of farcical topsy-turvydom. It is probably the outcome of that dislike of appearing to be pedantic and solemn, which is characteristic of certain classes, which causes them to refuse to take music anyhow but as a joke. Such taste in music is the counterpart of the habit of persiflage which has been justly attributed to a large section of upper-class wealthy society, which does not necessarily imply an incapacity for being serious and devoted, but a dislike of showing it. It is an affectation of nonchalance which is really more dangerous in art than it is in everyday life. For the persistent habit of using an art, which is one of man's most sacred inventions, for mere trifling and fooling, is not only a degradation and an insult to the art, but is bound to produce deterioration of the standard of appreciation, and a lowering of the intention and faculty of composers. English people seem to have less quickness in perception of style than many other nations, especially in things musical. Hence the question of style in light things becomes of the more importance, since having this predisposition for farcical and irresponsible music, lack of style will be the more surely leave them wallowing in sheer unalloyed stupidity.

While insisting that style is a desirable and possible quality in every standard of art, it must be admitted that it is no positive criterion of the quality of the thoughts expressed in the style. The style can be no more than a criterion whether the thing is good of its kind or no. Yet style is so closely interwoven with every moment of art's existence that a great thought is hardly separable from the style in which it is expressed; and a great thought which comes from a full heart is almost sure to be expressed in a style which is consistently noble and dignified. Whereas a thought that a man is only trying to make appear great is often betrayed by some triviality of detail, some glaring inconsistency of phraseology which betrays the mountebank or the charlatan.

The greatest achievement in point of style is to convey the idea which belongs to the artist or the speaker in its widest significance in the exact terms—no more and no less—which will make it take the most complete hold of the human mind. The perfect style does not weary with superfluous explanations, nor leave in doubt by lack of decisiveness. It anticipates how far a suggestive word will carry the mind, and how much can be left out. It plays with associations, with relations of terms to one another, with the lilt of rhythm and the infinite variety of tone. The resources of artistic appeal to men's sensibilities and intelligence seem almost inexhaustible. But there is a very important qualification, which restricts the range of what is available, and that is consistency. All things are neither lawful nor expedient. It is the misuse of resources which is mainly responsible for vulgarity; the hodge-podge of phraseology belonging to the pulpit and the street; the jumble of symphonic style and the histrionic. Some methods of art are capable of absorbing far greater of traits drawn from many different quarters than others. The greater somewhat

easily absorbs the less. And yet the greater easily drops and its nobility is tarnished by the deliberate utterance of a triviality. An inconsistency of style may be an accident. But if the accidents recur what seemed to be an accident becomes an essential. Many gifted composers have gone so far as to give the world a noble phrase which seems to have the qualities of fine music. But the impulse does not last. Lack of fibre, lack of the power of persistence, prevents the maintenance of the high level of thought, and then comes the inevitable make-up—mere phrases decked in futile and superfluous ornament; tricks of art which have no real relation to the mood at first suggested. The incapacity to maintain the standard of style betrays the lack of genuineness of the momentary spasm of inspiration which seemed to promise such great things. The great minds maintain the relevancy of the mood and the style. There is no variableness nor shadow of turning in the rugged Promethean spirit of the first movement of the Ninth Symphony, no shuffling make-believe to mar the fiery concentration of the first movement of the C minor, no mundane irrelevance to weaken the triumphant sweep as of the singing of an infinite heavenly host in the *Sanctus* of the B minor Mass. The consistent elevation of the style is equal to the depth and fervor of the thought.

All things are neither lawful nor expedient in style, but those only which are perfectly consistent with the conditions, the material, and the mood which the composer expresses. There is the style which is apt for things mundane, and a style which is apt for things devotional; a style for things pathetic, a style for things gay. Trivial phraseology is out of place in times of mourning, tragic violence in times of merriment. And the style which is inconsistent with the mood makes the product ring false, so is it with inconsistency in relation to conditions of presentment—the operative work

written in the style of absolute music, the instrumental music written in the histrionic style. There may be positive vulgarity in thought, but the greater part of vulgarity arises from misapplication of style. While even things little and light may be made admirable by dexterous consistency of style, the greatest inspirations cannot dispense with it.

In the end style is the sum of the appearances of all the factors which make up a work of art or an entity. It is the sum of the outward manifestations of qualities. The style of an apple-tree is the sum of the appearances produced by the shape, color, texture, and set of the foliage, the ruddy red of the fruit, and its relation to the color and character of the foliage, and the angles of the ramifications of the branches. The style of an orange-tree is quite different. The glossy leaf, the bright yellow fruit, the scent, the method of growth of the boughs, present quite a different effect, and suggest a different climate and different conditions and surroundings. We can hardly imagine such a monstrosity in nature as a tree made up half in the style of an apple-tree and half of an orange. The absurdity of gathering grapes of thorns or figs of thistles is self-evident. Yet the law of consistency in art is just as essential and as logical as in things organic. A perfect work of art is a perfectly organized presentation of an original unity. If apples are found on one bough and figs on another, men may guess that it is a sham. The perfect adaptation to conditions entails perfect unity of style, and it may be inferred conversely that complete perfection of style is to be found in perfect and relevant consistency.



## SINGING AS AN ART<sup>1</sup>

BY WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE

[WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Professor of Singing at the Royal Academy of Music, London; b. in 1849, at Corydon, London, where he became choir boy and organist at an early age at St. Andrew's; studied at Royal Academy of Music, 1860-65, where he won the King's scholarship in 1866; and the Mendelssohn scholarship in 1871; studied composition at Leipzig Conservatory, 1871-72; took course of singing instruction under Lamberti, in Milan, 1872-75; returned to London, 1875, and became famous as a teacher of the Art of Singing; has frequently delivered lectures in England, and lectured in 1900 in the United States. His compositions comprise music for orchestra, pianoforte, concertos, string quartets and songs. For five years conducted concerts of the Royal Academy of Music. AUTHOR OF *The Art of Singing*.]

The limited time at my disposal compels me to be brief in my lecture on "Singing as an Art."

I must preface what I have to say with a few words on the historical development of the art, recalling to your memories the names of some of the most eminent of the writers for a single voice.

We know that Henry Lawes, born 1595, wrote capital songs, demanding some sustaining power, and that Purcell, born 1658, composed his touching and sustained air, "Dido's Lament," as well as songs demanding the execution of scale passages, such as "Let the mighty engines." Alessandro Scarlatti, born 1659, wrote such airs as "Toglietemi la vita ancor," and "O cessate di piagarmi." Lotti, born 1667, who used modern harmonies with freedom and grace, composed "Pur dicesti," and Caldara (1678) wrote the air "Selve Amiche," which is a splendid specimen of the *sostenuto* or sustained style. These and many other composers wrote splendidly for the voice. All goes to

<sup>1</sup> Lecture, originally delivered in London, presented here to supplement the lectures originally prepared for the International Congress of Arts and Science.

prove that at this period there existed already a school of singing.

Bernacchi, born 1690, was equally celebrated both as a singer and a singing master. He received instruction from Pistocchi, then the first singing-master in Italy, where, we read, there were not a few of such at that time. Bernacchi was engaged by Handel in 1717 to sing in his opera "Rinaldo."

Porpora, a pupil of Scarlatti, teacher of singing and composer, was born at Naples in 1686. He wrote many operas and established a school for singing, whence issued those wonderful pupils who made his name so famous. He was the greatest singing master who ever lived, and from his pupils have been handed down to us the relics of a grand style.

Porpora has left us no written account of his manner of teaching, and his *solfeggi*, or *vocalises*, differ from others of his time in being more exclusively directed to the development of flexibility of the voice. To a profound knowledge of the human voice and an intuitive sympathy with singers, Porpora must have united the genius of imposing his will on others. It is said of him that he kept his pupil Caffarelli to a sheet of exercises for five years, and on the pupil asking if he might not be allowed to sing an aria, the master replied, "Go, my son, I have nothing more to teach you, you are the greatest singer in Europe." Caffarelli excelled in slow and pathetic airs as well as in the bravura style, and was unapproachable in beauty of voice and in the execution of the trill.

Porpora's pupil, Farinelli, when the Emperor Charles the Sixth expressed his regret that so consummate an artist should devote himself entirely to exhibitions of skill and bravura, struck by the truth of the criticism, resolved to appeal more to emotion, and proved adequate by becoming



the most pathetic as he had been the most brilliant of singers.

Farinelli had an inimitable power of swelling a note by minute degrees to an amazing volume and afterwards diminishing in the same manner to a mere point. This singer excited such enthusiasm in his audiences that one lady ejaculated the phrase (perpetuated by the painter Hogarth in "The Rake's Progress") "One God and one Farinelli." It was Farinelli who sang a cadence in a song with a trumpet obligato, and after finishing a long note, so that the trumpeter had to give up out of breath, extended the cadence with a further vocal passage in the same breath.

Farinelli, however, was not so fortunate when singing with his great rival Bernacchi, whom I have already mentioned, for on their meeting in public, after Farinelli had sung an air with great effect, Bernacchi repeated this with the same trills, roulades, and cadenza in such a superior manner that Farinelli, who possessed the sweetest and most modest disposition, owned his defeat, and entreated his conqueror to give him further instruction, which Bernacchi generously did. Farinelli thus perfected his style, and became the most remarkable singer, perhaps, who ever lived.

Pachiorotti, who, with a defective voice, possessed high intelligence, and made himself a consummate artist, was followed by many great singers. Among them were Gizziello and later on Crescentini.

In the time of Mozart the singer Faustina was credited with such extraordinary powers of respiration that it was supposed she could sing while taking in as well as sending out the breath.

The roll of famous artists in modern times includes among others Catalani, Malibran, Grisi, Rubini, Tamburini, Lablache, Guiglini, Mario, down to Adelina Patti, Santley and Jenny Lind. The last mentioned genius I myself

heard sing Mozart's air from his opera "Il Re Pastore," and in this she sang a trill with violin obligato in the most perfect *legato* style, so that every note agreed with the trill of the violin,—a marvellous achievement, but in addition, the feeling of the song was expressed in the most touching way.

Now what are the technical terms which can convey the qualities of this grand vocal art? Surely they are the unerring attack of the note in the very centre of the sound: the *sostenuto*, or sustaining all notes and joining them to others with a perfect *legato* without either jerkiness or slurring, and with the quality of expression intended; the *messa di voce* or swelling from *piano* to *forte* and back to the softest sound without loss of quality; command over execution; expression and pathos; breadth of phrasing which is only possible to those who have command of a long breath; and intensity or carrying power sufficient for the largest halls or theatres. Handel, Bach, and Mozart, and, among the moderns, more especially, Rossini, Bellini, Donizetti and Verdi, knew how to bring into play all the resources of their singers in respect to the points I have just mentioned. They gave them time to breathe and collect themselves between the phrases by a bar or two of the orchestra, in a manner quite different from later composers who often give little or no time for the singer to breathe.

Bach and Handel, both born in 1685, were two of the greatest musicians who ever lived. Handel, in 1706, traveled all over Italy, met the well-known singers of the day and composed operas for them, and for many years was connected with the King's Theatre, London. In the numberless masterpieces of this great composer we meet with every device favorable to the singer's art. Matchless *recitative*—loveliest airs—slow, sustained notes fostering *messa di voce*—many spaces for the singer to recover *breath*

*and calm*—trills and passages—invocations and triumphant phrases. For *recitative*, “Deeper and deeper still,” and for sustained notes, “Waft her, angels,” and “Comfort ye;” for vigorous passages, “Ev’ry valley” and “Love sounds the alarm;” for prayerful utterance, “Pious orgies;” for invocation, “O sleep,” “Father of Heaven,” and “O Liberty,” also “Heart, thou source of pure delight” (“Acis and Galatea”). How many of these commence with the voice unaccompanied! Note the phrasing of Handel, where he interrupts the musical phrase, sometimes more than once, on a single word, in the air “Where-er you walk” from “Semele.”

Sebastian Bach, who was neither a traveller nor a writer of operas like Handel, at times gives to the singer uncouth and awkward passages, difficult chromatic intervals—words recited on the highest notes—a voice-part perhaps treated too much like a solo stop on the organ—disregarding the compass or most favorable parts pertaining to the different voices. Yet in spite of all this, what effects! In *recitative* and *sostenuto*, “Ah, Golgotha;” and the following air, in religious fervor and slow passage singing, “With Jesus will I watch and pray;” for quicker passage singing, “Haste, ye shepherds;” for holy devotion, “Into Thy hands my spirit I commend,” etc.

Glück, a German composer, born 1714, studied in Milan, and his first operas met with some success. Handel, however, declared his music at this period to be detestable, and asserted that he knew no more about counterpoint than his (Handel’s) cook. Glück went on persevering. He entirely reformed the style of writing for the stage, and in 1762 brought out his opera “Orfeo ed Euridice.” He was not satisfied until he introduced what he considered a still more truthful kind of declamation, and banished all false and useless ornaments from operatic music. Note the pro-

foundly dramatic accents of Orfeo in the recitative and lovely air "Che farò." In the air, how he uses the *legato* effects of the voice in often giving more than one note to a word. What a stirring climax there is at the end of the piece!

Now, unfortunately, little is known of the methods adopted by the old masters of singing. They were not in the habit of printing their secrets as nowadays. According to precepts handed down to us, we may gather that singing "as an art" consists in freedom of the throat and command over the breath. That is to say, by breathing out slowly on an imaginary object with perfect command so that the breath goes out as one wills and, furthermore, by loosening the throat—a much more difficult matter—so that all the notes sound to this controlled breathing, the result is "perfect production." The voice can now be produced with greater force—a force proportioned to the increased command of breath and to the perseverance of the singer in developing his vocal range.

The interesting question now arises:—What would a singer of the old school find if he were to appear to-day? He would ask himself, "Is singing still an art?" and how could he use his masterly effects, so necessary in a past age? He might inquire "What is there to sing to in modern vocal works?" Could he make use of his *sostenuto*, his *legato*, the *mezza di voce*, the *fioritura* execution and trills? I fear he would find that modern music affords no scope for these effects. Modern music has generally a separate syllable for every note—only *forte* singing is required, by reason of the presence of elaborate and powerful accompaniments.

A voice that has always to be produced at high pressure will, in the end, of necessity fail to produce a pure sound. We constantly hear singing out of tune. The artist can

scarcely avoid fatigue in making the strenuous efforts which are demanded under modern conditions, and one result is that audiences become gradually indifferent to perfect singing in tune, and to steadiness of voice, and are no longer sensitive to delicate effects.

How then is an artist to touch his audience when they have become accustomed to notes that are not commenced in the centre of the sound, and to a forcing of voice and sentiment alike? There is only one possible way of attaining the desired result. He must do what Verdi has asserted to be essential, namely *ritornare all' antico*, i. e., return to the old Masters, and he must begin afresh to educate his audience to a higher appreciation of the art of singing. If the artist only perseveres he is bound to succeed in this, and we shall see a restoration of the true art of singing.

It is time now to give a short sketch of the technique of singing as practised by a past age.

Singing is a *prolonged* talking, and must be higher and louder than the voice we use in ordinary conversation, and more especially is this the case when the voice has to be used in a large hall.

Some people say "breathe naturally." One may as well tell the gymnast to perform naturally. His wonderful feats may appear natural, but they are the result of a vast extension of that which is natural to us.

If when we draw in the breath we feel expansion about the soft place under the breast bone; we have done so by using the diaphragm. Another mode of drawing in the breath is to expand the ribs. Now the ribs, when we raise them, move outwards and the cavity inside is made larger than before. A singer must use both these methods; he must feel an expansion of the body at the soft place, and he must also feel an expansion of the sides by lifting the ribs. Perhaps the greatest fault that we can make is to

raise the ribs by the muscles which are fixed to the points of the shoulders in front. We should avoid this error by the use of very powerful muscles which are felt at the back under the shoulder-blades and under the arms, and so expand enormously the sides of the body. The muscles by which we drive out the breath are principally situated in the abdomen. They perform a double duty: one is to pull down the ribs; and the other is, by their pressure inwards, to cause the diaphragm to ascend again.

By the control of the breath we mean that we can regulate the action of the muscles which draw in the breath, at the same time that our expiratory muscles are sending it out. There is then a struggle between these two forces, the one force causing a continuous steady pressure while the other regulates, controls and economizes this same pressure, which if not regulated would let the breath escape altogether and the phrase sung would come to a premature end.

We see the result of a clumsy way of breathing in the unpleasant gaspings and noisy breathing produced by those who rely on the raising of the chest and shoulders. The poet puts this correctly when he says, "My bosom heaved with many a sigh." On the other hand, the result of a right method of drawing in the breath is a noiseless and imperceptible respiration. It should be so imperceptible that the audience is unaware of the breath being taken.

The old Masters knew nothing of anatomy, yet Science only proves how right they were in their ideas of breathing. In accordance with the accepted axiom "*Summa ars celare artem*" (the highest art lies in its concealment), they insisted that the goal of the singer should be "imperceptible and inaudible breathing." The celebrated singing master, Lamperti, was never tired of insisting that the points of the shoulders must be free, and that the breathing of a singer should resemble that of a swimmer.

The great tenor, Rubini, was once closely watched for several minutes by the equally celebrated bass, Lablache, and although the latter was holding Rubini's hand while singing a duet, he declared that he was unable to observe when or how he breathed, so noiseless and imperceptible was his method of respiration. An oft-repeated anecdote of Rubini, however, describes that, later in his career, being desirous of bringing out the high B flat he used so much force as to break his collar-bone! First, I do not believe this story, but, if it were true, either the artist's collar-bone had become very brittle, or else he was not singing with that schooled respiration described on the occasion of his duet with Lablache.

A friend of mine tells me that his father knew Lablache intimately, and that this artist one day for fun sang a long note from *piano* to *forte* and back to *piano*, then drank a glass of wine, and, without having breathed, finished by singing a chromatic scale in trills up the octave all in the same breath, and finally blew out a candle with his mouth open!

There were giants in those days!

A word on voice-production. When we sing, the delicate edges of the vocal chords are brought together so that the pressure of the breath sets them into vibration, and prolonged sound is the result. The muscles connected with the vocal chords enable us to tune them to the notes of the scale, and melody ensues.

Whilst many earnest scientists have endeavored to determine the exact action of the most delicate muscles in the larynx, nothing of so simple a character has yet been discovered as to make the study of singing any easier.

We shall learn more by observing what happens to the muscles which form the floor of the mouth. They assist in holding the larynx in its proper position, and become

tenser as we ascend the scale in the different registers. The muscles, however, connected with the different movements of the tongue lie just above these; indeed, they also help to form the floor of the mouth.

The least rigidity of the floor of the mouth involves the muscles of the tongue, and the tone as well as the pronunciation is distorted through the awkwardness of the singer. The term "placing the voice" is so commonly used that I do not hesitate to employ it here. But when the voice is rightly produced the placing muscles do not interfere with the muscles above them which move the tongue, and so pronunciation and tone are now unimpeded, for they act independently. By whispering a sentence, and then suddenly singing it, we can observe the placing muscles come into play, and how they are quite different from those we employed in whispering only.

Thus we see that the difficulty lies not in the pronunciation itself, but in singing in such a manner that unconscious pronunciation is a result. In bad singing the jaw is always fixed; indeed, a triple combination for evil is coincident in the fixedness of the tongue, throat and jaw. When one is rigid all are rigid, and this could be easily explained scientifically.

The old masters of singing, without any knowledge of anatomy, held it to be of the greatest importance that during the singing of scale passages the jaw was not to move. Their maxim was "He who moves the mouth cannot sing." Pachiorotti held that "He who knows how to breathe and how to pronounce" knows how to sing. Crescentini averred that "Looseness about the neck and the voice on the breath" is the art of singing. If we do not produce the voice rightly, either the throat contracts in a manner which we recognize as throaty, or the nasal cavities are rigidly held and we say the sound is nasal; or we hear a hooting,



lugubrious sound, terribly monotonous and sepulchral; or silly sounds are produced which have been called in Italian *voce bianc*, *voix blanche* by the French, or white, blatant, colorless voice, like that produced by the half-witted.

Awkward rigidity about the floor of the mouth is also fatal to the freedom of the muscles which tune the larynx. So when a note starts exactly on the pitch intended, it is the most important sign of perfect voice-production. Many of us at times have sung a note which seemed to roll out in unconscious freedom and with great sonority. The art of singing is to find out how this excellence may be attained in all the notes of the voice.

There are placing muscles and tuning muscles. When length, breadth and thickness of the vocal chords are rightly adjusted, the intrinsic muscles of the larynx can tune the different notes in unconscious ease. Moreover, such notes respond to the right breath control.

We learn from the old Masters that they arrived at placing the voice, poising the larynx on the breath, by the very simple method of endeavoring to sing a note while they measured the breath by breathing on a mirror or against a lighted taper held opposite the mouth. They could thus judge whether the note sounded fully without disturbing the breath. Supposing the note was not placed, the singer was compelled to press more than he could do without upsetting the breath control. This caused a puff, which was considered a disaster. Under this system it was found that that was the right note which produced the most sound with the least breath. Scientifically they were right, for they produced a greater result with less means.

The student, in trying to sing a note, frequently forgets his breath control, and this will bring home to him the truth of the old saying, "The art of singing is the school of respiration."

The looseness of the neck and unconscious feeling about the throat during singing caused the old singers to boast that the Italian singer has no throat. They might have added, no jaw and no tongue.

Then a note may be described as *placed* if it speaks to the breath we are able to control, if it can be produced in the very centre of the sound intended, if it leaves in freedom the pronunciation and the expression.

The essence of the teaching of the old Masters is contained in the axiom: "Every note of the voice should be produced by a column of air over which the singer should have perfect control."

The attack of the note (that is to say, the art of starting a sound with frankness in the very centre of the pitch intended) has always been regarded as a great test of good singing. The many scoopings up to, or "seeking or feeling for the note," are, of course, a sign of bad production.

The accomplishment of what is known as "legato singing," namely, that *joining of the notes* which yet must at the same time all be "clean cut out," was looked upon by the old Masters as another of the great signs of good singing. They said, "He who cannot joint cannot sing." All the notes of a passage on the same vowel should be "like pearls on a string," and the string supporting them is the right control of the breath.

Those who have mastered breath control and freedom of the throat and tongue are now in a position to add tone to the voice through the loose, unrestrained condition of the space behind the tongue and the nasal cavities. The throat in its normal state and when we are asleep is wide open, and only bad singing interferes with this. For some vowels the throat space undoubtedly has temporarily to be somewhat contracted, and possibly as we sing higher there may be a corresponding modification of the throat space.

But all these changes are unconscious, and the contortions of the bad singer render these natural conditions impossible, just as the unconstrained throat of the good singer leaves nature free to utter her loveliest tones.

With the throat wide open, the vowel sound which is emitted is *ah*. This pure *ah* was the goal towards which the Italian singers never ceased to advance, as affording the greatest test of tone and facility of pronunciation.

As an aid to the freedom necessary to this perfect vowel the student was wont to practice a rapid tongue movement before the *ah*, and the consonant *l* was generally adopted on account of its demanding a free movement of the whole of the tongue. On singing *lah* rapidly the inclination to stiffen the instrument was overcome. This sudden tongue movement, when done with entire absence of hesitation, and in conjunction with a proper breath control, became the foundation for the attack of the note, and the freedom and richness of the *ah* was found to depend on its daring and spontaneity. The value of *lah* as a foundation study cannot be over-estimated by the student, who through it will discover freedom of throat. The sudden, rapid movement of the tongue in reiterated *lahs* was the device used by the old Masters for bringing about the freedom of the tongue and jaw which invariably accompanies good singing.

Sing with frank and fearless attack *lah, lah, lah, lah lah*, on the same note. Was the tune commenced in the very centre of the sound intended? Was there no hesitation at the commencement? Was the jaw in repose and independent of the movement of the tongue? Another mode of finding the perfect *ah* is to repeat it in a slow, *staccato* manner on the same note in the same breath. If we tune with absolute accuracy, and if we open the throat so as to emit a pure *ah*, we shall be compelled to control the breath rightly. These exercises each produce in the end precisely the same result, viz., the fullest natural tone.

Let us now take a step forward and vary the vowel sounds used in the exercise, while strictly regarding the rules just laid down for naturalness of tone. We will sing, *lah, leh, lee, ah, eh, ee*. Can we change the position of the tongue (which rises somewhat in the centre for *eh*, and still more for *ee*), without moving the jaw, or allowing the breath to slip and the throat to close?

We have now arrived at the last test of good singing, which I must insist upon. When we sing two or more notes on the same syllable do they join in the *legato* style? Dare we sing with unerring tuning? We have arrived very nearly at the goal of voice production if we can do this on consecutive notes on all the intervals.

Lastly, if we can sing in the *legato* style we have arrived at a state of freedom which will permit, with practice, the execution of the most rapid passages.

A word about registers. In Italy the stops of the organ are called the registers. Now because of this, the three different characteristic series of tones which exist in every voice have been named the three registers. One might say these three stops are the *grand* stop, the *brilliant* stop, and the *flute* stop.

We have all heard of the chest voice. This simply means that the lowest notes of the voice when produced naturally in a certain way cause a remarkable sensation of vibration in the chest which can be physically felt by the hand of the performer, as well as heard by the audience. Such notes are manly and grand in character.

In the middle of the voice, immediately above the chest register, is another series of notes usually termed the medium register. In these notes the most characteristic sign of singing correctly is the extraordinary sense of vibration of the air in the mouth, which seems to strike the upper teeth. The notes of this series of sounds are distinguished by their brilliant and silvery quality.

The third register is known as the head voice, by reason of the sensation felt by the singer, and recognized likewise by the listener, that the sound reverberates in the skull beyond the last upper teeth. All the teeth that are shown when we smile must be shown when we sing the head register. These head notes are characterized by a fluty and bird-like character of surpassing loveliness.

The first notes of all the registers are weak and a source of trouble to the student, for the breath slips out until some experience is gained. For this reason, instead of strengthening the lower, weak notes of the medium register, the inclination of all singers is to hurry on their studies by forcing up the chest notes when they ought to sing medium, with the result that the men are said to shout or bawl, or yell like the men in the streets, and the contraltos and sopranos force up the chest notes and emit sounds like boys shouting to each other.

Mezzo-sopranos and sopranos, moreover, are very prone to avoid the cultivation of the head-notes altogether, and to force up the medium register, with a sad result. It is no longer singing in a high sense, it is not expressive of lovely feelings, pronunciation is impossible, and the characteristic sound of the voice is described as screaming, screeching; whereas nothing in nature is more lovely and truly womanly than the sound of the head voice.

The registers so dovetail one into the other, or overlap one another, that we can sing softly some notes in one register and repeat the same notes loudly in another register. We can also commence a note *p.p.*, and swell it out to *f.f.*, and return to the softest *p.p.*, but probably not always with the same throat mechanism; indeed, the achievement of this was formerly considered the culminating effort of the singer, and was termed the *messa di voce*. It is, however, as necessary to sing with loose throat to do this as it is to join the notes in the *legato* style.

The trill was another of the accomplishments highly thought of as proving the mastery of the vocal art. It is, perhaps, the most delightful of all the embellishments of music. The trill is still used in piano-forte and violin pieces, where it is still regarded as a worthy aid to expression. Singers, however, finding its accomplishment beyond their powers are wont to assume that, together with scales and passages, it is unworthy and meretricious and that as an ornament, it is but an empty and stale device for showing off the voice.

The trills have not yet been cut out of Beethoven's Sonatas, so we may not deem them unworthy of a word here. As the performance of this delightful ornament is a sure sign of the greatest freedom of the instrument, the two notes must be perfectly produced by one or both of the devices already mentioned. That is to say, we must sing the two notes on *lah la la la*, faster and faster until an even trill is the result, or we must do *staccato* notes more rapidly until the notes join and trill of themselves. In practicing this, never sing faster than you can sing exactly in tune, exactly in time (that is, not jerking), with the perfect pronunciation of *ah*, and with a smiling tone which must reveal absolute ease of manner.

The *portamento* is another graceful effect.

PRONUNCIATION.—The vowels of the English language are thirteen in number, and as we have conquered the pronunciation of the typical *ah*, we must sustain the other twelve sounds with similar freedom starting with *ah*, we find such sounds as *at*, *a* (and *air*), *et*, *it*, and *ee*, which are different upward tongue positions; then come changes of lips and throat, such as *oo*, *hood*, *aw*, *o*, *ot*, *er* and *ut*.

As singing words at first takes our attention from the unerring tuning which we should associate with our studies, beware of commencing too soon to attempt singing with

words. The old Masters insisted on *solfeggi* and *vocalises* or songs without words for a considerable time before permitting an aria.

INTENSITY AND EXPRESSION.—By intensity the good singer means the intense pressure of the breath on the voice which gives effect to any and every emotion he chooses, because he has power over the breath that intensifies, and has acquired the freedom of the instrument. By means of this he can make the loudest sounds possible expressive, and he can also cause the softest sounds to be carried to the farthest end of the theatre or concert hall. The artist when he intensifies a *pianissimo* note can make this travel to the end of the room and touch his hearers, and arouse emotions as of distance brought near to us, or of memories of the past recalled. The bad singer has to rely on his loud notes, which become monotonous; he dare not sing softly, he would most likely become inaudible.

Let us never cease striving to bring out all the force and intensity with which nature has endowed us; but, at the same time, let us endeavor never to give out more force than that with which we are able to express. The real amount of fervor we can produce depends on our instinct and individuality, and the result is the depth and intensity of expression of which we are capable.

The sacred warmth of expressive melody is the gift of the gods, and without it there will be little emotion.

The play of the face varies the expression of the voice. How could the inanimate face produce sounds other than monotonous? It is impossible to smile with the face and express sorrow with the voice. Every emotion has its appropriate facial expression. So if we insist on expressing with the face the sentiment we sing, and at the same time control the breath, we shall certainly succeed in our art.

PHRASING.—Let us study the words and music we have

to sing until both are mastered mentally, the picture of the words and the phrasing of the music; the *crescendo* of the ascending notes of the melody and the *diminuendo* of the falling cadence; the accents necessary to the words, the sensitive loveliness of the accents which belong to the melody.

The effect of diminishing the power of the voice on nearing the end of a phrase is sometimes magical. Let us avoid dragging and hurrying. The greater the artist the less he tampers with the time of the music, without due consideration.

The old Masters prided themselves on their phrasing, on the calmness of the *tempo* on the just accent, and on the *crescendo* and *diminuendo*. The singers were so sensitive to lovely phrasing that the clarinetist, Lazarus, whom I knew intimately, on being asked "Where did you learn your exquisite phrasing?" said, "I learned it from the singers at the opera, some fifty years ago." On the other hand, a great tenor, on being asked, "From whom did you learn your phrasing?" said, "I fancy I learned more from hearing Lazarus play the clarinet than from any one else." Nowadays the instrumentalists are certainly ahead of the singers in loveliness of phrasing, but formerly the contrary was the case.

The development of the orchestra has, of course, been carried to its highest pitch by Wagner. But, unfortunately, while he has increased the volume, the richness and complexity of the orchestra to an unprecedented degree, he has been unable to add anything whatever to the volume of the human voice. There still live composers who have written music full of deep feeling, true loveliness and dramatic character, yet not well-fitted for the voice, and, indeed, sometimes almost incapable of successful performance.

As a public singer I have had to sing cantatas and other works which, though written for a tenor, were quite un-



suitable, and I have heard many times artists singing music too low, or painfully laden with words on the highest notes, parts almost impossible to render with any true vocal effect. Vocalists have asked the composer, "For what voice is this written?" He answers, "Well, I do not mean exactly any particular kind of voice; it is for a kind of baritone or mezzo-soprano." What a confused idea of the capabilities of the different voices!

Some two years before his death, I begged the great Brahms to write some songs specially for a tenor voice. I told him I found his lovely songs too low. He said, "Transpose them higher, for I like them to be transposed according to the voice." "But," I said, "if I put them up, then there are notes which will be too high, for the tenor voice is only good between the two A flats. Your songs are too extensive in compass." "Ya, ya!" he said, "that is what my friend Walther, the tenor, tells me." What a loss to singers it is, then, that the beautiful songs of Brahms, as well as those of other great composers, were not written for some particular voice, like the music of the Italian composers.

The question suggests itself, Why do not composers study singing before writing for the voice, just as they must study the pianoforte or the violin before writing a concerto for these instruments? It is well known how much Mendelssohn was indebted to his friend David for the excellence of his violin part in the *Concerto*, one of the most graceful works ever written for any instrument. Brahms, too, sought the assistance of Joachim when engaged in composing his violin *Concerto*.

In the olden times, singers were frequently composers and composers were singing-masters. Furthermore, Handel and Mozart both went to Italy and studied singing, and associated with singers. I believe the time is fast coming

when there shall spring up composers who will study singing and singers, and find the *legato* style of singing—the long, expressive notes, the invocation and all the charms of a classic school as worthy of their attention as the piano-forte, violin, and other instruments. There exist the same splendid voices now as ever, and the same poetic imagination. There are already signs everywhere that an inquiry is being made relative to singing and singers, which augurs well for the art.

The more the subject is discussed, the better. Such discussions cannot fail to be the means of bringing together the composer, the singer, and the singing-master, and it is only by the constant association of these three that we shall realize the great object on which the hopes of all of us are set, namely, great works of art that shall open to us new fields of beauty through the medium of the only instrument that is at once human and divine.

## SPECIAL REFERENCE WORKS RELATING TO MUSIC

- AMBROS, Geschichte der Musik.  
 APTHORP, Musicians, Music-Lovers and Other Essays.  
 BEAUQUIER, Philosophie de la Musique.  
 BITTER, Geschichte des Oratoriums.  
 BRENDL, Geschichte der Musik.  
 BROOKS, Olden Time Music.  
 BUEL, The Great Operas. 10 Vols.  
 BURNEY, History of Music.  
 CHAMPLAIN, Cyclopædia of Music.  
 CHAPIN, Masters of Music.  
 CLEMENT, Historie de la Musique.  
 CROWEST, The Story of Music.  
 DICKINSON, Guide to the Study of Music-History.  
 DOLE, Famous Composers.  
 EDWARDS, The Prima Donna—Her History in the Seventeenth,  
     Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.  
 ELSON (A.), Modern Composers of Music.  
     Woman's Work in Music.  
 ELSON (L. C.), National Music of America.  
     Great Composers and Their Work.  
 EMERSON, Oration on Music.  
 ENGEL, The Literature of National Music.  
 FAY, Music Study in Germany.  
 FETIS, Biographie des Musiciens.  
     La Musique mise à la portée de tout le monde.  
 FINK, Wesen und Geschichte der Oper.  
 FORKEL, Augemeine Geschichte der Musik.  
 FULLER-MAITLAND, English Music of the Nineteenth Century.  
 GRAF, Die Musik in Zeitalter der Renaissance.  
 GREY, Studies in Music.  
 GROVE, Dictionary of Music and Musicians.  
 GUERBER, Stories of Famous Operas.  
 HADOW, Studies in Modern Music.  
     Oxford History of Music.  
 HART, The Violin and its Music.  
 HAWKINS, General History of Science.—Music.  
 HENDERSON, How Music Developed.  
     The Story of Music.  
 HOGARTH, Memoirs of the Opera.  
 HUGHES, Contemporary American Composers.  
 HULLAH, Modern Music.

- HUNT, Concise History of Music.
- HUTCHINSON, The Music of the Bible.
- KELLER, Illustrierte Geschichte der Musik.
- KIESEWETTER, Geschichte der Europäischen Musik.
- KILBURN, The Story of Chamber Music.
- KREHBIEL, Bibliography of Music.  
How to Listen to Music.
- LANGHANS, History of Music.
- LAVIGNAC, Music and Musicians.
- LAVOIX, Histoire de la Musique.
- LEGGE, Music in the Nineteenth Century.
- MACFARREN, Musical History Briefly Narrated.
- MARETZEK, Crotchets and Quavers.  
Sharps and Flats.
- MARSILLAC, Histoire de la Musique Moderne.
- MASON, From Grieg to Brahms.
- MATTHEW, The Literature of Music.
- MATTHEWS, Hundred Years of Music in America.
- MAZZINI, Philosophy of Music.
- MERIAN, Illustrierte Geschichte der Musik im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert.
- MOORE, Cyclopædia of Music.
- NAUMANN, History of Music.
- NOHL, Allgemeine Musikgeschichte.
- OUSELEY, Treatise on Harmony.
- PARRY, Evolution of the Art of Music.  
Music of the Seventeenth Century (*in Oxford History of Music*).
- PERKINS, History of the Handel and Haydn Society.
- REISSMANN, Das Deutsche Lied in seiner Historischen Entwicklung.  
Geschichte der Musik seit Beethoven.  
Handbuch der Musikgeschichte.
- RITTER, Music in America.  
Music in England.
- ROCKSTRO, General History of Music.
- ROWBOTHAM, History of Music.
- SCHLETTERER, Das Deutsche Singspiel.  
Studien zur Geschichte der Französischen Musik.
- SHARP, History of Music in the Nineteenth Century.
- STRAUSS, Die Musik.
- VIARDOT, Histoire de la Musique.
- WAGNER (R.), Opera and Drama.
- WEINGARTNER, The Symphony since Beethoven.
- WILLEBY, Masters of English Music.
- WILLIAMS, The Story of Notation.  
The Story of Organ Music.

## THE IDEA OF LAW IN POETRY<sup>1</sup>

BY WILLIAM J. COURTHOPE

[WILLIAM JOHN COURTHOPE, Professor of Poetry, University of Oxford, 1895-1901; b. 1842; educated at Harrow and New College, Oxford, Litt.D., Durham, 1895; LL.D. Edinburgh, 1898. AUTHOR OF *Life of Addison* (Men of Letters series); *History of English Poetry*; *Life in Poetry*, *Law in Taste*. EDITOR OF the *Standard Edition of Pope* (including a life of Pope from his pen).]

FINE art is the imitation, by the poets, painters, sculptors, and musicians of any people, of the idea of the Universal in Nature. This idea springs out of the character of the race, the course of its history, the common perceptions of its men of genius. As the life of a nation develops, the practice of its various artists instinctively falls in with the growth of society, advances with it to maturity, and languishes in its decline. Sometimes, as in ancient Greece, the history of art seems to manifest itself with almost as much certainty and regularity as the life of a flower, or a tree, or a human body. The Greek poet discovered by a kind of spontaneous instinct how to express the idea of greatness in his race in the divine simplicity of hexameter verse; the Greek musician learned at a very early stage how to imitate human passions in dance and song. With the remarkable development of civic life that followed the Persian invasion the Greek architect and sculptor co-operated to embody in marble the loftiest ideas of religion. Instinctively, in the same age, the dramatist combined, from the epic minstrelsy and the religious hymn, a mode of imitation fitted to express the profounder ideas of society about life and nature. With rare and delicate taste, Æschylus and his two great successors made the drama, in its progressive development, a mirror for all the changes of moral

<sup>1</sup> Lecture delivered originally in Oxford, presented here to supplement the lectures originally prepared for the International Congress of Arts and Science.

and religious feeling that transformed the Athenian mind between the battle of Marathon and the Sicilian Expedition. And when, after the battle of Chæronea, the Greek enthusiasm for liberty and the old Hellenic belief in the gods died away together, the loss of imaginative energy in society reflected itself in the purely prosaic imitation of the New Comedy. In all directions the law of Greek art was embodied in the works of great artists, and Aristotle's best criticism in the *Poetics* is not new legislation, but the declaration of the law of Nature already existing in art.

Had it been the destiny of Aristotle to declare the æsthetic law of any modern European nation, his task would have been far more difficult. In no Christian society has the artist shown the same spontaneous faculty for imitating Nature as in Greece. Many obstacles stand between Nature and the imagination of the modern artist. To begin with, he has been cut off from the fountain head of his primæval instincts by the conversion of his ancestors to Christianity. Moreover, the nation in modern Europe is not constituted simply, as in the small Greek states, but is vast and complex, composed of antagonistic classes, each with its own perceptions and ideals, which often baffle the attempt of the artist to divine the ideas common to the whole society. Lastly, the modern imagination and judgment are bewildered by the presence of surviving models of Hellenic art, which constantly oppose themselves to the ideas derived from Christian education. Nevertheless, a historic examination of art will hardly leave room for doubt that the varieties of ideal imitation in the different countries of Europe have been as much the product of national character as was the case in the City States of Greece; and I propose in this lecture to illustrate, as clearly as I can in the time at my disposal, how national forces have combined to give a dominant bias to the genius of French poetry.

Experience shows how closely the master qualities of the French character still correspond with Cæsar's description of them. The assimilation of Visigothic and Frankish elements have not materially altered in the Gaul either the brilliant and fickle temperament, vividly colored by transient emotions, the rapid logical perception of things, or the sense of artistic form and proportion common to all races that have felt the influence of the Latin mind. As this national character expands in the course of French history, there passes before the imagination a long drama of something like civil war between two mutually irreconcilable factions—the bourgeoisie and the feudal aristocracy. The landmarks of the struggle stand forth prominently; the long agonizing conflict of the early ages between the Crown, as the representative of civil law and order, and the great vassals, as the representatives of feudal privilege; the victory of the Crown, allied with the bourgeoisie, under Louis XI., the religious wars between Catholics and Huguenots; the accession of Henry IV. and the elimination of the Huguenots as a political power; the wars of the Fronde and the annihilation of the political power of the feudal aristocracy; the absorption of all the powers of the State by the Crown in the reign of Louis XIV.; the decay of the Monarchy in the eighteenth century; the French Revolution.

As illustrating the working of the Law of National Character in literature, nothing can be more remarkable than the vivid reflection of this course of political development in the various stages of French poetry. There in the very infancy of society, may be observed the trenchant antithesis between the genius of the two opposing classes in the contrasted styles of the Provençal lyric and the *fabliau* of the Trouvère; the one the poetical vehicle of the inhabitants of the Castle, the other of the inhabitants of the town. We

see the two types brought into deliberately satiric contrast in the famous *Romance of the Rose*, in the latter part of which the bourgeois John de Meung mocks at the ideals of his chivalric predecessor William de Lorris. The alliance between the Court and the bourgeoisie is symbolized in the poems of Marot, who set himself to refine the character of the old French poetry to suit the more fastidious taste of Francis I. On the other hand, the poetry of Ronsard, the representative, with the Pleiad, of the party of the aristocracy, reflects in a new form the old tendency of the castled nobility to mark out for themselves a manner of conception and expression sharply separated from that of the vulgar. Ronsard's movement, in spite of his real genius, is seen from the first to be against the inevitable tendency of things, and is therefore doomed to failure; and in the same way D'Aubigné Huguenot ideals, unable to make head against the Catholic tendency in the French nation, find utterance, like a lonely "Vox Clamantis," in the lofty strains of *Les Tragiques*. Henry IV. ascends the throne; and with Malherbe as the dictator of poetical taste, the victory of the Monarchical over the feudal principle in French politics, the victory of reason over imagination in French poetry, is practically decided.

If, turning from this general historic view, we ask how these two parties respectively manifested their character in French literature, it is clear, in the first place, that the qualities in the French nation which the aristocracy communicated to the language were of the feminine order, both in their virtue and their defect. How remarkable is the long array of brilliant women who have left a name in French literature—the Countess of Champagne, Christine de Pisan, the Marquise de Rambouillet, Madame du Sablé, Madame de Sévigné! How powerful an influence on the course of refined taste was exercised by the Cours d'Amour,



the Hôtel Rambouillet, the Salons of the Précieuses! From the noble ladies of France, and the men who, according to the laws of chivalry, declared themselves their servants, the French idiom acquired that exquisite vein of irony and innuendo which made French conversation for so long the standard of manners in European society, and French prose the finest instrument of criticism, letter-writing, and diplomacy. But the masculine qualities of imagination are conspicuous by their absence. What the French aristocracy wanted in their literary style was substance, sincerity, a sense of the reality of things. Weigh the names of their representative men, Charles of Orleans, Ronsard, Voiture, Chapelain, St. Amant, against such names as Rabelais, La Fontaine, Molière, and Voltaire, representatives of the bourgeoisie; observe the triviality of matter in the lyrics of the Troubadours, in the poetry written for the Hôtel Rambouillet, in the romance of the Grand Cyrus; and you will see the defeat of the French aristocracy in the conflict of History explained in the conflict of Ideas.

The bourgeois element in French poetry is of an evidently opposite kind. It has none of the romance, delicacy, or spiritual imagination, which distinguish the work of the chivalric party; its qualities are, above all, good sense, shrewd observation, keen logic, a penetrating appreciation of hypocrisy and unreality, an unerring sense of the ridiculous, an Epicurean enjoyment of life. Deprive this bourgeois genius of its native tendency to vulgarity, by putting it under the patronage of the Court, give it subjects for imitation suitable to its knowledge and powers, find it an instrument of expression analogous to its favorite *fabliau*, and the flower of the French imagination will in time unfold itself in the Comedies of Molière and the Fables of La Fontaine. It is in the works of these two writers, perhaps above all others, that we may observe the operation of what

it is not improper to call the idea of Natural Law in French Poetry.

Molière has been severely censured by the more austere critics of France as a careless and slovenly writer. He is blamed for want of polish in his style, for his incorrect selection of metaphors, for his audacious plagiarisms; and all these reproaches he has to some extent justly incurred. But his defects are almost the inevitable accompaniment of his splendid qualities as a comic creator. Molière imitated the ridiculous in Nature wherever he found it. When he thought that Spanish or Italian phrases, or the vulgarisms of French idiom, were expressive of character, he used them without any regard to the delicate nerves of the French Academy. With as little hesitation he drew on the inventions of the classic and Italian dramatists or the *fabliaux* of Boccaccio, if they furnished him with convenient plots for framing his observation of what was deserving of ridicule in his own society. But all his creations are eminently original. Nowhere else than in France could such universal types of human nature as M. Jourdain Tarrtuff, and Alceste have been conceived and embodied. No one but Molière could have observed with such nice precision, and have expressed in dialogue so sparkling and lifelike, the essence of absurdity in the manners of *Les Précieuses* or *Les Femmes Savantes*. As a mirror for such universal truths of Nature the refined literary language of the Academy, and the conventional standard of manners in the Hôtel Rambouillet, were equally inadequate. Molière in his Comedies doubtless leans to farce; but he does so because the old popular French farces furnished him with the ideal atmosphere required to give poetical truth to the observed realities of Nature. Nor do his bourgeois instincts carry him into excess. His seemingly buffon extravagance of conception and spontaneous

exuberance of expression were kept within due limits by the sense that his plays were to be performed before the most fastidious of monarchs, who would never have tolerated the exhibition of vulgarity beyond what was necessary for the purposes of art. Hence, in spite of its negligence, the composition and language of Molière are in the highest sense well-bred, harmonious, and classic.

Exactly analogous to the dramatic practice of Molière is the literary practice of La Fontaine, except that, as the poems of the latter were intended to be read, no one has ever blamed him for incorrectness of style. La Fontaine makes no more effort than Molière to raise himself into a consciously ideal atmosphere. He cares no more than Molière did for the praise of absolute originality; his fables, like the plots of Molière, are borrowed from the inventions of predecessors, fabulists such as Phædrus, Babrius, Horace, and a hundred others. But through all this borrowing and adaptation, the unmistakable character of the old French *fabliau*, and the individuality of La Fontaine, make themselves felt. His verses breathe the easy Epicurean air characteristic of his class. His peasants and citizens are types of the men and women whom he saw in the farms and markets; his beasts use the average human language of prudence and good sense. In the flow of his verse we listen to the natural idiom of the conversation of his time. Nevertheless, the ideal atmosphere, required for the imitation of the Universal, is never absent from his creations, and knowing as he did that he was writing for refined society, his poetry, with all its apparent ease, is in reality the result of the most careful selection of words and harmonies.

The dominant bias of French taste, however, discloses itself not merely in works in which the artist is felt to be dealing with materials akin to his own nature, but in the abstract reasoning by which men of genius have endeavored

to regulate practice in the higher spheres of poetic invention. For example, the French idea of law in art is strikingly exhibited in the approved rules of composition for the tragic drama. Unlike the dramas of Athens and of England, the tradition of the theatre in France is not of popular origin, but is the late creation of a few great poets, accommodating their practice to the taste of comparatively refined audiences. There was, indeed, a time when the itinerant stage of the Middle Ages found a welcome among the French, as among the English people, but these exhibitions had so dwindled during the miserable period of the Hundred Years' War, that, at the close of the sixteenth century, one company of actors, in the Hôtel Bourgoyne, was sufficient to satisfy the dramatic requirements of the whole country. When the taste for the stage began to revive the poet was free to invent for himself, and he naturally turned for his models to the tragedies of Seneca, never meant for acting, in which an abstract situation is worked out by means of rhetorical harangues and sharply pointed dialogue. The form thus adopted proved so acceptable to French taste, that, in spite of the efforts of Voltaire and Diderot, it kept possession of the stage for nearly 200 years.

Having thus grounded the practice of the drama on the authority of Seneca, the French poets proceeded to regulate it by the supposed theory of Aristotle. Corneille was the first to define the law of the stage in his *Discourse on the Three Unities of Action, Time, and Place*. He assumed that the external form of the Greek drama was something immutable; that Aristotle had defined its changeless rules in the *Poetics*; and that these rules had been faithfully observed in his own tragedies. Now the only unity on which Aristotle really insists is Unity of Action; and in his *Discourse* Corneille plainly shows that he does not know what Aristotle meant by Unity of Action. Unity of Action in

the *Poetics* means simply the representation on the stage of a fictitious story, with a proportioned beginning, middle, and end, involving a display of human passion, character, and misfortune, in such a form as to appear probable and lifelike to the spectators.

Shakespeare and the Greek poets perfectly understood the working of this fundamental law. So vividly does Shakespeare conceive his ideal situations as a whole, that he even realizes in his imagination the state of the climate and temperature, as when Hamlet says to Horatio: "The air bites shrewdly; it is very cold;" or when Duncan praises the amenity of Macbeth's Castle:

This guest of summer,  
The temple-haunting martlet, does approve  
By his loved mansionary, that the heaven's breath  
Smells wooingly here: no jutty, frieze,  
Buttress, nor coign of vantage, but this bird  
Hath made his pendent bed and procreant cradle:  
Where they most breed and haunt, I have observed,  
The air is delicate.

So again, in *As You Like It*, when Oliver asks the way to Rosalind's cottage, with what particular details the poet brings the scene before us!—

Good morrow, fair ones: pray you, if you know,  
Where in the purlieus of this forest stands  
A sheep-cote fenced about with olive trees?

To which Celia replies:

West of this place, down in the neighbour bottom:  
The rank of osiers by the murmuring stream  
Left on your right hand brings you to the place.

The fact is, that both the Greek and English dramatists were the natural successors of the minstrels—the former of Homer and the cyclic poets, the latter of the mediæval *trouvères*—and their imaginations were accustomed to live in the ideal action of the story-tellers. Now for a story in itself

Corneille cared nothing. What he meant by unity of action was the unity of abstract idea in a drama. He understood very well the nature of the stage effects required to produce emotion in an audience; and he constructed his plays logically and scientifically with a view to securing these effects. I imagine that the way in which he composed a tragedy was something like this: First, he searched for a situation in which he might exhibit a conflict between the will and the passions; then, when he had found the subject, he filled in the situation with the characters, and determined their relations to each other in successive scenes; after that, he thought out the emotions and sentiments proper to each scene; lastly, he colored the whole of the dialogue with impassioned rhetoric and epigrammatic points.

Composing on this principle, Corneille was able to exclude from the structure of his drama every external that was not necessary to the evolution of his abstract idea, but he was far from attaining unity of action. He strove to imitate, as far as possible, the outward form of Greek tragedy, and took note of Aristotle's saying, that it is not necessary to represent on the stage the whole of a recorded action. But he did not observe that the reason of this was that, in the Athenian theatre, the audience were all familiar with the whole story represented, and so were able to supply from their imagination the necessary gaps in the action. But this is not the case in *The Cid*. Corneille, in this play, merely selects from the story of the Spanish hero such episodes as he deemed necessary for the treatment of his own idea. We are plunged at the opening of the play *in medias res*. We do not know, except from the table of *dramatis personae*, who Don Rodrigue and Chiemène are; Don Diegue and Don Gomes are, or what were the events which led to the quarrel causing the complication of the

whole drama. The dramatic situation resembles a chess-board after the game has been developed according to one of the conventional openings. The love of Rodrigue for Chimène is held in check by Rodrigue's filial obligation to avenge the insult offered to *his* father; the love of Chimène for Rodrigue is checked by the duty imposed on her to avenge the death of *her* father; the dramatic interest depends on the solution of the psychological puzzle.

It is extremely interesting and instructive to observe how carefully Corneille applies the Law of the Three Unities to a tragedy thought out on this completely abstract principle. He wished to make the play appear logical to the audience *on the stage*; he did not care about making it appear real to *the universal imagination*. Accordingly, he pleads apologetically, in his *Discourse on the Three Unities*, that he has not departed from the rule of Unity of Place further than he was absolutely obliged by the nature of his subject. And as to the Unity of Time, since the action of the play is restricted by the supposed law to twenty-four hours, the dramatist is obliged by the course of events to make Don Rodrigue first kill Don Gomes, then conquer the Moors, then come back to fight a second duel with Don Sanche; and that he may do all this within the prescribed time limits, his father, Don Diegue, opposes the desire of the king to give *The Cid* an interval for rest and refreshment, observing that it is nothing for a man of his son's heroic valor to come from a battle to a duel without making a pause!

And yet, though Corneille is so anxious to satisfy the demands of a dramatic law which has no existence in truth or nature, he sees no improbability in representing Chimène making long speeches to her lady-in-waiting in order to show the audience the state of her mind in the struggle between her inclination and her duty; no improbability in bringing Don Rodrigue to his mistress, after he has killed

her father, to entreat her to plunge the same sword into his own heart; no improbability in causing the king to decide that Chimène's plea for vengeance against the man who has killed her father shall be satisfied by a duel between Rodrigue and Chimène's selected champion, the prize of victory being the hand of Chimène herself; no improbability in leading us to suppose, at the close of the play, that Chimène marries her father's slayer and lives happily for ever after! Such improbabilities could never have been conceived by any poet who understood the meaning of Aristotle's principle of Unity of Action in the imitation of Nature; but they proved no obstacle to the appreciation of the tragedy by an audience which accepted the artificial hypothesis with which the poet started, and mainly desired to have their own love of antithesis and rhetoric satisfied in a dramatic form of representation.

Far be it from me, as an Englishman, to speak with disrespect of the great dramatists of France. Viewed in their relation to the taste of French society, plays like *Horace*, *Cinna*, *Phèdre*, and *Athalie* seem to be marvels of dramatic skill and invention. My argument is that a society like that of France was incapable of conceiving tragic action like that found in the plays of Æschylus and Shakespeare. The action of the poetic drama in Greece and England was a reflection of widespread popular energy, of freedom of thought, speech, and deed, of national greatness and patriotism exalted by an inward sense of power and by the defeat of such foreign enemies as Xerxes and Philip II. No such inspiring air of liberty stirred the imagination of France in the seventeenth century. With what feelings would Louis XIV., retaining in his memory his youthful experiences of the Frondist wars, have witnessed on the stage the sufferings of legitimate kings, deprived, as in *Richard II.* and *Macbeth*, of their thrones and lives by the usurpation



of ambitious subjects? How would his monarchical pride have revolted against such a spectacle as King Lear, stripped of his last shred of authority, the sport of the elements, the companion in adversity of fools and madmen! What would the Jesuits have said to the daring doubts and speculations of Hamlet's conscience? Absolutism and centralization called for another order of dramatic exhibition in France. Driven from her free range in external Nature, the Muse of Tragedy retired into the recesses of the human soul, whose inner conflicts she might represent without rousing the political suspicion of king or cardinal. Yet even here she was haunted by the phantoms of her own self-consciousness. The overpowering sense of the authority of Aristotle, the anticipation of the verdict of the associated critics of the Academy, the oppressive idea of a dramatic standard formed by ancient models of unrivalled excellence, all these influences co-operated to make the French dramatist voluntarily fetter himself in his imitation of nature. The Law of the Three Unities is an illustration of the tendency in the French character, as developed by the history of France, to repress the liberties of imagination by the analysis of Logic.

As the French law of the stage is defined by Corneille in his *Discourse on the Unities*, so the law of French literary taste is expounded by Boileau in the *Art Poétique*. Critics are apt to undervalue poems of the class of Horace's *Ars Poetica* and Pope's *Essay on Criticism*, because they regard them as abstract treatises on taste, containing cold and commonplace maxims of composition; whereas their real interest and importance lie in the fact that they are declarations of law by a victorious literary party. The *Ars Poetica* and the *Epistle to Augustus* were manifestoes of the Hellenising party in Roman literature, directed against those who favored the rude facility of poets like Lucilius

and Plautus. The *Essay on Criticism* is an argument in verse against the taste represented by the metaphysical Poets of the seventeenth century in England. More suggestive than either of these poems, because more relentless and uncompromising, the *Art Poétique* stands out prominently as the final declaration of Law, by the literary representatives of the French bourgeoisie, in alliance with the Crown on the one hand, and with the Classical Humanists on the other, against the aristocratic literary party represented in the coteries of the *Précieuses*. The artistic value of the apparently abstract rules formulated in the poem consists in their oblique way of reflecting on the practice of the Seudèrys, St. Amant and Pradon. The *Art Poétique* is the formulated expression of the law of French poetry, first recognized nearly a century before in the verses of Malherbe, whose praises Boileau so enthusiastically sounds. "Lastly," he says, "came Malherbe, the first in France to give an example of just cadence in verse, to show the power of a word in its right place, and to restrict the Muse to the laws of duty. Restored by this wise writer, our language no longer offered any rude shock to the refined ear. Stanzas learned how to close gracefully; one verse no longer ventured to overlap another. Everything approves the justice of his laws, and this faithful guide still serves as a model to the authors of our time. Walk in his steps; love his purity; imitate the clearness of his happy style."

What, then, was the ideal which Boileau, by his reasoning and illustrations, set before the French poet? The expression of Truth, Reason, Logic. The aim was not wanting in life and vigor. Genius, says the critic, at the opening of the *Art Poétique*, is indispensable, but the medium in which genius must work is good sense. "Tout doit tendre au bon sens." And again, "Good sense must prevail even in song." Hardly so deeply laid as the foun-

dation of Horace, "Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons," the rule implies that the standard of the correct imitation of nature is the lucid perception and logic of the bourgeois mind, aided by the refined manners of the court. "Étudiez la cour, connaissez-vous la ville." Above all, whatever subject is chosen, the poet must go to its essence, and not be satisfied till he has found the exact and perfect form of words required for the expression of the thought. Not a word about Beauty, Liberty, Imagination, Fancy. In every phrase we hear the voice of the stern proscriber, the Sulla of poetry, on the watch to put on the list for massacre some dangerous partisan of the Hôtel Rambouillet, who has managed to escape critical notice.

Boileau was well aware that Poetry could not dispense with the aristocratic element in language; and being at war with the principle favored by the social aristocracy, he sought to fill the void in his critical system by allying himself with the literary aristocracy of the Renaissance, and exalting the authority of the Greek and Roman classics. The principle was excellent so long as it meant no more than self-criticism by the highest standard of antiquity. But Boileau was almost inevitably carried into error by his logic. He regarded all the types of verse composition met with in the history of French literature as immutable moulds of thought; and he fancied that the classic propriety of each could be determined by settled rules. "Every poem," he says, "shines with its proper beauty. The rondeau, Gallic by birth, has the artlessness of nature, the ballad, strictly subject to its old maxims, often owes a lustre to the caprice of its rhymes. The madrigal, more simple and more noble in its style, breathes gentleness, tenderness, and love." Thus, in opposition to his own and Horace's teaching, that the form of poetry must necessarily adapt itself to the thought, he speaks as if poetry lay in

stereotyped forms of versification. In spite of his foundation of sound reasoning, he came insensibly to identify the imitation of Nature, under the guidance of good sense, with the mere external imitation of Greek and Roman poets.

Two examples will show the inconsistencies into which his logic betrayed him. Among the various types of poetry which he found himself obliged to define was the *Eclogue*. According to the dictates of good sense this form of poem must, he says, avoid the two extremes of pompous elevation on the one hand, and of rustic meanness on the other. An easy abstract rule; but what does it practically mean? "Between these two excesses," says Boileau, "the path is difficult. In order to find it, follow Theocritus and Virgil. Let their feeling compositions, dictated by the Graces, never quit your hands; turn them over by night and day. They alone in their learned verse will be able to teach you by what art an author may without meanness lower his style; how to sing of Flora and the fields, of Pomona and the woods; how to animate two shepherds to contend on the flute, to celebrate the allurements of love's pleasures; to transform Narcissus into a flower; to cover Daphne with bark; and by what art at times the *eclogue* invests the country and the woods with consular dignity." Would a poet who in Louis XIV.'s time acted obediently on these instructions have been imitating Nature according to the law of Good Sense?

Again, Boileau found himself much perplexed how to apply the principle of Good Sense to his idea of an epic poem. The epic, he says, sustains itself by faith and lives by fiction; therefore you cannot dispense in a poem of this kind with the machinery of pagan mythology. Hence it is impossible to write a Christian epic. "In vain," he says, alluding to the attempts in this direction of poets in the

anti-classic camp; "in vain do our deluded authors, banishing from their verse these traditional ornaments, strive to make God, the saints, and the prophets act like the deities sprung out of the poet's imagination, take the reader into Hell at every step, and introduce him to Ashtaroth, Beelzebub, and Lucifer alone. The awful mysteries of the Christian faith are incapable of gay and brilliant ornament. On every side the Gospel presents to the mind the spectacle only of Repentance and Judgment, and the inexcusable mixture of fiction gives to its truths an air of fable. What an object to offer to the eye, the devil blaspheming against heaven—the devil, whose aim it is to abase the glory of your Hero, and who often disputes the victory with God!"

True enough in its application to the feeble invention of Scudéry and his companions, a criticism like this only proves that the French were incapable of producing a great epic poem. It does not prove that there was anything fundamentally wrong in the conception of *Paradise Lost*. And the same rigid restrictive logic characterizes all Boileau's devices with regard to diction and versification—the exclusive use of the Alexandrine, the cæsura always in the middle of the line, the avoidance of the *hiatus* and the "enjambement," the choice of words to harmonize exactly with the movement of the rhythm,—all which are only the final declaration by the Academic dictator of the laws first promulgated by Malherbe. For the time the victory of Boileau and the ideas of the cultivated bourgeoisie over the party of mediæval Romance was complete. Nor was it a mere transient fashion of taste. For about one hundred and fifty years the Law of Classicism, as defined in the *Art Poétique*, exerted an irresistible authority. In spite alike of the half-hearted efforts of Voltaire to enlarge the liberties of dramatic action, and of the experiments of Diderot in sentimental comedy, the classic style, founded

on the Law of the Three Unities, reigned supreme upon the French stage through the eighteenth century. But it was a party triumph, a Pyrrhic victory, won by the vigor of a certain element in society, and liable to be reversed when the class from which the movement sprang lost its vitality. Undermined by the growth of natural science, by the philosophy of the encyclopædists, and by the sentimentalism of Rousseau, the imposing structure of French classicism fell almost at the first discharge of artillery brought against it by the Romantic party after the restoration of the Bourbons.

It is not to be denied that it deserved its fate. But at the same time it would be well for us Englishmen to examine very carefully the true lesson to be learned from the triumph of French Romanticism. The Law of Classic Taste in France could not have remained paramount for so long a period; its authority could not have been instinctively recognized by so many great creative intellects, or so clearly defined by a succession of able critics, if it had not represented something real and positive in the constitution of the French character. And looking at the matter historically, when we see that the idea of the manner in which Nature ought to be imitated in Poetry, as expressed in the *Art Poétique*, is actually embodied in the poems of La Fontaine and Molière, and that the idea of the structure and versification proper to the drama is the same in the tragedies of Racine and Voltaire as in the criticisms of Boileau, then candid minds will allow that, however narrow may have been the sphere of imitation, and however restricted the perception of harmony, both adapted themselves to an irresistible tendency of things in the development of French society. The great error of the Romanticists was that they ignored the existence of this historic law. As a revolt in the sphere of art and imagina-

tion their movement was fully justified, and nothing would have been easier for them than to show that a law of taste which might have been suitable for the times of Louis XIV. was quite unsuitable for the times of Charles X.

What the Romanticists wanted, however, was not a revolt but a Revolution. The rules, distinctions, practices, and traditions, which had been the result of so much ingenious thought and labor were to be swept away, and Poetry was to find for herself a basis in first principles, supposed to be entirely modern. What were they? The manifesto of the victorious Romanticists is to be found in the Preface to Victor Hugo's *Cromwell*, which founds its reasoning on this colossal generalization: "To sum up the facts we have just observed, Poetry has three Ages, each of which corresponds with an epoch of society: Ode, Epic, Drama. Primitive times are lyric, ancient times are epic, modern times are dramatic. The Ode sings eternity; the Epic solemnizes history; the Drama paints life. The character of the first kind of poetry is *naïveté*; the character of the second simplicity; the character of the third truth. The rhapsodists mark the transition of the lyric poets to the epic poets, as the romance-writers from the epic poets to the dramatic poets. Historians arise in the second epoch; chroniclers and critics in the third. The personages of the Ode are Colossi: Adam, Cain, Noah; those of the Epic are giants: Achilles, Atreus, Orestes; those of the Drama are men: Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello. The Ode derives its life from the ideal, the Epic from the grandiose, the Drama from the real. In a word, this threefold Poetry springs from three great sources—the Bible, Homer, Shakespeare."

The upshot of this reasoning is, that the end of the modern or romantic drama is to paint real character, and Victor Hugo tells us very naïvely how this was done in the case of *Cromwell*. He had for a long time accepted the

portrait of the regicide, painted by Bossuet, as true to life; but, happening to come across an old document of the seventeenth century, he discovered that the portrait did not resemble the original. The idea must therefore be corrected, and the proper place for correcting it was the Drama. Accordingly he read a vast number of books, from which he generalized the character of the man and his times, chose a dramatic moment in the life of his hero which would enable him to exhibit his real motives to the reader, surrounded him with more than sixty other *dramatis personae*, and finally completed the portrait of the character in a play which extended itself to about 12,000 lines. It seems, indeed, to have struck Victor Hugo that there was something paradoxical in the fact that a composition founded on æsthetic principles, in an epoch of the world in which the drama was the natural vehicle of imaginative thought, could not possibly be acted, and he made a half promise that, at some future time, he would adapt *Cromwell* for the stage. I am not aware, however, that he ever reduced his ideas to practice.

But what Victor Hugo did not perceive was that, while he professed to be sweeping away all French dramatic tradition, while he imagined himself to be imitating Shakespeare, and to be creating in a spirit of unfettered liberty, he was showing a complete ignorance of the principle on which Shakespeare's plays are constructed, and was unconsciously following, though with a variation, the stage principles of his predecessors. As I have already said, Shakespeare's method of dramatic creations, like that of the Greeks, is to reduce what was originally a well-known epic story into such a form as will please the imagination of spectators in a theatre; the method of the French playwright is to analyze an idea in his own mind and then to reproduce it in a dramatic shape. It matters not that the idea which Hugo



analyzed was that of a single man's character, while that which Corneille analyzed was a psychological situation; that, in *The Cid*, the spectacle to be contemplated is a conflict between Love and Honor, and, in *Cromwell*, the conflict of motives in the mind of a regicide; in both cases the imaginative process is the same, the logical combination of abstract ideas; in both cases the artistic result is fundamentally the same, a play depending for its effect on rhetorical speeches and epigrammatic points. This is the method of Seneca, not the method of Shakespeare.

Examine, again, the motto of another great standard-bearer of Romanticism, Théophile Gautier. His principle, "Art for Art's sake," seems to promise the artist unlimited liberty in imitating Nature, provided he is possessed of adequate skill. When illustrated by Gautier's own practice, however, his maxim evidently implies a determination to identify the methods of poetry with the methods of painting. Gautier endeavored to imitate Nature in words, exactly in the same way as the painter imitated her in form and color. Now, in a lecture on "Poetical Decadence" I fully admitted that the art of poetry included an element analogous to the art of painting, as may be plainly seen in the descriptions and similes of great poets like Homer, Virgil, Milton, Spenser, and Ariosto. Nor do I deny that Gautier's poetry abounds in admirable pictorial *tours de force*, such as the humorous picture, in his *Émaux et Camées*, of Winter as an old violinist. "With red nose and pale face, and with a desk of icicles, he executes his theme in the quartet of the Seasons. He sings with an uncertain voice old-world quavering airs: his frozen foot warms itself while it marks the time. And like Handel, whose wig lost its powder when he shivered, he makes the white sprinkling of snow fly from the nape of his neck."

But to confine the function of poetry, as Gautier did, to

word-painting is surely, in the first place, to form a meagre conception of the art, and in the second place, this supposed invention of the Romanticists is really nothing more than an application of the old classic law of Boileau, that the poet is bound to find for his verse the word exactly corresponding with the image in his mind. Turn to the *Lutrin*, and Boileau's picture of the Treasurer of La Chapelle in bed will furnish you with a brilliant sample of the word-painting which was Gautier's whole poetical stock-in-trade. "In the dark retirement of a deep alcove is piled a costly feather-bed. Four pompous curtains in a double circle defend it from the light of day. There, amid the calm and peaceful silence, reigns over the swan-down a happy indolence, and there the prelate, fortified by breakfast, and sleeping a light sleep, waited for dinner. Youth in full flower beams in his countenance; his chin descends by two storeys on to his breast, and his body, thick-set in its short stature, makes the bed groan beneath its lazy weight."

Do not the instances I have given furnish in themselves an answer to the reasoning of the Romanticists? Had these children of the Revolution possessed real self-knowledge they would have perceived that their most successful work was conceived in accordance with the old classical law, and they would have aimed only at such an amplification of that law as would give free play to their own gifts and genius. Unfortunately they were animated by a spirit not of comprehension but exclusion. The party of the Romanticists had gained the upper hand, and they were determined to proscribe and massacre the party of the Classicists as ruthlessly as the Classicists of the seventeenth century had proscribed and massacred the party of the *Précieuses*. Romanticism under Louis XIV. and under Louis Philippe was equally the protest of a faction against the inevitable tendency of things; but in the one case it was

the struggle of a social caste against the principle of Absolutism, in the other of a literary coterie against the principle of Equality. Just as Mlle. de Rambouillet and her friends sought to separate themselves from the vulgar world by the nicety of their manners and language, so did Théophile Gautier and his followers seek to shock the instincts of the bourgeoisie by their red waist-coats and outrageous verses." "For us," says Gautier, in his account of the Romantic movement, "the world divided itself into 'Flamboyants' and 'Neutral Tints,' the one the object of our love, the other of our aversion. We wanted life, light, movement; audacity of thought and execution, a return to the fair period of the Renaissance and true antiquity; we rejected the tame coloring, the thin and dry design, the compositions resembling groups of dwarfs, that the Empire had bequeathed to the Restoration."

To the foreign critic it seems that, as in French politics the centralizing principle has overpowered local liberty, so in French art the native tendency is for logic to prevail over imagination. Whatever literary party has been dominant in the taste of French society has sought to establish its supremacy by imaginative Analysis. The result has been to develop in the art of our neighbors great beauty of abstract Form, a splendid capacity of lucid expression, but more and more to turn away the creative impulse of the artist from the imitation of universal ideas of life and action. In the rival theories and practice of the modern French Naturalists and Impressionists I seem to detect, under a changed form, the old party struggle between the Classicists and the Romanticists. In one direction I see the disciples of Gustave Flaubert, by a new application of the precepts of Boileau, employing all the resources of precise and artistic language to decorate the sordid commonplace of bourgeois life; in another, M. Ana-

tole France, as the successor of Renan, arresting the transient impressions of his own mind in a succession of delicate phrases, which would have been the delight of the Hôtel Rambouillet. But, in both directions, Analysis undermines the conscience with the suggestion of subjects and ideas which lie at the very foundation of the Family and the State.

Must these things be? Is it impossible for the French novelist to contemplate Man under any aspect except that which involves some relation to his neighbor's wife? impossible for him to transport the imagination into the world of ideal action? Perhaps it may be answered that all the energies of the nation are concentrated in Paris, where lies its brain, and that Analysis alone can penetrate to the principle of life underlying the wild excitement of the Parisian Bourse, the gossip of the Parisian journal, the intrigues of the Parisian drawing-room. But Paris is not France; the poetry of the people, its historic soul and character, lies elsewhere. Turn away from the dissolving scene of life in the capital, with its superficial reflection of vulgar materialism, to the bypaths of rural France, where Nature pursues her ancient round in the midst of silent labor and elemental pieties. Pause in imagination, for example, in the valley of the Loire, as that noble river flows peacefully amidst historic battle-grounds; through walled towns, where every stone seems to recall some national memory—Orleans, Tours, Angers; through fields in which, here and there, peasants may still be seen, as Millet saw them, listening with bent heads to the voice of the Angelus; under gray châteaux which, perhaps, no longer tenanted by the descendants of their former lords, look down, at fixed seasons, on popular festivals celebrated around them since the Middle Ages—will any man of taste and imagination, viewing scenes like these in the light not of romance

but of history, and thinking of all the movement and animation of the present in its relation to the past, venture to say that Molière and La Fontaine would have found nothing worthy of imitation in the France of this century? Would they not have been able to show us in an ideal form, though it were but in comedy, how much of the historic character of their country has survived the conflict of thirty generations; how many of the primæval springs of national life combine to preserve the unity of French society; to what extent the ancient religion is still a moving power in the hearts of the people? Let it be granted that it is no longer the drama or the poem, but the novel, which is the vehicle of imaginative expression. Yet the novel also can be made the mirror of the ideal imitation of Nature, and the novelist who is able to give a reflection of the true morals and manners of France in the classic language inherited from Pascal and Mme. de Sévigné, will command an European audience as wide and appreciative as in the days of Louis Quatorze.

## WORKS OF REFERENCE RELATIVE TO POETRY

ARISTOLLE, Poetics.

ARNOLD, Study of Poetry.

AUSTIN, Poetry of the Period.

BAUMGARTNER, Goethe and Schiller; Weimar's Glanzperiode.

BOILEAU, L'Art Poétique.

BOUTERWEK, Geschichte der Poesie, 12 Vols.

BORINSKI, Deutsche Poetik.

Die Poesie Der Renaissance in Deutschland.

BRAITMAYER, Geschichte der poetischen Theorie von den Diskursen  
der Maler bis Lessing.

BROWNING, Essays on the English Poets.

BURDON, Comparative Estimate of English Literature.

CAMPBELL, Lectures on Poetry.

CARRIERE, Das Wesen und die Formen der Poesie.

CLEVELAND, English Literature of the Nineteenth Century.

COOK, Art of Poetry.

CRAIK, Compendious History of English Literature.

COURTHOPE, History of English Poetry.

DOYLE, Lectures on Poetry.

DOWDEN, History of French Literature.

Studies in Literature.

New Studies in Literature.

The Modern Period in English Literature.

DRYDEN, Discourse on Satire and Epic Poetry.

EMERSON, Poetry and Criticism.

FAURIEL, History of Provençal Poetry.

GOSSE, History of English Literature in the Eighteenth Century.

GOTTSCHALL, Poetik, 2 Vols.

GRANGER, Index to Poetry and Recitations.

GUEST, History of English Rhythms.

GUMMER, Beginnings of Poetry.

HALLAM, Literary History of Europe, 4 Vols.

HAZLITT, On Poetry in General.

HIRSCH, Geschichte Der Deutschen Literatur.

HORACE, Art of Poetry.

HUNT, What is Poetry?

LECLERC AND RENAN, Historie Litteraire de la France au XIV. siècle,  
2 Vols.

- LEIXNER, Geschichte der Deutschen Litteratur.  
 LESSING, Laocoon.  
 LOISE, De l'influence de la Civilisation sur la Poésie.  
 LONGFELLOW, Poets and Poetry of Europe.  
     Defence of Poetry.  
 MAHAFFY, History of Classical Literature.  
 MASSON, Theories of Poetry.  
 MILL, Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties.  
 MOIR, Poetical Literature of the Past Half Century.  
 MONTGOMERY, Lectures on Poetry and General Literature.  
 MORELL, Biographical History of English Literature.  
 MORLEY, Writers Before Chaucer.  
     Chaucer to Dunbar.  
 NEWMAN, Lectures on Poetry.  
 NICHOL, American Literature.  
 NEELE, Lectures on English Poetry.  
 PEACOCK, The Four Ages of Poetry.  
 POSNET, Comparative Literature.  
 PROCTOR, English Poetry.  
 QUINET, De l' Histoire de la Poésie.  
 RAYMOND, Poetry as a Representative Art.  
 REED, Lectures on the British Poets, 2 Vols.  
 RENAN, La Poésie des Races Celtiques.  
 ROETTEKEN, Poetik.  
 ROSENKRANZ, Handbuch einer allgemeinen Geschichte der Poesie,  
     3 Vols.  
 SAINTSBURY, History of Nineteenth Century Literature.  
     History of Elizabethan Literature.  
     History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe,  
     3 Vols.  
     A Short History of English Literature.  
     A Short History of French Literature.  
     Minor Poets of the Caroline Period, 2 Vols.  
     Periods of European Literature, 8 Vols.  
 SAUER, Geschichte der Italienischen Litteratur.  
 SCHERR, History of English Literature.  
 SCHILLER, Ueber Naive and Sentimentalische Dichtung.  
 SCHLEGEL, Lectures on the History of Literature; Ancient and  
     Modern.  
 SELKIRK, Ethics and Aesthetics of Modern Poetry.  
 SHAIRP, Aspects of Poetry.  
 SISMONDI, Literature of the South of Europe.  
 STAEL-HOLSTEIN, Treatise on Ancient and Modern Literature, 2 Vols.

STEDMAN, Victorian Poets.

Nature and Elements of Poetry.

STEMPLINGER, Das Forteleben der Horazischen Lyrik seit der Renaissance.

SYDNEY, Apologie for Poetry.

SYMONDS, Studies of the Greek Poets.

TAINE, Histoire de la Littérature Anglaise.

TUCKERMAN, Thoughts on the Poets.

VIGIE-LECOCQ, La Poésie Contemporaine, 1884-1896.

WARTON, History of English Poetry. XI-XVIII Centuries.

WELSH, Development of English Literature.

YONGE, Three Centuries of English Literature.



# PROBLEMS OF THE STUDY OF MODERN PAINTING

BY RICHARD MUTHER

(Translated from the German by Dr. George Kriehn, New York)

[RICHARD MUTHER, Professor of History of Art, University of Breslau, since 1895. b. Ohrduff, Germany, February 25, 1860. Studied at Heidelberg and Leipzig. Privat-docent, University of Munich, 1883-95; Conservator of the Cabinet of Engravings, 1885-95. AUTHOR OF *Anton Graff*; *Gothic and Early Renaissance Illustrations of German Books*; *The History of Modern Painting*; *Geschichte der englischen Malerei*.]

OF the several works treating the painting of the century just passed which have recently appeared, we shall first consider the *Geschichte der modernen Malerei*, by Richard Muther (1893). This work for the first time attempted to give a general view of the entire activity in Europe during the nineteenth century. All painters were treated who had created works of real artistic value in France, England, Germany, Scandinavia, Italy, and Spain. If, in spite of such wealth of detail, the book has not quite solved the problem of presenting a clear picture of the artistic development of the century, this is to be attributed to the circumstance that it endeavored to unite incompatible things, and to be, at the same time, an historical and a controversial work. In the years in which it was written, modern art was fighting for its very existence. The author was enthusiastic and wished to take part in the struggle. The new ideals appeared to him so victorious, that a misguided enthusiasm for them led him to consider the earlier ideas more or less false. In reading the book one has the feeling of having climbed a high mountain, from which classicism, romanticism, and historical paint-

ing seemed gloomy ravines, through which it was necessary to pass in order to ascend. Only after reaching the summit one could breathe freely; for here all is bright, illumined by the rays of the sun of impressionism.

An artist defending his principles is, indeed, justified in such partiality, but not an historian. For he whose ideals we no longer accept is not, therefore, to be dismissed as antiquated and worthless. The actual is not necessarily the eternal, nor are present tendencies the only truth. Every artistic movement which has ever existed is justified within the bounds of the time of its existence, and, like other organisms, when its time has come, it will die a natural death. The historian should not battle for a cause, either as accuser or defender; his proper position is rather that of a mere recorder.

In this spirit Cornelius Gurlitt approached the great theme in his work, *Die deutsche Kunst des 19 Jahrhunderts* (1890). He never blames or condemns, but, effacing the personal element, he enters into the spirit of the past, not in order to glorify our present achievements, but to mete out justice to every sincere and inspired effort. For objectivity and impersonal appreciation, Gurlitt's history cannot be surpassed. If, notwithstanding, the reader, after the perusal of the book, has the feeling that the artistic development of the present is to-day less clear than that of the past, this must be ascribed to another reason. The author takes his phenomena as he finds them; and although he analyzes and weighs them, he never inquires after the causes. He neglects to examine the soil from which the art of every age springs, which after all is the first and most important thing in historical writing. For history is not a storehouse of accidental occurrences, but the result of inevitable laws which affect each other in all directions. The problem is to find the point of view which commands


1. The first  
2. The second  
3. The third  
4. The fourth  
5. The fifth  
6. The sixth  
7. The seventh  
8. The eighth  
9. The ninth  
10. The tenth

## A TRAGEDY IN THE HAREM

*Photogravure from a Painting by Pierre Louis Bouchard*

An uprising in a harem is not so rare that the polygamous chief can afford to ignore such a possibility; so, to intimidate the unfortunate inmates, he inflicts the most terrible punishments for violations of fidelity or attempt to escape. In the painting here shown the artist has pictured a terrible scene, in which an uprising of the enslaved wives is discovered by the concealed husband, who has summoned his mutes to seize the women, one of whom has fainted as the drawn drapery from an alcove reveals the presence of her cruel lord. The picture is full of action and Oriental richness, but almost terrifying in its illustration of customs that flourish in Mohammedan countries. This painting, which is one of Bouchard's masterpieces, has become famous in France as *Les Muets du Sérail*, and was originally exhibited in the *Salon* of 1887.





the whole stream or tendency, and from which its component parts may be arranged into comprehensive groups. As we rightly explain the works of Giotto, Botticelli, and Raphael from the time and circumstances under which they arose, we must also treat modern art as a natural problem, by deducing the character of its works and the changes of style from the historical changes in culture during the nineteenth century.

It will first be necessary to cast a glance at the eighteenth. For this love-crazed and blood-shedding, this trifling and fighting century is the mighty period in which the old world passed away, and the foundation was laid upon which we are to-day building. With what seven-league boots did the spirit of the age then sweep over the nations, and with what dreadful harshness did the opposing forces crash into each other! "Vive la joie!" Such was the device at the beginning of the eighteenth century. With what feverish joy the old aristocratic families of the *ancien régime* celebrated their rococo! The whole world seemed to have become an Isle of Cythera, where nothing of the sorrow of life could enter. But while the distinguished gentlemen and ladies, disguised as Pierrots and Columbines, celebrated their gallant shepherd masquerades, rough voices suddenly sounded in the midst of their cooing and whispering. Threatening symptoms announced that the long and beautiful day of the aristocratic order must end, and that the plebeian also demanded a seat at the table of pleasure. The great writers of all countries were the bold heralds of the battle. In proclaiming their thoughts of a new religious and social progress, they sowed the seed which ripened at the end of the century. In 1789 the die was cast, and the Revolution completed what literature had begun. "Après nous le déluge," so lightly expressed by the Marquise de Pompadour, became an awful truth.

Naturally the events which at that time shattered the old world into ruins also exercised a deep influence on art. Glancing for a moment at the days of the Renaissance, we find art supported in the main by two powers, the church and royalty. Raphael and Michelangelo, Correggio and Titian, Velasquez and Rubens,—they all created their most magnificent and monumental works either for the church or for the princes of their country. With the close of the eighteenth century these two powers ceased to be factors which determined the character of art. In Germany Kant wrote his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, showing that God, who, according to the teaching of the Bible, had created man, was in the light of philosophy a mere idea created by man. In France also the Almighty was dethroned, and the Goddess of Reason was raised in his place. The church thus lost the inspiring power which it formerly exercised upon art, and, although during the nineteenth century religious pictures were still painted, their very small number serves to show how far an age of investigation in the natural sciences has deserted the cycle of ideas in which human thought formerly moved. The close of the eighteenth century was no less fatal to the kingly power which ruled by divine right. A constitutional king no longer has the means to be a Maecenas in a grand style, as was Louis XIV., and even if he could command them, his commissions could be of no avail to art, because they would contradict the modern view of life. The painting of our own days can no longer permit itself to be made a herald of royalistic ideas.

Now it is a characteristic of art that it can only flourish upon the basis of a quiet, clarified culture. But this clarified culture of the past had been destroyed by the Revolution, and modern culture was still in a state of formation, so incomplete and full of contradictions that it could not yet



serve as a basis of a new art. Only when the spirit of an age has been clearly formed can art incorporate it in tangible form. Such was not yet the case at the beginning of the nineteenth century; and this explains what seems at first sight the remarkable circumstance, that painting, which had previously been an expression of its own epoch, now placed itself in opposition to this epoch. The eye of artists was fixed not upon their own time, but upon the past. They thought to produce better art by glorifying the beautiful culture of former centuries.

The painting of the first half of the nineteenth century was, therefore, in the main retrospective. At first the subjects were taken from the old Hellenic world, and later artists became absorbed in the fables and legends of the Middle Age. Then, in further course of the development, they proceeded to modern times, and there came a period of historical painting which found its chief aim in glorifying, in large paintings, rich in figures, the principles and political actions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The painters of *genre* and of landscape also accommodated themselves to this point of view; for the latter did not paint nature as it existed before their eyes, but sought rather, in a reconstructive manner, to revive the vision of the earth as it appeared in the days of ancient Hellas or of the Middle Ages. The *genre* painters did not exhibit the people of the present; rather, in their peaceful painting of peasants, they depicted an idyllic world, which, like an immovable piece of the past, had survived in modern life. Paintings were not conceived as representations of the present, but as hymns of praise of the good old times. The windows of the studios were hung with heavy curtains to avoid seeing anything of the ugly world without.

Yet events were gradually taking place which caused the artist, instead of lingering in the past, to turn his eyes

to the present, and to paint not only the world of long ago, but the world of his own day. The most important of these events were certainly the great changes in transportation which have taken place since the forties. Until that time the coach had lumbered heavily from village to village; now the steamship and the locomotive established rapid connection between the most distant parts of the earth. The world came under the influence of this traffic, and it would have been strange, indeed, if painters had not made use of the possibilities of travel thus made so easy. They took up the wanderer's staff and became globe-trotters, traversing in every direction the Orient, Scandinavia, and even America. In numerous *genre* paintings they recounted the manners and customs of strange people, and in numerous landscape pictures they exhibited the sights of the Universe,—

Wenn jemand eine Reise tut,  
So kann er was erzählen;

such is the content of these pictures.

While artists were thus wandering in distant countries in order to depict an exotic nature, there occurred contemporaneously another event which caused them to occupy themselves with what was going on in their own home and their immediate neighborhood. The great social problem of the nineteenth century arose after the revolution of 1789, which had been a struggle of the people against feudal despotism; the fruits of these struggles fell into the lap of the bourgeoisie. The federal knights had been followed by knights of fortune, and a chasm yawned between bourgeoisie and proletariat, between the possessors of property and the poor. The year 1848 passed like a threatening storm over Europe. When the workmen were fighting behind barricades, many of the painters felt the need of tak-

ing part in these struggles. Searching in the slums and tenements, they made their brush a weapon with which they entered the lists for the rights of the disinherited. "The lot of the poor is pitiful," such is the refrain that runs through their paintings. The fame of having been warm-hearted friends of mankind cannot be denied these artists. They proved that art cannot be joyful when life is serious, and they fought for noble aims with worthy intentions. Unfortunately, however, their paintings can no longer afford us a pure, æsthetic pleasure, because the intention is better than the execution. Occupied only with the thoughts they wished to express, all these tribunes of the people neglected beyond measure the purely technical side of their art.

With these tendencies we approach a difficult question, but one of great importance for the future development of modern painting. For what is true of these apostles of humanity is more or less true of all who wielded the brush in the first half of the nineteenth century. They were less painters than disguised *litterati*. The value of their paintings consisted more in what they studied than the manner in which they rendered it. It is easy to explain the literary spirit which at that time dominated painting. With the close of the eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie became the principal purchaser and the most important patron of art. In these circles purely æsthetic needs did not yet exist. They could only understand art in so far as it served culture, and therefore demanded of pictures the representation, in epic breadth, of interesting things which could be read from them. It was not thus in former centuries. During the rococo period men surrounded themselves with works of art only in order to enjoy their beauty. They knew that a picture could play upon the filaments of the soul through the noble language of line and the power

of color to awaken feelings akin to those caused by music. But in the nineteenth century this purely sensuous joy in the beautiful had to be awakened again. It had to be brought home to the general consciousness that painting was not an appendix of literary culture, but an independent art which ruled a mighty realm, that of beautiful form and beautiful color.

The painters of the succeeding generations felt the need of treading this path. They desired to show by their works that it was not the function of the artist to relate, amuse, or teach, but only to paint in the best manner possible. But how and where should they begin? Under the tutelage of the literary, the purely artistic taste had greatly suffered. The prerequisite of artistic production, therefore, was to refine this taste; and this could be best accomplished by seeking advice from the classic painters of the past. With the middle of the century, modern painting, accordingly, entered upon the second phase of its development. Artists began now to examine, technically and æsthetically, the works of classic painters, and sought to paint pictures which, in technical excellence, should not be inferior to theirs. This originated a systematic study of the colors used by the old masters.

These painters, also, may be classified in accordance with the models they chose. There were some who preferred the rugged and angular masters of the *quattrocento*; others who endeavored to acquire the light and shade of the Venetians of the sixteenth century; others, again, who became absorbed in the works of the little masters of Holland during the seventeenth century; and, finally, others who delighted in the bold brush-work and the dark tones of the Neapolitans of the baroque period. The result of these studies was an exceedingly important one. A whole generation of painters in all countries of Europe had made it a

lifework to discover the secret of color possessed by the old masters; and they consequently commanded in virtuoso fashion all the technical means of the past. All of their works are pleasing on account of their cultivated, distinguished beauty, reminding us of the old masters.

But was the goal actually reached when the power was gained to imitate the old masters to the extent of actual illusion? Had these old masters themselves been in their turn imitators, or is not the wealth of varied beauty created in former centuries to be explained rather by the circumstance that every artist dared to trust his own eye and his own feelings? This independence had not yet been attained by the moderns. There existed a contradiction between the modern subjects which they represented and the style of the old masters in which they represented them. Examining their paintings, we may well ask whether the movements of modern man are actually represented, or whether they are not a slavish repetition of the positions and gestures which are found in the old masters. Does the arrangement actually express the surging activity of modern life, or is not everything forced into a scheme of composition prescribed long ago? The color deserves a special attention. The old masters observed carefully the conditions of lights under which they labored. They painted their pictures in studios into which the light penetrated through small bull's-eye panes, and their paintings were destined partly for gloomy chapels in great churches, partly for narrow rooms paneled in brown wood, into which the light of heaven fell softly through stained glasses.

In the nineteenth century life has become brighter. Through large panes of glass the light streams full into our rooms. Furthermore, the great physical achievements of the nineteenth century have brought wonders of light before which an old master would have stood speechless.

When they, or even when our grandparents lived, there were only candles and oil lamps; to-day we have gas and electricity. It is magical to see the gas-lamps throwing their flickering rays through bluish twilight; to observe the light of electricity flood a salon and mingle with the soft rays of a lamp. From all these wonders of light of the new age, painters had heretofore kept fearfully at a distance. They labored in the regular transom light of their studios, and even softened this by means of curtains and draperies, in order that it might most nearly approach the conditions known to the old masters.

The succeeding generation of painting, therefore, saw itself confronted by three great problems. Whereas formerly modern men had received a pose studied from old painters and ancient statues, the problem now was to seize upon the movements of actual life. Whereas formerly the works had been composed in accordance with a rigid scheme, it was now proposed to present real life in a picture, without doing violence to it or forcing it into the narrow prison of traditional rules. Where formerly the dark color-schemes of the old masters had been projected upon subjects of modern life, it was now proposed to substitute for this "brown sauce" the fresh brightness of nature, and to record all the wonders of artificial light which the age of electricity and gas had produced.

From two sides the painters were strengthened in this tendency. In the first place, an event of great consequence occurred in the discovery of Velasquez, on the occasion of an exhibition of his work in private possession held at Paris in honor of the two hundredth anniversary of his death. While artists had until now been only familiar with the dark masters, they here made the acquaintance of a light one. For the tone of his pictures is not a brown, but a cool pearl gray. An old master, therefore, had al-

ready painted nature as they were now beginning to see her, and it is always important for new truths to find classical verification. Of no less importance was the influence of the art of Japan upon the course of the development of European painting. At the beginning of the sixties there had been a heavy importation into Europe of colored prints, the study of which acted like a revelation. Here, too, everything that painters sought was expressed in classical perfection. They marveled at the spirited and lively arrangement of leaves, in which all architectonic balance was lacking, but which, just because of this symmetry, had an effect as realistic as if nature itself had improvised them. They were impressed by the surety with which the Japanese seized upon the most rapid motion; things which the European had learned to see only by means of instantaneous photographs were here presented with boldest directness. Finally, they marveled at the color-effects. What fresh brightness, and at the same time what beauty of tone, was possessed by these magical prints; red and green trees, glowing lanterns, the yellow sickle of the moon, twinkling stars,—everything was represented, and nowhere a false note; everything held together by that wonderful harmony which had formerly been attempted by a false tuning to brown. Thus did Velasquez and the Japanese contribute to the origin of modern impressionism.

Freedom from the great dead have been thus won, an independent representation of entirely new impressions became the aims of painters. Especially did they try to solve all the problems of life which had formerly been so timidly avoided. After they had been so long painting in brown, they found the wonders of *plein air* so attractive that for several years only scenes in the open air were painted. Rays of sunlight which flutter blinkingly through the tree-tops, great green meadows bathed in sunlight, the glim-

mer of glowing air, the play of a spot of light on the water and on yellow sand—such were the most popular subjects. After they had learned to paint sunlight, other problems received their turn. They attempted to depict the foggy freshness of morning and the sultry vapor of the storm, the mysterious night scenes and gray twilight. Upon open air pictures followed others representing the movements of light indoors with a delicacy previously not thought of. Lastly came the wonders of artificial light, those phenomena which the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with its unheard-of improvements in the entire lighting system, has brought about. It may, indeed, be said that never before have light-effects of such subtlety been recorded in pictures.

And to-day? Well, every art suffers from the defects of its qualities. The impressionists had discovered air: for it they neglected line, since in atmosphere the outline disappears. They had discovered light: for it they had, in a certain sense, neglected color, since color is disintegrated by light, and the colored surface is dissolved into a conglomeration of differently colored luminous points. The impressionist delighted also in the most subtle nuances of tones dissolved in light; but in eliminating from their works all pregnant lines and all pronounced colors, they destroyed, in many respects, the decorative effect of their pictures, which, from a distance, often had the effect of indistinct violet and yellow chaos. And so towards the end of the century, another new problem appeared, how to progress from the purely artistic to the decorative.

Modern painting had concerned itself very little with this problem. In reviewing the products of classical art, it will always be found that the old masters carefully weighed the relations of the picture to the space it was destined to occupy. The mosaics of Ravenna and the frescoes of Giotto were intended to fill the whole church



with solemn harmonies and to be effective from every point of view, even from the greatest distance. Therefore, purely decorative artists like Giotto used only great, impressive lines, and arranged mighty complexes of color in accordance with simple decorative laws. All naturalistic effects are avoided; all belittling detail, as well in the fall of the drapery as in the structure of the landscape, is eliminated; only the clear silhouette speaks. The pictures must be visible from a distance, and at the same time correspond, in all their lines, with the lines of the building.

Quite a different sort of painting arose in the Netherlands at a later period. In abrupt contrast to the monumental work of the Italians, the small pictures of Jan van Eyck are painted stroke by stroke, with minute exactness; the stubble of the beard, every vein of the hand, every ornament of clothing, is rendered with naturalistic accuracy. Jan van Eyck could indulge himself in such fine brushwork, because his pictures made no pretense of effect at a distance, but, like the miniatures of the prayer-books, were destined to be inspected at close quarters. They were altar-pieces for domestic use, before which the observer, after he had drawn away the curtain, knelt or stood. In like manner we may explain the style of later Dutch cabinet pictures. Placed for the most part upon easels, they hinted to the spectator that their delicacies could best be seen by close inspection. Even when they served as decoration for a wall, the delicate work of a Dou or a Mieris was calculated in accordance with the proportions of the small Dutch rooms. If any of these Dutchmen, as, for example, Koning, exceptionally received a commission in Flemish palaces, he immediately changed his style; for he knew that a picture for a large room must be differently treated, not only in style, but also in composition, from his accustomed work.

The weakness of the nineteenth century was most clearly revealed in the circumstance that it had lost every feeling for the relation of the picture to space. What awful performances did not mural painters perpetrate in our public buildings! In accordance with the literary trend of painting of the first half of the century there was no thought of beauty in form and color, but only of the didactic value of the works. Instead of proceeding on the supposition that a picture should really adorn, they endeavored to give historical instruction to the public, and tacked historical *genre* paintings on the walls. As to art in the home, we have not yet forgotten the time when small photographs and line engravings, instead of being kept in portfolios, were fastened to the walls, where they naturally had the effect of dead white and black spots. Museums and exhibitions also contributed to confuse public taste by juxtaposing the most heterogeneous things on the walls: little cabinet pieces of Brouwer and Ostade alongside of a great altar-piece by Reubens, and a mighty Delacroix flanked by dainty Meissoniers. In this way the feeling for the decorative importance of art was more and more lost. The purchaser was not astonished when a picture, which he had admired at the exhibition, looked like a hole in the wall or like a monotonous dirty brown spot, when seen from a distance in a large room of his home.

The change for the better was first seen in the domain of mural painting. Almost contemporaneously in all countries, tendencies appeared, the object of which was, by means of the clear arrangement of the complexes of color and line, to restore the mural picture to its place as a decorative element. But the panel picture was also reminded of its decorative purpose. Our rooms are not only brighter but more spacious than were the small and dimly lighted Dutch rooms; and it was only a sign of a lack of

originality in modern painters, notwithstanding the changed conditions of light and space, to hold fast to the manner of the old masters. Impressionism first brought the colors into harmony with the brighter light-effects of our rooms, and neo-impressionism supplemented this by paying the greatest possible attention to distant effects. It is, indeed, astonishing how impressive these dotted paintings are. The little dots, at close view a gaudy chaos, when seen from a distance shape themselves into such plastic forms, that neo-impressionistic paintings overlook the widest rooms. Pointillism (in which the surface of the picture is not smooth, but composed of little elevations and depressions) contributes further to this effect; for, by reason of their rough surface, the paintings, like the old mosaics, are effective from every point of view. Numerous masters have sought to reach the same goal of monumental decorative effect by other means, such as the simplification of form by the effect of harmonious spots of color, and by the subordination of color to decorative purposes.

But it cannot be denied that this latest art, in so far as it is good, still stands in intimate connection with impressionism. After impressionism had taught painters how to catch the finest nuances of motion and expression, an entirely new language of line was the result of their reversion to the principle of style, and of the reduction of the thousand details which they had learned to see anew to their simple and significant original forms. In observing with scientific accuracy the effect of light on color, impressionism also discovered a wealth of new shades of color. We now distinguish a hundred values where formerly we saw only one. Expressions like red, green, and brown have become meaningless for the manifold infinitely differentiated values of color. Consequently, when artists proceeded from the realistic rendering of their impressions of

nature to free symphonic composition in the colors which impressionism had discovered, there arose wealth, harmony, and softness of color, not hitherto achieved. Such, in its principal stages, is the course which painting has traversed from the beginning of the nineteenth to the dawn of the twentieth century.

## CORNER STONES OF THE MODERN DRAMA<sup>1</sup>

BY HENRY ARTHUR JONES

[HENRY ARTHUR JONES, dramatic author. b. Grandborough, England in 1861; produced his first play, *A Clerical Error*, in London, in 1879; made a great hit in 1882 with his melodrama, *A Silver King*, which was written in collaboration with H. Herman, and had a long run both in London and New York. This play was followed by many other successes, noted for cleverness of dialogue and stagecraft, and which were mostly comedies and dramas reflecting various social phases of modern life. His plays include *The Middleman*, *Judah*, *The Dancing Girl*, *The Tempter*, *The Crusaders*, *The Masqueraders*, *The Physician*, *The Case of Rebellious Susan*, *Saints and Sinners*, *The Triumph of the Philistines*, *The Rogue's Comedy*, *The Liars*, *The Manoeuvres of Jane*, *Mrs. Dane's Defence*, and *The Evangelist*. He has delivered lectures on the Drama both in England and the United States. AUTHOR OF *The Renaissance of the English Drama*.]

LET the first words I speak be those which shall most frankly and heartily own my great debt of gratitude to American playgoers. If to-day I am free from pressing, sordid cares, it is largely due to the continued favor which your nation has shown to my plays. For nearly a quarter of a century my work has been seen in all your leading cities, and every year has been a year of welcome and encouragement on your part, and every year has been a year of renewed and increasing indebtedness on mine. A few weeks ago America received my last play with an unparalleled generosity of enthusiasm. Such a welcome as was then given me I can never forget. But it leaves me still more hopelessly in your debt. I cannot pay. Let me, then, simply own my insolvency, and offer to you and through you to the great body of American playgoers, my most inadequate, but most deeply felt, most lasting, most sincere gratitude.

<sup>1</sup>A lecture originally delivered in Sanders' Theatre, Harvard University, and presented here to supplement the lectures originally prepared for the International Congress of Arts and Science.

A friend of mine in England pardons himself any lapses from general truthfulness by affirming as a splendid compensation, "I never tell lies about art." I believe that a clear vision and a high sense of rectitude in all the arts would develop a new sense of national beauty and national dignity both in America and in England, and would also be a valuable lever to both nations in matters of conduct and character. I am persuaded that this clear vision, this right-thinking and right-doing in the popular art of drama, would have a wide, compulsive influence on national manners and behavior. Therefore, I hope you will allow me to adopt my friend's motto and to say, "I never tell lies about the drama." I am sure you would wish me to deal with this subject with the utmost candor and courage, to speak out of the fullness of my heart. And if I tell you some hard truths and ask some harsh, rude questions, you must not think that I am exceeding the liberty and courtesy of a guest; for the same hard truths must be told, and the same rude, harsh questions must be asked about the drama in England. Indeed, I hope you will allow me for the moment to class England and America as twin nations in the affairs of the drama. So much interchange of plays and actors has taken place between the two countries; the means of communication have been so constantly quickened and increased, that now, for many years past, large currents of the two main streams of national drama have filtered through to each other, and have commingled, and are now flowing together.

In the higher reaches both of the modern and of the poetic drama, England and America may be largely reckoned as one country. Therefore, I am not speaking simply to and for American playgoers. I still remain your debtor, and at the outset I must own that if you had a National American Drama such as I desire for you, such as I see

many signs of your compassing in generations to come—I say, if that National American Drama were already an accomplished fact, I fear you would not so readily have welcomed my plays for the last twenty-four years, and I fear you would not care to listen to me now.

If we throw one sweeping glance over the whole past history of the drama, we are deeply impressed by two main, commanding features. The first of these is the perennial and universal existence of the dramatic instinct, always and everywhere seeking expression, always and everywhere pushing up its shoots into the national life. Often repressed, often debased, often childish, often vulgar, often obscene, often the emptiest, silliest bauble, formless, ribald, violent, grotesque, a feast of indecencies, or a feast of horrors, there has yet rarely been a time, or a country, where some kind of a drama has not been fitfully and precariously struggling into existence. That is the first main feature in the world's dramatic history.

The second main feature is inverse and complimentary. Twice in the past the Drama has splendidly emerged, has seized, possessed, inflamed and interpreted the whole of the nation, has become the supreme artistic achievement of the age and people. Twice it has thus emerged—once in Greece, and once in Elizabethan England. But a Frenchman would say that three times, and a Spaniard would claim that four times in the world's history have there been great creative outbursts of drama. Well, we who possess Shakespeare will generously allow that there have been four such great creative outbursts which have left standing these lowering mountain ranges of drama for us to wonder at. France, in the seventeenth century, was the scene of the last of these great creative outbursts, and the incomparable Molière was the head and front of its glory.

This brings me to the purpose of my lecture, which is,

indeed, to ask this practical question: "By what means can a worthy art of the Drama be fostered and developed in America and England to-day?" I think we may best get an answer to this question by comparing the history and status of the Drama in France and in England from the time of Molière down to the twentieth century—down to the modern Drama of the day before yesterday.

Here I must beg time and space for a rather long but quite relevant parenthesis. No glance at any corner of the Modern Drama can leave out of sight the ominous figure of Ibsen. A great destroyer, a great creator, a great poet, a great liberator, in his later prose plays he has freed the European drama, not only from the minor conventions of the stage, such as the aside and the perfunctory soliloquy, but from the deadlier bondage of sentimentality, of one-eyed optimism, and sham morality. As there is no modern playwright who understands his craft that does not pay homage to Ibsen's technique, so there is no serious modern dramatist who has not been directly or indirectly influenced by him, and whose path has not been made clearer, and straighter, and easier by Ibsen's matchless veracity, courage and sincerity. Throughout these later plays, again and again he shows us how far more poignant and startling are inward spiritual situations and the secret surprises and suspenses of the soul than outward physical situations and the traps and surprises of mechanical ingenuity.

Like all the greatest artists, he is greatest, not where he is most realistic, but where he is most imaginative. It is true he does not reach through the middle zones of cloud and tempest; he does not attain those sunny heights of wisdom and serenity where Sophocles and Shakespeare and Goethe sit radiantly enthroned, watching all the turbid stream of human life as it flows a thousand leagues beneath their feet. Ibsen for the most part looms darkly through



a blizzard, in a wilderness made still more bleak and desolate by the great lava streams of corrosive irony that have poured from his crater. Yet by this very fact he becomes all the more representative of his age, and of the present cast and drift of European thought and philosophy. His generation has heard and received his insistent new gospel, "Live your own life." But human hearts will always long for that strain of higher mood which we seem to remember, "Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it; whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it."

Ibsen is a citizen of a small country; this gives him many signal advantages and some monstrous disadvantages. If his eyes avert their ken from half of human life, yet his vision is the more keen and strenuous for the half that lies before them. If he is a sour and shabby courtier to beauty, he is never a traitor to truth. He will never be surpassed in his angry scorn for lies. He has great fascination, but little charm. Joyous youth will never hobnob with him. For happy lovers he grows no sweet forget-me-nots. The poor in spirit he crushes. They who have rooted themselves at ease in the rank stubble of modern commercialism shudder at him, as a weed at the plowshare, as a cancer at the knife. For two-thirds of humankind he has only a command of self-contempt and a sentence of despair and destruction. But the strong he fortifies; the steadfast he establishes; he is a scourge to slaves, but for them that are free he enlarges the bounds of freedom. They honor him who honor the truth, and they welcome him who welcome the growl of the thunder and the dart of the lightning rather than stagnancy and miasma and the fitful shimmer that dances around corruption.

A test of Ibsen's quality is supplied by the characters of the men who have most hated and villified him. Some tribute may, perhaps, be offered, belated, but I hope not

too late, by those whom his tense and shattering genius has at length conquered and brought to own with great regret that they have in part misjudged, in part underestimated him. He will long stand forth, a frowning landmark in the domain of the Drama. Weak creatures may now be counseled to shun him, and to cease from cursing and shrieking at him. He remains.

But at present Ibsen, by his circumstances, by his character, by the nature of his genius, by the language he wrote in, abides a solitary figure, and, though he has alarmed and shifted the whole Modern Drama, he stands mainly apart from it. And that we may get an answer to my prime question: "How can we foster and develop a worthy art of the Drama in America and England to-day?" I must take you back to a comparison of the history of the Drama in England and France during the last 250 years.

Let us look at England first. Immediately after Molière we have Dryden and the brilliant and corrupt Restoration Comedy, largely drawing its inspiration from France and Molière. But our leading Restoration Dramatists had not the immense advantage of Molière's practical acquaintance with the theatre, and their plays, compared with Molière's, are badly and loosely constructed. Further, there is a profound, instinctive, all-pervasive morality in Molière. Molière's morality is sure, intrinsic, inevitable; like Dante's, like Ibsen's, like nature's morality. Our English Restoration Comedy is arid, heartless, degrading; essentially mischievous, corrupt, and depraved. Our love for Charles Lamb must not tempt us for a moment to accept his ingenious and audacious excuse for Restoration Comedy. We will not withdraw our censure from these Restoration heroes and heroines on the curious plea that they are fairy rakes and harlots living in a fairy land of cuckoldry. In spite of Charles Lamb we will, if you please, very heartily and

wholesomely condemn them, and feel all the better and more self-righteous for having done it. Our Restoration Comedy, then, has vanished from our stage on the score of bad construction and bad morality; more, I fear, because of its bad construction than of its bad morality. But though the Restoration Comedy no longer holds our stage, the splendor of its wit, and the vividness of its portraiture of town life insure it a lasting place in English Literature.

Since the Restoration Comedy, what place has the English Drama held in English Literature?

I was dining the other night with a book-collecting friend. He brought out first editions of "The Rivals," "The School for Scandal," and "She Stoops to Conquer." "There!" he exclaimed, "that's all the harvest of your English Drama for the last 200 years." Those three little volumes were all that a wealthy collector thought worthy to preserve of the dramatic art of the Anglo-Saxon race in the past 200 years—that Anglo-Saxon race which during that same 200 years has held sovereign sway and masterdom in Literature, in Science, and in Arms, which once held the sovereignty of the world in Drama; a race of restless and inexhaustible achievement in almost every field; a race of action, and therefore, essentially a dramatic race; a race whose artistic instincts would irresistibly find their natural and triumphant outlet on the stage. And in 200 years all that the Anglo-Saxon race has produced of drama worthy to be preserved as literature is contained in those three tiny volumes. Why have we made such a beggarly mess of our Drama?

Now, if we turn from England to France and survey the French Theatre and the French Drama, we shall find that there has been an almost continuous stream of great writers for the stage from Molière onward to the present time. In the seventeenth century, Molière stands not only at the head

of the French Drama, but also at the head of French Literature, holding the same relative place as did Shakespeare in England half a century earlier. If France were asked, "Who of your sons since Molière dare claim the garland of eternal and universal renown? Who in your later days is fit to stand in the circle of Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, and Goethe?" if France were asked that question, I suppose she could only send in the names of two candidates—Voltaire and Victor Hugo. But these, her two most famous men of letters in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are also her leading playwrights.

As Molière in his century headed both literature and drama, so do Voltaire and Victor Hugo in theirs. But what a crowd of illustrious companions swarm around these great men! Look down the long list of them—Regnard, Marivaux, Beaumarchais, Dumas, Alfred de Musset, Casimir Delavigne, Dumas *fils*, Augier, Labiche, not to mention half a dozen living writers who are yearly throwing out powerful dramas, dealing faithfully, sincerely, and searchingly with the vital characters, scenes, and issues of our modern social life. Take the long list of French writers of the first rank, and you will scarcely find one who has not been more or less successful on the stage.

The French Theatre has not been merely in constant touch with French Literature; the French Theatre and French Literature have been wedded to each other for the last 200 years, bone of one bone and flesh of one flesh. Every play by a leading French playwright is not only eagerly discussed and judged in the theatre; it is immediately published and eagerly discussed and judged as literature. A year or two ago I remember taking up at a little wayside French book-stall a copy of the two hundred and eightieth thousand of "Cyrano de Bergerac."

Further, during those two centuries, there has been a

constant method of training actors and actresses. Acting is known to be a great art in France. The all-round performance of a strong emotional play in Paris is immeasurably above the all-round performance of a strong emotional play in London; while the exhibition of quite amateur performers in leading parts, such as is not rarely seen on the London stage, would be a thing disgraceful or impossible in any leading city of France, to say nothing of Paris. Again, in France the Drama is reckoned as a fine art, and is judged on that level; that is, as a means of providing amusement by the representation and interpretation of life. The French are a nation of cultivated playgoers alert to seize the finest shades of the actor's and the author's meaning. In England the great mass of playgoers have lost all sense that the Drama is the art of representing life, and go to the theatre mainly to be awed by scenery, or to be tickled by funny antics and songs and dances that have no relation to life, and merely provide a means of wasting the evening in entertainments not far removed from idiocy.

If the English Drama for 200 years makes a beggarly show when looked at by itself, how abject and meagre and utterly despicable does it appear when compared with the Drama of France in the same period. Once more we are brought around to the question, "What are the causes of the present pitiable condition of the Anglo-American Drama to-day?" Again I claim that the Anglo-American race is naturally and instinctively a dramatic race; a race of action; a race fitted for great exploits on the outer and larger stage of the world's history, and also for great exploits on the inner and smaller stage of the theatre. We have proved our mettle on both stages. We hold the world's price for Drama. Why, then, are we so far to seek? Why are we lagging behind in this our own native art of the Drama, where by right we should lead the other

nations at our heels? How is it that these three poor thin volumes of plays are all that we have to show for 200 years, while of living, serious, operative Modern Drama to-day America and England have barely a fragment that will stand the final test of a quiet hour in the study?

The fundamental reason is to be found in the character of our race. We are a dramatic race; we are also a deeply religious race. Religion easily runs riot to fear and meanness and madness, and creates abominable hells in its panic. After the mellow pomp of the Elizabethan age Religion ran riot in England. We owe the imbecility and paralysis of our Drama to-day to the insane rage of Puritanism that would see nothing in the theatre but a horrible, unholy thing to be crushed and stamped out of existence. Let our Puritan friends ask themselves how far their creed is responsible, by the natural and inevitable law of reaction, for the corruption of the national Drama at the Restoration, and for its pitiable condition ever since. The feeling of horror and fright of the Theatre, engendered at the Restoration, is even to-day widely prevalent and operative among religious classes in England and America. It muddles and stupefies our Drama, and degrades it from the rank of a fine art to the rank of a somewhat disreputable form of popular entertainment.

I have pointed out what I believe to be the underlying cause of the intellectual degradation of the Anglo-American Drama to-day. But attendant on this primary cause are those other secondary and resultant causes and signs of degradation which we have glanced at in comparing the English and French Drama. I will repeat them in the order of their importance.

I. The divorce of the English Drama from English Literature, of which it is, indeed, the highest and most difficult form, and of which it should be the chief ornament.

Accompanying this divorce of Literature and the Drama is the contempt of English men of letters and literary critics for the Theatre; their utter ignorance of the difficulties of the dramatist; their refusal to recognize the modern Drama as literature, which refusal again reacts upon the dramatist, and tends to lower the quality of his work, inasmuch as he is left without encouragement and without any appeal to high standards of literature and good taste.

II. The general absence from the English Theatre and from modern English plays of any sane, consistent, or intelligible ideas about morality, so that, while the inanities and indecencies of Musical Comedy are sniggered at and applauded, the deepest permanent passions of men and women are tabooed, and the serious dramatist is bidden to keep his character well within the compass of that system of morality which is practiced among wax dolls.

III. The divorce of the English Drama from its sister Arts; its deposition from any assured place in the intellectual and artistic life of the nation.

IV. The absorption of the English Drama into popular amusement; the absence of any high standard whereby to judge acting or plays; the absence of all great traditions, the absence of all pride in the Drama as a fine and humane and dignified art.

V. The want of a training school for actors—the want of any means for giving promising novices a constant practice in varied rôles, that they may gradually acquire a sure grip of their art, and make the best of their natural gifts; and that the author may have a sufficient supply of competent actors to interpret his characters in such a way that his play may be seen to good advantage.

VI. The elevation of incompetent actors and actresses into false positions as stars, whereby, in the dearth of any general level of experienced and competent all-round acting,

the possessor of a pretty face or a fine physique is able to dominate the situation, and to rule what plays should be produced, and how they shall be cast and mounted. The general lack of all interest in the play, or in the author's study of life and character, apart from their being the vehicle for some star actor to put or keep himself in a leading position, with his actor brothers and sisters as his satellites.

VII. A widely spread dependence upon translations and adaptations of foreign plays, inasmuch as they can be bought at a cheap rate, and as owing to the absence of any general care or knowledge as to what a National Drama should be, they are just as likely to provide the actor with a personal and pecuniary success, while they also largely set him free from all obligations to that objectionable and interfering person, the author.

Now all these discouraging symptoms and conditions of our Modern Drama which I have glanced at are inextricably related to each other; many of them are, indeed, only different aspects of the same facts; they are woven all of a piece with each other, and with that Puritan horror of the theatre which I believe to be the cardinal reason that neither America nor England has to-day an art of the Drama at all worthy the dignity, the resources, and the self-respect of a great nation. Many of these discouraging symptoms and conditions are perhaps more widely prevalent and more pronounced in England than in America. But I hope you will not think I have given an ill-natured or exaggerated sketch of the present condition of the Anglo-American Drama. If I have wounded your susceptibilities, I have done it with the good intention of rendering you some small help in your noble design of building up a great national school of American Drama. And, as an Englishman, I must regretfully own that I see a great chance of your hav-



ing a National Theatre and a National Drama, while we are left fumbling about among the grotesque futilities of French adaptations, and the imbecilities of musical farce.

Now, if I have struck my finger on the place in pointing to the religious dread of the theatre, and the consequent abstinence from it of the best and soundest elements of our nations—if I have traced our difficulties and shortcomings to their true source, it is clear that before we can hope for any signal advance in dramatic art we must win over a large body of public opinion to our views. In their attitude toward the Theatre and the Drama, we may, I think, make a rough division of the Anglo-American public into three classes. Both in England and in America we have large masses, who may be counted by millions, of mere amusement seekers, newly enfranchised from the prison house of Puritanism, eager to enjoy themselves at the theatre in the easiest way; without traditions, without any real judgment of plays or acting; mere children, with no care or thought beyond the delight of the moment in finding themselves in a wonder-house where impossibly heroic and self-sacrificing persons make love and do prodigious deeds, and marry and live happy ever afterward; or in a funny house where funny people do all sorts of funny things. These form a great bulk, I think, of American and English playgoers. Then we have a very large class of moderate, reasonable, respectable people, who go to the theatre occasionally, but with some feeling of discomfort at having done a frivolous if not wicked thing; who are not actively hostile to the Drama, perhaps, but who are quite indifferent to its higher development and to its elevation into a fine art. This class contains many refined, cultivated people,—that is, they seem to be cultivated and refined in all subjects except the Drama. It is a constant puzzle to me why men and women who are thoroughly educated and developed in every other respect

should suddenly drop to the mental range of children of five the moment they think and speak about the Drama.

Again we have a third class, a very large class, which contains some of the soundest and best elements of the Anglo-American race—very influential, very respectable, very much to be regarded, and consulted, and feared. And this large, influential, religious class is in more or less active hostility to the Theatre, and to the Drama, and to everything and everybody connected therewith. We may call these three classes, respectively, the amusement-seeking class; the moderate, reasonable, indifferent class; the hostile, religious class. This is the very roughest and loosest division, and, of course, all these classes blend and shade into each other without any rigid line of distinction.

I do not know how actively hostile to the Drama are the religious elements in American society. I am told that while the religious prejudice against the Theatre is dying away in the eastern seaboard States, it is still most potent and aggressive in the West. But a story that was told me before leaving England will, I think, convince you that this religious prejudice is still a terrible hindrance to the highest development of your Drama. There is nothing in which Americans can more legitimately take pride than in the magnificent public spirit shown by their wealthy citizens. Englishmen stand agape and envious at the large sums given by your millionaires to advance and endow all kinds of scientific, artistic, and social enterprises. I am told that a very large amount was designed by a wealthy American to found and endow a National American Theatre on a most lavish scale, but he was persuaded by a religious friend to hold his hand and shut his pocket because of the evil that a National Theatre might work in your midst.

Consider what mischief was done to the whole American community by the frustration of that most wise, most hu-

mane, most benevolent scheme. Consider how many hundreds of thousands of your fellow-citizens will in consequence waste their evenings in empty frivolity when they might have been drawn to Shakespeare and Goethe. Therefore, we must still count that the hostile, religious spirit is very active and potent on your side of the Atlantic as upon ours. It everywhere sets up a current of ill-will and ill-nature toward the Drama throughout the two entire nations; it everywhere stimulates opposition to the Theatre; it keeps alive prejudices that would otherwise have died down two hundred years ago, and it is, in my opinion, the one great obstacle to the rise and development of a serious, dignified, national art of the Drama. I fear there will always be a crew of unwholesome, religious fanatics in America and England who will be doomed at their birth to be hostile to the Drama. It is useless to argue with them. You cannot argue the jaundice out of a man, and advise him that it is foolish to have a sickly green complexion. He needs something far more drastic than advice and argument. We must leave the fanatics to rave against the Theatre and against all art and beauty.

But among this actively hostile religious class, and also among the moderate, reasonable, indifferent class, there must be thousands who, having been nurtured to regard the Theatre as frivolous and empty and evil, have adopted the ideas current around them, and have never taken the trouble to examine their stock prejudices against the Drama, and to inquire whether there is any ground for them. To this large body of American and English citizens, to the heads and leaders of all those religious sects in America and England who are now hostile to the Drama, and especially to that large allied class of influential, educated men in both countries, who, if not actively hostile, are supercilious and cold and indifferent and blind to the aims and possibilities

of this fine art—to all these citizens representing the best and soundest elements in the Anglo-American race we may make a strong and friendly appeal. I propose that we shall say to them:

“Brother Puritans, brother Pharisees, the dramatic instinct is ineradicable, inexhaustible; it is entwined with all the roots of our nature; you may watch its incessant activity in your own children; almost every moment of the day they are acting some little play; as we grow up and strengthen, this dramatic instinct grows up and strengthens in us; as our shadow, it clings to us; we cannot escape from it; we cannot help picturing back to ourselves some copy of this strange, eventful history of ours; this strange, earthly life of ours throws everywhere around us and within us reflections and *re-reflections* of itself; we act it over and over again in the chambers of imagery, and in dreams, and on the silent secret stage of our own soul. When some master dramatist takes these reflections and combines them and shapes them into a play for us, very nature itself is behind him, working through him for our welfare. So rigidly economical, so zealously frugal is she that what is at first a mere impulse to play, a mere impulse to masquerade and escape from life—this idle pastime she transforms and glorifies into a masterpiece of wisdom and beauty; it becomes our sweet and lovable guide in the great business and conduct of life.

“This is what she did for us in Shakespeare and Molière. Consider the utility of the Theatre, you practical Americans and Englishmen! You have noticed cats teaching their kittens to play at catching mice. But this is their great business and duty in after life. You have noticed puppies pretending to hunt and shake and kill game. But this is their great business and duty in after life. That is what all children and young things do. They play at their father’s

business. So that their playtime is not wasted, but is, indeed, a wise, amusing way of preparing for life. So nature teaches us, her children, to play at life in the theatre, that we may carelessly and easily learn the great rules of conduct; that we may become insensibly instructed in the great art of living well, insensibly infected with a passion for whatsoever things are true and honest and just and pure and lovely and of good report.

"This, then, is the use of the theatre, that men may learn the great rules of life and conduct in the guise of a play, learn them, not formally, didactically, as they learn in school and in church, but pleasantly, insensibly, spontaneously, and oftentimes, believe me, with a more assured and lasting result in manners and conduct. Is not that a wise form of amusement? Ought not every good citizen to foster and encourage it? Then why, Brother Puritans, why, Brother Pharisees, are you found in such bitter opposition to it? If you are the veritable salt of the earth, as by your demeanor we seem to sniff, and as by this appeal we are willing to allow—if you are the veritable salt of the earth, where can you exhale your savor to better effect than in the theatres of your native land? Come among us and brace and strengthen us; incidentally we may sweeten and humanize you, and give you a larger outlook upon life.

"Look at the vast population of our great cities crowding more and more in our theatres, demanding there to be given some kind of representation of life, some form of play. You cannot quench that demand. During the next generation hundreds of theatres will be opened all over America and England. If you abstain from visiting these theatres, you will not close them. Millions of your countrymen, the vast masses, will still frequent them. The effect of your absence, and of your discountenance, will merely be to lower the moral and intellectual standard of the plays

that will then be given. Will you never learn the lesson of the English Restoration, that when the best and most serious classes of the nation detest and defame their theatre, it instantly justifies their abuse and becomes, indeed, a scandal and a source of corruption? Many of you already put Shakespeare next to the Bible as the guide and inspirer of our race. Why, then, do you despise his calling, and villify his disciples, and misunderstand his art? Do you not see that this amusement which you neglect and flout and decry is more than an amusement; is, indeed, at once the finest and the most popular of all the arts, with an immense influence on the daily lives of our fellow-citizens? Help us, then, to organize and endow this fine art in all the cities of our Anglo-American race, wherever our common tongue is spoken, from London to San Francisco. Help us to establish it in the esteem and affections of our fellow-countrymen, as the measure of our advance in humanity and civilization, and in that knowledge of ourselves which is the end and flower of all education!"

Some such appeal may, I think, be made to the more seriously-minded of our countrymen on both sides of the Atlantic. I have given it great prominence in this lecture because I feel that before we begin to build we need to clear the ground of the rank growths of prejudice and Puritan hatred which still choke the Drama. Both in England and America we seem to be waiting for some great national impulse, some word of command for a general forward movement toward a creative school of Drama. In spite of many discouragements and humiliations during the last ten or twelve years; in spite of the hatred of the religious world, the indifference and contempt of the educated and artistic classes, the debased frivolity of the multitude, the zealous envy and rage of those whose ignoble trade and daily bread it is to keep the Drama on a degraded level—

in spite of all these hindrances, I believe that word of command will be spoken, and that we shall march to it. But if there is to be any stability and permanence in the movement, it must be a national one. We must engage the sympathies and co-operation of all classes. We have many schisms and sects in religion; let us have none in the Drama.

I have taken much time, and, I fear, I have taxed your patience in thus clearing the ground. But having cleared the ground, we can begin to lay the corner stones. I have already told you what seem to me to be the corner stones of any school of Drama worthy to be called national in such countries as America and England. Perhaps I may here repeat them in the order of their importance. They are these:

I. The recognition of the Drama as the highest and most difficult form of Literature; the establishment of definite and continuous relations between the Drama and Literature.

II. The acknowledged right of the dramatist to deal with the serious problems of life, with the passions of men and women in the spirit of the broad, wise, sane, searching morality of the Bible and Shakespeare, his release from the hypocritical fiction that his fellow-creatures are large wax-dolls stuffed with the sawdust of sentimentality and impossible self-sacrifice. To sum up, the establishment of definite and continuous relations between the Drama and reality.

III. The severance of the Drama from popular entertainment; the recognition of it as a fine art which, though its lower ranges must always compound with mere popular entertainment, and be confused with it, is yet essentially something different from popular entertainment, transcends it, and in its higher ranges is in marked and eternal antagonism to popular entertainment. To sum up, the estab-

lishment of definite and continuous relations between the Drama and her sister Arts.

IV. The establishment of those relations between actor and author which shall best aid the development of the Drama; the recognition by the public that there is an art of the Drama as well as an art of Acting; the assignment of their due place and functions and opportunities to each; the breaking down, so far as may be possible, of the present deadening system of long runs; the provision of training schools for actors so that they may get constant practice and experience in varied rôles, so that the auxiliary arts of the Drama and the Theatre may keep pace and tune with each other; so that the art of Acting may not languish for lack of new plays, and that the art of the Drama may not languish from the lack of competent and serious actors. To sum up, the establishment of rigidly definite relations and well-marked boundaries between the art of the Drama and the art of Acting, to the benefit and advancement of both actor and author.

These seem to me to be the four corner stones upon which we must build, if we are ever to raise, in England and America, an art of the Drama with any real influence and import and dignity in Anglo-American civilization. But each of these four divisions of the Drama demands consideration and examination by itself.

Especially I should have liked to speak in this place upon the Modern Drama and Literature. But I felt that clearing of the ground was of primary importance. And now that I have given so much time to that troublesome operation, I fear you have been thinking that in Harvard at least the ground has been already cleared, and the first corner stone, the corner stone that is to bind together Literature and the Modern Drama, has been already laid by Professor Baker. Well, that is a most encouraging fact which I gladly recognize and acclaim.



After years of unsuccessful endeavor to get our English playgoers to read and examine in the study the plays that had delighted them on the stage, I one day received from Prof. Baker a letter to the effect that, as Professor of English Literature, he had given his Harvard students a course of modern English plays. Of all the many encouragements and rewards that I have received in England and America, I value most of all the recognition that was conveyed in that letter. It was a bold and original action on Prof. Baker's part. He must have met with considerable opposition, and perhaps some derision. I wonder what Oxford would say if it was suggested to her that modern English plays should form a part of her teaching. Oxford might rouse herself for a moment if some bold messenger dare knock at her gates on such an errand, and her reply would be: "Aeschylus I know, and Sophocles and Euripides I know, but who are ye?"

"Representatives of the modern Drama!"

"Modern Drama? The parvenus, Shakespeare and Molière, have pushed their way into my precincts. They represent the modern Drama here."

"No! No! Not the Drama of three centuries ago and of a vanished civilization, but the Drama of to-day, the modern Drama."

"There is no modern Drama," Oxford would sternly reply.

"Yes! Yes! Our plays run for hundreds of nights and take up a vast quantity of the winter leisure of our city millions, and help to fill the empty spaces in their skulls where their brains ought to be."

"Blank verse?"

"No—plain prose."

"Polished English prose?" Oxford would ask.

"No—unfortunately the English and American public

have abandoned for the present the habit of speaking in blank verse, or even in polished prose, and for the most part talk a slovenly, slangy shorthand, which, faithfully taken down, reads much like a sporting-man's telegram. If we were to put into the mouths of our characters a dignified, resounding prose, with nicely balanced cadences, we should be told we were stilted and unnatural. So we put into the mouths of our characters the actual phrases of the market place and the drawing-room, and we are scorned for not being men of letters and writing literature."

"But are you men of letters? Do you write Literature?" Oxford would solemnly demand.

"Well, scarcely at present," we could only stammer.

"Then, why should Oxford lose her hoary dignity and condescend to such as you?"

"Well, we trusted that Oxford as the center of English learning and education might aid us in rescuing the English Drama from chaos and imbecility; and, incidentally, in helping to set a standard of manners and conversation all over the English-speaking world."

"This smacks to me of elevating the masses, and never will I unbend my reverend energy to such revolting drudgery. The masses! The masses! Let them darken in labor and pain without my gates! I am the home of lost causes and decaying superstitions! What concern have I, Oxford, with the masses?"

"But it isn't merely the masses. You must have noticed how all classes of society regard our modern Drama—"

"Modern Drama!" Oxford would thunder. "All things modern I abhor. Has not my old age been vexed and shaken enough by modern Science? Modern Drama! Forsooth! There is no modern Drama! Away! You are raw! You are crude! You are vulgar! I suspect you are improper! And I allow none but classic impro-

prieties within my hallowed cloisters! Away, you plebeians! You mountebanks! You interlopers! Profane not my gray serenity with your uncouth diction. Avaunt and quit my sight! Your blood is warm! Your bones are full of the marrow of youth! Your eyes flash back the sunlight! You are alive! And I suffer none but the dead to enter here!"

Thus would Oxford answer, I fear, and let fall the massive portcullis of her learning, shutting us out forever, while she goes dreaming on among her dreaming spires.

But Harvard has welcomed us. Harvard has welcomed us, and the other American universities have also opened their doors. I have said that Prof. Baker did a notable and courageous thing in recognizing the modern English Drama at Harvard. I believe he also did a wise and far-seeing thing, a deed that may return in future days, like a happy harvestman bringing sheaves of ripe and benign consequences to American Art and Civilization.

When I was in America last autumn after an absence of twenty years, I could not help feeling myself in the presence of immense forces that are gradually shifting the foundations and changing the drift of Anglo-American civilization. I could not help feeling that the sceptre of material prosperity is slipping from our hands in your vigorous, remorseless grasp. I could not avoid the uneasy presentiment that in a few generations the centre and seat of whatever system of Anglo-American civilization may then be current will be irrevocably fixed on this side the Atlantic. That cannot be other than a saddening, chilling thought to an Englishman who loves his country. I cannot but think it will bring some sympathetic regret to many Americans. Yet, after all, your chief feeling must be one of pride and triumph in your young nation, and you will chant over us your Emerson's ringing notes:

The Lord is the peasant that was,  
The peasant the Lord that shall be;  
The Lord is hay, the peasant grass,  
One dry, one the living tree.

But the Empire of Mammon sucks after it other empires; perhaps in our modern commercial world it will suck after it all other empires, all arts, all interests, all responsibilities, all leaderships. Yet we must still trust that in the days to come, as in days of old, it will not be the sceptre of material prosperity that will finally hold sway over the earth. Granted that, in a short time as reckoned by the life of nations, we shall have to hand over to you, with what grace we may, the sceptre of material prosperity, shall we not still hold that other magic wand, shadowy, invisible, but more compulsive than sceptres of gold and iron,—the sceptre of literary, intellectual, and artistic dominion? Or will you wrest that also from us? May we not rather hope to see both nations united in a great array to build one common monument of graceful, wise, beautiful, dignified human existence on both sides of the Atlantic? Your nation has what all young nations have, what England is losing, the power to be moved by ideas and that divine resilient quality of youth, the power to be stirred and frenzied by ideals.

If a guest whom you have honored so much, if your most fervent well-wisher may presume to whisper his most fervent wishes for a country to whom he is so deeply indebted, he would say: "As you vie with us in friendly games and contests of bodily strength, may you more resolutely vie with us for the mastership in art and in the ornament of life; build statelier homes, nobler cities, and more aspiring temples than we have built; let your lives be fuller of meaning and purpose than ours have lately been; have the wisdom richly to endow and unceasingly to foster

all the arts, and all that makes for majesty of life and character rather than for material prosperity and comfort. Especially foster and honor this supreme art of Shakespeare's, so much neglected and misunderstood in both countries; endow it in all your cities; build handsome, spacious theatres; train your actors; reward your dramatists, sparingly with fees, but lavishly with laurels, bid them dare to paint American life sanely, truthfully, searchingly, for you. Dare to see your life thus painted. Dare to let your Drama ridicule and reprove your follies, and vices, and deformities. Dare to let it mock and whip, as well as amuse you. Dare to let it be a faithful mirror. Make it one of your chief counselors. Set it on the summit of your national esteem, for it will draw upward all your national life and character; upward to higher and more worthy levels, to starry heights of wisdom and beauty and resolve and aspiration."



## THE IDEA OF TRAGEDY<sup>1</sup>

BY WILLIAM L. COURTNEY

[WILLIAM LEONARD COURTNEY, Editor of the *Fortnightly Review* since 1894; b. in India in 1850; educated University College, Oxford; LL.D. St. Andrew's; member editorial staff of *Daily Telegraph*, London; and one of the directors of Chapman and Hall's Publishing House; produced his drama, *Kit Marlowe*, in 1893; and in 1903 a dramatic version of De LaMotte Fouqué's story, *Undine*. AUTHOR OF *The Metaphysics of John Stuart Mill*; *Constructive Ethics*; *The Development of Maeterlinck*; three lectures on *Tragedy*; and *Studies of Leisure*.]

THERE is a curious passage in one of Heine's prefaces in which he says that while writing his poems he seemed to hear the whirring of the wings of a bird above his head. He asked some of his brother poets in Berlin whether they had had a similar experience, but they only looked at each other with a strange expression and declared that nothing of the kind had occurred to them.<sup>2</sup>

The wings which Heine had heard, and the young Berlin poets had never heard, were the rush and whirr of new ideas. Only those who are conscious of this wing-winnowing are inspired by the thoughts of a newer era, and are awake when the dawn appears. To Euripides, at all events, who thought to some extent contemporary with the older poets, Æschylus and Sophocles, was a whole age after them in thought, there must have come the strange sounds which Heine heard; for no one more characteristically than he became the exponent of a period of revolution and change. It was a new heaven and a new earth, or, at all events, it was a new earth, which figured itself in his imagination, an earth in which rationalizing thought, a clear logical intelligence,

<sup>1</sup>This lecture was originally delivered at the Royal Institution, London, England, and is presented here to supplement the lectures originally prepared for the International Congress of Arts and Science.

<sup>2</sup>Heine's Preface to his *New Poems*.

and a determination not to accept unverified and unverifiable dogmas wrought havoc with the older scheme of things.

There was much in the contemporary state of Athens, so different from the Athens of the Persian wars, to explain and account for the transformation; but the phenomenon itself which was being exhibited in the Ionic capital can be sufficiently interpreted from the spiritual or intellectual side alone. No one can be sure whether Euripides was the friend of Anaxagoras or of Socrates; but the point is of little consequence, for there was a certain kinship between the two philosophers, and the dramatist may have caught the dominant notes of the newer era from either the one or the other. The older Olympians were being stormed by a young divinity called after no names of imperial or divine majesty, but by the simple term of "intelligence," "*νοῦς*" Whether the human analytic intelligence is applied to antique structures of religion, or superstition, or old-fashioned political theory, or hoary dogmas of morality, the result is always primarily destructive; and a chaotic period supervenes before reason can mould out of the scattered and inconsistent theories the fabric of a better and more intelligible world order.

Shall we look at it on the side of ethics? There comes the discovery that there are no abstract moral laws, true forever and in all places, but only recognized conventions which one country or city can adopt, and another community can reject. Shall we look at it from the side of political theory? We shall make strange discoveries as to the real seat of authority in a state, the meaning of justice, the rationale of civic law, the justification of state punishment. Shall we look at it from the side of religious belief? Here for the poet and the imaginative artist the acid seems to bite deeper still. Either the gods are good, and then the stories told about them are false, or else the stories are true,



and then the gods are no gods at all. How can Zeus and Apollo have carried out their dominion over the earth by means of actions reprobated by the better feeling of humanity? Cheating and stealing and adultery, these are the acts which the ancient legends impute to the gods, to say nothing of an absurd jealousy and a miserable system of favoritism. Such, speaking in general terms, was the character of the destructive work done by the Sophists and teachers of the new enlightenment.

The ordinary conception held in Athens about Socrates was that his influence was exerted on similar lines. He was brought up on a charge of corrupting the youth. It was an absolutely unjust charge, if we may trust Plato, who, indeed, gives us a glorified Socrates. Yet even Socrates' great pupil has to allow that dialectics, the business of argument and discussion and controversy, taught young men to wrangle like puppies and Aristotle said without hesitation that people ought to have come to years of discretion before they learned moral philosophy. Euripides, however, lived in the flood-tide of these ideas, and whether he learned from the lips of Anaxagoras the notion that intelligence was the supreme principle in the universe, or caught from Socrates the trick of argument and analysis of the current notions of the day, his dramas, ostensibly like some of the older ones, are yet inspired by a perfectly different spirit. The effect in his case is all the more interesting to us because there are many superficial and some real likenesses between the age of the Sophists in Greece and that spirit which has been called *fin de siècle* in our modern world.

Skepticism is, of course, the first result. Much learned controversy exists as to whether Euripides was really a skeptic; but there is no manner of doubt that his handling of the older myths and his treatment of the divinities of Greece were conceived in a skeptical vein. Listen to the

naïve way in which Ion, coming out of the temple in the early morning light, rebukes his patron god Apollo for the treatment he had meted out to his mother. "I must needs rebuke Phoebus," he says. "He betrays virgins and abandons them, and allows his own children to perish. Not so, Phoebus: since you have the power, try to be virtuous. The gods punish a man who conducts himself badly. Is it just that the authors of the laws imposed on mortals should themselves transgress them?" Listen in "Andromache" to the words of the messenger who has told us of the death of Neoptolemus: "The god who inspires oracles, who reveals to all men the rules of justice, see how he has treated the son of Achilles. Like a villain he has wreaked vengeance for an ancient quarrel. Where then is his wisdom?" But, indeed, I need not quote examples which are familiar to all those who have read the plays of Euripides. No one was more daring than he in making the characters rebuke the gods for their extraordinarily low ethical standard. One of the apparent exceptions is furnished by the "Bacchantes," in which Euripides seems to recommend the worship of Dionysus. But he was writing for a Macedonian Court, and the meaning of the "Bacchantes" is one of the most contested points among Euripidean commentators.

Skepticism is the half-sister of pessimism, and the thinker who has adopted the one glides almost insensibly into the other. Here we reach a point which is of peculiar importance to us in reference to the idea of tragedy, and I must be pardoned for dilating a little on this subject. It is obvious that tragedy itself is born of pessimism, and could scarcely be conceived as having any other origin. Unless a poet is keenly alive to the sufferings of humanity, unless he feels to the full the irony of mortals whose everyday dream is of happiness, and whose everyday experience is of disappointment and unhappiness, he would hardly adopt tragic themes

for the exercise of his muse. Everything, however, turns on the meaning that we attach to this word pessimism, and the particular form in which it becomes the inspirer of dramatic efforts. In a previous lecture, when speaking of the pessimism that was in Shakespeare, I attempted to distinguish between the pessimism which despaired of human happiness and the pessimism which despaired of human virtue. That is looking at the matter from the point of view of the moralist. Now we must occupy ourselves with the standpoint of the artist.

There are some forms of the philosophic theory of pessimism which appear to cut at the very root of the artistic impulse. If they ever produce fruit in the imaginative sphere, the fruitage is singularly bitter, stunted, abortive. Take, for instance, a scheme like that of Schopenhauer. Beginning with an assurance that there is a large preponderance of misery over happiness in this world, he explains that we are all the victims of a great, mysterious, blind, but all-powerful force, which he calls "the will to live." If you and I and all other men and women are alike miserable, the reason is that we are at once the creatures and playthings of a great impersonal, natural volition, driving us to live our dreary lives, to fear death, and cling to existence, whether we will or no. Intelligence which is given to the human race is the dreariest of mockeries, for it is powerless against this insatiable craving. All that intelligence can do is to throw light upon the turmoil, to make us comprehend the fatal conditions in which we are ensnared, and thus to make us more unhappy than we were before. Now observe the moral which Schopenhauer draws from his philosophical scheme. He tells us that we should deny the will to live, not so much by suicide, for that would be a willful act, and our object is to get rid of will—but by asceticism, self-restraint, resignation to passivity, such as was practiced and is now practiced in the East.

Now, if we suppose that any dramatic artist accepted Schopenhauer as his guide, philosopher and friend, he would have to believe that passivity was better than activity, and would be essaying the almost impossible task of painting by means of action a goal of inaction. The essence of drama is human activity; the very word signifies action; and the idea is absolutely eviscerated of all meaning by the assumption that a denial of the will to live is our real object. Schopenhauer's own notion of tragedy illustrates this. It is only at best a sort of alleviation or temporary consolation—part and parcel, therefore, of that lamentable gift of intelligence which shows how hideous is the chaos in which we live. "What gives to all tragedy, in whatever form it may appear, the peculiar tendency towards the sublime is the awakening of the knowledge that the world, life, can afford us no true pleasure, and consequently is not worthy of our attachment. In this consists the tragic spirit; it therefore leads to resignation."<sup>1</sup>

But the artist must believe in his work as a free and joyous form of activity, not assuredly as a mere anæsthetic, an anodyne, a mode of sending to sleep a ceaseless grumble of indignation and despair.

Such pessimism as this is, I say, for the most part fruitless, or, if it bear fruit, such fruit is atrophied, abortive, bitter, like dead sea-apples in the mouth. It is difficult, perhaps, to suggest a work of art which is conceived in this spirit, and is the direct fruit of Schopenhauer's pessimism. But perhaps Mr. Hardy's *Jude the Obscure* comes the nearest to it, a work which depresses human vitality, and therefore, as I take it, sins against humanity. Better examples can perhaps be found in some of Zola's novels—*L'Assomoir*, *La Terre*, and others.

Nevertheless, the conditions of life may be regarded as

---

<sup>1</sup> Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Idea." Book III, cap. 37.

miserable, and yet human actions stand on a higher plane than before. On a dark background of gloom the higher qualities of the human being—his love, devotion, passion, self-denial, recklessness—may stand out in almost radiant colors. Let us grant with the pessimist that man, as he exists in the midst of a nature that is alien to him, and under social conditions which stunt or retard his growth, is not likely to secure much happiness. Nature, as we know, is harsh and cruel, and her laws are those which are terrible for the individual, though helpful, it may be, for the world's progress—the laws of struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest, and development by means of unlimited competition. Or if we take it from another side of science—the science of biology—there is reason to suppose that the sins of the fathers are visited on the children, and that many men and women begin their careers crippled and maimed by a hereditary taint. Or once more, the social order is found to be oppressive, framed as it is for the convenience of the majority—the incarnation of triumphant commonplace, the victory of the conventionally useful rather than the ideally good, the despotism of a majority which, as Dr. Stockmann declares in Ibsen's *Enemy of the People*, is at least quite as often wrong as right.

Such things may well breed a sort of pessimism, may produce for the thinker and philosophic student a mood of nervelessness and gloom. But the artist who approaches these subjects not as a thinker or as a student, but as an observer of the flash and play of human life, sees that on this background of darkness he can paint his human beings with all their rich vitality and spontaneousness of effort, transfigured and ennobled by contrast. And he has this justification to begin with—that all the nobler and higher activities of man, whether in founding States, creating rules of morality, or even building hospitals, are done in the teeth

of nature, and constitute a direct challenge to the dull mechanical cruelty of her laws. But the sovereign vindication for the artist is the exceeding beauty of all human vitalities, whether they are effective or ineffective, whether they succeed or fail.

It is life as such that the artist loves, strong, exuberant, magnificent life, defying laws of time and space, and conquering the impossible—circumscribed, indeed, if we look at its scientific conditions, but absolutely free and untrammelled in its spiritual essence. If an artist who feels the intoxication of life writes tragedies, they do not in reality depress us, because instead of making the pulse flag and beat slower, they stir us, as it were, with a trumpet-call, they cause the blood to flow more eagerly through our veins. Did any one ever feel his sense of vitality lowered by either reading or seeing on the stage the ruin of Othello or the tragedy of Lear? It is more difficult to find contemporary examples, but one can feel much the same thing with regard to many even of the modern novelists whose books are often classed as pessimistic. Take, for instance, the two books of that strong, original writer, who calls herself "Zack"—*On Trial* and *Life is Life*. They are pessimistic enough in all conscience, if we mean by the word that the authoress is keenly conscious of the sorrow of things. But the artist has known how to enhance the dignity of human effort, even when she proclaims it to be hopeless. We do grievous wrong to works of art if we dismiss them because they seem to preach a gloomy moral. There is a gloom which is paralyzing; there is another gloom which a man or woman of strong creative personality can turn into a very mainspring of pulsing action and life.<sup>1</sup>

If, therefore, we class Euripides as a pessimist, we must

---

<sup>1</sup> See an essay by Mr. William Archer (contributed to the *Fortnightly Review*), entitled "Tragedy and Pessimism."

be careful to define what kind of pessimism he represents. He is an apt parallel to the moderns because he comes after the first primitive artistic impulse has waned; he lives in an age when for the majority the native hue of resolution had been sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. But on a canvas of vacillation and doubt, with a background of skepticism as to the nature and existence of the gods and a resolute acknowledgment that life is in many respects evil, he paints, with all the more touching and picturesque pathos, suffering, struggling, doomed, passionate, but always vigorous humanity.

It is the pathos of things, indeed, the *lacrimae rerum* which so occupy Euripides that he becomes almost romantic in the treatment of his themes. It is this sense of pathos and pity which made Aristotle call him the most tragic of the poets, and was in the mind doubtless of Mrs. Browning when she wrote of "Euripides the human with his droppings of warm tears." Men and women in the Euripidean drama are always alive: they sin passionately, they transgress all moral and divine laws; they destroy one another with a fierce ferocity, they make glorious failures—but they are vital. And just because the play of life was so infinitely interesting to Euripides, whether it was Anaxagoras who told him this lesson or Socrates or his own artistic genius, he can put into clear light quite as many virtues as the vices of which he is so prodigal. Many critics have called him misogynist, and certainly he says very hard things of the female sex. As a matter of fact, in the tragi-comedy of existence, he realizes far more clearly than his predecessors the extraordinary value from an artistic standpoint of women-characters. He knows how they can embroil and embellish human things, how they can at once disturb and improve, ruin and save. By the side, therefore, of his splendidly villainous women like Phaedra and Medea and

Stheneboea, women who break through every natural impulse with undaunted recklessness, he will give you women who are patterns of high moral duty, women filled through and through with the idea of self-sacrifice, willing victims, like Polyxena and the beautiful Iphigenia—not, as in the older dramatist, killed by her father, but going voluntarily to the altar for the sake of the Trojan expedition. So, too, there is no higher example of conjugal love than that of Alcestis, who died for her unworthy lord.

Like Virgil after him, Euripides sees also the artistic value between man and maid. This was a complete innovation in tragedy. Plato thought that love itself was not a worthy theme in drama. Aristophanes derides it. But the poet's contemporaries who were themselves perhaps learning a softer mood of romance, as the great patriotic impulses of the Persian wars were dying away, appreciated the novelty as though it were indeed a revelation. Take the young Haemon with his love of Antigone, cheerfully dying for her sake, or take the moving treatment of "Perseus and Andromeda," which seems to have captivated Athenian audiences though it only exists for us in fragments. Andromeda, as Professor Lewis Campbell remarks in his interesting book on Greek tragedy, says the very words to her deliverer which Miranda in "The Tempest," says to Ferdinand: "Sir, take me with you, whether as your servant, or wife, or handmaid," anticipates Miranda's "To be your fellow you may deny me, but I will be your servant, whether you will or no." Euripides may or may not have been a misogynist, but at all events he was one of the "Feminists," a protagonist in that movement which so profoundly influences the Norwegian dramatist Ibsen.

In what I have said I have already anticipated some of the conditions of a modern age. In a remarkable speech to a club of workingmen at Drontheim in 1885, Ibsen declared



that "the Revolution now preparing in Europe is chiefly concerned with the future of the Workers and the Women. In this I place all my hopes and expectations, and for this I will work all my life." Here are certainly two points which will mark the lifework of an advanced thinker in contemporary times. The rise of what is known as the Feminist Movement, the echoes of which are even heard in France, as proved by such remarkable novels as *Femmes Nouvelles*, by the Brothers Margueritte, and *Une Nouvelle Douleur*, by Jules Bois, must naturally alter the point of view of any dramatist who is concerned with the social aspects of the era.<sup>1</sup> Themes therefore, which treat of the contrast between the two sexes, and of woman's economic moral and intellectual emancipation, come to the forefront, and indeed could scarcely be expected to be absent in any author who is inspired by the newer lights.

So, too, with regard to the other great question, which in its general tendency is called socialism. The various classes of society, their differences of station, their life struggle, the contrast between rich and poor, the great gulf fixed between social influence and social impotence, these will not leave themselves without evidence in the works of a modern thinker. Add to these a characteristic mark of the latter part of the 19th century—the solution of all questions on scientific grounds and by means of scientific formulæ—and we have the main ingredients of that environment in the midst of which a contemporary dramatist has to work. Materialism—a practical materialism which makes wealth one of the objects of men's lives, and a theoretical materialism which makes the doctor the great hero of modern life, because all diseases, spiritual or mental, are in the last resort declared to be physical; a social order in which woman

<sup>1</sup> The note is, of course, different in England and France. In England it is the practical inconvenience of the revolting female; in France it is the voluble indignation of the baffled male.

is acclaimed as the arbiter of her own destiny—these are the general aspects, the contemporary features which art has to work with, and, if possible, mould to her own purpose.

There is, however, another point which, for our immediate object, is more important still. We are not dealing with a young civilization such as was to be found in Greece in the sixth century B.C., and in Italy in the early Renaissance. We are dealing with a society which has lost, to a large extent, its faith in ideals, which has become skeptical of its own efforts, more than a little weary of the higher aims, more and more content to relapse on the lower levels of life and thought. To an age of this kind, to a civilization which can be described in these terms, how will the general idea of tragedy be altered? It depended, you will remember, on a certain equipoise between an external compelling fate and an internal power of initiative and resistance. The one was the element of necessity, the impersonal order of the universe; the other was the element of freedom, the personal fount and source of action.

Now, when Shakespeare was attracted by this problem—the sphere allowed to human volition in the midst of a great overpowering environment—he slowly worked towards a conclusion which was consistent with his own energy of temperament and with the general characteristics of his age, that what we mean by Destiny and Fate is nothing more nor less than a man's character. Man has not to look outside for the impulses which govern him, but the tyrants which rule his birth are found within the four walls of his own personality. Such a doctrine might suit the strong youthful times of art and of a nation's vigor, because, under such conditions, the value of human efforts is recognized as the one great thing in the universe; but when the times have grown older, when there has appeared a certain lassitude in

art and in national existence, such a doctrine is too hard to be borne. It is so much easier for those who are already fatigued and wearied with much experience and much knowledge of the fallaciousness and failure of human effort to say that destiny comes from the outside, and is an irresistible force overbearing human wills.

In Maeterlinck, for instance, you find the conclusion that man is the plaything, the sport of Destiny. At all events this is true of Maeterlinck's earlier dramas, where the human figure is so faintly drawn that the notion of spontaneity or freedom is absurd and impossible. "Pelleas and Melisande" were both the victims of fate, which they could not control; so, too, were Aglavaine and Selysette; so, too, was the unlucky Princess Maleine. If you reduce human vitality to a thin, almost incorporeal vapor, if, instead of human beings that have length, breadth and thickness, you have frescoes on a wall, it is absurd to ask if things like these can alter their fates, or recognize that the supreme fate lies in their character. They will be driven hither and thither as leaves in a wind, puppets dangled on wires over which they have no control, dolls which the dramatist takes out, dresses up, and when they have finished their task, puts into the box again. What Maeterlinck will do hereafter is another matter. He has written a fine book on *Destiny and Character*, and for aught we know may be devising in his mind quite other characters and dramas from those with which we are at present conversant.<sup>1</sup>

It is more than commonly difficult to arrive at any just estimate of the position of Ibsen as a dramatist. It would not be true to say of him, as I venture to say about Maeterlinck, that he depresses the sense of human vitality. His thought, if not always quite clear, is always vigorous; he

<sup>1</sup>In what I have said I am only dealing with the dramatic qualities of Maeterlinck. The poetic qualities, the haunting and suggestive beauty of his scenes and some of his lines, are quite another matter.

has a singular grasp of many of the insistent problems that vex the modern world, and for reasons that are connected with his unique personality, he wields a curious power of fascination in many ways disturbing to the judgment. There is much of the sorcerer in him, so that however much one may dislike his themes, he holds us, like the Ancient Mariner, with his glittering eye, compelling us to read what he has to say to the last page. Moreover, he is so unconventional that he gives a vivid impression of originality, not always, I think, quite deserved. Many of his social themes, for instance, appear in French dramatists, who raise, though in a different form, the precise questions which Ibsen raises. But no one could deny him the name of a dramatist. He is a master of theatrical technique, in the presentment of his themes, and in the evolution of such plot as he allows himself. Both his characters and the phrases which from time to time he puts into their mouth have a distinct power over our imagination, so that they become unforgettable. Indeed, I might go further. They obsess the mind like a nightmare that we should like to shake off, but cannot.

If all this means anything, it means that Ibsen is a real dramatist. Think, for instance, in one of the least satisfactory of his dramas, "Little Eyolf," how admirably the first act is arranged, how clearly it puts the issues before us, how instantly we understand the situation of the father and mother now that their boy is lost. Sometimes, as in this case, Ibsen begins with a catastrophe, and works out its consequences; sometimes, as in "John Gabriel Borkman," the catastrophe has happened before the curtain goes up. In each case we are put as close as possible to the critical moment, and the concentration of interest which is thereby gained is found to be of no little dramatic value. The Norwegian writer prefers to work analytically rather

than synthetically. He does not show how the tragedy grows, but, breaking it into its component parts, he traces the effects of the tragedy on his characters.

Nevertheless there remains one constant quality for which it is not easy to find a word. It is a quality of grimness, of ruggedness, of irritability, as though life and the world had got on his nerves and filled him with spleen. His dramas are never written in a serene artistic temper, but too often represent the unfathomable indignation of the idealist who looks from Dan to Beersheba and finds the whole country barren. It is not an uncommon effect of analysis that it leaves few of the fair structures of life standing. The analytic mind, whether in the man of science or in a disappointed and thwarted poet like Ibsen, by resolving a thing into its component parts, loses the sense of its general value, mars its beauty, destroys its serviceableness in the order of the universe. We know, for instance, how victorious analysis, in the sphere of practical and moral science, has done its best to resolve the notion of duty into convenience or pleasure or personal utility, and the idea of conscience into an inherited fear of the spirits of dead ancestors.

Something of the same kind must happen when an isolated thinker like Ibsen probes the ordinary conventions of social life and finds them hollow, taps at all the shutters and discovers that what is behind them is valueless, throws open the closet-doors and reveals the skeletons, tears the veil from human affections, and displays their meanness and littleness. Mankind must appear very despicable to a man who makes Peer Gynt the hero of a drama, paints the conventional husband under the form of a self-satisfied idiot like Helmer, and has an especial fondness for introducing the Norwegian emancipated young woman as the destroyer of connubial felicity. The human animal is either

a knave or a fool, and generally contemptible; nor does Ibsen even spare men like Master-builder Solness, or wounded Napoleons like Borkman, albeit that they are supposed to enlist our sympathies.

It is not an age for the male being, Ibsen would seem to tell us; on the other hand, it is emphatically an age for the female being. In this, of course, the dramatist is true to the ideas of his century, the latter half of which has been overridden by the claim of women to fashion their own world as they will, to succeed or fail, self-taught and independent, and to have no kind or manner of reverence for hoary social institutions. In Ibsen the woman is often treated with a tenderness which stands out in vivid contrast with his natural moral suspiciousness. Take, for instance, these lines, from an early play, "The Pretenders." The King says, "Every fair memory from those days have I wasted or let slip;" and Ingeborg, the woman, replies, "It is a man's right," or in the later edition, "It is your right to forget." "And, meantime," the male continues, "you, Ingeborg, loving, faithful woman, have sat there in the north, guarding and treasuring your memories in ice-cold loneliness." To which the woman simply answers, "It was my happiness to remember." As she leaves the stage she utters the beautiful words, "To love, to sacrifice all, and be forgotten; that is woman's saga."

Although this little dialogue is conceived in a tender and gracious spirit, it reminds one of those keen heart thrusts which pass between husband and wife in "A Doll's House." Helmer: "No man sacrifices his honor even for one he loves." Nora: "Millions of women have done so." We cannot easily forget the piteous wife of the Master-BUILDER who has kept all her old doll's clothes in a drawer; nor, better still, the figure of Agnes in "Brand." Agnes, poring over her little dead boy's suits, or placing her candle in the

window so that its light may fall across the snow on his grave, and give the little one a gleam of Christmas comfort, is drawn with some of the most exquisite touches, full of a soft and radiant sweetness in the midst of an almost habitual gloom. Nor can the man be said to have failed in understanding the feminine nature who has drawn such remarkable figures as Rebekka in "Rosmersholm" and Hedda Gabler in the play called after her name. You will find, I think, that many actresses have liked to act in Ibsen's plays, because the heroine appeals to them. Even Eleanora Duse has acted in "A Doll's House," albeit that her masterful vitality and the richness of her artistic nature made the little butterfly Nora, who suddenly wants to discover "whether society is right or she is," a more paradoxical character than before.

There is, however, in Ibsen, despite the fact that he is above all a thinker and a student, a certain incoherence of ideas which has sometimes a very baffling and confusing effect. Partly this no doubt is due to the fact that some of his earlier dramas were written under the inspiration of a Danish thinker, Søren Kirkegaard, an influence which evaporated when he executed his later studies. The tragedy of "Brand" and the work "Love's Comedy," which, thanks to Professor Herford, those of us who do not know Norwegian can now peruse for ourselves, are especially overshadowed by the thoughts of Kirkegaard. I say "overshadowed," because of all the thinkers who have made life difficult for us mortals this Danish philosopher is the most paradoxical. He is an idealist, who seems to have begun in the school of Kant, but his paradoxes are even more remarkable than those famous antinomies of reason and experience which made the German philosopher of Königsberg so full of hard sayings even for a Teutonic audience. In "Brand," for instance, the Kirkeguardian

god, whom the hero worships, is a deity who demands the most appalling sacrifices of all human ties and associations before he can be approached and understood, or subsequently revealed as a *deus caritatis*. Brand lets his mother go to hell, is the cause of the death of his own child, and finally sacrifices his wife—all in the pursuit of an ideal righteousness, a peculiar state of will, wholly remote from our actual life in some impossible transcendental sphere. How a god who required such sacrifices as these, who demanded so urgently and cruelly that all human feelings should be eradicated, can be afterwards proclaimed as the god of love, when his sovereign power had emptied such a word of all meaning, is impossible to understand.

Observe, too, a curious cynicism with which this pursuit of paradoxical idealism manifests itself in "Love's Comedy." In a boarding house are collected a number of young men and maidens, mostly ordinary and conventional, under the care of a lady who boasts herself to be one of the most successful match-makers of her time. But there is one thinker, Falk, and one true woman, Swanhild, who stand out above the common herd. They are the predestined lovers, because each has understood in the other where the need of true companionship lay, and because they had real spiritual affinities. Nevertheless, when this love is mutually confessed, they decide to separate, and Swanhild elects to marry a practical elderly merchant, Guldstad. Why? Because love is such a rare thing, it has such a delicate essence of its own, that when caught in the nets of matrimony it is only too apt to disappear. It is better to have loved and to remember, than to love and get married. Love which prompts the need of union is apparently the very thing which dies when the union is consummated.

Of course such a doctrine has an obvious common-sense truth of its own, but for the idealist it is based on a con-



fusion between the material form and the spiritual essence of love. Passion, being a fugitive and inconsistent thing, may and will certainly die, but the butterfly will often soar with all the brighter colors because the chrysalis shape has been thrown off. Observe, however, the sort of moral which the mocking spirit of Ibsen seems to draw from his play. Conventional marriages—*marriages de convenance*—can safely be recommended. No injury can be done by them, no mortal wound inflicted on love. And yet this is the man who afterwards will storm and rail against conventional marriages, because they destroy human individuality. Cynically to recommend an union which is afterwards found destructive to the human soul betrays what I venture to call incoherence of ideas. Nor is this the only form in which this incoherence is exhibited.

There is a tendency in many of the later plays to employ high-sounding phrases apparently of deep symbolical value, but which on examination seem to contain but little or nothing. We hear of "the great law of Change," a pretentious phrase to signify that human character is more or less fickle; or "the great law of Retribution," with which, indeed, every dramatist should deal without investing it with capital letters. Nor shall I hesitate to say that over and over again the word "Liberty" is used as if it could only mean irresponsibility. Sometimes the freedom for which Ibsen is constantly pining is hardly to be distinguished from license.

I touch with hesitation on another point which I believe forms a somewhat envenomed subject of debate between the older and the newer schools of criticism. I refer to a certain poverty of *mise en scene*, a designed squalor in the range and meaning of the plot, a provincialism, as it were, in the intrigue and management of Ibsen's dramas. You will remember that Matthew Arnold believed that the only

true literature was the literature of the centre, something that belonged to the main line of literary development on the ground of its style, its manner of treatment, its arrangement of data. Ibsen's literature could never be described as that of the centre. Perhaps the time has come when literature ought no longer to belong to the centre, but to the circumference, and there are many signs among our contemporary writers that they have definitely accepted this view of the circumference as the chief object of their interest. Meanwhile, from the point of view of tragedy, which Aristotle said is to deal with great things, and which has been depicted in poetry as tragedy "with purple pall," as though some regal splendor should belong to those whose ruin is depicted before our eyes, the tragic drama that you find in Ibsen is singularly mean, commonplace, parochial—as if Apollo, who once entered the house of Admetus, was now told to take up his habitation in a back parlor in South Hampstead. There may be tragedies in South Hampstead, although experience does not consistently testify to the fact; but, at all events from the historic and traditional standpoint, tragedy is more likely to concern itself with Glamys Castle, Melrose Abbey, Carisbrooke, or even with Carlton House Terrace.

Behind some of the grandiose tragedies of Shakespeare, there is the suggestion of a world-catastrophe as if palsied King Lear shaking his menacing finger at the waterspouts, was the crazy prophet of a cosmic ruin. Such an atmosphere never surrounds the Ibsen drama. For instance, "The Enemy of the People" is a play on much the same subject as "Prometheus Vincit." In both there is a picture of the one man, never so strong as when he is all alone waging, on the ground of his superior knowledge and insight, war against the forces of ignorance, and blind, unreasoning force. Dr. Stockmann is a Prometheus, a Pro-

metheus who has his front windows broken, instead of having his liver eaten by Zeus' eagle. In the one case the scene is laid in the Caucasus with winged messengers of Heaven, with patient or impatient victims of divine injustice, thronging the stage; in the other case the scene is laid in the editorial room of a provincial newspaper, with disputes between the business manager and a contributor, and a general apparatus of printer's devils to take the place of Io and the daughters of Oceanus. There is something in the "grand manner" after all!

The same result is arrived at if we study most of the social dramas, by which Ibsen has made himself notorious. There is that triumphant masterpiece of squalid obscurity, with all its incisive analysis of a petty woman's soul, which is called "Hedda Gabler," or there is that dreary record of provincial meanness and pessimism enshrined in the exceedingly clever play "The Wild Duck." Neither the heroines nor the heroes are really great. Perhaps Ibsen has taken peculiar pains to destroy the titles of his heroes and heroines to greatness. Was, for instance, Master-Builder Solness an architect of commanding rank? Was John Gabriel Borkman a real Napoleon of finance? In both instances you have a peculiarly poignant picture of success followed by failure; but are the characters typical enough to make us feel that they are decisive examples of masterful skill or masterful rapacity? Solness is almost a symbolical figure, and the symbolic character tends to failure as an ordinary human being. Just as a mere phase of individual idiosyncrasy will not necessarily make a personage dramatic, so, too, will character in a tragedy fail to bring home to us the desolation of failure, unless he be in a real sense not symbolic but typical.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>It is necessary to distinguish between a symbolical figure and a typical figure. A symbolical figure is an abstraction; a typical figure may be full of the ripe juices of humanity.

What, in fact, is Ibsen's idea of tragedy? As far as I can see, it is the failure on the part of a given individual to achieve his mission. In some dim way we realize that the broken-down heroes or heroines of Ibsen have had some task which they ought to have been able to perform, and some object of life which, under happier circumstances, they might have achieved, and their disappointment and disgust make the tragedy. This, of course, might be the description of every tragedy in the world's history. To know that one has a life vocation, to sin against it, and consequently to acknowledge oneself a failure, is of the very essence of the tragic idea. Nevertheless, if we are thinking of the impression upon ourselves, the character of the personages and the circumstances which are too strong for them have both to be considered.

Well, the indubitably great thing about Ibsen's characters, perhaps the only great thing about them, is their vanity; while the circumstances against which they have to struggle are, for the most part, relative to the circumscribed conditions of life in a young, crude, immature civilization in Norway. We know that when Ibsen had produced his extraordinarily impressive play of "Ghosts," and found that instead of sympathy he had won derision, he shook the dust off his feet against his native country and lived abroad. He realized that he was too advanced in thought and feeling for his Norwegian home. He is always full of the idea that the cramping circumstances of life in Norway are fatal to individuality, to human liberty. But he is a real revolutionary in this respect, that he does not care for liberty as a possession, but only as a pursuit. If heaven were to offer him freedom in a socialistic community on the one hand, and a vehement conflict on behalf of liberty in an old aristocratic and oligarchic state on the other hand, he would unhesitatingly choose the latter. For him it is the conflict which is sweet, not the victory.

Nor is he a pessimist in the proper sense of the term. He does not despair of human happiness under all circumstances, he only despairs of it under special and limited conditions. So much of the early idealism belongs to the disappointed and bitter poet that he thinks happiness well worth striving for. He will put all social institutions into the melting-pot, and wage ceaseless war against the established, the conventional, and the decorous, because the individual human being has a right to struggle ceaselessly for happiness. A later Ibsen play, "When We Dead Awaken," leads to much the same conclusions.

I have left myself but small space in which to deal with the contemporary movements of the drama. For many reasons it is better that I should pass over such points as still remain with only a brief notice. There is something invidious, perhaps almost distasteful, in the criticism of one who has no very large knowledge of the English theatre, and yet ventures to lay down dogmas in an authoritative way on artists who know their business a great deal better than he can know it. One or two general remarks, however, may be hazarded. In the present age there is no particular liking or room for tragedy. The world is apt to shut its eyes to the deeper aspects of existence, because any attempt to pierce below the surface is held to involve unpleasantness.

Comedy may or may not be a great success, but at all events it is far more likely to win its triumphs in an epicurean age than its elder sister, tragedy. People go to the theatre in order to be amused and to laugh; they hardly care to be made to feel. Some of the most earnest work of contemporary authors falls flat because it is held to be out of tune with fashionable surroundings of leisure and wealth, and artists themselves acquire a willful petulance and an accent of revolt owing to this atmosphere of care-

lessness or apathy. There is, too, that phenomenon, the literary drama, which has a paralyzing effect,—the drama, never intended to be acted, which under present circumstances comes to be recognized as the only form of dramatic writing that the leaders of the literary world care to essay.

Many of Browning's dramas belong to this class, all of Swinburne's and, according to some critics, a good many of Tennyson's. Nevertheless, there are some signs of a return to serious dramatic writing. There is the work of Mr. Laurence Irving and of Mr. Esmond, by no means devoid of promise. Quite recently we have been reading Mr. Stephen Phillip's "Paolo and Francesca," in which the beautiful legend of Dante has received a worthy setting of literary beauty; and Mrs. Craigie's "Osborn and Ursyne," vigorous, poetical, and rife with sincere emotion.

But, after all, the great reason for optimism with regard to the future is the fact that Mr. Pinero has given us in our modern age a play which is a masterpiece, "The Second Mrs. Tanqueray." Hereafter we shall know better, I think, than we do now how great an achievement Mr. Pinero's "The Second Mrs. Tanqueray" really is, how true a tragedy in form, management and style. We stand too close to it at present to see its true proportions, and the real issue disappears because it is classed not only among other plays of his, but superficially described as a study after the model of Ibsen. In form it is much more like a play of the school of Dumas the younger, although Dumas did not often write anything half so good. The character of Paula Tanqueray is one of the most triumphant creations which has ever been composed for the stage, in the fearlessness and truth of its portraiture and the artistic cunning of its presentment.

Dumas wrote "La Dame aux Camélias" when he was a young man. Mr. Pinero wrote "The Second Mrs. Tanqueray" in the maturity of his powers. While the one

gives a theatrical glorification of the courtesan, the other dares to draw her as she really is, in all the pathetically good instincts, and also the littleness and bitterness of her artificially developed soul. The style is in every sense worthy of the theme; indeed, here and there are classical passages, classical in their restraint, sobriety, and clear-cut form. Listen to the following, when Aubrey and his wife are sitting amid the hopeless ruin of their fortunes, discussing the probability or possibility of beginning again. The sentences ring with suppressed emotion, but the logical situation is exposed with a master's hand.

*Aubrey.* We'll make our calculations solely for the future, talk about the future, think about the future.

*Paula.* I believe the future is only the past again, entered through another gate.

*Aubrey.* That's an awful belief.

*Paula.* To-night proves it. You must see now that, do what we will, go where we will, you'll continually be reminded of—what I was. I see it.

*Aubrey.* You're frightened to-night; meeting this man has frightened you. But that sort of thing isn't likely to recur. The world isn't quite so small as all that.

*Paula.* Isn't it? The only great distances it contains are those we carry within ourselves—the distances that separate husbands and wives, for instance. And so it'll be with us. You'll do your best—oh, I know that—you're a good fellow. But circumstances will be too strong for you in the end, mark my words.

*Aubrey.* Paula!

*Paula.* Of course I'm pretty now. I'm pretty still—and a pretty woman, whatever else she may be, is always—well, enduring. But even now I notice that the lines of my face are getting deeper; so are the hollows about my eyes. Yes, my face is covered with little shadows that usen't to be there. Oh, I know I'm "going off." I hate paint and dye and those messes, but by-and-bye I shall drift the way of the others; I shan't be able to help myself. And then, some day—perhaps very suddenly, under a queer fantastic light at night or in the glare of the morning—that horrid, irresistible truth that physical repulsion forces on men and women will come to you, and you'll sicken at me.

*Aubrey.* I!

*Paula.* You'll see me then at last with other people's eyes, you'll see me just as your daughter does now, as all the wholesome folks see women like me. And I shall have no weapon to fight with—not one serviceable little bit of prettiness left me to defend myself with. A worn-out creature, broken up, very likely some time before I ought to be—my hair bright, my eyes dull, my body too thin or too stout, my cheeks raddled and ruddled—a ghost, a wreck, a caricature, a candle that sputters; call such an end what you like! Oh, Aubrey, what shall I be able to say to you then? And this is the future you talk about! I know it. I know it. *(He is still sitting staring forward, she rocks herself to and fro as if in pain.)* Oh, Aubrey! Oh! Oh!

*Aubrey.* Paula! *(Trying to comfort her.)*

*Paula.* Oh, and I wanted so much to sleep to-night! <sup>1</sup>

And the future? Of that, too, I perhaps may venture to say a word. The future of the drama depends more upon the temper of the people than upon anything else. For years past there has been a period of increasing prosperity, in which notions of ease and comfort and security have forced into the background all graver questions as inconvenient and irksome. How can the artist thrive when the standard of living is fixed by the men who run theatres for various motives: because it is not a bad form of investment, because the patronage of the drama is fashionable, but mainly because they want to be amused?

It is under such circumstances that English comedy becomes farce, or else a so-called musical play; while those who might appreciate tragedy, if they saw it, have to content themselves with vulgar and extravagant melodrama. But when the people alter, these things will, too, be different, and it is possible that even before our eyes the temper of the nation is transforming itself. Tragedy born of the people is at its best and fullest when it is contemporaneous with a great outburst of national life. Are we not living at present under a wave of indignant emotion, which is sweeping away class distinctions, destroying the false notion

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Pinero's "The Second Mrs. Tanqueray," Act IV.



that wealth is a form of nobility, bringing down the rough estimate of things to the bare human level, the qualities which make a virile and efficient man? Never in history has a nation awakened to the consciousness of its real sources of greatness without finding expression for its heightened feeling in art. That, I take it, is the hope, as eventually it will be the glory, of the twentieth century.



## THE PLAYS OF HENRIK IBSEN.<sup>1</sup>

BY PHILIP H. WICKSTEED

[PHILIP HENRY WICKSTEED, M.A., English Unitarian clergyman, and University Extension Lecturer since 1887, on Dante, Ibsen, and Economics; b. in Leeds, 1844; educated University College, Manchester, and New College, London; entered Unitarian Ministry, 1867; officiated Little Portland Street Chapel, London, 1874-97. Translated and wrote the notes of Dante's *Paradiso*, Temple edition. AUTHOR OF *Dante, Six Sermons*; *Alphabet of Economic Science*; the *Coördination of the Laws of Distribution*; and *Henrik Ibsen*.]

"BRAND" and "Peer Gynt" were fierce invectives against Norway, but they were welcomed with boundless enthusiasm by the very people they lashed.

It may be doubted whether such a phenomenon has ever been paralleled. Dramas filled with scathing satire and denunciation of the Norwegians have become as it were the Norwegian national epics. They have given Norway an exalted sense of national existence and national significance. They have been read by high and low, are known almost by heart by hundreds of Norwegians, and have enriched the thought, the proverbial wisdom, the imagination, and the language of Norway. To the wanderer over fell and fiord, they are ever present; their magic lines so blending with the scenery they describe, that he *sees* them in the snow-field and ice tarn; and the author of "Peer Gynt" and "Brand" is forgotten and lost—absorbed into the invisible and impersonal genius of the place which has become articulate through his words.

But Ibsen's direct polemic against his people was not yet completed. "Brand" and "Peer Gynt" were followed by "The Youthful League" (1869), a satire on the political

<sup>1</sup> Lecture originally delivered at Chelsea, England, and presented here to supplement the lectures originally prepared for the International Congress of Arts and Science.

parties and the political motives of Norway. This brilliant play is naturally one that ill bears transplanting, but English readers are in a position to form their own opinion of its merits in an English dress, and it is not my purpose to dwell upon it further than to point out that it is the first of Ibsen's plays written in that limpid simplicity of current modern prose which stamps his dialogue in all his later work with unsurpassed verisimilitude and naturalness in the original, and with the inevitable appearance of baldness in even the best translation.

"The Youthful League" checked Ibsen's rising popularity. It was received with indignation in his native land. The philosophical observer may find much food for reflection in the fact that the people which not only admired, but positively exulted in "Brand" and "Peer Gynt," indignantly resented the "Youthful League." But this, too passed away. My copy bears the date of 1883, and shows that in that year the work reached its fifth edition.

After writing these three plays, Ibsen at last returned to "Julian the Apostate," and in 1873 the two dramas, respectively entitled "Cæsar's Apostasy" and "The Emperor Julian," but also embraced under the common title, "Emperor and Galilæan," made their appearance.

In some respects this is the most ambitious, as well as the most bulky, of Ibsen's works. It has great merits, so great, indeed, that it would not be easy to exaggerate them; but yet it is almost the only one of Ibsen's published works that can fairly be called an artistic failure. Critics, I think, are substantially agreed on both these points. The drama gives evidence of a historic sense, the more remarkable since Ibsen was presumably not much of a Greek scholar, and must have depended largely upon translations and secondary sources for his vivid reconstruction of the epoch of Julian. The intolerable atmosphere of suspicion, hypocrisy, and

treachery in which Julian passed his youth; his own timid, feverish, superstitious, yet attractive character; and the heroic potentialities which never rise into heroism, the talent which never becomes genius, the capacity which never ripens into greatness, and the all-penetrating, all-corroding vanity that are the distinctive characteristics of Julian, are thrown into vivid relief in the first of the twin dramas. In the second we witness the moral and intellectual collapse of a fanatic who lacks inspiration. Julian is a pedant, not a prophet; and his pedantry swallows up his humanity, and dictates actions as revolting and less excusable than the wildest excesses of the Christian fanatics. But he never can adopt the *rôle* of a persecutor with a whole heart. He is ashamed of himself, and is half conscious all along of the hollowness of his own cause. He is engaged in a hopeless struggle against fate, and its hopelessness does not bring out the tragic grandeur of his nature, but saps his force and vitality, and reduces him to insignificance, indecision, and at last to mere helpless superstition and crazy arrogance. It is a relief to all, a relief chiefly to himself, when he receives his death wound, can drop the weary struggle, and can cry, "Galilæan! Thou hast triumphed."

The whole picture is drawn with deep insight both historical and psychological. But it cannot be denied that the dialogue often drags and sometimes overstays the climax; and that the second of the two dramas has no sufficient development, and no sufficient interest to sustain it, at any rate through the first three of its five long acts.

But in spite of all this, there is, perhaps, not one of Ibsen's works which the serious student of the social plays can less afford to ignore than the "Emperor and Galilæan," for here if anywhere, Ibsen sets forth his formal creed.

Julian perceives rightly enough that the official Christianity of his day is hollow and hypocritical. It does not

make men spiritual, but it lays a ban upon their earthly enjoyments, and corrupts and corrodes them. It has quenched the beauty of the old pagan religion of joy, and has planted in its place a grovelling religion of superstition, of fear, of bargaining, and of treachery.

But now that it has once come and has made the old religion wither, as under a blight, it is vain to endeavor to recover that old religion again. A man may seek relief from the present by transporting himself into the past, but he cannot bring back the past into the present and make it live again.

When Julian has been crowning his brow with vine-leaves, and seeking the fresh life of joy and freedom that reigned of old, and has then fallen into a conversation that stirs in his heart thoughts of the passionate earnestness of the early Christian spirit, he cries out that the only real life is to be found in the fire of martyrdom and the crown of thorns; and as he strikes his hand upon his brow, it falls upon the vine crown! Sadly he removes it and gazes on it, then flings it away with the bitter cry, "The new truth is true no more, and the ancient beauty is no longer beautiful!"

And yet he perpetually strives to recover that ancient beauty, though he feels that it is now hateful. As he rides through the streets in Bacchic triumph with the panther skin thrown over his shoulders and the wild chorus of revelers round him, he tries to imagine that he is restoring ancient beauty; but no sooner is he alone than he feels the hideous hollowness of the whole thing. Is a band of drunkards and harlots paid to sport in the streets, while the abashed or amused crowd stares in bewilderment, or raises a mercenary shout to please the Emperor,—a shout with no joy, no conviction, no ring in it—is this beautiful?

Beautiful? Nay, he cries out for a bath, a bath for the body and the soul, to wash away the stench of it!

And thus in the war of philosophy against superstition, of toleration against fanaticism, of beauty and freedom against anxious earnestness, he has changed sides without knowing it. He finds himself engaged in a crusade against luxury, worldliness, and indifference. He strives to lay a new consecration upon men, instead of leading them back into frank and free enjoyment of life. The Galilæan has laid a spell upon the world, and his foe can no more escape it than his followers can.

It is clear enough, then, where Julian is wrong. But what would have been the right? The Christianity he knew was rotten. He could not acquiesce in it. But the true way out of it into something better lay forward, and not backward.

This doctrine is expounded—in a jargon which, it must be confessed, severely tries our patience—by the mystic Maximus. The “Third Kingdom,” which is neither that of the Emperor nor that of the Galilean, and yet is both; which is neither that of the flesh nor that of the spirit, and yet both; neither of beauty nor of truth, and yet both,—the “Third Kingdom,” the consummation and harmony of its imperfect predecessors, towards which all rebels against what is have dimly felt their way, which none can describe because none have seen the unborn—this “Third Kingdom” is to be reached *through* the past and the present. Infancy has its beauty, which dies, but is not lost when youth swallows it up. Youth has its beauty, which dies, but is not lost when manhood succeeds it. You cannot go back to *recover* infancy; you must go forward to *preserve* both it and youth transfigured and embraced in manhood.

Thus decisively is the reactionary solution of social and religious problems rejected. When the truths that once inspired men have become mere catchwords, salvation lies in an advance which will recover and reincorporate, while

transmuting and transforming, their essential spirit, not in a retreat which will attempt to preserve the perishing or re-suscitate the dead formulæ.

And again: the mere fact of any truth being accepted, recognized, formulated, patronized, enforced, and established, itself tends to make it a lie; for it tends to become a convention instead of a formative power, a tradition instead of a conviction, a profession instead of a belief. Hence Julian's established Paganism has all the vices of the established Christianity it superseded, in addition to its own reactionary unreality; and the only vivifying power which his zeal for Paganism really exercises is its purifying influence upon the Christianity which he persecutes. In this, and in this only, he is really effective; for he thus helps to re-invigorate the Christians, and push them forward towards the new truths they had ceased to seek.

Such, I take it, is the meaning of the "Emperor and Galilæan;" and it will be seen how closely it all bears upon the faiths and scepticisms, the advances and reactions of our own day; and what a flood of light it throws upon Ibsen's attitude towards all the problems of modern life in the social plays. . . .

And thus we have come to understand the meaning and the mission of the "poet of doubt."

Is it not enough after this merely to enumerate the social plays? "The Pillars of Society," "The Doll's House," "Ghosts," "The Enemy of Society," "The Wild Duck," "Rosmersholm," "The Lady from the Sea," "Hedda Gabler."

Well has the "poet of doubt" fulfilled his mission. If he were the mere cynic, with no eye to beauty, and no belief in nobility of character, who can only see, and only cares to see, what is foul, mean, or repulsive, he would, indeed, have little enough significance for us. But we are speaking of



the creator of Lona Hessel and Martha Bernick and her sister, of Dr. Stokman and his wife and daughter and seafaring friend, of Hedvig Ekdal and Juliane Tesman. For myself I could add many more, but their names might be challenged; and these are enough to vindicate the poet of doubt from the charge of indiscriminate cynicism.

Again: the poet of doubt is not the poet of negation. We have had many apostles of negation, who thought they had found the formula of emancipation in the gospel of reason, and the negation of all that reason cannot render an account of. How many of them could stand before Ibsen's judgment-seat, and come away with the same light-hearted conviction that everything which they could not demonstrate was mere superstition? Surely the terrible poet of doubt will not spare them any more than other believers. There is many a one besides Fru Alving who holds that any feeling for which he cannot give a reason is a mere "Ghost." Do they know the meaning of their creed? Let them go with her through the horrors of that night in which she is called upon to judge whether every instinct of her nature, and at last whether the very central purpose and passion of her whole being is a mere "ghost," and they will, at least, come forth from that ordeal chastened and sobered, with the glib confidence in their independence of the past shaken as perhaps none but Ibsen could shake it, with the knowledge that they have hardly begun to ask the questions they thought they had already answered.

Or where can we find anything more searching than the light thrown in "Rosmersholm" upon the self-deceptions of a man and woman who think that, in their relations one with another, they can ignore the garnered wisdom and experience of ages, and dismiss, as superficial conventions that have no reference to them, the resultant beliefs and mandates of society? Or where can we find a bolder or more

virile representation at once of the necessity and of the danger of the rupture with an established moral or religious order already antiquated, but not yet replaced, than is embodied in this same "Rosmersholm"?

Or yet again: if you think you have got the formula of life in a war cry against conventional reticence and lies, and a belief in probing instead of skinning over wounds, go with Gregers Werle on his crusade, and learn how easy it is to think you are setting a man's feet upon the rock of truth when, in fact, you are calling upon him to act on principles he only respects at second hand, and to profess sentiments he neither feels nor understands.

But where am I to stop? There is scarcely one of Ibsen's social plays which we can read without being forced to admit that we had somewhere stopped short of the full meaning of our own questions, and accepted an answer that concealed from us the duty, and robbed us of the strength, of deeper questioning.

The poet of doubt has, indeed, fulfilled his mission! But people say he is "immoral." What do they mean?

Do they mean that the moral nature is braced by the habitual contemplation of noble and beautiful things; that it is dwarfed and poisoned by habitual contemplation of horrible, foul, or ignoble things; that there are some who delight in unwholesome familiarity with what is hateful, and some who are banefully fascinated by it, even while they loathe it; and that Ibsen is therefore a depressing moral influence?

If this is what is meant I believe there is truth in it. I doubt not that Ibsen has done, is doing, and will do, moral harm to some of his readers. The same may be said of Thackeray. And—for very different reasons—the same may be said of Goethe, of Carlyle, and of many more. There are minds capable of deriving harm, and perhaps incapable of deriving good, from Ibsen as from these others.

But do people mean more than this when they say that Ibsen is immoral? Do they mean that he makes vice seem attractive, or that he stimulates the imagination to vicious activity? I cannot conceive of such a charge being intended by any man who has read Ibsen; but, unhappily, many use language calculated to convey to those who have not read him the impression that this is the charge they bring.

Or do they mean that Ibsen's writings tend to confuse moral issues, and therefore to weaken moral restraints? Inasmuch as his works have a terrible solvent power, they may indeed tend to reduce a man to a condition of ethical agnosticism, with all its attendant dangers; but this may be said of all who challenge accepted ideas; and Ibsen is singularly free from the sin of representing a tinsel nobility as genuine, or failing to appreciate the true ore of humanity wherever it is found. In Ibsen, as in Thackeray, the moral *stress* is always true.


But what really lies at the basis of all morality? Is it not the sense of the magnitude of the issues of our thoughts, words, and deeds? He who saps, deadens, or overbears the sense of responsibility, is the really immoral writer. Will any one bring this charge against Ibsen? Who, in our day, has brought home with greater force the significance to others of what we do, what we think, and what we are, than Ibsen? Or who has made us feel the responsibility sitting closer to us for frivolity in rejecting, or hypocrisy in accepting, the current code and creeds of society?

But enough of this cheap reproach of immorality. Let us turn again to the central problem of Ibsen's social plays. That problem I take to be the relation of the individual to his social and personal surroundings. Everyone who has given a moment's serious attention to social facts knows that our personal and individual life comes to us in and through

our "human environment," and can only express itself fully and richly when it goes out towards, and in some sense loses itself in, the life of others. And yet this "life of others" constantly presents itself to us as a hampering and dwarfing power, forcing conventions and untruths upon us, and preventing us from ever becoming ourselves. "To be oneself is to slay oneself." Yes, but, unhappily, there are many other ways of slaying oneself besides self-realization; and many there be that find them.

Now, there is one special case of this problem of self-surrender and self-realization so obvious and so complex that it cannot fail to have a quite specific attraction for Ibsen; and, moreover, conventional morality and tradition choose persistently to ignore its true nature. It is the problem of a woman's life when she marries. Here is a special field for the bold questioner, whose voice, once heard, may be cursed or ridiculed, but cannot be forgotten.

If a woman has a life and individuality of her own before she marries, she is called upon to reconcile self-realization with self-surrender in a manner so conspicuous that the blindest cannot fail to see it, when once their attention is called to it. Fatherhood is an incident. Motherhood is an occupation. A man marries and apparently remains himself. When a woman marries she becomes someone else. She changes her name; she changes her home; she changes her occupation; and her new name, her new home, and her new occupation are determined by her husband and her children. Hence marriage, regarded from the woman's point of view, is the problem of society, focused and epitomized—the problem of self-realization in and through self-surrender. The same problem meets us all, men and women, in all the relations of life; but in none is it so obvious and so tangible as it is here. Again, the change in a woman's life when she marries is so great that it may



## DEATH OF CÆSAR

*Photogravure from the Painting by Jean Léon Gérôme*

This is an artistic reproduction of the famous painting by Gérôme, depicting in a most dramatic manner the tragic climax to the conspiracy that was formed against Cæsar under the leadership of Brutus. The painting was first exhibited at the Paris Exposition of 1867, at which Gérôme was awarded one of the eight grand medals.







seem to offer her an almost complete escape from conditions that oppress and confine, or haunt, or tease her. She may have at least the appearance of reason on her side if she separates herself from her circumstances and refuses to believe that she is herself the greatest and most important factor in her own life. She may pant for an escape, and may believe that marriage will give her a career. A man may look to marriage for many things, but hardly as in itself opening a career to him. Hence, a woman's temptation to a refined form of mercenary motive in marriage. When she seems to be giving her heart to the man who loves her, she may be in truth bartering herself to him for a position and a career.

*Ellida.* Now, just listen, Wangel. What is the use of our lying to ourselves—and to each other?

*Wangel.* Lying, do you say? Is that what we are doing?

*Ellida.* Yes, that is what we are doing. Or, at any rate, we are hiding the truth. For the truth, the pure, clean truth, is just this, that you came out there—and bought me.

*Wangel.* "Bought"! do you say "bought"?

*Ellida.* Oh! I wasn't an atom better than you were. I agreed to it. I went and sold myself to you.

*Wangel.* Ellida! have you really the heart to call it so?

*Ellida.* But what else can I call it? You couldn't endure the void in your house. You were looking about for a new wife.

*Wangel.* And a new mother for my children, Ellida.

*Ellida.* Well, perhaps, incidentally, though you hadn't the least idea whether I was fit for the position. You'd only seen me and talked to me once or twice. And you took a fancy to me, and so—

*Wangel.* Yes! call it whatever you please.

*Ellida.* And I, on my side—there was I, all helpless and resourceless, and utterly alone. It was so natural for me to fall in—when you came and offered to look after me for all my life.

Ellida feels that she was forced into the transaction which she calls a sale and her husband calls a marriage. At the very time she is speaking thus to him, Bollette is arranging a transaction, very different in its terms, but identical in its

nature, with Arnholm, Nora Helmer and Fru Alving presumably drifted into marriage, and promised to surrender themselves before they had come to any consciousness of who and what they were. Not one of them had any real choice, or knew what she was doing. If they had had a choice they would have known that their problem was the problem of life—to find oneself by losing oneself.

I am convinced that it is in this typical significance of marriage, and not in any special interest in the so-called "woman question" as such, that we are to seek the reason of Ibsen's constant recurrence to this theme. Suppress individuality and you have no life; assert it and you have war and chaos. The principle of life is found when we can reconcile the strong utterance of self with self-abnegation; and the necessity of harmonizing these two is absolutely forced upon us when we think of marriage. The mere freedom of choice on which Ellida Wangel and Nora Helmer lay such stress is but a condition, not a principle of healthy life. Hedda Gabler neither drifted nor was forced into marriage; but she deliberately and shamelessly paid the flattered and delighted Tesman in the forged coinage of love for opening to her a retreat from the career she had exhausted, and an entry into the best career she could still think of as possible; and we see the result. Without the spirit of self-surrender free choice will never secure self-realization.

Ibsen may well say that his *forte* is asking questions, not answering them! In this particular matter his questioning began early. And this brings me to the only part of my proper task which I have not yet attempted. There is one of Ibsen's most celebrated and most brilliant metrical dramas that I have not yet so much as mentioned. It is his first work on the conditions of modern society, his first satire, and the first utterance that roused that indignant resentment

which has from time to time flamed out against him from that day to this.

I refer to "Love's Comedy," written in 1862, when Ibsen was still living in Christiania. Its subject is love, courtship, and matrimony, and its hero and heroine are Falk (or Falcon), a young poet and author, and Svanhild, the eldest daughter of the lady with whom he boards.

To us Englishmen there is always something supremely ludicrous in the approved Continental customs and ideas concerning courtship; and Ibsen's relentless satire will be keenly enjoyed by all Englishmen who are fortunate enough to be able to read it in the original. But how can I give those who are not in that happy position any conception of the be vies of fluttering maids and matrons that thrill with delight at the announcement of another engagement, of the excitement which pervades them on the report of a "little misunderstanding" between the newly-engaged couple, of their officious zeal in bringing about a "reconciliation," of their rapturous exclamations when one of them sees Lind kissing Anna's glove, of their vexation and disappointment when the lovers seem tired of being exhibited, of their dismay when the poor harassed "quarry," as his friend calls him, escapes for a moment; of the clergyman who seizes every occasion of solemnly descanting on the beauty and sanctity of domestic joys, and waves his hand towards the eight daughters (out of twelve!) who are on the scene, with their mother, as living tokens and pledges thereof; of the sobbing matron, who, with her handkerchief at her eyes, tenderly dwells upon her "record" as a match-maker, "seven nieces—and all of them with boarders"!

And yet, when the curtain falls upon husband and wife and engaged couples, old and new, kissing each other two and two, to a grand chorus of the "triumph of love!" it is difficult to exaggerate the sense of desolation which

swallows up and overwhelms all amusement, and makes the concluding scene of "Love's Comedy" one of the saddest pieces of writing in Ibsen's works.

Falk has noted from the first with disgust and scorn how all this "officialism," as it were, marks the grave of love. As soon as a "lover" is promoted to the recognized privileges of "my love," the poetry is gone out of life. Falk looks upon the parson, who braved public opinion and risked all his future in early life, for the girl he loved, and who is now the very embodiment of commonplace, conventional, worldly respectability; upon Styver, who once wrote poetry by the ream, and did not *mend* his pen, but *tuned* it, and who now treats his *fiancée* with an almost more than *marital* indifference; upon his friend Lind who was intoxicated with love till his engagement was announced, and now forlornly seeks a moment's escape from Anna and her friends and aunts,—he looks upon all these as *corpses*. Only he and Svanhild, who do not wear their hearts upon their sleeves, who—so far from parading their love—have never uttered it even to one another, and like a modern Benedick and Beatrice are at perpetual war with each other, only they are alive!

But of course this cannot last. A misunderstanding forces Falk into a passionate declaration lest he should lose Svanhild too soon; but his declaration has in it the sublimity of masculine selfishness and arrogance which Ibsen knows so well how to paint. He is a Falcon, and he must fly against the wind! He needs Svanhild's support and inspiration to achieve the height of his poetic calling. It is her glorious mission to protect his belief in beauty and love from "falling" like Adam, during all the spring of her life and his; and when she has performed this noble mission and the leaves begin to fall in autumn, then the world may claim her, and their ways will part. The whole rela-

tion of course is to be a purely spiritual one, the idealism of which will not be soiled by the vulgar cares that make courtship and matrimony the grave of love!

Svanhild, in answer, reads Falk a lesson under which he writhes. But the result of it is to make him resolve with such intensity as he never put into anything in life before, to win her as his wife, and prove, up to the hilt, the falsity of the creed which he himself held but now. For true love need not shrink from any test and strain of practical life; and the vital breath has deserted all these spouses and betrotheds, not because they have left the ideal for the real, but because they themselves are of the earth, earthy. He and Svanhild will prove that is so.

His satire becomes fiercer than ever now, but there is a ringing tone of triumph in it, and when he gives as his toast amongst all the pairs, married and to be married, "the late lamented love," he knows that his own love is victorious.

And so it is. Svanhild is won. She and Falk, side by side, will wage war against the miserable conventions and pretences of love, and will live the reality.

Then comes Guldstad, the rich middle-aged merchant, and explains to Falk and Svanhild that marriage is after all a very practical business, involving many considerations that have not the least connection with love. You are in love with a *woman*, you marry a *wife*; and a wife has to do and be many things that a lover, blinded by his love, does not consider. Guldstad himself does not profess to be in love with Svanhild, but he is convinced that she would make him an excellent wife, and he can offer her the quiet stream of a warm and friendly affection and respect, a sense of the happiness of duty, the peace of home, and mutual bending of will to will, a tender care to smooth the path of life for her, a gentle hand to heal her wounds,

strong shoulders to bear, and a strong arm to support and lift. Can Falk offer her as much? If so let her take him, and he, Guldstad, who has no belongings and no claims upon his wealth, will deal with them as his son and daughter.

Then Guldstad leaves them together. Their love cannot bear the test he has applied to it. *Would* it last in all its triumphant glory, they ask, right on till death? It is so much more than Guldstad has to offer now, but if it should fade and pine, and die down into mere friendship, what a fall were there!

"It will last long," says Falk. But Svanhild answers, "'Long!' 'Long!' Oh wretched word of beggary! How will 'long' serve love's turn? It is death's sentence; mildew on the seed. 'I hold that love has life eternal' shall no more be sung; and the cry shall be, 'A year ago I loved thee!'"

Will it really be more than this? Who shall dare to say? Who shall dare to risk it? Not Svanhild. No! Their love shall know no autumn. It shall remain forever with its beauty undimmed. Their midday sun shall know no setting! And Falk accepts her decision. She is his love, but must never be his wife. Only by leaving and by loosing her can he win her truly.

So he goes his way. The bebies of ladies eagerly repeat the news, "She's rejected him! she's rejected him!" Her mother presses Guldstad's eligible offer upon her. She asks for a respite "till the leaves are falling;" and as all the "pairs" exult over the discomfiture of the arch-enemy, Falk, who has met his deserts at last from Svanhild, Guldstad offers her his hand, which after an involuntary start, almost a shudder, she meekly accepts, and the curtain falls upon "the triumph of love."

What did Ibsen mean by it all? Was the creed of Falk

and Svanhild his own? If so he here fairly succumbed to the danger indicated in some of his poems, and fell into the twin vices of sentimentality and cynicism. For I take it that a man who regards the passion of love as the richest and most beautiful thing in life, and who also holds that familiar human intercourse is essentially and necessarily destructive of it, is at once a cynic and a sentimentalist. The real is incapable of being idealized to him, and therefore he is a cynic; and his emotional life is essentially unreal, therefore he is a sentimentalist.

But was this Ibsen's creed? I cannot tell. In any case "Love's Comedy" was a comparatively early work, and though it bears a distinct relation to Ibsen's maturer representations of love and marriage, yet it does not embody them.

Guldstad's sober but earnest conception of marriage as a deliberately considered choice, involving manifold relations not to be entered into lightly, and affecting every branch of practical life, remains the keynote of Ibsen's treatment of the subject. And observe that, in all this, marriage is a type of human relationships in general. There is nothing specific or unique in it. Now, the love that draws the opposite sexes one to the other is something quite unique, but not specifically human. It pierces right through the animal and vegetable kingdoms. It is organic and pre-human in its origin.

Remember that profoundly suggestive saying of Peer Gynt's. He had desecrated his relationship to Solvejg, and he says it cannot be patched up again. A *fiddle* can be mended, but a *bell* cannot. A fiddle, with its delicate mechanism, is *constructed*, and when constructed it can be tuned, patched, replaced in pieces, broken and mended. A bell is cast whole in the one molten rush that creates it. It has one note, a note that appeals to something in us

deeper than all art, not to be analyzed, in one sense not to be developed, to live unchanged—till the bell cracks, and then to be gone forever.

What we call "falling in love" rings the bell-note in our lives. In its mysterious infra-and-supra-human simplicity it thrills down to the very roots of our organic nature, and fills us with the sense of a more than human life. Where it is absent the union of the sexes is unhallowed, and becomes what Ellida calls it, a bargain and a sale; and for men and women who buy and sell in this matter there should be but one name. But marriage is a great deal more besides this "bell-ringing." It is a many-sided and complicated human relationship, and the bell-note, however clear and true it may ring, does not suffice for married life. Details which you may call prosaic if you will enter into the duties of husband and wife. They must be to each other much that partners in business must be, much that servants or other employés must be, much that friends and advisers must be. In a word, their life together must be built up and constructed out of many parts and pieces, to the harmonious fitting of which friendship, good-will, kindly forbearance, and consideration are essential, but which are not secured by "love" in the narrower sense, and may exist without it. And if a man and woman who are "in love," but are not suited to enter into the complicated relations of husband and wife with each other, none the less marry, there is indeed nothing unhallowed in the fact of their union; but the bell is pretty sure to crack ere long. And what is there left then?

Off they go pell-mell to the altar, set up a home in the very shrine of happiness, pass a season in an orgy of triumph and faith; and then comes the day of reckoning, and lo, and behold! the whole concern is hopelessly bankrupt. The wife's cheek is bankrupt in the bloom of youth,



and her heart bankrupt in the flowers of thought. The husband's breast is bankrupt in victorious courage, bankrupt in every glowing spark that was struck of old; bankrupt, bankrupt is the whole concern; though they two entered life as a first-class firm of love.

Then does Ibsen teach that because "falling in love," though it be never so many fathom deep, gives no sure promise of wedded happiness, therefore the element of passion should be ignored in marriage? I cannot tell. But this is certain, that he lays the stress of his representations not upon the truth that being "in love" is essential to an ideal marriage, but upon the other truth that it is not enough for an ideal marriage.

He seems always to represent "love," in the romantic sense, in its misleading and delusive character. Johan Tönnesen is in love, and in consequence he does not "so much as see" Martha Bernick, who had been tried and found as true as steel, and who was made to be the companion of his life; and he marries a girl of whom he knows nothing. Torvald Helmer is in love—note that—in love after many years of married life, still thrilled by the same magnetic influence, still finding in Nora's society the same unreasoning and unanalyzable delight which first drew him to her. And therefore he thinks himself a model husband, when really his relations with his wife have never risen above mere organic attraction, and have never been human at all. Rebekka West is in love, and her love leads her into depths of treachery and cruelty that make "Rosmersholm" one of the most appalling of Ibsen's dramas; and Rosmer himself is in love, and his love drives him to leap with Rebekka into the dark pool below the foss. And lastly, Ellida is in love, and in her the untamed, pre-human nature of love, as Ibsen conceives it, comes out in its full significance. Like the heaving of the sea to the moon, like

the craving of the stranded mermaid for the deep ocean, unreasoning, and not to be reasoned with, dark and deep and wild, this elemental drift and upheaval of our nature must be tamed and mastered, that our relations, one with another, may be sober, well-considered, and human.

And is this all? Does Ibsen know that in considering marriage in this sober, human, rational style, he is leaving out the specific element in it, and dealing with it only as typical of all human relationships? Does he ignore the truth that in the ideal marriage the bell-note rings from first to last, and that all else is dominated and glorified by it? Does he know that it is only that "love" which has its roots far down beneath our humanity that can raise marriage, as such, into a truly human relationship? I will not answer for him. There are indications, deep rather than numerous, especially in "The Doll's House" and in "The Lady from the Sea," that he knows all this as well as any of us. But at any rate he does not choose to dwell upon it. He chooses to dwell upon marriage under its other aspects. And can we afford to be ungrateful to him? How many marriages are there that, tried by the ideal standard, will not be found wanting? They may be few or many, but at least they are something less than all. And what of the others? The bell is cracked. Are husband and wife simply to sit down and say that life is a failure, or at least that they can be nothing to each other now? Surely they may be much. The tenderness of considerate friendship, and the mutual helpfulness of loyal partnership are not love, but in their measure they are beautiful and life-giving; neither is love a substitute for them, even where love is. That the bell is sound, or that the bell is cracked, is an equally foolish reason for not mending the broken fiddle, or tuning its neglected strings.

With respect to marriage, then, I do not find in Ibsen

the highest truth insisted on with any distinctness or directness. He even leaves me in doubt whether he is not profoundly mistaken in his teaching; but he works out some aspects of the problem with a piercing insight and a relentless truth, for which I have no words but those of grateful admiration. If I can find the husband and wife who show me that they have read and understood "The Doll's House," "Rosmersholm," and "The Lady from the Sea," but that they had nothing to learn from them, then I will lay down Ibsen, and ask leave to sit at their feet. But I do not expect that this will be either to-day or to-morrow.

The strength and the weakness of Ibsen's much discussed treatment of marriage lies in the fact that he does not deal with it as marriage at all, but as the most striking instance of the ever recurrent problem of social life, the problem that we may hide in other cases, but must face here, the problem of combining freedom with permanence and loyalty, of combining self-surrender with self-realization.

When Ibsen turned his back upon "the dear North," and tried to forget the life that lay behind him, he bathed his soul for a time in the warmth and beauty of Italy.

His thoughts and studies turned to the ancient world, and he planned and partly executed the work that afterwards grew into the two plays, of which Julian the Apostate is the hero.

But the spell of the North was still upon him. It forced his mind back to the bleak and chill home of his childhood with all its freezing memories. The unfinished work was set aside, and before it was taken up again and completed, "Brand," "Peer Gynt," and "The Youthful League" had flowed in rapid succession from Ibsen's pen.

In "Brand" the poet turns fiercely upon his native land, but amid all his passion and contempt learns and tells the truth that there is no redeeming power save in love.

Brand is a young Norwegian clergyman, to whom the heroic age has vanished, and who regards his contemporaries as a paltry, timorous, and sordid race, who plead their own self-inflicted feebleness as the excuse for shrinking from every sacrifice, who believe they have been stamped as farthings in the mint of God, and are content to have it so, and who are yet not content to give up all pride in the past, and all aspirations for the future, and frankly own themselves the slaves of earth. He finds them striving to be a little of everything, to have a little faith and earnestness for use on Sundays, a little patriotism for national anniversaries, a little hilarity and good-fellowship for festive occasions after work, a little recklessness and abandon in making promises, a little caution and sobriety in fulfilling them, a little attachment to the good old times and their customs and memories, a little perception of the changed spirit of their own day. Their life is all broken up into fragments, and each fragment hampers, contradicts, deadens all the rest so that they can never live a full *life*.

Their religion is in perfect keeping with all this. One might perhaps think that their very materialism had, at least, given unity to their lives—but no, it is haunted and broken by memories of a spiritual religion that make a discord with it. Men still repeat the Lord's Prayer, but there is a line of it that is winged with will and has in it such deep and anxious insistence of demand as will launch it heavenwards with the full ring of prayer, save the fourth petition: "Give us this day our daily bread." This has become the people's war-cry and the password of the world. Wrenched from its context and stamped upon every heart this prayer remains—the storm-tossed spar that tells of the wreck of faith! Yet this very survival is the testimony that men are not contentedly and whole-heartedly material. They snip and trim the kingdom of God till it can all get

inside the Church walls, but they must have "a little" of it. They have none of the fresh manhood of faith that can bridge over the chasm between spirit and flesh, but they still haggle for "a little" of the spiritual consolations now dealt out in retail by the ecclesiastical hucksters. "A little" idealism and spiritual exaltation is quite essential as an element in their existence.

Into such a society Brand leaps with his awful and heroic motto, "All or nothing," and in the name of the jealous deity who "will have no other gods by his side," seeks to build up human nature into unity, to remake, out of these stumps of soul and torsos of spirit, out of these scattered heads and hands, such a whole that God may be able to recognize once more his noblest work in man.

For the current religion Brand has neither sympathy nor even pity—nothing but scorn. The God men worship is a superannuated and feeble dotard, that did miracles long ago, and was once a jealous God, but is now quite easy-going, and content with his fragment of the human heart, willing enough to accept the service of one day out of seven, and altogether past working miracles. The very doctrine of Christian redemption has made men look upon themselves as no longer called upon for any sacrifice as long as they formally assert their claim to a share in the great sacrifice made for them long ago.

Against this miserable, sordid, and decrepit religion Brand declares war to the death. Better become frankly material and godless, better give oneself up to the world and become an acknowledged muck-raker on the one hand, or Bacchanal on the other, than cheat oneself with such a sham. It must be "everything or nothing," and if there be a God to serve, then his service must be "everything." And such a God there is. If we must picture him under human form, then he is no benevolent and weak old man;

he is young and strong as Hercules, his love is the love that could listen to the prayer of anguish in Gethsemane and yet *not* take away the cup. He demands the whole life and will accept no less. He who offers God one-seventh or one-half, or nine-tenths of his life flings it into the abyss—it must be *all* or *nothing*. Brand's God can still work miracles, and the life that is given wholly to him may still be divinely harmonious as of old.

When we first see Brand he is fired with the thought of preaching this living God to all the world, and, as he contemptuously puts it, burying the dead God that men still profess to worship.

With the so-called "practical" spirit of the age he has little sympathy, still less with its tolerant and humane culture. Its "practical" spirit means putting material things before spiritual, with the poor hope of achieving a true humanity by means of increased material appliances. It thinks a new road and a new bridge of more pressing consequence than a bridge between faith and life, fails to see that until we are men we heap up wealth in vain, and if we are men we do not need it. And the humane and tolerant spirit of the age is only a fine name for indifference to truth, for weak shrinking from giving or bearing pain, for dissipation of energy,—for the devil's breath of compromise and cowardice.

To this man, with his motto, "All or nothing," there is no common measure between material and spiritual things. You may stay your steps on God's errands because you *can* not go farther, but never because you *dare* not, or because you *will* not. If his way leads him over the crevasse-crossed glacier, and the mists fall upon him as the ice rings thin and hollow beneath his feet, and the roar of the hidden waters threaten him with instant death, he has no thought of pausing or turning back. It is enough for him that he

*can* go farther, and while his peasant guide leaves him in mortal terror, though his dying daughter lies on the other side of the snow-field and cannot be at peace without seeing him, the intrepid priest, with no reason to cross to-day rather than to-morrow, save that each day is a day to be devoted to his mission, pursues his way.

No physical suffering moves him. He passes untouched through the starving town, where the blue-grey ring round every hollow eye shows that death is holding his assize, and is only moved to a deeper scorn when he sees that the scourge brings out the brute rather than the angel in the sufferers. But a tale of the mental anguish of a father who has slain his child that he might not see it starve, and now himself lies dying, stirs him to deepest compassion, and in a storm through which even the wife of the dying man dare not venture with him, he crosses the fiord in an open boat to stand by the bed of the murderer and suicide as the messenger of God.

Then the call comes to him to relinquish all this thoughts of a crusading march through his land, and an attack in the face of all the world upon the idols it serves, and to bury himself in a sunless town on a remote fiord, where the memory of his lonely childhood broods like night over his soul, where his miserly mother, who bartered away her soul for wealth in her early days, and hopes to save it in her old age by dedicating her son to the Church, oppresses him with her unreclaimed sordidness, and where every influence seems most hostile to his life-work.

And yet in truth the sacrifice is no sacrifice at all. For Agnes has already convinced him that his crusade must be fought out at home and not abroad.

And who is Agnes? We see her first, with her lover, Einar, the painter and poet, in the sunshine and beauty of the morning on the hill-side.

*Einar.* Agnes, my beautiful butterfly, thee will I capture in sport! I am weaving a net with meshes so fine, and the meshes so fine are my songs.

*Agnes* [*dancing back before him and darting out of his reach*]. If I'm a butterfly little and fine, then let me still sip from the ling-bloom; and if you are a boy that delights in his game, then chase me, but catch me not ever.

*Einar.* Agnes, my beautiful butterfly, now have I woven the meshes; sure your fluttering flight will avail you naught—soon you sit in the net fairly captured.

*Agnes.* If I'm a butterfly young and bright, rejoicing I swing in the sport; but should I be caught 'neath your woven net, then brush not against my wings.

*Einar.* Nay! With such care on my hand will I lift thee, and lock thee right into my heart; and there shalt thou play thy whole life long the gladdest of games thou e'er knewest.

But when Agnes hears Brand speak of the feebleness and poverty of the age and of the stern gospel it needs, she wakes from her butterfly existence as from a dream. It is in vain that Einar strives to pick up the thread of sport where they dropped it. Agnes answers him without hearing, and in her turn asks, without looking at him, in a hushed whisper as if in church: "But tell me, did you see—how he *grew* while he was speaking?" Then when Brand is ready to cross the storm-torn fiord and none dares to go with him, Agnes bids Einar join him, and when he shrinks back in terror the whole world-ocean stretches between him and her. She herself leaps into the boat and braves the storm with Brand.

When he leaves the death-bed to which he had come to stand between the dying sinner and his fighting soul he sees Agnes sitting in the clear sunshine, rapt as if in a vision.

See how there she sits and listens, as to songs that fill the welkin. In the boat she sat and listened, as it cleft the troubled waters; as she grasped the thwart she listened, listened as she shook the storm-spray from her clear, unclouded forehead. 'Twas as though the sense had changed its seat, and with her eyes she listened.



What is her vision, as she sits there listening with her eyes? She sees the crude forces of an unborn world, with its torrents, its clouds, its lightning glow, its wild winds, its desert stretches, its unmeasured possibilities, waiting to be created—and created by her! For in her own breast she recognizes its counterpart in the swelling of untamed forces like mountain torrents, in the rising light of the new day, in the widening of the reach of life, in the new quickening and movement of thought and deed, as though their hour of birth had come, in the sadness and the joy that are as one, in the divine voice that rings in her ears, “Now shalt thou create, now be created! Now art thou redeemed or lost! Do thy work—thy work of dear account.”

When Einar comes and claims her once again she stands between him and Brand. Brand warns her that he is uncompromising in his demands, requiring “all or nothing,” that if she fails half way, then all her life will have been flung into the sea, that she must look for no concession in time of need, no yielding to any weakness, that if her life-strength falls short she must face death itself. Einar cries to her that she is choosing between storm and calm, between peace and sorrow, between night and morning, between life and death. And she answers, “Into the night. Through death. Behind, there gleams the morning dawn.”

At the beginning of the third act we find Brand and Agnes, with their baby boy, living on the margin of the sunless fiord under the overhanging rock, and we learn something of the progress of his work. He is still true to his old motto, “Everything or nothing.” His uncompromising devotion and his overmastering individuality have produced a profound impression in his parish. The commonplace, material, matter-of-fact tradition of the place, impersonated in the bailiff of the town, though not over-

come, is forced into a kind of acquiescence in his leadership, and a new spirit seems to be abroad. And Brand himself is in one sense changed. Till now no strong human affection has ever claimed him. In the home of his youth and at school he was a stranger. A hideous act of covetous heartlessness, of which he was an unsuspected witness, completely alienated him from his mother when he was yet a child. The grandeur and heroism of his character had been untempered hitherto by the personal tenderness the whole wealth of which he now pours out for his wife and child. But Agnes complains that to others his love is still hard, and that in the terrible sternness of his demand, "all or nothing," he repels instead of winning. His old mother yearns with a superstitious longing to receive the sacrament and the assurance of forgiveness from him on her deathbed. He lays down the condition that before she dies she shall give away the whole of that wealth for which she has sinned, and toiled, and pinched, and lived a loveless and sunless life, and shall go naked into her grave. In vain she pleads that he is bidding her scatter her very soul to the winds. He is inexorable. In the anguish of a deathbed repentance she sends messengers to him. She offers half her wealth, at last nine-tenths of it; but is only met with the old answer, "everything or nothing," and dies muttering, "God is not so hard as my son," comforted, so says the almost broken-hearted Brand, by the old lie, looking upon God, as all the rest do, as a good-natured huckster that may be beaten down if he cannot get his full price. And yet this man, now that his love is awakened, is visited in spite of himself by seasons of compunction if not of doubt. To stand before men with his awful "everything or nothing," draws tears of blood from his heart. In loneliness he bites the tongue with which he has chastised, and when he lifts his arm to strike, the pas-

sionate longing comes over him to embrace the weak and sinful brother.

Then comes his own trial. He and Agnes both notice, though neither will confess it, the pale cheek and waning strength of their boy. Surely, says Brand, God cannot take him from them. Yet what if he can? May not God do to-day what "the terror of Isaac" did long ago? Then comes the doctor's verdict. It is certain death to the child to stay another month on the sunless fiord, and Brand in an agony of apprehension orders immediate preparations to be made for leaving their home that very hour.

Then one after another, from the mouth of the doctor himself, from the parishioner who has heard a report that he means to leave them on receiving his inheritance from his mother, from the poor mad girl, Gerd, who is so strangely connected with his fate, from every side come echoes of his own teaching, "all or nothing." He has given up his ambition, he has given up his life to his work in his remote parish, he has refused to yield or to depart, has nailed his flag to the mast and declared that here he will stand or fall in conflict with his foe. He has given much for his work on the fiord. Yet it is nothing if he will not give all. Now he realizes what he has been demanding of others, and stands horror-smitten before his own motto, "all or nothing." Nominally he throws the choice upon Agnes, but not till he has shown her that there is no choice at all. Brand's awful God seems to pass by in the thick darkness before our very eyes as Agnes lifts her child on high and cries—

"God! the sacrifice thou canst demand I can lift up towards thy heaven! Guide me through life's horror!"

When next we see Brand and his wife their child has been lying for months beneath the sod of the churchyard. It is Christmas eve, the children's festival. Brand is not

content with having made the sacrifice; he demands that there shall be no repining, no tender idolatries, no cherished memories making the season of rejoicing into a season of mourning. Agnes must not dwell on the contrast between this Christmas and the last; she must not draw the curtain back that the light may stream upon the little grave; she must not even plead for time and beg her husband to have patience with her. And at last when a wild gypsy woman, with her mouth full of profanity and her heart full of defiance, bursts into the house and begs, or rather demands, the little garments that Agnes keeps as sacred relics, that she may wrap them round her own child born among curses and, as it were, baptised in gin, she must part with all her treasure, must not retain even a single relic—"all or nothing." Agnes has at one point rebelled like a wild thing driven to bay; but now a serene and perfect joy overspreads her countenance, now she is free and triumphant, but as she turns to her husband and thanks him for the strength with which he has uplifted her, and for the awful but now glorious vision of God that he has revealed to her, she bids him remember the old word, "He who sees Jehovah dies."

Then there sweeps upon Brand the vision of his lonely life and strife when Agnes shall be gone, and he folds round her the arms of a giant and declares that she shall not be taken from him. Nor need she be taken. She tells him that if he will sink her down again into the life from which he raised her, it will hide from her once more the God that he has revealed, if he will bid her return to her idol-house and forget his "all or nothing," she will have no power against him as he unteaches any more than she had as he taught. Then she can live and be his wife. But to see Jehovah is to die; and unless he takes her back she must pass on and leave him to fight alone.

"Soul!" cries Brand, "Be steadfast to the last. 'Tis victory's victory to forfeit all. The sum of loss has framed thy gain, only the lost is our own for ever!"

Agnes used to say that the "church was too small," but she could give no account of what she meant by it. The truth was that the church with its associations and forms and traditions oppressed her; and the feeling of narrowness and oppression translated itself into a sense of physical confinement. Everything else was too big for her, she sometimes felt. Her husband, his vocation, his purposes, his presence, his will, his ways; the mountain that overhung her, the fiord that locked her in, her sorrows, her memories, her darkness, her strife, all were too big for her, only the church was too small.

The mad Gerd said the same. The church down there in the valley was poor and hideous because it was so small. She knew of a church up on the mountain height, a church of ice and rock, and snow, where waterfall and avalanche read the mass, and the wind preached amongst the snow-peaks.

And Brand felt that the ruinous and mouldering edifice, with its cramped and narrow walls, was the symbol of the pining and paltry spirit of a religion in its second childhood. He would dedicate his mother's wealth to the rearing of a church worthy of the religion he preached. It should be the symbol of a wider and a stronger faith in which life should find its unity. Its vault should stretch not only over faith and doctrine, but over all to which God has given the right to be human in life—the day's toil, the evening's rest, the cares of night, the fresh delight of childhood—all that can claim a lodgment in a human heart. The river that foams down its course, the waterfall that roars through the cleft, the voice from the storm's great lungs and the sounds that ring from the sea soul-

caught should melt into one with the organ notes and the stave on the people's tongue!

So Brand builds his church-symbol. And from all around the people stream to fill the air with commonplace laudations of his generosity, to give him knowing advice as to the best way of turning his gift to the advantage of the State—and his own; to burn in upon his tortured soul the fact that of all his deeds this one is least understood; to madden him by showing him that his symbol has none but a material meaning for the world; to drive him to fanaticism when he sees that all he does or says feeds the very spirit of commonplace against which he is fighting; to teach him that his church itself has become one huge lie and that its dedication will be his lying reward.

Overladen now with his sorrow and his defeat, and losing all touch with practical reality, goaded yet further on the path he has been taking, and no longer recognising any physical limitations or conditions of his mission, he turns the key contemptuously in the lock of the church door and flings it into the river, and summoning the people to follow him on his crusade through the world, and show that "life" and "God's sacrifice" are one, he leads the multitude up to wild mountain heights whither they follow him in the belief that he is an inspired prophet and can work miracles for their sustenance and glory. When, hungry and footsore, they halt, and learn, in answer to their demands, that they must look for life-long toil, must strip themselves naked of every joy and comfort, that a crown of thorns pressed upon every brow will be their wages, and a free soul their reward, they turn round fiercely upon the "deceiver" and chase him with blows and curses out into the snow-fields.

Weary, bleeding, and alone, Brand now sees as in vision the people for whom he has sacrificed himself, the God

whom he has striven to serve, the home and happiness that he has lost.

Those miserable thralls, whom he has given his very life to raise out of their sordid cares, will sink lower and lower. Their national history passeth before him. He sees them sheltering their cowardice under the plea of feebleness, sitting still while their brethren in Denmark are crushed; bribed by English gold to pollute their land with smoke and their hearts with greed; drawing aside from the great spiritual battles of the world, suffering the old faith to die, and taking no part in establishing the new; for their stake in the world's redemption is too small to fight for. Not for them was the cup drained, not for them did the crown of thorns strike its teeth into the Saviour's temples, not for them the thrust of the Roman lance into his side, not for them the burning of the nails that pierced his hands and feet, not for them the bearing of the cross—the purple ridge that rose upon his shoulder under the leather thong with which the cobbler Ahasuerus smote him, is Norway's "fraction of the passion." These are the men he, Brand, had sought to redeem!

And as for the God whom he had striven to bring men to serve with whole heart, had he not accepted his all and then rejected him? Had he not quenched every light that shone upon his path, had he not suffered him to be crushed in utter defeat, had he not flung back his prayers to him and deserted him in his utmost need?

Through the storm he hears the sentence of doom chanted,

Never, never canst be like him, for in flesh hast thou been made.  
Do his bidding or desert him, either way alike thou'rt lost! Worm,  
thou never canst be like him, though thou drain the cup of death!  
Follow after or desert him, either way thy deeds are doomed.  
Dreamer! ne'er shalt thou be like him; lands and goods though  
thou hast lost; all thou giv'st can naught enrich him—for the  
earth-life wast thou formed.

And in the service of this inexorable and unapproachable God, for the sake of these sordid and unredeemable earthlings, what had he lost? Agnes and his baby boy might yet have been his—may yet be his, for Agnes appears to him, in his fever, and tells him that all the loss and sorrow is but a dream. She is still living, and so is their boy. They may have peace and joy if he will but strike a line through these words, “everything or nothing,” and fall into the even easy ways against which he has fought in vain. No, never! If indeed it has been a dream, then he will now make that dream a reality, will lose wife and child and everything sooner than endure the devil’s breath of compromise! Whereat the shadowy form of the tempter vanishes with a shriek, “Then die! The world has no use for thee.”

Then comes the end. From the mad Gerd he learns more than the wisdom of the wise had taught him. He learns in penitential tears that while the name of Jesus has been on his lips, he has never been bathed in his spirit, that while proudly thinking himself another Saviour by whose wounds the world may be healed, he has not even found salvation for his own poor soul. With still unbroken will, recognizing himself as the poorest thing that creeps the earth, feeling that he stands on the lowest round of the ladder, yet still with fresh hope as new truth breaks upon him, Brand rises to begin his journey anew.

But his weary and shattered powers are spared the fresh trial. For Gerd brings down an avalanche by a rifle shot, and as the great snow-slip sweeps over him and her, Brand cries to God from the jaws of death to answer whether man’s modicum of *will* weighs a single grain in the scales of salvation. And as the crashing of screees and ice overwhelms him and fills the valley, a voice thunders the answer, “He is the God of Love.”



## SPECIAL REFERENCE WORKS RELATING TO DRAMA

- ADAMS, Dictionary of the Drama, Vol. I.  
ARCHER, English Dramatists of To-Day.  
ARNOLD, Das Moderne Drama.  
BAKER, Books on Drama and Literary Criticism. (*Columbia University Bulletin*.)  
BARON, Histoire de 'Art Dramatique.  
BATES, The Drama, 20 Vols.  
BERGH, The Drama, Painting, Poetry and Song.  
BISSON, The Drama an Element of Education.  
BROWN, History of the New York Theatres, 2 Vols.  
BRUNETIERE, Conférences de l'Odeon.  
COLLIER, History of English Dramatic Poetry to Shakespeare.  
CREIZENBACH, Geschichte des Neuerer Dramas.  
DEVRIENT, Dramatische und Dramaturgische Schriften.  
DIDEROT, De la Poésie Dramatique.  
DOUMIC, De Scribe à Ibsen.  
DU MERIL, Les Origines Latines du théâtre moderne.  
DUNLAP, History of the American Theatre.  
EDWARDS, Famous First Representations, 1666-1850.  
FLEAY, Biographical Chronicle of the Drama, 1559-1642.  
FREYTAG, Die Technik des Dramas.  
FOWLER, Influence of the Theatre.  
GAUTIER, Histoire de l'art dramatique en France.  
GOEBEL, Ueber tragische Schuld und Sühne.  
GOTTSCHALL, Zur Kritik des modernen Dramas.  
GREIN, Dramatic Criticism.  
GUBERNATIS, Storia del teatro drammatico.  
HAGEMANN, Die Schaubühne und ihr Einfluss.  
HARDEN, Literatur und Theater.  
HAZLITT (W.), Lectures on the Dramatic Literature of the Age of Elizabeth.  
HAZLITT (W. C.), English Drama Under the Stuarts and Tudors.  
HENNEQUIN, The Art of Playwriting.  
HUNEKER, Iconoclasts; a book of dramatists.  
HUTTON, Plays and Players.  
KERR, Das Neue Drama.  
KLAAR, Geschichte des modernen Dramas.  
KLEIN, Geschichte des Dramas, 15 Vols.

- KOEHLER, Die Weisheit der Tragiker.  
 KOERTING, Geschichte des theaters.  
 LARROUMET, Etudes de Critique Dramatique.  
     Etudes de l'Histoire Dramatique.  
 LEMAITRE, Corneille et la Poétique d' Aristotle.  
 LESSING, Hamburgische Dramaturgie.  
 LOWE, Bibliographical Account of English Theatrical Literature.  
 MATTHEWS, The Development of the Drama.  
     French Dramatists of the Nineteenth Century.  
 MAZZINI, On the Historical Drama.  
 MEREDITH, Essay on Comedy and the Uses of the Comic Spirit.  
 MOULTON, Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist.  
 POUGIN, Dictionaire historique et pittoresque du théâtre.  
 PRICE, Technique of the Drama.  
 PROELLS, Geschichte des neueren Dramas.  
 REES, Dramatic Authors of America.  
 ROYER, Histoire Universelle du Théâtre, 6 Vols.  
 SEILHAMER, History of the American Theatre, 5 Vols.  
 SAINT MARC, Cours de Littérature Dramatique, 5 Vols.  
 SCHLEGEL, Dramatische Kunst und Litteratur, 3 Vols.  
 SCOTT, Drama of Yesterday and To-Day.  
 SITTENBERGER, Studien zur Dramaturgie der Gegenwart.  
 STEIGER, Das Werden des neuen Dramas, 2 Vols.  
 SYLE, Essays in Dramatic Criticism.  
 TREE, Some Fallacies of the Modern Stage.  
 TUNISON, Dramatic Traditions of the Dark Ages.  
 ULLRICH, Kratische Aufsätze ueber Kunst und Theater.  
 ULRICI, Ueber Shakespeare's Dramatische Kunst.  
 WALKLEY, Dramatic Criticism.  
 WARD, English Dramatic Literature, 2 Vols.  
 WEYMSS, Chronology of the American Stage, 1752-1852.  
 WETZ, Vom mittelalterlichen Drama.  
 WHIPPLE, Literature of the Age of Elizabeth.  
 WOLFF, Geschichte der Deutschen Literatur in der Gegenwart.—  
     Drama.  
 WOODBRIDGE, Drama, its Laws and its Technique.  
 ZABEL, Zur modernen Dramaturgie.

## TELEPATHY

BY SIR WILLIAM CROOKES

[SIR WILLIAM CROOKES was born in London in 1832. Since 1851 he has given himself to original research in chemistry. In 1859 he founded the "Chemical News" and in 1864 became editor also of the "Quarterly Journal of Science." He is both a practical and theoretical Chemist,—an authority on sewage, beet sugar, dyeing, calico printing; the inventor of the Crooke's tube which led to Röntgen's discoveries; and a theorizer on the ultimate composition of the atom. He is a believer in telepathy, and his deep insight into the laws of radiant energy demands a careful consideration of the hypothesis he explains below.]

THE task I am called upon to perform to-day is to my thinking by no means a merely formal or easy matter. It fills me with deep concern to give an address, with such authority as a president's chair confers, upon a science which, though still in a purely nascent stage, seems to me at least as important as any other science whatever. Psychical science, as we here try to pursue it, is the embryo of something which in time may dominate the whole world of thought. This possibility—nay, probability—does not make it the easier to me now. Embryonic development is apt to be both rapid and interesting; yet the prudent man shrinks from dogmatising on the egg until he has seen the chicken.

Nevertheless, I desire, if I can, to say a helpful word. And I ask myself what kind of helpful word. Is there any connection between my old-standing interest in psychical problems and such original work as I may have been able to do in other branches of science?

I think there is such a connection—that the most helpful quality which has aided me in psychical problems and has made me lucky in physical discoveries (sometimes of rather unexpected kinds) has simply been my knowledge—my

vital knowledge, if I may so term it—of my own ignorance.

Most students of nature sooner or later pass through a process of writing off a large percentage of their supposed capital of knowledge as a merely illusory asset. As we trace more accurately certain familiar sequences of phenomena we begin to realize how closely these sequences, or laws, as we call them, are hemmed round by still other laws of which we can form no notion. With myself this writing off of illusory assets has gone rather far and the cobweb of supposed knowledge has been pinched (as some one has phrased) into a particularly small pill.

Telepathy, the transmission of thought and images directly from one mind to another without the agency of the recognized organs of sense, is a conception new and strange to science. To judge from the comparative slowness with which the accumulated evidence of our society penetrates the scientific world, it is, I think, a conception even scientifically repulsive to many minds. We have supplied striking experimental evidence; but few have been found to repeat our experiments. We have offered good evidence in the observation of spontaneous cases, as apparitions at the moment of death and the like, but this evidence has failed to impress the scientific world in the same way as evidence less careful and less coherent has often done before. Our evidence is not confronted and refuted; it is shirked and evaded as though there were some great *a priori* improbability which absolved the world of science from considering it. I at least see no *a priori* improbability whatever. Our alleged facts might be true in all kinds of ways without contradicting any truth already known. I will dwell now on only one possible line of explanation, not that I see any way of elucidating all the new phenomena I regard as genuine, but because it seems probable I may shed a light on some of those phenomena.

All the phenomena of the universe are presumably in some way continuous; and certain facts, plucked as it were from the very heart of nature, are likely to be of use in our gradual discovery of facts which lie deeper still.

Let us then, consider the vibrations we trace, not only in solid bodies, but in the air, and in a still more remarkable manner in the ether.

These vibrations differ in their velocity and in their frequency. That they exist, extending from one vibration to two thousand millions of millions vibrations per second, we have good evidence. That they subserve the purpose of conveying impressions from outside sources of whatever kind to living organisms may be fully recognized.

As a starting point I will take a pendulum beating seconds in air. If I keep on doubling I will get a series of steps as follows:

Starting point.	The seconds pendulum.	
Step 1....	2	vibrations per second.
2....	4	
3....	8	
4....	16	
5....	32	Sound begins to human ear.
6....	64	
7....	128	
8....	256	
9....	512	
10....	1024	
15....	32768	Sound ends to human ear and electrical waves begin.
20....	1,048576	
25....	33,554432	
30....	1073,741825	
35....	34359,738368	Electrical waves end.
40....	1,099511,627776	
45....	35,184372,088832	Light waves begin for human eye.

Starting point.	The seconds pendulum.	
50....	1125,899906,842624	Light waves end for human eye.
55....	36028,707018,963968	
56....	72057,594037,927936	
57....	144115,188075,855872	
58....	288220,376151,711744	X-rays begin?
59....	576440,752303,423488	
60....	1,152881,504606,846976	
61....	2,305763,009213,693952	
62....	4,611526,018427,387904	
63....	9,223052,036854,775808	

At the fifth step from unity, at 32 vibrations per second, we reach the region where atmospheric vibration reveals itself to us as sound. Here we have the lowest musical note. In the next ten steps the vibrations per second rise from 32 to 32,768, and here, to the average human ear, the region of sound ends. But certain more highly endowed animals probably hear sounds too acute for our organs; that is, sounds which vibrate at a higher rate.

We next enter a region in which the vibrations rise rapidly, and the vibrating medium is no longer the gross atmosphere, but a highly attenuated medium, "a diviner air," called the ether. From the sixteenth to the thirty-fifth step the vibrations rise from 32,768 to 34359,738368 a second, such vibrations appearing to our means of observation as electrical rays.

We next reach a region extending from the thirty-fifth to the forty-fifth step, including from 34359,738368 to 35,184372,088832 vibrations per second. This region may be considered as unknown, because we are as yet ignorant what are the functions of vibrations of the rates just mentioned. But that they have some function it is fair to suppose.

Now we approach the region of light, the steps extending from the forty-fifth to between the fiftieth and the fifty-first, and the vibrations extending from 35,184372,088832 per second (heat rays) to 1875,000000,000000 per second, the highest recorded rays of the spectrum. The actual sensation of light, and therefore the vibrations which transmit visible signs, being comprised between the narrow limits of about 450,000000,000000 (red light) and 750,000000,000000 (violet light)—less than one step.

Leaving the region of visible light we arrive at what is, for our existing senses and our means of research, another unknown region, the functions of which we are beginning to suspect. It is not unlikely that the X-rays of Professor Röntgen will be found to lie between the fifty-eighth and the sixty-first step, having vibrations extending from 288220,576151,711744 to 2,305763,009213, 693952 per second, or even higher.

In this series it will be seen there are two great gaps, or unknown regions, concerning which we must own our entire ignorance as to the part they play in the economy of creation. Further, whether any vibrations exist having a greater number per second than those classes mentioned we do not presume to decide.

But is it premature to ask in what way are vibrations connected with thought or its transmission? We might speculate that the increasing rapidity of frequency of the vibrations would accompany a rise in the importance of the functions of such vibrations. That high frequency deprives the rays of many attributes that might seem incompatible with "brain waves" is undoubted. Thus, rays about the sixty-second step are so minute as to cease to be refracted, reflected, or polarized; they pass through many so-called opaque bodies, and research begins to show that the most rapid are just those which pass most easily through dense

substances. It does not require much stretch of the scientific imagination to conceive that at the sixty-second or sixty-third step the trammels from which rays at the sixty-first step were struggling to free themselves have ceased to influence rays having so enormous a rate of vibration as 9,223052,036854,775808 per second, and that these rays pierce the densest medium with scarcely any diminution of intensity, and pass about unrefracted and unreflected along their path with the velocity of light.

Ordinarily we communicate intelligence to each other by speech. I first call up in my own brain a picture of a scene I wish to describe, and then, by means of an orderly transmission of wave vibrations set in motion by my vocal chords through the material atmosphere, a corresponding picture is implanted in the brain of anyone whose ear is capable of receiving such vibrations. If the scene I wish to impress on the brain of the recipient is of a complicated character, or if the picture of it in my own brain is not definite, the transmission will be more or less imperfect; but if I wish to get my audience to picture to themselves some very simple object, such as a triangle or a circle, the transmission of ideas will be well-nigh perfect, and equally clear to the brains of both transmitter and recipient. Here we use the vibrations of the material molecules of the atmosphere to transmit intelligence from one brain to another.

In the newly discovered Röntgen rays we are introduced to an order of vibrations of extremest minuteness as compared with the most minute waves with which we have hitherto been acquainted, and of dimensions comparable with the distances between the centers of the atoms of which the material universe is built up; and there is no reason to suppose that we have here reached the limit of frequency. Waves of this character cease to have many of the properties associated with light waves. They are produced in the



same ethereal medium, and are probably propagated with the same velocity as light, but here the similarity ends. They cannot be regularly reflected from polished surfaces; they have not been polarized; they are not refracted on passing from one medium to another of different density, and they penetrate considerable thicknesses of substances opaque to light with the same ease with which light passes through glass. It is also demonstrated that these rays, as generated in the vacuum tube, are not homogeneous, but consist of bundles of different wave-lengths, analogous to what would be differences of color could we see them as light. Some pass easily through flesh, but are partially arrested by bone, while others pass with almost equal facility through bone and flesh.

It seems to me that in these rays we may have a possible mode of transmitting intelligence which, with a few reasonable postulates, may supply a key to much that is obscure in psychical research. Let it be assumed that these rays, or rays even of higher frequency, can pass into the brain and act on some nervous center there. Let it be conceived that the brain contains a center which uses these rays as the vocal chords use sound vibrations (both being under the command of intelligence), and sends them out, with the velocity of light, to impinge on the receiving ganglion of another brain. In this way, some at least, of the phenomena of telepathy, and the transmission of intelligence from one sensitive to another through long distances, seem to come into the domain of law and can be grasped. A sensitive may be one who possesses the telepathic transmitting or receiving ganglion in an advanced state of development, or who, by constant practice, is rendered more sensitive to these high-frequency waves. Experience seems to show that the receiving and the transmitting ganglions are not equally developed; one may be active, while the

other, like the pineal eye in man, may be only vestigial. By such an hypothesis no physical laws are violated, neither is it necessary to invoke what is commonly called the supernatural.

To this hypothesis it may be objected that brain waves, like many other waves, must obey physical laws. There, fore, transmission of thought must be easier or more certain the nearer the agent and recipient are to each other, and should die out altogether before great distances are reached. Also it can be urged that if brain waves diffuse in all directions they should affect all sensitives within their radius of action, instead of impressing only one brain. The electric telegraph is not a parallel case, for there a material wire intervenes to conduct and guide the energy to its destination.

These are weighty objections, but not, I think, insurmountable. Far be it from me to say anything disrespectful of the law of inverse squares, but I have already endeavored to show we are dealing with conditions removed from our material and limited conceptions of space, matter, form. Is it inconceivable that intense thought concentrated toward a sensitive with whom the thinker is in close sympathy may induce a telepathic chain of brain waves, along which the message of thought can go straight to its goal without loss of energy due to distance? And is it also conceivable that our mundane ideas of space and distance may be superseded in these subtle regions of unsubstantial thought. where "near" and "far" may lose their usual meaning?

I repeat that this speculation is strictly provisional. I dare to suggest it. The time may come when it will be possible to submit it to experimental tests.

I am impelled to one further reflection, dealing with the conservation of energy. We say, with truth, that energy is transformed, but not destroyed, and that whenever we can trace the transformation we find it quantitatively exact. So

far as our very rough exactness goes, this is true for inorganic matter and for mechanical forces. But it is only inferentially true for organized matter and for vital forces. We cannot express life in terms of heat or of motion. And thus it happens that just when the exact transformation of energy will be most interesting to watch, we cannot really tell whether any fresh energy has been introduced into the system or not. Let us consider this a little more closely.

It has, of course, always been realized by physicists, and has been especially pointed out by Dr. Croll, that there is a wide difference between the production of motion and the direction of it into a particular channel. The production of motion, molar or molecular, is governed by physical laws, which it is the business of the philosopher to find out and correlate. The law of the conservation of energy overrides all laws, and it is a pre-eminent canon of scientific belief that for every act done a corresponding expenditure of energy must be transformed. No work can be effected without using up a corresponding value in energy of another kind. But to us the other side of the problem is even of more importance. Granted the existence of a certain kind of molecular motion, what is it that determines its direction along one path rather than another? A weight falls to the earth through a distance of 3 feet. I lift it, and let it fall once more. In these movements of the weight a certain amount of energy is expended in its rise and the same amount is liberated in its fall. But instead of letting the weight fall free, suppose I harness it to a complicated system of wheels, and, instead of letting the weight fall in the fraction of a second, I distribute its fall over twenty-four hours. No more energy is expended in raising the weight, and in its slow fall no more or less energy is developed than when it fell free; but I have made it do work of another kind. It now drives a clock, a telescope, or a philosophic

instrument, and does what we call useful work. The clock runs down. I lift the weight by exerting the proper amount of energy, and in this action the law of conservation of energy is strictly obeyed. But now I have the choice of either letting the weight fall free in a fraction of a second, or, constrained by the wheel-work, in twenty-four hours. I can do which I like, and whichever way I decide, no more energy is developed in the fall of the weight. I strike a match; I can use it to light a cigarette or to set fire to a house. I write a telegram; it may be simply to say I shall be late for dinner, or it may produce fluctuations on the stock exchange that will ruin thousands. In these cases the actual force required in striking the match or in writing the telegram is governed by the law of conservation of energy; but the vastly more momentous part, which determines the words I use or the material I ignite, is beyond such a law. It is probable that no expenditure of energy need be used in the determination of direction one way more than another. Intelligence and free will here come into play, and these mystic forces are outside the law of conservation of energy as understood by physicists.

The whole universe, as we see it, is the result of molecular movement. Molecular movements strictly obey the law of conservation of energy, but what we call "law" is simply an expression of the direction along which a form of energy acts, not the form of energy itself. We may explain molecular and molar motions, and discover all the physical laws of motion, but we shall be as far as ever from a solution of the vastly more important question as to what form of will and intellect is behind the motions of molecules, guiding and constraining them in definite directions along predetermined paths. What is the determining cause in the background? What combination of will and intellect outside our physical laws guides the fortuitous con-

course of atoms along ordered paths culminating in the material world in which we live?

In these last sentences I have intentionally used words of wide signification—have spoken of guidance along ordered paths. It is wisdom to be vague here, for we absolutely cannot say whether or when any diversion may be introduced into the existing system of earthly forces by an external power. We can no more be certain that this is not so than I can be certain, in an express train, that no signal-man has pressed a handle to direct the train onto this or that line of rails. I may compute exactly how much coal is used per mile, so as to be able to say at any minute how many miles we have traveled, but, unless I actually see the points, I cannot tell whether they are shifted before the train passes.

An omnipotent being could rule the course of this world in such a way that none of us should discover the hidden springs of action. He need not make the sun stand still upon Gibeon. He could do all that he wanted by the expenditure of infinitesimal diverting force upon ultra-microscopic modifications of the human germ.

In this address I have not attempted to add any item to the sound knowledge which I believe our society is gradually amassing. I shall be content if I have helped to clear away some of those scientific stumbling-blocks, if I may so call them, which tend to prevent many of our possible coadjutors from adventuring themselves on the new illimitable road.

I see no good reason why any man of scientific mind should shut his eyes to our work or deliberately stand aloof from it. Our proceedings are, of course, not exactly parallel to the proceedings of a society dealing with a long-established branch of science. In every form of research there must be a beginning. We own to much that is tentative, much that may turn out erroneous. But it is thus, and thus

only, that each science in turn takes its stand. **I venture to** assert that both in actual careful record of new and important facts, and in suggestiveness, our society's work and publications will form no unworthy preface to a profounder science both of man, of nature, and of "worlds not realized" than this planet has yet known.

# THE THEORY OF SERUM TREATMENT

BY ROBERT KOCH

[ROBERT KOCH, b. Hanover, Dec. 11, 1843; graduate of University of Göttingen, 1866. Asst. Surgeon Hospital at Hamburg; practiced medicine at Wollenstein where, in 1876, he began researches in bacteriology. In 1880 was chief of Sanitary Institute, Berlin, where he prosecuted his studies of Consumption and Cholera and discovered that these diseases are caused by a specific micro-organism. In 1883 published a method of preventive inoculation against anthrax, and in the same year he was sent by the German Government to Egypt and India to investigate the plague of Cholera, which resulted in his discovery of the Cholera Bacillus. In 1890 he announced his discovery of the Bacillus of Consumption.]

IN this summary I shall confine myself to the most obvious conclusions. It has indeed of late become too common to draw the most sweeping conclusions as to infective diseases in general from the most unimportant observations on bacteria. I shall not follow this custom, although the material at my command would furnish rich food for meditation. For the longer I study infective diseases the more am I convinced that generalisations of new facts are here a mistake, and that every individual infective disease or group of closely allied diseases must be investigated for itself.

As regards the artificial traumatic infective diseases observed by me, the conditions which must be established before their parasitic nature can be proved, we completely fulfilled in the case of the first five, but only partially in that of the sixth. For the infection was produced by such small quantities of fluid (blood, serum, pus, etc.,) that the result cannot be attributed to a merely chemical poison.

In the materials used for inoculation bacteria were without exception present, and in each disease a different and well marked form of organism could be demonstrated.

At the same time, the bodies of those animals which died of the artificial traumatic infective diseases contained bacteria in such numbers that the symptoms and the death of the animals were sufficiently explained. Further, the bacteria found were identical with those which were present in the fluid used for inoculation, and a definite form of organisms corresponded in every instance to a distinct disease.

These artificial traumatic infective diseases bear the greatest resemblance to human traumatic infective diseases, both as regards their origin from putrid substances, their course, and the result of post-mortem examinations. Further, in the first case, just as in the last, the parasitic organisms could be only imperfectly demonstrated by the earlier methods of investigation; not till an improved method of procedure was introduced was it possible to obtain complete proof that they were parasitic diseases. We are therefore justified in assuming that human traumatic infective diseases will in all probability be proved to be parasitic when investigated by these improved methods.

On the other hand, it follows from the fact that a definite pathogenic bacterium, e. g., the septicæmic bacillus, cannot be inoculated on every variety of animal (a similar fact is also true with regard to the bacillus anthracis); that the septicæmia of mice, rabbits, and man are not under all circumstances produced by the same bacterial form. It is of course possible that one or the other of the bacteric forms found in animals also play a part in such diseases in the human subject. That, however, must be especially demonstrated for each case; *a priori* one need only expect that bacteria are present; as regards form, size and conditions of growth, they may be similar, but not always the same, even in what appear to be similar diseases in different animals.

Besides the pathogenic bacteria already found in animals



there are no doubt many others. My experiments refer only to those diseases which ended fatally. Even these are in all probability not exhausted in the six forms mentioned. Further experiments on many different species of animals, with the most putrid substances and with every possible modification in the method of application, will doubtless bring to light a number of other infective diseases, which will lead to further conclusions regarding infective diseases and pathogenic bacteria.

But even in the small series of experiments which I was able to carry out, one fact was so prominent that I must regard it as constant, and, as it helps to remove most of the obstacles to the admission of the existence of a centagium vivum for traumatic infective diseases, I look on it as the most important result of my work. I refer to the differences which exist between pathogenic bacteria and to the constancy of their characters. A distinct bacteric form corresponds, as we have seen, to each disease, and this form always remains the same, however often the disease is transmitted from one animal to another. Further, when we succeed in reproducing the same disease *de novo* by the injection of putrid substances, only the same bacteric form occurs which was before found to be specific for that disease.

Further, the difference between these bacteria are as great as could be expected between particles which border on the invisible. With regard to these differences, I refer not only to the size and form of the bacteria, but also to the conditions of their growth, which can be best recognized by observing their situation and grouping. I therefore study not only the individual alone, but the whole group of bacteria, and would, for example, consider a micrococcus which in one species of animal occurred only in masses (i. e., in a zooglæa form), as different from another which in the same variety of animal, under the same conditions of

life, was only met with as isolated individuals. Attention must also be paid to the physiological effect, of which I scarcely know a more striking example than the case of the bacillus and the chain-like micrococcus growing together in the cellular tissue of the ear; the one passing into the blood and penetrating into the white blood corpuscles, the other spreading out slowly into the tissues in its vicinity and destroying everything around about; or again, the case of the septicæmic and pyæmic microcci of the rabbit in their different relations to the blood; or lastly, the bacilli only extending over the surface of the aural cartilage in the erysipetalous disease, as contrasted with the bacillus anthracis, likewise inoculated on the rabbit's ear, but quickly passing into the blood.

As, however, there corresponds to each of the diseases investigated a form of bacterium distinctly characterized by its physiological action, by its condition of growth, size, and form, which, however often the disease be transmitted from one animal to another, always remains the same and never passes over into another form, e. g., from the spherical to the rod shaped, we must in the meantime regard these different forms of pathogenic bacteria as distinct and constant species.

This is, however, an assertion that will be much disputed by botanists, to whose special province this subject really belongs.

Amongst those botanists who have written against the subdivision of bacteria into species, is Nägeli, who says, "I have for ten years examined thousands of different forms of bacteria, and I have not yet seen any absolute necessity for dividing them even into two distinct species."

Brefeld also states that he can only admit the existence of specific forms justifying the formation of distinct species when the whole history of development has been traced by cultivation from spore to spore in the most nutritive fluids.

Although Brefeld's demand is undoubtedly theoretically correct, it cannot be made a *sine qua non* in every investigation on pathogenic bacteria. We should otherwise be compelled to cease our investigations into the etiology of infective diseases till botanists have succeeded in finding out the different species of bacteria by cultivation and development from spore to spore. It might then very easily happen that the endless trouble of pure cultivation would be expended on some form of bacterium which would finally turn out to be scarcely worthy of attention. In practice only the opposite method can work. In the first place certain peculiarities of a particular form of bacterium different from those of other forms, and in the second place its constancy, compel us to separate it from others less known and less interesting, and provisionally to regard it as a species. And now, to verify this provisional supposition, the cultivation from spore to spore may be undertaken. If this succeeds under conditions which cut out all sources of fallacy, and if it furnishes a result corresponding to that obtained by the previous observations, then the conclusions which were drawn from these observations and which led to its being ranked as a distinct species must be regarded as valid.

On this, which as it seems to me is the only correct practical method, I take my stand, and, till the cultivation of bacteria from spore to spore shows that I am wrong, I shall look on pathogenic bacteria as consisting of different species.

In order, however, to show that I do not stand alone in this view, I shall here mention the opinion of some botanists who have already come to a similar conclusion.

Cohn states that, in spite of the fact that many dispute the necessity of separating bacteria into genera or species, he must nevertheless adhere to the method as yet followed

by him, and separate bacteria of a different form and fermenting power from each other, so long as complete proof of their identity is not given.

From his investigations on the effects of different temperatures and of desiccation on the development of bacterium termo, Eidam came to the conclusion that different forms of bacteria require different conditions of nutriment, and that they behave differently towards physical and chemical influences. He regards these facts as a further proof of the necessity of dividing organisms into distinct species.

I shall bring forward another reason to show the necessity of looking on the pathogenic bacteria which I have described as distinct species. The greatest stress, in investigations on bacteria, is justly laid on the so-called pure cultivations, in which only one definite form of bacterium is present. This evidently arises from the view that if, in a series of cultivations, the same form of bacterium is always obtained, a special significance must attach to this form: it must indeed be accepted as a constant form, or in a word as a species. Can then, a series of pure cultivations be carried out without admixture of other bacteria? It can in truth be done, but only under very limited conditions. Only such bacteria can be cultivated pure, with the aids at present at command, which can always be known to be pure, either by their size and easily recognizable form, as the bacillus anthracis, or by the production of a characteristic coloring matter as the pigment bacteria. When, during a series of cultivations, a strange species of bacteria has by chance got in, as may occasionally happen under any circumstances, it will in these cases be at once observed, and the unsuccessful experiment will be thrown out of the series without the progress of the investigation being thereby necessarily interfered with.

But the case is quite different when attempts are made to

carry out cultivations of very small bacteria, which, perhaps, cannot be distinguished at all without staining; how are we then to discover the occurrence of contamination? It is impossible to do so, and therefore all attempts at pure cultivation in apparatus, however skillfully planned and executed, must, as soon as small bacteria with but little characteristic appearances are dealt with, be considered as subject to unavoidable sources of fallacy, and in themselves inconclusive.

But nevertheless a pure cultivation is possible, even in the case of the bacteria which are smallest and most difficult to recognise. This, however, is not conducted in cultivation apparatus, but in the animal body. My experiments demonstrate this. In all the cases of a distinct disease, e. g., of septicæmia of mice, only the small bacilli were present, and no other form of bacterium was ever found with it, unless in the case where that causing the tissue gangrene was intentionally inoculated at the same time. In fact, there exists no better cultivation apparatus for pathogenic bacteria than the animal body itself. Only a very limited number of bacteria can grow in the body, and the penetration of organisms into it is so difficult that the uninjured living body may be regarded as completely isolated with respect to other forms of bacteria than those intentionally introduced. It is quite evident, from a careful consideration of the two diseases produced in mice—septicæmia and gangrene of the tissue—that I have succeeded in my experiments in obtaining a pure cultivation. In the putrefying blood, which was the cause of these two diseases, the most different forms of bacteria were present, and yet only two of these found in the living mouse the conditions necessary for their existence. All the others died, and these two alone, a small bacillus and a chain-like micrococcus, remained and grew. These could be transferred from one

animal to another as often as was desired, without suffering any alteration in their characteristic form, in their specific physiological action and without any other variety of bacteria at any time appearing. And further, as I have demonstrated, it is quite in the power of the experimenter to separate these two forms of bacteria from each other. When the blood in which only the bacilli are present is used, these alone are transmitted, and thenceforth are obtained quite pure; while on the other hand, when a field mouse is inoculated with both forms of bacteria, the bacilli disappear, and the micrococcus can be then cultivated pure. Doubtless an attempt to unite these two forms again in the same animal by inoculation would have been successful. In short, one has it completely in one's power to cultivate several varieties of bacteria together, to separate them from each other, and eventually to combine them again. Greater demands can hardly be made on a pure cultivation, and I must therefore regard the successive transmission of artificial infective diseases as the best and surest method of pure cultivation. And it can further claim the same power of demonstrating the existence of specific forms of bacteria, as must be conceded to any faultless cultivation experiments.

From the fact that the animal body is such an excellent apparatus for pure cultivation, and that, as we have seen, when the experiments are properly arranged and sufficient optical aids used, only one specific form of bacterium can be found in each distinct case of artificial traumatic infective disease, we may now further conclude that when, in examining a traumatic infective disease, several different varieties of bacteria are found, as e. g., chains of small granules, rods, and long, oscillating threads—such as were seen together by Coze and Feltz in the artificial septicæmia of rabbits—we have to do either with a combined infective disease,—that is, not a pure one,—or, what in the case cited

is more probable, an inexact and inaccurate observation. When, therefore, several species of bacteria occur together in any morbid process, before definite conclusions are drawn as to the relations of the disease in question to the organisms, either proof must be furnished that they are all concerned in the morbid process, or an attempt must be made to isolate them and to obtain a true pure cultivation. Otherwise we cannot avoid the objection that the cultivation was not pure, and therefore not conclusive. I shall only briefly refer to a further necessary consequence of the admission of the existence of different species of pathogenic bacteria. The number of the species of these bacteria is limited; for, of the numerous diverse forms present in putrid fluids, one or but few can in the most favorable cases develop in the animal body. Those which disappear are, for that species of animal at least, not pathogenic bacteria. If, however, as follows from the foregoing, there exist hurtful and harmless bacteria, experiments performed on animals with the latter, e. g., with *bacterium termo*, prove absolutely nothing for or against the behavior of the former—the pathogenic—forms. But almost all the experiments of this nature have been carried out with the first mixture of different species of bacteria which came to hand without there being any certainty that pathogenic bacteria were in reality present in the mixture. It is therefore evident that none of these experiments can be regarded as furnishing evidence of any value for or against the parasitic nature of infective diseases.

In all my experiments, not only have the form and size of the bacteria been constant, but the greatest uniformity in their actions on the animal organisms has been observed, though no increase of virulence, as described by Coze and Feltz, Davaine, and others. This leads me to make some remarks on the supposed law of the increasing virulence of

blood when transmitted through successive animals, discovered or confirmed by the investigators just named.

The discovery of this law has, as is well known, been received with great enthusiasm, and it has excited no little interest owing to its intimate bearing on the doctrine of natural selection (*Anpassung* and *Vererbung*). Some investigators, who are in other things very exact, have allowed themselves to be blinded by the seductive theory that the insignificant action of a single putrefactive bacterium may, by continued natural selection in passing from animal to animal, be increased in virulence till it becomes deadly though a drop of the infective liquid be diluted in a quadrillion times. They have founded thereon the most beautiful practical applications, not suspecting that the bacteria in question have never been certainly demonstrated.

The original works of Coze and Feltz, as also that of Davaine, are not at my disposal for reference; and I cannot therefore enter into a complete criticism of them. So far, however, as I can gather from the references accessible to me, especially from the detailed notices in Virchow and Hirsch's "*Jahresbericht*," no complete proof that the virulence of septicæmic blood increases from generation to generation seems to have been furnished. Apparently blood more and more diluted was injected, and astonishment was felt when this always acted, the effect being then ascribed to its increasing virulence. But controlling experiments to ascertain whether the septicæmic blood were not already as virulent in the second and third generations as in the twenty-fifth, do not seem to have been made. My experiments so far support and are in accordance with those of Coze, Feltz, and Devaine in that for the first infection of an animal relatively large quantities of putrid fluid are necessary; but in the second generation, or at the latest in the third, the full virulence was attained, and afterwards remained constant.



Of my artificial infective diseases the septicæmia of the mouse has the greatest correspondence with the artificial septicæmia described by Davaine. If we were to experiment with this disease in the same manner as Davaine experimented, we would, if no controlling experiments were employed, find the same increase in virulence of the disease. It would only be necessary to use blood in slowly decreasing quantities in order to obtain in this way any progressive increase of the virulence that might be desired. I, however, took from the second or third animal the smallest possible quantity of material for inoculation, and thus arrived more quickly at the greatest degree of virulence. 'Till, therefore, I am assured that, in the septicæmia observed by Davaine, such controlling experiments were made, I can only look on an increase in virulence as holding good for the earlier generations. In order to explain this we do not, however, require to have recourse to the magical wand of natural selection; a feasible explanation can be very naturally furnished. Let us take again the septicæmia of mice, as being the most suitable example.

If two drops of putrefying blood be injected into such an animal there is introduced not only a number of totally distinct species of bacteria, but also a certain amount of dissolved putrid poison (sepsin), not sufficient to produce a fatal effect, but yet certainly not without influence on the health of the animal. Different factors must therefore be considered as affecting the health of the animal. On the one hand there is the dissolved poison, on the other the different species of bacteria, of which, however, perhaps only two, as in the example before us, can multiply in the body of the mouse and there exert a continuous noxious influence. Only one of these two species can penetrate into the blood, and if the blood alone be used for further inoculations, only this one variety will come victorious out of the

battle for existence. The further development of the experiment depends entirely on the quantity of the putrid poison, and on the relation of the two forms of bacteria to each other in point of numbers. If one injects a large amount of septic poison and a large number of that variety of bacteria which increases locality (in this case the chain-like micrococci causing the gangrene of the tissue), but only a very small number of the bacteria which pass into the blood (here the bacilli), the first animal experimented on will die, as a result of the preponderation influence of the first two factors before many bacilli can have got into the blood and multiplied there. Of the blood of this first animal, containing, as it does, proportionately very few bacilli, one-fifth to one-tenth of a drop must be inoculated in order to convey the disease with certainty. In the second animal, however, only the bacilli are introduced, and these develop undisturbed in the blood. For the infection of the third animal the smallest quantity of this blood which can produce an effect is then sufficient, and after this third generation the virulence of the blood remains uniform.

We may also imagine another case in which the increase of the virulence may go on through more than two generations without any modification resulting from natural selection and transmission from animal to animal. This would take place if several species of bacteria capable of passing into the blood were introduced into the animal at the first injection. Let us suppose, for example, that in the same putrefying blood which served for the foregoing experiment, the bacilli of anthrax were also present, there would then be contained in the blood of the first animal not only the septicæmic bacillus, but also bacillus anthracis, and of each only a small number; of the anthrax bacillus there would be even fewer than of the other, because in mice they are deposited chiefly in the spleen, lungs, etc.; while in the blood of the

heart they are, even in the most favorable cases, only sparsely distributed. On the other hand, the anthrax bacilli have this advantage, that, provided they be inoculated in considerable numbers, they kill even within twenty hours, while the septicæmic bacilli only destroy life after fifty hours. In the blood of the second animal, therefore, both species of bacilli would be present in larger numbers than in the first, although not yet so numerous as if either organism had been inoculated singly. Hence a larger quantity of blood is necessary to ensure transmission to a third animal. Perhaps this might be the case even in the fourth generation, till finally one or other variety of bacillus would alone be present in the blood injected. Probably this would be the septicæmic bacillus.

In this way the experiments of Coze, Feltz, and Davaine may admit of simple explanation and be brought into harmony with my results.



# CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: ITS HEALING MINISTRY

BY BLISS KNAPP

[BLISS KNAPP, A.B., C. S. B., a son of Ira O. Knapp, C. S. D., member of the Christian Science Board of Directors of the Mother Church, was educated at the Boston English High School, and graduated from Harvard University in 1901. Since that time he has been a practitioner of Christian Science, studied at the Massachusetts Metaphysical College in 1903, and was appointed in 1904 a member of the Christian Science Board of Lectureship.]

If Christian Science were simply an intellectual pastime, touching only the emotions and sentiments of men, it could never emulate the mercy of primitive Christian healing. On the contrary, it appeals to their highest moral and spiritual nature, and leads them to find in God a sure reward for trusting in Him. It is a prophet of good tidings, promising deliverance from pain, suffering and disease; and by the accomplishment of this deliverance, its truth has been established. It has challenged attention, not because of any failure, but because of its success in good works. Indeed its most uncompromising critics are now ready to admit that Christian Science has made good its claim to be a healing religion.

Possibly the larger part of song and of verse has been inspired by the tragedy of life. The mystery of suffering has compelled even the most frivolous to seek the meaning of life; and it is the theology of Christian Science that not only clears this mystery, but removes the suffering. If the healing seems to be of more consequence than the religion, in its appeal to the stranger, it is because he has not looked beyond the cure to its spiritual cause, for it is the theology of Christian Science which heals the sick and reforms the sinner. Far from being an ethical philosophy, Christian Science is a life to be lived,—a truth to be proved.

In looking over the entire range of religious beliefs, whether handed down by tradition or recorded in the sacred books, it is interesting to note that they all claim to be the promulgation of revealed truth; but whatever may be the nature or quality of such truth, that which differentiates the demonstrable revelation of Jesus Christ from them all is its power to give health and life, for "I am come," said Jesus, "that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." Moreover, that truth which heals and reforms, manifests the only religion that is susceptible of proof; for the Master's healing, resurrection and final ascension demonstrated this life-giving element in Christianity.

The works of healing which Jesus accomplished have been preached for centuries; but for one to relate the simple story, of how he went to the mother of Peter's wife and healed her of a fever, does not adequately explain how the healing was accomplished. Suppose one were to repeat the simple words of Jesus and imitate his manner of addressing disease, the mere form could never reveal the effective power which he employed, nor could it give the process so that another might repeat the operation. At least we might infer this from the fact that these works have not been more commonly done for many centuries. That which has made Christian Science eminently practical is its ability to define not only the power which Christ Jesus employed, but the rule by which another may repeat his works; and this withal in so simple a manner that even a child can understand and enjoy its protection; indeed its understanding is a panacea for everybody and at all times, whether the difficulty be a sick body or a sick mind, for "He that believeth in me," said Jesus, "the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do; because I go unto my Father."

*Footsteps in Spiritual Discovery*

When Jesus healed the centurion's servant and the Syro-phenician's daughter without as much as going near them, it should be clear that the power employed was mental, as mental indeed as any Christian prayer. An English poet has propounded the query, "For to say truly, what else is man but his mind?" Indeed we might ask, What else is God but divine Mind? It is truly unthinkable to conceive of an all-wise, all-intelligent God apart from Mind. Moreover, how can an ever-present God be everywhere present, except that presence is Mind? The words of Paul, that "to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace," express the fact that the healing power is in the divine Mind,—in Spirit, not in matter.

To explain how the Mind that is God should have become available for our needs may seem as impossible as to determine the character of the distant stars. But as God's messenger's have come down to us from former generations pointing the way, it may be interesting to contemplate the manner by which these early prophets came to understand for themselves this healing power of God, that we may emulate their good works. The first of the old patriarchs, although reared in the school of idolatry, was touched by a divine impulse and began to contemplate a diviner sense of authority; he began to recognize that, instead of many powers manifested in so many different idols, there is really but one Mind or intelligence, whose power governs the universe and man; the same power, in fact, which later divided the waters of the Red Sea and closed the lions' mouths. Abraham's unswerving devotion to this guiding and saving power inspired an absolute faith in its omnipotence. His recognition of this supreme power revealed God to Abraham as "the Almighty;" and yet, although Abraham

had absolute faith in this saving power and in its promises, his concept of it must have been limited, for the voice of God said unto Moses, "I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty, but by my name JEHOVAH was I not known to them," indicating that there was more to learn about the application of this Mind to human needs.

Moses was taught from his youth to believe in God, but when he began to comprehend what he once believed, he discovered at the outset the same power which inspired the faith of Abraham. Moses was a great observer, and he began to note that this power is not confined to isolated places, like so many nuggets which might be discovered at random, nor is it restricted to holy places or occasions, for he perceived the great fact that this divine power operates through well-defined laws, emanating from the one Principle or Mind, and that as ever-present law this power has a healing and saving influence. Indeed this power manifested through law brought the actual proofs of deliverance from the plagues, from the Red Sea, and from the terrors of the wilderness, until its reliability and truth were absolutely established. Hence, we have in the Scriptures not only Abraham's recognition of God as the Almighty, but the Mosaic declaration that He is "a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he;" and the psalmist adds, "Thy law is the truth." This, then, is the basis for Jesus' declaration, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Nevertheless, when these people had the law, and lived the law, and were delivered by the law, there was yet one thing needful. The final revelation which fulfils the law had not yet been received, for they were continually looking for Immanuel or "God with us."

The Jews had been looking for Immanuel; they needed a final revelation, and expected one. This final interpretation



was to bring the very presence of God to their understanding; and when Christ Jesus took up the thread of this progressive revelation and carried it on to completion, an unbroken highway to the Father's kingdom was established on earth. Christ Jesus' vindication was in his works, for he said, "Though ye believe not me, believe the works." Indeed these works of healing and reformation were precisely what Moses and the prophets had foretold. If the mission of Christ Jesus is to point "the way" by manifesting the works of healing, then the intelligence or spiritual understanding which removes the scales of sin and disease in every age must be the same,—Christ, Truth,—for Jesus himself declared, "No man cometh unto the Father, but by me;" that is, by apprehending that divine Truth which brought about the healing.

Now the Scriptures imply that what the Israelites lacked was the Christian teaching that "God is Love," for "he that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is Love." Moreover, Paul declared that "Love is the fulfilling of the law." Thus we learn that divine Love is the benign presence that heals the sick, reforms the sinner, and fulfills the law.

### *Scientific Discovery*

I have briefly presented this idea of divine law, fulfilled in Love, by way of anticipating the frequent remark that Christian Science is neither Christian nor scientific. What does it mean to have a science? You well know that a science implies classified knowledge; it is the presentation of a law in its unity, order, and system, and this is precisely what Christian Science does. It presents divine law in its unity, order, and system, with such precision and accuracy that Christian healing prevails by way of proof. It is therefore eminently scientific; moreover, it is Christian because

this law is not physical, but spiritual, divine, compassionate, and helpful.

Every one would like to have the power to do the good that Jesus did; every one would be glad to understand the divine law well enough to heal and reform men as did the primitive Christians; and when one does understand this law in its spiritual sense, he is a Christian Scientist as truly as one who understands the mathematical law is a mathematical scientist.

The ability to do the works of Jesus was lost through the idolatry and materialism of the dark ages, and no further discovery in spiritual progress could be made until the re-discovery of primitive Christian healing. Before Jesus went away he had promised to send another Comforter, who should guide into all truth. Therefore Christendom has been looking for the appearing of this Comforter even as the Jews have been looking for Immanuel; but as Jesus pointed to the works of healing as the only proof that Immanuel, or the understanding of God, had come, so he declared this healing Comforter to be not a man, but the "Spirit of Truth," which shall guide into all truth, even that truth which to know is freedom from all fear, sin and disease. When Mrs. Eddy re-discovered primitive Christian healing, she made the further great discovery of its Science and called it Christian Science. She presented the spirit and power of divine law with such precision and accuracy, that it is indeed the "Spirit of Truth," or Comforter, which opens the way to all truth by revealing the practical Science of Christian healing, so that all may follow in the way of Christ Jesus. With this discovery came also the recognition that a divine Science must have a divine Principle. Consequently Mrs. Eddy has presented the further discovery, that God is divine Principle, governing the universe and man through the eternal laws of truth.

*Spiritual Activity*

When a man is suffering a burden of disease, he wants to know respecting the practical application of this law to his needs—how it is that he may have the assurance that God is indeed “a very present help in trouble.” Now, a student never prays to have his problem in mathematics work itself out, for this would do away with the necessity of understanding. He has the problem and also the rule, and he must act in obedience to the rule. There must be a mental activity on his part; and when that activity obeys the mathematical rule the correct solution is inevitable. In Christian Science we have divine law, and when we are confronted by the problems of sin and disease, our next important step is to act, or demonstrate this law. The activity which gives to it a healing effect is the energy of eternal Spirit.

The prophet Zachariah voiced this Christian idea when he said, “Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord.” For “the hour cometh,” said Jesus, “and now is, when the true worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth.” Therefore when this spiritual sense, by which we worship God, is guided by the divine law—that is, scientifically—Christian healing is inevitable. It is truly significant that Jesus opened his mission with Isaiah’s prophetic words, “The spirit of the Lord is upon me.” From that moment he began to solve these problems through the destruction of sin and disease. He healed the sick, cleansed the lepers, raised the dead, cast out devils. Moreover he declared (according to the Revised Version) that “God is Spirit.”

*God is Principle*

It is to be noted that although Christian Science presents no new God, it does present several Scriptural names for

Deity. This does not mean so many different gods, these are but human terms, used to define the one God according to His several offices. That is, Truth is the law; Love fulfills the law; Spirit demonstrates the Science of the law, and so forth. To illustrate: Let us suppose we have a six-sided room, with each side a mirror, and a lamp placed in the center of the room. Each mirror will present a perfect reflection of the lamp, which will be similar each to the others. And yet, their office differs, for the reason that it is the office of one to image or define the north side, for another to image or define the south side, and so on, all being required to image or define the complete object. In like manner these synonymous terms for Deity are necessary to present the complete nature and being of God, whereby we have the Scriptural definition that God is all Mind, Spirit, Soul, Life, Truth, Love. Though differing in their office, we recognize that they are really identical in their essence, for divine Love is indeed the Mind and Spirit which is God.

It is evident, therefore, that Christian Science teaches no new God, but it does present a new name which includes these synonymous terms for Deity, and that new name is Principle. It is quite impossible to conceive of a divine law without a Principle to govern that law, and therefore Christian Science teaches that God is divine Principle. This may be seen in the relation of principle to rule as presented by the Century Dictionary. "You can make a rule; you cannot make a principle; you can lay down a rule; you cannot, properly speaking, lay down a principle. It is (already) laid down for you. You can establish a rule; you cannot, properly speaking, establish a principle. You can only declare it." If this word Principle implies any of the harshness of the Mosaic law with its "Thou shalt," and "thou shalt not," we must remember that the divine

Principle manifests all wisdom, intelligence, and goodness. Indeed, it includes the all of divine Love which binds up the broken-hearted and sets the captive free.

*Method in Jesus' Teaching*

Recognizing how essential it is, at some time, for all to claim their God-given right to be free, it may be interesting to observe the method which Jesus adopted in teaching this healing power to his disciples. Not being gifted in learning, these disciples manifested an average intelligence, and a certain familiarity with the Mosaic law. Doubtless they were as familiar with the Old Testament writings as is the average individual of today. However that may be, we read in Luke's Gospel that Jesus reproved them for their unbelief. "Then opened he their understanding, that they might understand the scriptures." One may be thoroughly familiar with the Scripture lessons, and in his unbelief fail to understand them. For example: When Jesus healed the man with the withered hand, all that he said was, "Stretch forth thine hand . . . and it was restored whole, like as the other." We are all familiar with these words, but suppose that to-day these same words were repeated to one suffering from a withered hand, could their mere repetition heal him? It must be evident to all that not the words, but the spiritual understanding of the Master healed the sick. One might commit to memory the whole Bible, from Genesis to Revelation, and be unable to heal a single disease, for it is the spiritual understanding that needs to be opened. "The letter killeth," says the Scripture, "but the spirit giveth life."

To present this spiritual understanding, it was necessary for Jesus to begin on their plane of thought, where they could grasp the meaning of his teachings. He began with parables, and "without a parable spake he not unto them."

A little later he said, "I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs, but I shall show you plainly of the Father."

In this he did precisely what the mother does when she teaches her child that two and two make four. The child does not understand this at first for the reason that it is mental. He sees nothing but physical forms. Therefore the mother begins with something as tangible as red apples. They mean something directly, and he can understand that two red apples in one hand placed with two red apples in the other make four red apples. The mental character of the problem, however, has thus far escaped the child's notice. For his second lesson, the apples are removed, and he must learn by thinking red apples that two and two are four. Then for his third lesson, he is ready to grasp the mental problem without the physical forms.

In like manner Jesus taught the disciples first in parables, using the things of common experience which they could readily understand. Gradually in this way he turned their thoughts away from the physical to a more spiritual sense of things, until they began to apprehend a degree of reality in spiritual things. Indeed, their faith was strengthened by visible proofs of healing performed by their Master. To watch others solve these problems, however, was insufficient. For their second lesson, they were sent out in pairs to heal the sick, and thus prove their slight understanding; and behold they returned saying, "Even the devils are subject unto us through thy name." The great mental Principle which underlies all being and action was unfolding to them, and they grasped the spirit of it all by the actual demonstration of healing, so that Jesus could say as an opening to his third lesson, "I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs, but I shall show you plainly of the Father." That is, he could then teach them spiritual things in spiritual terms and they could understand spiritually. From that

time their healing was even more remarkable than before, in proof of their positive understanding of spiritual law.

Some there are who believe that the healing works of Jesus are not in obedience to a teachable law, averring that the disciples gained their understanding through the personal inspiration of the great Master. If this were true, what shall we say of Paul and the early Christians? Paul was not a personal disciple of Jesus, but he understood how to heal the sick and raise the dead. He was at first a persecutor of the Christians, actively engaged in opposing their teachings; but the moment he gained a spiritual sense of this Divine Principle, he gave to the world the proof of his understanding by the healing works. It was no longer unreasonable to him. He had learned that the carnal mind is no fit standard by which to judge the spiritual facts of being. For three hundred years this same Christian healing continued to be exercised by the Church.

### *Disease Mental*

When one turns to God for comfort or consolation it is commonly through prayer. Christians are taught to pray for deliverance from sickness and from sin. They continue their preaching against sin, but through unbelief they are apathetic toward the Christian healing of sickness. The explanation may lie in the physical appearance of sickness, for if sickness were known to be as mental as sin, then it could be seen how a mental prayer could control both. If disease were purely physical and could be reached only by drugs or material means, there could be no such thing as Christian healing. One of the leading points in the theology of Christian Science, and one which physicians are now admitting to be true, is the mental nature of disease.

We should look beyond the physical effects to their mental cause, just as Moses did, for when he withdrew his hand

from his bosom white with leprosy he awoke to the mental nature of leprosy. Again, when he returned his hand to his bosom, in obedience to the word of God, and withdrew it free from that dread disease, he learned of its mental cure, and that the divine Mind is the healer. It follows therefore that Christian prayer should be just as efficacious in healing disease which is mental as in casting out the belief in mental sin.

Now when a dentist administers anesthetics to suspend or divert the thought during the process of an operation, he is proceeding on the assumption that if a man cannot think, he cannot be hurt; for during the time when the patient's thought is suspended or diverted, his flesh and bones can of themselves experience no pain nor sensation, no life nor intelligence. Consequently pain is all in the thinking. It is in the mortal mind and not the physical form. It follows therefore, that even surgery may prove indirectly the mental nature of disease.

This leads us to the point where we must recognize with Paul two types of mind, the false and the true, "for to be carnally minded," said Paul, "is death, but to be spiritually minded is life and peace." These may be differentiated by their fruits, for the fruits of the carnal mind are anger, hatred, revenge, jealousy, evil thinking and so forth, which qualities make for sin and death. These are continually at war with the fruits of the Spirit, for these are honesty, goodness, mercy, purity, righteousness, loving kindness and so forth, which qualities make for life and peace. Recognizing how specifically the individual's own thinking governs his body both in health and in disease, we may ask, "Which mind is governing you? Is it the carnal which results in sin and death? Or is it the spiritual which makes for life and peace?" It is this spiritual mind which Jesus opened to his disciples and which demonstrates the law in Christian



healing. It is this spiritual mind that purges the conscience of its carnal thoughts and beliefs and fulfills the law of life and salvation.

### *Human Mind Not Regenerative*

The observation that disease is mental has aroused the frequent remark, "Well, if pain is all in the thinking, just think you are well and you will be so." Now the same ignorant belief that causes disease can never cure it; for, if thinking you are well is all that is necessary, and it could be so arranged at twelve o'clock to-night to have everybody think they are well, then all the pain and suffering of the world might be wiped out in a single night. But the most masterful logic of material philosophy can never convince a suffering man that his pain is not real, for the same carnal mind that produces disease can never destroy it. Only the spiritual Mind revealed by Christ Jesus can uncover sin and disease and destroy them, and that Mind which was in Christ Jesus has stood forth in bold relief throughout the Christian era as the panacea for the world's ills. Therefore, "let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus."

Christian Scientists do not go to the sick-bed with the heartless assertion, "Nothing ails you." Jesus had compassion for those who were bound. He never healed a man by ignoring his difficulties, but by recognizing in his bondage a problem which needed to be solved not by ignorant belief, but in obedience to divine law, for the spiritual understanding of this law exposes the nothingness of evil, which is dissolved before it like dew before the sun.

### *Jesus Eschewed Human Will*

It is well to know that the supposed cause of disease obtains in the mortal mind, and that the understanding of the divine Mind will cure it; but human nature always finds

somebody who wants to climb up by some other way. Such people hold that spiritual-mindedness is fit only for weak women and children, but for the man with a belief in personal magnetism the exercise of human will seems more manly. This unchristian belief in human will has been seized upon as a ready method for competing with Christian Science in casting out disease by a mental process. Various names have been used to designate these efforts, such as suggestive therapeutics, psychotherapeutics, or Christian psychology. These are admitted to be the operation of the human will or carnal mind, and they may be used by a wicked man, an infidel, or a pagan, and therefore they must be the polar opposites of the Mind of Christ, for "the carnal mind is enmity against God."

Human will is an animal propensity which tries to dominate everything and seeks to exploit itself as some great thing, but if "the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness." This blind belief in animal will would commit murder and do all manner of evil to satisfy its own desires. Its chief characteristics are lust and selfishness. As an educational system, its more hidden use is exploited in hypnotism and mesmerism, which are specifically defined as animal magnetism. Think you that this fable monger of materialism is the panacea for the world's ills?

Christ Jesus completely eschewed any use of the carnal will, well knowing that it possesses none of the joy and strength of divine Love, which regenerates both mind and body. Indeed, he understood the powerlessness of human will, for he said, "I can of mine own self do nothing. . . . because I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent me. If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true."

Paul declared that the unrighteous mammon "changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshiped and served the creature more than the Creator." Therefore the basis of all

evil, animality, and disease is a lie; without mind, intelligence, or power. Hence, too, any use of this animal will or therapeutic suggestion is a lie about God, or Truth. This carnal mind being a lie, or nothing, no one can ever explain it as something. "Who can understand his errors?" asks the psalmist. Truth, on the other hand, can always be understood, and the understanding of Truth casts out error as dew before the sun. We are learning in Christian Science to recover man's divine inheritance of dominion over all sickness and sin, and in consequence we are learning to experience more of the joy of that blessed freedom from error by the understanding of Truth.

### *Cause and Effect*

We may read from the book of Hebrews how that the figure of the law never made the chosen people perfect, rather did it continually remind them of their sins, in view of which they made sacrifice year after year, and for the same sins. But Christ Jesus, manifesting the eternal spirit of the law, purged their conscience once for all, and once purged they had no more consciousness of those sins, either in mind or in body. The apostle Paul has portrayed this as the true healing. Instead of continually doctoring effects, Christ Jesus dealt with the mental causes, and when he purged the conscience of sin, it also freed the body of disease, indicating a positive relation between sickness and sin. "For whether is easier, to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee; or to say, Arise, and walk." Thus it is that Christian Science heals both physically and morally.

There are many who really believe that God visits sickness and death upon humanity. It would startle many to learn of the large number of excellent people who are driven annually into infidelity by the cold and cruel assertion that God takes our loved ones away from us. Christian Science

wins these good people back to the Father's kingdom by proving that divine Love never afflicted a man with suffering and disease. When Jesus healed the lunatic child he did not rebuke the angels of God, in the belief that God had inflicted the disease, but he "rebuked the devil; and he departed out of him; and the child was cured from that very hour." He referred to a poor crippled woman as "a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years," and he healed her by casting out the sinful cause.

The mission of Christ Jesus was to "destroy the works of the devil." He regarded both sin and sickness as belonging to that which he proceeded to destroy with Truth and Love. His sense of devil was not a something with hoofs and horns, but the carnal mind which is enmity against God. The sick man by reason of his sickness may not be half so sinful as the well man. This is indicated by Christ Jesus' words when he said, "Those eighteen, upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." And from what should we repent, if not the carnal mind with its train of materialism, that we may "hold fast that which is good?"

So good a man as Job regarded his sickness as the buffetings of Satan and not of God; and he sought his release through a better understanding, not of his disease, but of the power of God,—the truth that makes free. He was exhorted to acquaint himself with God and be at peace, and finally he cried out, "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee," and he was healed.

### *Mrs. Eddy's Discovery*

Before Mrs. Eddy discovered Christian Science, she had been searching for years along this line of mental causation.

She had been studying homeopathy, had learned the mental nature of disease, and that the higher attenuations of medicine which contained the least of the drug and the most of mind were the most powerful. She continued her investigations beyond homeopathy to a mental standpoint, with the question ever before her whether matter or mind heals the sick.

In her subsequent investigations of mental influences she learned that the carnal will or magnetic healing was absolutely opposed to her own ideals of mental healing as practiced by inspired Christians, and she turned from it. She possessed a spiritual insight that others failed to appreciate. Surely God was even then guiding her up to the right understanding of primitive Christian healing. Indeed she submitted to all manner of stress and trial, but withal proving a special fitness to receive the revelation of Truth, by clinging so naturally to her ideal of right and forsaking the counterfeit.

It was at this period of her experience that the great spiritual light dawned upon her consciousness, and found her waiting and prepared to receive the message. The circumstance which brought this spiritual awakening, and thereby established her conclusions, was her remarkable recovery, in the year 1866, from an injury caused by an accident. She was seeking to console her suffering sense by reading passages from the Scriptures, when she caught the depth of its spiritual import and was instantly healed. This was the vindication of her long search, for it was the Spirit that quickened and she knew it.

Now that Mrs. Eddy had found the Comforter, which is the "Spirit of truth," and which heals the sick, she resumed her search of the Scriptures for a scientific explanation of it, that she might impart it to others. She soon learned that the healing it effected according to a divine law, and she

began to write out her observations. These writings formed the basis of her more complete work, known as "Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures," which was first published in 1875.

### *The Text-Book*

This wonderful treatise on Christian Science presents so accurate an exposition of its Science that thousands of people have been cured of all forms of chronic and acute diseases by its simple reading, in fulfillment of the Scripture, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Mrs. Eddy has religiously excluded any mere opinion on the subject, confining herself strictly to a declaration of the facts as they exist. For this reason it cannot be the human opinion of a woman, for no one can either make or change the law. The facts of the divine law have been presented with such precision and grace that all may read, and understand, and be free. Indeed the last chapter in this book Science and Health, known as the chapter on Fruitage, contains a hundred pages of testimonials in evidence and proof of the fact that its study has healed all manner of sin, sickness, disease, and infidelity. Surely, by such works of redemption, Mrs. Eddy has become the greatest benefactor to suffering humanity since the time of the great master Christian.

There are some, however, who have found it difficult to grasp the author's meaning in their study of the Christian Science text-book. Indeed there are some intelligent people who have confessed to this difficulty. On the other hand, little children have been known to gain a sufficient understanding of its teachings to heal themselves and others. The seeming obscurity to the riper intellect is occasioned by a wrong method of approach. When one approaches the study of Christian Science from as material a view-point as

he would the study of physiology, he fails. As one has to think mathematically to learn mathematics, so must he think spiritually to understand Christian healing.

The Master said, "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." We discover therefore certain needful childlike qualities which lead to an understanding of Christian healing. There are humility, spiritual receptivity, and teachableness—three simple qualities, yet so essential that, if lost, they must be regained before one can reach the verities of Spirit.

### *Conclusion*

Whatever else may be said about her, this fact should portray the true character of the Discoverer and Founder of Christian Science; for these childlike qualities must have characterized her attitude of thought in order for her to apprehend and accurately express this "Spirit of truth" or divine Comforter. Indeed she is a true friend to all lovers of Truth. She has presented the true meaning of liberty, and thereby won the boundless gratitude of humanity.

How clear it is that a book indicates the quality or character of the author's mind. We can know the mind of Shakespeare to-day by reading his books. We can discern the kind of man, whether he was good or evil, by his writings. In like manner the purity of Mrs. Eddy's thought is clearly portrayed by her writings, for she is a faithful disciple of her own teachings. To understand the works is to understand the author, and it follows that to understand the author is to understand the works. This is why Jesus said, "There is no man which shall do a miracle in my name, that can lightly speak evil of me," and it follows just as truly that no one can lightly speak evil of the author of Science and Health and understand its teachings. Paul had to

change his thought concerning the early Christians and their teachings, and his advance in understanding was coincident with this change. It should be thought a reasonable thing in a Christian land for the teachings of our Master and Wayshower to be fulfilled. Christian Science has penetrated the mystery of his words and works; and in all that we do we are asked simply to observe Mrs. Eddy's enjoinder, "Follow your Leader only so far as she follows Christ."



## PSYCHOTHERAPY.

BY ROBERT MACDONALD

[ROBERT MACDONALD, Minister Washington Avenue Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., since 1897. b. Liverpool, Nova Scotia, July 23, 1862. Graduated Newton Theological Institute, 1885. A.B. Harvard University, 1894. A.M. *Ibid.* 1895. S.T.B. *Ibid.* 1896. University Preacher, Harvard, 1899, 1900. D.D. Acadia University, 1907. AUTHOR OF *Mind, Religion and Health.*]

PSYCHOTHERAPY may be defined as "the preservation of health and the cure of disease through mental, moral and spiritual methods." While Dr. Richard Cabot of the Harvard Medical School and the Massachusetts General Hospital speaks thus, Professor Munsterberg of the same University defines psychotherapy as "the preservation of health and the cure of disease through mental means." Neither definition is intended to mean that psychotherapy is to be hailed as a modern cure-all. In fact, only a certain type of disease—namely, that recognized by the physician as functional, is psychotherapy's field of operation. Organic diseases—those signifying destruction of some one, in whole or part, of the bodily organs, or of the body's tissue, are legitimate problems for surgeon and medical practitioner to solve. Such are cancer, tumor; diseases of kidneys, liver, intestines and lungs; valvular heart trouble, consumption and many other diseases that make deadly inroads upon the physical parts. But when the organs are working unsatisfactorily—functioning in perverted manner, as is often expressed in indigestion, palpitation, constipation and numerous nervous disorders arising from deranged functioning, but presenting no trace of degeneration or inflammation destructive of the organs' parts, then psychotherapy is enabled to exert beneficent results.

It should not be inferred from this general definition, that all disorders of the nervous system are curable by mental therapeutic measures. All nervous conditions are not resultants of psychic causes, notwithstanding Professor Dubois' general proposition that nervousness is a disease pre-eminently psychic, and a psychic disease needs psychic treatment.<sup>1</sup> But there are organic as well as functional neuroses to be reckoned with. And when there is a change induced in the form and structure of the elements and organs of the nervous system, the neurosis seldom, if ever, yields to psychic treatment. "Such are those psychoneurotics who have," according to Dubois, "in the organization of their brains, certain diseased conditions which render the patient absolutely refractory to all psychotherapeutic action." There are, he further maintains, neurasthenic and hysterical patients who remain incurable in spite of every effort which they try to make to modify their mental state; melancholia and hypochondria often occur without any perceptible moral cause under the sole influence of troubles whose nature is unknown.<sup>2</sup> Then, of course, there are the psychoneuroses, that are of somatic origin, in which the central functions are disturbed by internal causes of which we are generally ignorant, save in well defined cases of corporal disease. Whether of the known or unknown constitutional causes, the remedial effects of psychotherapy are highly problematical. Real melancholia, for instance, does not yield to psychical treatment; but there is a variety of melancholic cases, marked with morbid self-consciousness and acute mental depression that express themselves in weakness of will and a brooding sadness, in spite of what should be happiest surroundings, leading to joyous activity; even those that in their gloom contemplate suicide and unless remedied would

---

<sup>1</sup>Dubois, "Psychic Treatment of Nervous Diseases."

<sup>2</sup>Dubois, "Ibid," p. 448.

burst forth in desperate deed. These, because they are of psychogenic origin, can be remedied—even cured—by psychotherapeutics.

What may be remedially expected of these melancholic conditions can be realized, more or less fully, in all functional neuroses. There is that most wide-spread and least-specialized malady neurasthenia, springing from over-strained and over-stimulated conditions of the nervous system. At first, it is nothing more serious than that depression, or nervous tension, or sense of irritating exhaustion, expressed from the earliest times in the general term "nervousness." But the strain upon the nerves, if not lifted, becomes acute, expressing itself in general physical debility, which can be detected in any one or all of the following physical ills: dyspepsia, which is perhaps neurasthenia's most common expression, constipation, insomnia, noises in the head and ears, brain fag, defective memory, pains in head, back and limbs, loss of appetite and flesh, palpitation of the heart and anaemia. Dubois goes as far as to say that ninety per cent of dyspeptics are psychoneurotics.<sup>1</sup> Every part of the human anatomy may be weakened and all the normal powers become unresisting to the moral shock, when mental anxiety, worry, and fear are likely to accompany the instability and exhaustion. Neurasthenia is then a much more serious malady than nerve weakness, though it may have its inception in that negative neurosis. Each of its many varieties shows positive and aggravating content. For example, cerebral neurasthenia, spinal neurasthenia, cardiac neurasthenia, visceral neurasthenia and sexual neurasthenia, all express themselves in aggravated physiological disturbances. But all skilled neurologists are united upon the remedial powers of psychotherapy for neurasthenia. Sir John Forbes mentions these psychic powers of cure—augmented

---

<sup>1</sup> Dubois, "Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders," p. 258.

hope, faith, cheerfulness, mental activity, decreased anxiety, new motives for mental action and physical experience, soothing moral and religious sensibility. Dr. Schofield<sup>1</sup> states that mental therapeutics may calm the mind in excitement, arouse emotions of joy, hope and love, induce regular mental work to direct the thoughts from the malady. Schofield goes so far as to state that the force of mind is a therapeutic agent in every disease.

Though Hysteria assumes a great variety of organic forms, in fact, there being no disease of the nervous system that it may not counterfeit, such as insensibility in parts of the body, paralysis of the leg or arm, difficulty in breathing, pains in the heart, stomach or intestines, it is, nevertheless, a purely mental disease like all other psychoneuroses, even though Boris Sidis<sup>2</sup> states that definition to be as inadequate as it is to define man as a two-legged animal. Sidis defines hysteria as a malady of emotional life, an intensification of reproduced emotion brought about by the abnormal intensity of the associated ideo-sensory processes. Dubois<sup>3</sup> says it is the superior ego that is weak and which thus permits the polygon a semblance of autonomy. "Thus," continues Dubois, "the remedial appeal must be made to that ego in its highest individual sense, by making their minds critical and giving them a conscious sense of their independence." Dr. Rennie,<sup>4</sup> in the *British Medical Journal*, says "Hysteria is not an imaginary disease, caused, as generally supposed, by shamming. It is a true functional disturbance, but not of the conscious mind; therefore not intentional with the patient." Bernheim<sup>5</sup> sees the source of hysteria to be the psychic centres, but unconscious. Professor Biener<sup>6</sup> says

<sup>1</sup> Schofield, "The Force of Mind," pp. 209-211.

<sup>2</sup> Boris Sidis, *Multiple Personality*, pp. 347-349.

<sup>3</sup> Dubois, p. 221.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Rennie, "*British Medical Journal*," May 4th, 1901.

<sup>5</sup> Prof. Bernstein, "*Brain*," XVI. 190.

<sup>6</sup> Prof. Biener (Vienna) "*Neurologistes Centralblatt*," January, 1893.

it is produced by the sundering of consciousness, the condition precedent to hysteria being in the existence of hypnoid states. Charcot and Sir R. Reynolds say it is ideogenic—which ideas are unconscious. Janet says it arises from psychic failure to grasp or attend to sensation, the impressions not arising above the lower sphere tending to foster, at the expense of consciousness, a secondary subconscious mental state. This noted authority sees hysteria to be a purely emotional disturbance, thus agreeing with Briquet. But Janet also sees, with Sollier, that it is a neurotic disturbance due to an excess of sleep. No less would he give credence to the theory of Féré, that it arises from excessive fatigue. "All these," continues Janet,—“emotion, sleep, fatigue—are at bottom precisely the same thing, inducing the same feelings of weakness, of powerlessness, of automatism, and expressing itself in the same intensely exaggerated agitations as are to be found in convulsions, spasms, curious hallucinations, and all ideas which develop automatically, as the result of suggestion. All such results are a narrowing of the field of consciousness to the intense occupation of the abnormality occupying it, which results in paralysis of will and obliteration of all those sensations and ideas which, in a normal mental state fuses, regulates and controls the impressions coming in from without, that would counteract the suggested idea. Dr. Morton Prince sees hysteria to be not only a mental disease, but includes a splitting of the personality, with or without a doubling of consciousness, also including automatism. All these authorities seem to agree with the theory of Frederick Myers, who stated squarely that hysteria was a disease of the subconscious mind. Hysteria is, therefore, especially amenable to suggestion, inasmuch as its phenomena are produced by morbid auto suggestion stronger than the normal consciousness. Suggestion may, however, depend upon the hypnotic state to be suc-

cessful, for the patient is ever keenly absorbed in his own moods and sensations, and more interested in and reliant upon his own morbid suggestions, than in your rational ones.

Another form of nervous trouble is psychasthenia, so called because the psychical element is primary rather than secondary, as though dependent upon various functional disturbances. Dubois<sup>1</sup> calls the mental peculiarities in psychasthenia "stigmota," by reason of their constancy. The mental defect being primary and dominant, gives rise through mental representations and autosuggestions to numerous functional disorders which the sufferer constantly dwells upon and aggravates. The psychoneuroses are more likely to be congenital than not. Their most apparent characteristic is volitional weakness, while the patient's mental predisposition is characterized by over-scrupulousness, illogicalness, lack of judgment, hasty and erroneous conclusions and often a condition too perplexed to reach any conclusion at all. Hours are sometimes spent in splitting hairs about the right and wrong of a word or act. As one said to me a while ago, "I question some days my every act, and though my reason approves, my conscience will not let me rest until I do it over again, and even then, I doubt if I have done it right. This indecision and worry are killing me; at times I fear I am going insane."

I recall a physician who consulted me about his psychasthenic condition. Over-scrupulousness was his malady. It had led to such emphatic self-distrust as to force him to give up his practice, and for three years he had not even permitted his modest doctor's sign upon the door of his office, lest he be giving the public a false hope of a remedy he felt he could not produce. His sense of incompetence affected his commonest speech, and much of his time was spent in

---

<sup>1</sup> Dubois, p. 157.

seeking out persons to whom he had talked the day before, that he might correct his statement, else determine if they thought he had overstated or understated the fact. When not occupied in searching out those he had supposedly deceived, he brooded over his words and acts at home and was confessedly miserable. Strangely enough, he attributed his psychoneurosis to a former clergyman, under whose preaching he had sat for some years, who had worked upon his nerves through too strict and frequent presentation of the rigors of the divine law. His wife's intuition doubtless struck the cause more accurately by her simple statement that he had always had a supersensitive conscience, which had recently completely gotten the upper-hand of him.

Another case that came recently under my notice and care was of a lady made miserable by fears of disease when she was fourteen years old—a very impressionable age. She happened to read of the lepers in the South Sea Islands, to whom Father Damien ministered. When she read of their hands and feet rotting off and their faces being eaten by the disease, she claimed to have fainted, and when she came to herself repeatedly shuddered from head to foot. For a dozen or more years after that psychic upset, she lived in abject terror of the disease. Reading of cases in distant cities threw her into spasms of fear, accompanied by insomnia and tears. She was seized with an abnormal longing to read in dictionaries and encyclopaedias about the disease's symptoms, and could talk as intelligently as the specialist about the different kinds of leprosy, their forms and action. So morbid was she upon the vexing subject, that upon entering a trolley-car or train, though pressing engagements called and her fare was paid, if any face within sight had pimple or sore, she would bound from the car as though shot out of a catapult. No Chinaman or brown-skinned Oriental was passed on the street, for fear of contagion. No travel

in other cities or lands was entertained for a moment. In spite of all this precaution, she was sure she would contract leprosy and die with it, for she assured me she had contracted small pox and other diseases through fear of them. To both my surprise and her's she was cured of this alarming psychoneurosis through suggestion, and quite apart from the aid of hypnosis, and is now rejoicing in a normal outlook upon life, never flinching, let alone fleeing in the presence of Chinamen, Oriental or American of blemished countenance. Psychasthenia may be considered a neurosis rooted in the subconscious self, inasmuch as the conscious and reassuring mind neither causes nor dominates the psychological situation. The phobias are automatic in their expression; as instinctive and habitual as any deep-set trait of character. Such shows subconscious origin and location, and the need of treatment that gets deeply and strongly into the depths of personality.

When we come to hypochondria, we overlap upon all these heretofore mentioned neuroses. In fact, neurasthenia used to be called hypochondriasis, but according to Dr. Schofield, that was some years back, when nervousness and a good many other indefinable ills were supposed to be traceable to a disordered liver. Dubois<sup>1</sup> says "mild hypochondria could, without straining matters, be put in the pigeon-hole of neurasthenia, were that pigeon-hole not already full. Then it borders on hysteria, which, feigning somatic neuroses, even most organic constitutional diseases, is not far removed from sure belief in the possession of such maladies. Also melancholia in both its mildest and strongest forms is often an attendant upon hypochondria. Then again, many neurologists refuse to use the term "hypochondria," preferring to put all such cases under the "psychasthenia" heading. We must, however, give to this malady a distinct and very

---

<sup>1</sup> Dubois, p. 195.



positive content, ascribing it to all symptoms that postulate a fixed delusive notion of some particular idea or local suffering. Herman defines it as the belief without cause of serious bodily disease. Moreover, it is the most widespread psychological ailment of all psychoneuroses. A prominent physician recently told the writer that every man and woman in the United States was a neurasthenic. Though I fail to join issue with the statement, I believe it is not too radical to assert that everybody, at some time or other is a hypochondriac. Dubois<sup>1</sup> speaks of "many people who, when the least hurt, imagine themselves possessed of functional or organic malady; when they have a cold, consider themselves phthisical; have a cancer in the stomach the moment they feel a heaviness in the epigastrium; who believe themselves tabetic because they have staggered a little when walking. Physicians and medical students are subject to this infirmity—it is often passing—but they should take care and not let these phobias grow. When anyone goes mad, he does so along the line of his former mentality and I have found, toward the fifties, symptoms of very serious hypochondria in fellow physicians, who, during their student period had merely shown a weakmindedness which exposed them to the jests of their comrades."

Dr. Walton<sup>2</sup> is authority for the statement "that the victim of hypochondria may be the picture of health or may have some real ill regarding which he is unduly anxious. His consultation with a physician is likely to be preceded by letters expressing his exact condition, naming his various consultants, also naming the various remedies he has taken. At the time of his visit, notes are consulted, lest some detail be omitted. In his description, anatomical terms abound—thus, he has pains in the lungs, heart or kidneys. Demon-

<sup>1</sup> Dubois, p. 196.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Walton's "Why Worry," p. 101.

stration by the physician of the soundness of these organs is met by argument at which the hypochondriac is generally adept."

My own records recall to me such a case. A professor from a western university came to me with tuberculosis of the lungs, evidence of which was his very hard cough, and a cancer or tumor on the liver, proof of which being abdominal pains, also an anaemic condition of countenance, and a well-developed Bright's disease, because of pains in the lower part of the back. He reminded me he had been examined by three leading specialists, who had deceived him upon his real condition, lest he worry unduly. But, said he, their deception was to him a more aggravated cause for worry than his actual diseases. I had him again examined by a competent physician, who reported "No organic trouble." Two hours' interview failed to convince him of these several physicians' honesty and correctness of diagnosis. But he admitted having from his earliest remembrance been morbid upon diseased conditions of his internal organs; also of long-standing neurasthenic conditions that had expressed themselves in insomnia, loss of appetite and various phobias which were sufficient to account for his hallucinations and psychic pains. He went away, wondering and grieved that no one, not even a clergyman—would tell him the truth when he knew so well what his maladies were.

It is to be noted that the more obscure and inaccessible the bodily organs, the more likely is the hypochondriac to fix his morbid attention upon them. Dr. Walton's<sup>1</sup> humorous illustration of the experienced invalid and the young doctor, admirably covers such extreme cases. "It seems a man who was constantly changing physicians at last called in a young physician just beginning his practice—"I lose my breath when I climb a hill or a steep flight of stairs," said

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Walton's "Why Worry," p. 115.

the patient—"if I hurry I get a sharp pain in my side, which shows a serious heart trouble." "Not necessarily sir," began the physician, but he was interrupted. "I beg your pardon," said the patient, irritably—"it isn't for a young doctor like you to disagree with an old and experienced invalid like me, sir."

The minor phenomena of hypochondria are, however, common and sufficiently well defined to deserve recognition. Huxley, it will be remembered, rather delighted in calling himself a hypochondriac because always troubled, and unduly so, about his health. Dr. Johnson was so self-conscious that he formed the habit of retracing his steps and repeating his acts to satisfy his hypochondriacal requirements. Carlyle was a slave to hypochondria, which can be traced back to his boyhood which was always shy, sensitive, proud and pugnacious, and in mature life, could not bear the crowing and cackle of his neighbors' hens and did his literary work in a sound-proof room constructed for the purpose. Even this did not prevent incessant internal discomfort. "No sleep for three weeks," he exclaims, "from impossibility to be free from noise! I impute nine-tenths of my present wretchedness to this infernal disorder of the stomach." "Sharp pains grasping me about the heart and strange dreams haunting me." But Froude, the historian, a careful observer of Carlyle's condition, contends that the functions of his stomach were never so far wrong as he imagined. "He was always impatient, moody, irritable and violent," continues Froude, "these humors were in his nature and he could no more be separated from them than could his body be separated from his shadow."

It must not be inferred that the hypochondriac's imaginary diseases are unreal. They are the most real facts in the world to him and take precedent of all other facts. Our subjective feelings are much more real than objective facts,

for they are the positive conditions of personality that cannot be effectually argued or laughed away. These are veritable functional neuroses, shackling the will, paralyzing all ability for decision and mental concentration, inducing weak memory, loss of self-control, self-reliance, self-direction, and conducing irritability, dispondency, fear, exhaustion and sometimes suicide. All such psychoneuroses lie beyond the reach of drugs and surgery, medical prescriptions as well as the electric current, a well-arranged system of baths, or strenuous exercise. Mental, moral and religious treatment are alone competent for cure. Psychotherapy meets the need and opens up a remedial world of vitalizing, energizing, reconstructive forces that destroy the embodied dissociations, restoring the psychical equilibrium and making a man free and normal.

### *Psychotherapy and Psychology*

But what is this new thing, psychotherapy? What its correlations with psychology? If psychology be the science of the mind and its activities and relations, psychotherapy may be thought of as the application of psychological principles to psychical and physiological conditions, especially upon their pathological side. We somewhat bridge the chasm between psychology and psychotherapy through the media of such terms as physiological psychology and pathological psychology. The tendency has for a long time been away from the older psychology permeated with philosophical speculation, with its unchanging theories upon our mental states; away from the simple study of memory, reason, and the theoretical will to their changing content in particular individuals under particular conditions and in a particular state of health. The constant investigation in a critical and scientific age of pathological conditions has revealed phenomena that necessitates psychological activity

and broadening of the professional field to take in the changes and oscillations characteristic in both the normal and abnormal individual, thus changing the psychological concept from an abstract to a real and vital thing. As Janet says, "it has ceased to be purely static and has become dynamic." Or, as Stanley Hall contends, "psychology should now be dominately inductive and practical. He illustrates this condition by stating that psychology lives not merely in the study, but where doubt and belief, sanity and inherited insanity struggle together, where temptation and cowardice wage their wars in the mob and cloister, where rage, terror, pity become convulsive and sweep all before them, and where love of the lie usurps that of the truth. Psychology in our practical age, must first study and teach how to live, love, learn, labor; must have something to say to all who reflect on reproduction, disease, health, and thus must first serve man well if it would later rule him wisely."

This modern adaptation of psychology to all changing conditions of consciousness premises an irregular and indefinable territory, because one as extended as the universe of mortals. But who is competent to conceive of the content of our mortal universe with its multitudinous relations and correlations of mind and body, and the never-determined distinctions between consciousness and matter? And there is other than consciousness to be reckoned with whether it be consciousness and matter or consciousness of matter which, to the idealist, gives matter its vitality. The paradox of unconsciousness presses for psychological attention. This carries us so far afield into such subliminal and subconscious depths that no possible limits to the field of psychology can ever be expected to be determined. Surely no *a priori* limits can be set. They must be of a continuously *a posteriori* nature and of a boundless empirical range. Is it not because of such limitless necessity that

so keen an observer as Professor Cattell claims for psychology the freedom of the universe for its subject matter, in which every method of science is employed? How then can it be that there is even up to the present time no new psychology, as Professor James claims, "but only the old psychology which began with John Locke, plus a little physiology of the brain and sciences and theory of evolution and a few refinements of introspective details?" If that be so, no wonder James,<sup>1</sup> in his "Principles of Psychology" launches such withering indictments against the psychology of a few years ago, when he affirms "Psychology is but a string of raw facts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level; a strong prejudice that we have states of mind and that our brain conditions them; but not a single law in the sense in which physics shows us laws. At present, psychology is in the condition of physics before Galileo, and the laws of motion or chemistry before Lavoisier." Truer to facts is the statement of Cattell "That the study of psychology is limited only by the capacity of the human mind. The barrenness of the traditional psychology is as verily distanced and out-dated by the vital and practical progress of today, as is the rudimentary alphabet by the words and sentences expressive of the thought of an age of the most varied and astute thought. The former was rudimentary and simple indeed, both in conception and phraseology, while the later is so magnificently complex and complicated, that even present postulation of its future evolution in terms of practical application is beyond the prophecy of the most sanguine and optimistic minds."

As rudimentary and theoretical as the earlier psychology was, there has been more or less steady though involved advance in psychological conception, since the early Greek

---

<sup>1</sup> James, "Principles of Psychology," p. 1.

philosophical period. From the time some 450 years before the Christian Era, when Zenophanes, Parmenides and Zeno with their doctrines of being, substance, movement and matter, opposed the empty conceptions of Greek mythology; and Heraclitus claimed that the primal element of the Universe was fire, and Empedocles, that while matter was immutable, all bodies were in a state of constant change; up to Plato, Socrates, Aristotle and the Sophists, knowledge has displayed a psychologic significance. Then hear Socrates call his fellow Athenians away from their cosmological speculations, to the consideration of man, as the measure of all things. Therefore, "Know thyself." Here begins with Plato and his well wrought-out system of "ideas," and Socrates with his problem of knowledge, what Professor Baldwin calls the era of "Experimental Subjectivity." Beginning with Aristotle, who lodged the idea in the material form and read the subjective into the objective, as Baldwin so well affirms, the movement is outward.

In Mediaevalism, when the intellectual and religious contest was between scholasticism and mysticism, the psychological side of introspection had no representation. Both contributed, however, indirectly to our present psychotherapeutics—scholasticism in training the mind to think as well as in paving the way to that renaissance which marked the breaking up of dogma and the emancipation of the individual into the freedom of thought which blossomed psychologically in the empiricism of Locke and Hume, and the positivism of Rousseau and Auguste Comte, and the genetic philosophy of Fechner and Lotze; mysticism which brought God within mortal touch as a vitalizing, remedial force. In the seventeenth century, the science of psychology, though distinctly born, was not differentiated from its metaphysical parentage, as embodied in the conceptions of Descartes Malebranche, Leibnitz and Kant. How well

Leibnitz anticipates our modern positions when he states that unconscious acts of mind are called obscure ideas, insensible perceptions.<sup>1</sup> Even Immanuel Kant could prove his place to be among the most advanced twentieth century psychologists, through such statement as this that "unconscious sensations and obscure perceptions form the larger portion of our mental states<sup>2</sup>." The nineteenth century certainly established the science of psychology and pointed the way for exclusive development. It is reserved for the twentieth century to make application of principles to life in all normal and abnormal conditions, the most important demonstration of which will doubtless be along the lines of experimental psychology, or what we designate, "Psychotherapy."

### *Consciousness and Unconsciousness*

To the twentieth century psychologist, the human consciousness is the most fascinating thing in existence. And the twentieth century physician, as truly as the neurologist, must attach his diagnosis to more than the patient's disordered body. To be in the broadest sense effective, he must take into account abnormal mental states, that are inextricably interwoven with primary somatic conditions. Temperament, habits of thought, moral and emotional motives, resiliency of will, even philosophical and religious view points in the one treated, are as much factors to be reckoned with as physiological dissection, anatomical disorders, muscular weakness and chemical analysis. "Symptomatology," says Professor MacDougall, "is as much a matter of psycho-physical responses as are physiological tests. This is true whatever the nature of the disease . . . above all, where these affect the cerebro spinal system. . . ." It is not necessary to complicate the matter by any discus-

<sup>1</sup> Leibnitz, "Nouveaux Essais," Vol. 11, Chapter 1.

<sup>2</sup> G. H. Lewes, "Study of Psychology," p. 17.



sion of the relations of mind and body, nor to take sides in the debate between interaction and parallelism. Stated in purely physical terms, it is but recalling to mind the necessity of taking into account the intimate and peculiar influence which conditions of excitement in the central nervous system exert upon the general metabolism of the body and the question is solely as to the treatment to be selected. A thorough course, he continues, "in the general science of mind is desirable in the preparation of every practitioner; but for the nerve specialist, a knowledge of the results of experimental psychology on normal function, as well as its variations, is absolutely indispensable. In his work, practice, as well as diagnosis, is largely mental in its nature. Drugs take a secondary place. The patient must be soothed, encouraged and guided into new mental habits by a process of suggestion, stimulation and restraint. The establishment, through mental therapeutics of a more central mental condition, supplemented by food, air and exercise, is trusted to bring about a restoration of equilibrium among the secondarily disturbed processes of the body. Psycho-physical investigation has transformed our views as to the nature and origin of idiocy and epilepsy, of hysteria and insanity, and all troubles of that misused and afflicted class of the mentally deranged, and has made over the whole system of treatment to which they are subjected. It is affecting more and more widely the general practice of the physician by emphasizing the significant part which mental attitude plays in the history of the disease." "The individual soul," exclaims Professor MacDougall, "is unqualifiable and can be treated only intuitively. Its education is the result of formative influences which can be expressed only in terms of will and personality."

Professor Calkins assures us that the self must be taken into the account, for it undergoes a development which is

psychic and not physiological, and refers to the change central in self-development as correlated with physiological processes, but not identical with them. All such professional conclusion opens the way for the science of psychotherapeutics, for as Dr. Weir Mitchell claims

"Tis not the body, but the mind that's ill."

And when we bring the entity man or self into the problem, our consideration becomes extremely complicated, for consciousness is vastly more than a series of ideas. As Professor Calkins says, "The self has permanence and identity, and is a growing and expanding thing. It is, moreover, not a temporal reality at all. Selves are untemporal. Both metaphysics and psychology disclose this untemporal quality, but each self has temporal relations with its own past and future, and with the temporal experiences of other selves. It is this ever heightening, deepening and broadening conception of the content of consciousness unto all states and relations of the soul, or the untemporal self, that makes a demand for moral and religious, as well as for mental remedial principles to be brought into the solution of the therapeutic problem.

It is interesting to ask and difficult to determine the part enacted in psychotherapy by the unconscious mind. Just here we enter a maze of conflicting opinions. The older psychology had no use for the term, nor for the content and characteristics of the supposed field connoted by the term. Its shibboleth was "no consciousness—no mind." Such definition makes even that fearless, psychical investigator, Professor James,<sup>1</sup> in his published volumes on psychology, limit psychology to the definition of Professor Ladd and that it is the description and explanation of states of consciousness as such. James<sup>2</sup> elaborates this conserva-

<sup>1</sup> James, "Psychology," p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> "Ibid," p. 2.

tive definition in these two data—(1) "Thoughts and feelings or whatever other names transitory states of consciousness may be known by; (2) knowledge of these states of consciousness of other things." Later on, James feels such ground insecure. Such conclusion fails to satisfy. All the knower can know leads far afield of such statement. "Everyone assumes that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our thinking activity as such . . . yet I must confess that I cannot feel sure of this conclusion. It seems as if consciousness of an inner activity were rather a postulate than a sensibly given fact—namely, the postulate of a knower as correlative of all the known."<sup>1</sup> A later statement still shows the tendency of James' psychologic thought. "The most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science, is the discovery that in certain subjects, at least, there is not only the consciousness of the ordinary field with its usual center and margin, but an addition, thereto, in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts and feelings which are extra marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, yet able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most important step forward, because, unlike the other advances which psychology has made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constituency of human nature."<sup>2</sup>

It is this extra marginal set of thoughts and feelings, forming an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in our human constitution, that is to be, as it appears, the battle ground of opinion and conviction during this century. Professor Montgomery<sup>3</sup> goes so far as to say that "a science constructed without reference to an abiding extra conscious-

<sup>1</sup> James, "Psychology," p. 467.

<sup>2</sup> William James in "Hypnotic Therapeutics," by Dr. John Quackenbos, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Professor Montgomery, "Mind," Vol. XIV, p. 499.

ness source of actuation and emanation will end in vacancy, our own conscious content being brought into existence by extra conscious powers and processes." Were such radical statement not abundantly reinforced by psychologists of repute the conservative position of such authorities as Ladd, Boune, Sully, Royce, Hutton, Ireland, Kirchener and Baldwin, might hold sway. Professor Ladd<sup>1</sup> denies that unconscious psychical or mental states belong to the mind, and shows the vain attempt of trying to force a metaphysical conception of mind which does not include consciousness as the one characteristic that distinguishes mind from not mind. An unconscious mental state is as inconceivable as "wooden iron" or the "unconscious conscious." Ladd<sup>2</sup> further claims that the term psychosis is not to be employed for any sort of processes that are not in consciousness; also, that the unconscious is the physical which is not conscious. Professor Boune<sup>3</sup> claims that "consciousness is the specific feature of all mental states. If the soul performs unconscious functions, they have no mental claim." Professor Sully<sup>4</sup> numbers among illusions, the belief that there are unconscious elements and processes in the human mind, and speaks of the deep regret of every earnest psychologist at the mischief wrought by this idea of unconscious mental processes in contemporary psychology. Professor Royce<sup>5</sup> sees thought to be a series of active conscious states, claiming Von Hartman's "Philosophy of the Unconscious" to be full of contradictory notions. Hutton<sup>6</sup> states that we should not attribute the cleaning up of a subject in our minds to unconscious cerebration, but to forgotten intervals of conscious intel-

---

<sup>1</sup> Ladd, "Philosophy of the Mind," pp. 395 and 385.

<sup>2</sup> Ladd, "Ibid," p. 381.

<sup>3</sup> Boune, "Introduction to Psychotherapy," p. 286.

<sup>4</sup> Sully, "Pessimism," pp. 193 and 194.

<sup>5</sup> Royce, "Mind," Vol. VIII, p. 33.

<sup>6</sup> Hutton, "Contemporary Review Inquiry," 1874, p. 201.

lectual work. Professor Baldwin<sup>1</sup> sees unconscious mental states to have no nobler origin than either a physical excitative, inadequate to a mental effort, else from the mental side as a state of least consciousness. Doctors Ireland and Kirchener are as strongly opposed to the paradox of unconscious mental activities and speak of the pretension of unconscious cerebration.

But over against these of the conservative school are as trustworthy advocates of the modern theory of the unconscious mind. Gallon<sup>2</sup> in his "Inquiry into the Human Faculty," speaks of only a minute part of the multiplicity of mental operations falling within the ken of consciousness. Hack Tuke<sup>3</sup> speaks of intellectual activity and mental modification going on without the consciousness of the subject. Dr. Laycock<sup>4</sup> speaks of unconscious mental life and action as a universally accepted guide in the affairs of life. Professor Bascom<sup>5</sup> claims that psychologists no longer believe that all the factors of mental phenomena can be discovered by mental introspection. All these lead up to that psychological extremist Myers, who treats of not only the unconscious mind, but of the mind's subconsciousness and supraconscious operations. He prefers the term "subliminal" for all that lies below the threshold of consciousness. "I suggest," writes Myers, "that each of us has an abiding psychological activity far more extensive than he knows. . . . For all which lies below the threshold, 'subliminal,' seems a fitter term than 'unconscious or subconscious,' which are misleading. I hold that the spectrum of consciousness is in the subliminal self indefinitely extended at both ends. At the inferior or physical end (sub) it in-

---

<sup>1</sup> Baldwin, "Psychology," p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> F. Gallon, "Inquiry into Human Faculty," p. 202.

<sup>3</sup> Hack Tuke, "Dictionary Psycho-Medico," Vol. 1, p. 348.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Laycock, "Mind and Brain," Vol. 1, p. 161.

<sup>5</sup> Professor Bascom, "Comparative Psychology," p. 38.

cludes much that is too rudimentary to be retained in the ordinary consciousness of an organism, so advanced as man's. As to the superior or psychical end (*supra*) it includes an unknown category of impressions which ordinary consciousness is incapable of receiving, save as messages from the subliminal consciousness."<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Schofield, to whose book, "The Unconscious Mind,"<sup>2</sup> I am indebted for many of the above references and who is, perhaps, our most radical and consistent advocate of the modern psychologic theory, goes to as extreme lengths as does Myers in showing the relation between the conscious and unconscious mind. He likens them to the visible and invisible parts of the spectrum of the sun's rays. "We know," he says, "that the chief part of heat comes from the ultra red rays that show no light, while the main part of the chemical changes in the vegetable world are the results of the ultra violent rays at the other end of the spectrum, which are equally invisible to the eye and are only recognized by their potent effects. Indeed, as these invisible rays extend indefinitely on both sides of the visible spectrum, so we may say that the mind includes not only the visible or conscious part, and what we have termed the 'subconscious,' that which lies below, or at the red end; but the supraconscious mind—that which lies beyond at the other end—and including all those regions of higher soul and spirit life of which we are only at times vaguely conscious, but which always exist and link us to the eternal verities, as surely as the subconscious mind links us to the body. The mind reaches all the way and while on the one hand it is inspired by the Almighty, on the other it energizes the body, all of whose purposes it originates. We may call the supraconscious mind the sphere of the

---

<sup>1</sup> F. W. C. Myers, "Journal of Psychical Research Society," Vol. VII, p. 306.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Schofield, "Unconscious Mind," p. 94.

spirit life; the subconscious, the sphere of the body life and the conscious mind the middle region where both meet. . . . The truth is that the mind, as a whole, is an unconscious state, but that its middle registers, excluding the highest spiritual and lowest physical manifestations, are fitfully illuminated in varying degrees of consciousness, and that it is to this illuminated part of the dial, that the word *mind*, which rightly appertains to the whole, has been limited." Maudsley<sup>1</sup> gives us as radical a statement, when he claims that "the brain not only receives impressions of consciousness but registers impressions without the coöperation of consciousness, elaborate material unconsciously, calls latent powers into activity without consciousness, and responds as an organ of organic life to the internal stimulæ which it receives unconsciously from the body."

The extreme positions for and against the presence and power of the subconscious are admirably illustrated in the instances given by Dr. Morton Prince in his paper before the International Congress on "Abnormal Psychology;" also by Dr. G. Thompson in his "System of Psychology." Dr. Prince, it should be noticed, believes in the subconscious state, even to the extent of the foundation of a secondary personality, but sees such states to be formed by functional dissociations, from the main system of ideas that make up the personal consciousness, but unifies them with abnormal syntheses and automatisms. He asks if subconscious states habitually exist normally, or are they always either artifacts or abnormal phenomena. He thus leans to Janet's theory that "a doubling of consciousness is always the sign of a diseased mind; thus, that subconscious states are abnormalities and manifested in the phenomena of absent-mindedness and abstraction,—thus, pathological." "I do not find," states Dr. Prince, "that my own conscious

---

<sup>1</sup> Maudsley, "Physiology of Mind," p. 35.

activity appeals to anything else but my own conscious processes, or that I am conscious of any such easy way of settling my problems, as to have an unconscious mind reach a solution my conscious mind could not. As an ordinary man, I do not find that I can rely on any other consciousness to write this address, but the thoughts which I laboriously elaborate." Dr. Thompson, as competent an authority, states "I have had a feeling of the uselessness of all voluntary effort and also that the matter was working itself clear in my mind. It has many times seemed to me that I was really a passive instrument in the hands of a person not myself. In view of having to wait for the result of these unconscious processes, I have proved the habit of getting together material in advance and leaving the mass to digest itself until I am ready to write about it. I delayed for a month those parts of this work relating to attention, association and representation. I went to my library each morning and persevered days in succession, reading Aristotle, Locke, Hartley, Mill, Bain, Spencer, Lewes and Hodgson, and then would sit for hours looking out of the window at the park. I was not yet in a proper mental state to say what ought to be said. One evening when reading the daily paper, the substance of what I have written flashed upon my brain and the next morning I began to write. This is only a sample of many such experiences."

I think we have more of us had the experience of Dr. Thompson than that of Dr. Prince. How often have we tried to recall a name of person or place and the more conscious we became of trying, the less successful at recalling? But when we ceased our conscious effort and attended to other things, else left the mind a blank, the name came up into consciousness. Then, frequently, we have been muddled over a certain mental work. We have done our utmost



to see the thing clearly; it may have been a lesson to be learned; a problem to be solved; an oration or poem to be committed to memory. We have gone to bed in that blurred condition of mind, but upon awakening the clear, strong mental condition we longed for and could not realize had arrived.

Mysterious, unconscious powers lent their aid. That the mind includes unconscious parts which become at times causes of consciousness, no careful observer can doubt. While it remains the great unexplored country, apparently limitless in extent and resourcefulness, much can be conservatively inferred concerning it, which both observance and experience verify. It may not be claiming too much to consider it the residential realm where we live. Such conception will eventually be seen to be nearer the truth than the declaration that we live in our conscious states, or in our reasoning capacity. While these postulate initial existence—namely that of experiment, investigation, diagnosis, acquisition, judgment and conclusion; all secondary states, such as those of instinct, intuition, habit, character, lie deep down in the realm of being. We love to boast of being reasonable beings, of thinking before we speak, of investigating before we affirm, of consciously paying heed before we act, of consistently willing before we undertake, but we do so only as students and strangers to the truth that we are striving to express. Once masters of the unique situation whatever it be, the involved truth expresses itself, using our mental and physical faculties for its functioning. This is seen in every masterly act of life. In fact, automatic action is more normal than abnormal, which, when inhibited by reason and consciousness, breaks up influential and powerful expression. The neophyte acquires his art consciously and painfully, through most laborious reasoning and investigating and study. Not until these conscious

methods hand down their gains unto the unconscious realm, where they become reinforcements for consciousness and realization in terms of instinct, intuition and autonomous action, is musician and artist and he of commonplace experience strong enough to exert pleasurable influence and awaken admiration of his talent and genius. The moment he lets the inhibitions of reason or consciousness come in, he introduces a disturbing, even destroying, element, as is noticeable in every intrusion of self-consciousness.

Philosophic and psychologic authority for such affirmation is multitudinous. The problem is illumined by such far-away writers as Sir William Hamilton and Noah Porter, who support this view, while Wundt, Hartmann, Jessen, Rosmini, Holman, Montgomery and Bascom, reinforce it. Sir William Hamilton<sup>1</sup> states, "I do not hesitate to affirm that what we are conscious of is constructed of what we are not conscious of. Thus, those mental modifications are not in themselves revealed to consciousness and we are thus constrained to admit as modifications of mind what are not phenomena of consciousness." Noah Porter<sup>2</sup> adds, "That the soul may act without being conscious of what it does and that these unconscious acts affect those acts of which it is conscious." Wundt<sup>3</sup> says, "I admit the necessity of referring the origin of sensuous perceptions and of consciousness in general, to unconscious logical processes, since the processes of perception are of an unconscious nature and only their results appear in consciousness. The suggestion of the logical character of the processes of perception are of an unconscious nature and only their results appear in consciousness. The suggestion of the logical character of perception possesses the essential require-

<sup>1</sup> Sir Wm. Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic," Vol. 1, p. 348.

<sup>2</sup> Noah Porter, "Human Intellect," p. 103.

<sup>3</sup> Wundt, "Beitrag zur theorie der Sinnes Vermehrung," pp. 169, 375, 436, 488.

ments of a very well grounded theory. That would be at once the simplest and most appropriate expression under which the facts of observation can be combined. The first act of apprehension which yet belongs to a sphere of unconscious life is already a process of inference; it being proved that there is not merely a conscious, but unconscious thinking. We believe that we have hereby completely proven that the assumption of unconscious logical processes is not merely competent to explain the results of the processes of perception, but that it in fact also correctly declares the real nature of these processes, although the processes themselves are not accessible to inward observation." Edward Montgomery<sup>1</sup> states that "the mental process must be wholly dependent for its origin to subsistence on an actuating substratum of unconscious force." Jessen<sup>2</sup> claims that "when we reflect on anything with the whole force of the mind, we may fall into a state of an entire unconsciousness, in which we not only forget the outer world, but also know nothing at all of ourselves and the thoughts passing within us. We then suddenly awake as from a dream and usually at the same moment the results of our meditations appear clearly and distinctly in consciousness without our knowing how we reached it." Rosmini<sup>3</sup> affirms that "a close attention to our internal operations, along with induction, gives us this result that we even exercise ratiocination of which we have no consciousness, and generally it furnishes us with this marvelous law that every operation whatsoever of our minds is unknown to itself until a second operation reveals it to us." Professor Holman<sup>4</sup> says "All precepts are practical judgments and are intuitive judgments. The mental processes involved are what is called

<sup>1</sup> Ed. Montgomery, "Mind," Vol. 7, p. 212.

<sup>2</sup> Jessen, "Psychology," quoted by Hartmann Phil. of the Unconscious, Vol. 1, p. 235.

<sup>3</sup> Rosmini, "Psychologia," Vol. 1, p. 196.

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Holman Intro. to Education, pp. 299, 300.

'practical reason.' Its most striking form is seen in those inventions which are so often made by artisans. There is no explicit thinking out of matters by bricklayers, but a kind of almost instinctive realizing that such materials will lead to given practical results. The individual regards the matter as one of doing, and not of thinking." Professor Bascom<sup>1</sup> states "It is inexplicable how premises which lie below consciousness can sustain conclusions in consciousness; how the mind can take up a mental movement at an advanced stage, having missed its primary steps."

The most convincing example of the action of the subconscious mind, possibly, ever give to the public is that edited by Professor Child,<sup>2</sup> in the "American Journal of Psychology." It gives the questions and answers of two hundred university students and professional persons, one hundred and fifty-one being men—forty-nine being women. "When you cannot recall a name you want, does it seem to come spontaneously without being suggested by any perceived associations of ideas? Eleven per cent answered "No." Eighty-one per cent answered "Yes." "Does such recovery ever come after sleep?" Seventeen per cent answered "No." Fifty per cent answered "Yes." "Have you ever had some new discovery or invention flash into consciousness as a clear conception?" Thirty-two per cent have had this conception, and of these, seventy-one per cent had it flash into consciousness suddenly. "When perplexed at mathematical problems or other puzzles, have you left it, turned your attention elsewhere and after some time found you could master it easily?" To this, seventy-seven per cent answered "Yes," and twelve per cent "No."

Professors Kirchener and Wundt, seem to give us the philosophy of these subconscious phenomena, in the follow-

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Bascom, *Comparative Psychology*, pp. 31-33.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Child, "Am. Journal of Psychology," Vol. 5, part 2.

ing words: Kirchener<sup>1</sup> states that "our consciousness can only grasp one quite clear idea at once. All other ideas are, for the time, somewhat obscure. They are really existing but only potentially for consciousness—*i. e.*, they hover, as it were, on the threshold of consciousness. The fact that former ideas suddenly return to consciousness is simply explained by the fact that they have continued psychic existence and that attention is sometimes voluntarily or involuntarily turned away from the present. The re-appearance of former ideas is thus made possible." Wundt<sup>2</sup> says "The traditional opinion that consciousness is the entire field of the internal life, cannot be accepted. In consciousness psychic facts are very distinct from one another, and observation itself necessarily conducts the unity in psychology. But the agent of this unity is outside of consciousness, which knows only the result of the work done in the unknown laboratory beneath it. Suddenly a new thought springs into being. Ultimate analysis of psychic processes shows that the unconscious is the theatre of the most important mental phenomena. The conscious is always conditional on the unconscious."

We give much space to these convictions upon the integrity of the unconscious mind, because of the part that portion of the human personality is destined to play in all coming psychological investigation, also because of the writer's firm belief that it is this extended submerged realm of being in which is stored excessive latent energy and much remedial resourcefulness that can be utilized physiologically as well as mentally and morally. Undoubtedly, psychotherapy is dependent upon this unconscious tract of being for its remedial and curative work. Undoubtedly, suggestion, which is the supposedly curative implement in psychother-

<sup>1</sup> Kirchener, "Psychology," p. 205, quoted from Dr. Schofield's "Unconscious Mind," pp. 108 and 109.

<sup>2</sup> Wundt, "Physio-Psychologia," Intro. p. 5, quoted by Pibot, in "German Psychology of To-Day," p. 191.

apy, sets these buried subconscious forces working in behalf of health. But it is to be observed that neither professors of psychology in our universities, nor neurologists in actual practice are acquainted with these remedial subconscious forces; or, if acquainted with their existence, do not acknowledge their scientific integrity and value. For instance, so thorough a work as Professor Dubois', "The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders," which is of recent date, shows neither acquaintance with, nor reliance upon, this supposed reservoir of psychic power. Multitudinous cures are wrought without analysis of mentality, save into its normal and pathological states. He makes much of mental forces, the ego, the effect of suggestion upon these entities, and especially of the hypnotic state. The nearest approach to a credence of a subconscious realm is perhaps in such statement as this: "This suggestibility becomes extreme when our convictions cease to become established in strange and unknown realms. . . . Our intelligence is always fragmentary; we are always ignorant of something."<sup>1</sup> Professor Munsterberg in his recent work, "Psychotherapy," emphatically denies the existence of a subconscious mind.

Many, if not all, modern neurologists show as little regard for the subconscious department of the mind's existence as Professors Dubois and Munsterberg. Both Professor Miller and Doctor Starr of Columbia University, show no acquaintance with, nor need of acquaintance with the subconscious mind. Professor Southard, assistant professor of neuropathology, Harvard University, goes so far as to make light of all subconscious forces, stating that "he has heard of a score of different names given to the subconscious mind, which is to him a mere will o' the wisp." Pro-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dubois, *Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders*," p. 113.

fessor Miller,<sup>1</sup> distinctly states that "what is done in effective suggestion is to set free certain energies in the brain that work favorably on certain functions of the body." Professor Miller claims that "all mental treatment is physical treatment. To talk to a man is to set up activities in his ears, nerves and brain, and those in his brain are the physical counterpart and reflection of the ideas that we suggest to him." Dr. Starr<sup>2</sup> states, Many critics draw back at the subconscious mind as though at the brink of some dark pit. Dr. Worcester's work referring to the 'Emmanuel Movement,' so called, does not rest upon the belief in a subconscious mind or as it has been more appropriately termed 'co-consciousness.'". In this statement, I claim Dr. Starr erroneously estimates Dr. Worcester's belief. Such statement, however, shows Dr. Starr's reluctance to credit the existence of subconscious powers. He further states "The important thing is that certain suggestions will be carried out, not that it is the unconscious mind that carries them out. Let them be carried out by whatever mind forces will do the work. The only practical thing is that they are carried out. The proposition that the normal man has a co-consciousness is very disputable." Professor Miller quite agrees with Dr. Starr, when he affirms that "the work depends on no metaphysical views, but on something much more solid—experience." Here Professor Miller is correct. Dr. Dubois would be no more effective in his cures, in acknowledging the existence of a subconscious power. With all neurologists, physicians, practitioners, the remedial work depends on no metaphysical distinctions, but on the appeal to the resident constituent elements of personality, give to them what name we may. Whether brain forces do the work, or mind

---

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Miller, "N. Y. Times," Nov. 13, 1908.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Starr, "N. Y. Times," Nov. 13, 1908.

forces, quite independent of the brain's functioning and purely psychical, matters not an iota. And it is significant that most present-day advocates of psychotherapy do not consciously make use of the subconscious mind as receiving a suggestion and assisting the curative work.

In running through the two volumes of "Psychotherapy" issued by the League of Right Living, which seems to be thoroughly up-to-date, and which is contributed to by Dr. Richard Cabot and Dr. James Putnam of the Harvard Medical School, Professor Angell of Chicago University, Professor Woodworth of Columbia, and Professor Simpson of the Hartford Hospital, no sympathetic recognition is given to the work of the subconscious mind. Neither Dr. Cabot nor Dr. Putnam mentions it in any way. Professor Angell dismisses the term with this word: "Some of the distinguishing facts may be 'subconscious,' as it is called. Certain German investigators have invented methods by which this subconscious stratum may be tapped. He, however, closes his article on 'Mind and Body' with the statement that there is needed the deepest knowledge—both therapeutical and practical of the psychology of the human mind, and the most penetrating insight into human character." Dr. Simpson uses the term in these relations: "Normally, these centres act automatically—'subconsciously,' if you please. There are certain general considerations connected with brain-structure and function, which, to my mind, make more comprehensible the phenomena of the psychoneuroses and of those secondary states of consciousness known as hypnotism and somnambulism, which are closely connected with them." Dr. Simpson quotes in this article, on the Nervous System, Dr. Boris Sidis, who claims that "hypnotism produces a cleft in consciousness. The primary consciousness is cut off and the secondary consciousness takes command, and this secondary



consciousness can do all that a man can do and sometimes more." He also quotes James as saying: "The stability, monotony and stupidity of the secondary self is often very striking—it is purely a servant at the command of the operator. It seems to think of nothing but the last order received." He further quotes Dr. Sidis as saying "It has no personality; it has no sense of rationality; it has no morality. It originates nothing; it does nothing of its own accord; has no judgment; no self-control; no will; no individuality." Finally, Dr. Simpson asserts "It is the belief of advocates of psychotherapy that the causation of these disorders lies primarily in the realm of mind—whether conscious or unconscious." Professor Woodworth sees psychotherapy as "an example of the influence of the brain on the lower centres and through them on the muscles and glands. In mental healing you influence the brain, and through it, the rest of the body." The nearest Dr. Putnam comes to the concession is to say the "mind is the parent of the body." "By the mind, we understand one form of the living principle of which the humblest sorts of vital energy are other forms."

We dismiss the discussion of the unconscious mind, by citing two modern authorities—one a doctor of philosophy—the other a prominent physician, who speak in most sweeping terms of its existence and function: Dr. Cutting<sup>1</sup> states "there is most mental activity of which we are not conscious. Some of this which at one time caused much conscious effort, is now carried on unconsciously through the mechanism of habit. Some other portions we have never consciously directed. All that part of the mind which ministers to somatic activity is an example of the latter. The respiration, heart action, secretions of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Geo. B. Cutten, "The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity," 1908, pp. 15 and 16.

various organs, peristaltic actions of the stomach and intestines, regulations of the blood supply and other vital functions are all controlled by subconsciousness and any direct conscious effort to control these organs tends rather to disarrange and disturb functioning than to assist it. . . .” Because the subconscious controls these bodily functions, it is only by reaching it directly or indirectly that these organs can be effected through mental means. While this is an important office of the subconscious, it is by no means its principal work. It is the constant ally of consciousness. Subconscious influence is woven into every mental product. There is no doubt that subconscious impressions govern many actions every day. They may even force us in opposition to our reason. Thus we have impulses, intuitions, unreasonable dislikes and likes, love at first sight, convictions with reason to uphold them, or spontaneous ideas well worked out. Delusive, fixed, insane or hysterical ideas also find their source in subconsciousness. It is not a separate entity, nor is it antagonistic to consciousness; they work together. The two fields of mental activity are divided by what has been designated, “The threshold of consciousness.” All above is consciousness; all below is subconsciousness, but they react on each other. The impressions which we consciously receive are not all that we get; the subconsciousness receives much which escapes consciousness and may despatch certain impressions of consciousness at an opportune time, or if not definitely impressed, it may furnish a mood which cannot be consciously accounted for. Consciousness is selective and critical, the subconscious is not. It takes anything and everything without question, but it is not always allowed by consciousness to incorporate these things into the life. It is exceedingly imitative. What is often charged to heredity may be but the activity of the imitative subconsciousness.

Dr. Schofield<sup>1</sup> in his "Unconscious Mind," illustrates the relation between the conscious and unconscious mind, by this convincing figure: "A coral island, in the South Pacific, is a mere ring of rock in the water of insignificant size to the sailor, but to the biologist or geologist it is the highest peak of a stupendous structure that rises from the bottom of the ocean, as a mountain miles high. Commencing, as it does, in the very smallest beginnings, it remains unrecognized until it rises above the surface of the sea. We only see the top of this structure and call it an island, indeed it is all we are conscious of except by soundings or occasional glimpses of what is beneath on calm days or at low tides. In the same way it appears that the sum of the psychic forces, which we may call mental, and which constitute mind, only a very small portion is fitfully illuminated by what we call consciousness. The establishment of the fact of an unconscious mind has a great bearing on the training of children, for children can be molded unconsciously with much greater ease than through consciousness. It gives also a key to the cause and cure of many, if not most, diseases. It lays at last the foundation of character, conscience, of the entire ego, so long obscured by a psychology bounded by the conscious." Dr. Schofield<sup>2</sup> continues, "surely then, a part of our being that is the repository of such vast powers is worthy of more consideration than it has yet received at the hands of any psychologist, and we are convinced that once they relinquish their narrow prejudices and seriously take up the study of this great subject in a worthy manner, a new era will have dawned for their science. It will have been placed on a broad and impregnable basis and rescued from the opprobrium and contempt that at present it excites in so many quarters.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Schofield, "Unconscious Mind," pp. 50-7.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Schofield, "Ibid," p. 120.

*The Subconscious Mind—The Soul*

This array of authority for and against the subconscious leads to a religious conclusion, and one which it is to be hoped at no distant day will be conceded—even scientifically demonstrated. It is that the subconscious mind is the soul of man. Such conclusion accounts for all these varieties of opinion as to its existence. The neurologist occupied with sensory and motor nerves, brain centres, ganglionic neurons and the excitation of the neurons of the cerebral cortex cannot be expected to be friendly to purely idealistic and cosmic entities of spirit origin. No more the psychologist entangled still with the materialistic tendencies of physical science. Even Schofield and Hudson, neither of whom can be said to enjoy scientific recognition, though going to splendid extremes in defining the content of the unconscious mind, dare not identify subconsciousness with the soul. And as for scientific psychology, it sees mind to be simply a complex of psychical processes, the conscious mind being the functioning of those processes with awareness, the subconscious mind being the functioning of those processes with unawareness, in a physiological way. They concede that thought normally and naturally works out into outward, muscular movement, and under proper conditions inward, retarding or accelerating physiological processes. They concede, further, that wrong thinking as expressed in fear, worry, morbid imagination, as well as overwrought emotion, will interfere with the rhythm and harmony of these processes, while right thinking and healthy emotion, will, under proper conditions, do much to correct wrong functioning. None of these even the most generous supporter of subconsciousness claims to possess any vision of the soul. To do such would be to wander far afield of scientific ground. But when Dr. Van Gieson, of the Willard Parker Pathological Institute, declares that his

investigation and experimentation assures him that fully ninety per cent of everyone's personality is submerged under the threshold of consciousness, it is well to ask if those depths of being that we never become conscious of, except in intuition, instinct, habit and character, are not that part of us made in the image of the Creator, and endowed with His characteristics. Such conception simplifies things amazingly and accounts for every claim made in behalf of subconsciousness. If we can believe it to be the individual manifestation of the Universal mind, we can see whence its latent remedial power is derived. If it has control of the organs and activities of the body, so that during sleep the lungs breathe, the heart pumps, the stomach digests, the liver secretes and the kidneys act as correctly and more so that during our conscious rational state, we can realize its potency. If, further, the mind's limits have never yet been discovered, we can see why not discovered,—because limitless. Such conception also shows why the suggestion that starts up its activity is so potent. The soul is not expected to be self-guiding. It is a secondary consciousness, dependent upon the intelligence or non-intelligence of its possessor, else some other intelligence to whom it looks for guidance. By and by in the eternities, when man's poor wisdom is no more, under the control of the Creator, the soul will have that opportunity to which, through conscience and revelation, it has been approximating through the years of the earthly pilgrimage. This view gives the broadest rational basis for psychotherapy, which means the remedying of our ills through mental, moral and religious principles.

### *The Religious Element in Psychotherapy*

The above reflection brings us up to the religious side. Whether or not the integrity of the subconscious mind be

conceded, all advocates of psychotherapy acknowledge the remedial aid to be derived from vital religious faith. There is something within that responds to the religious trust in God and prayer, which shows these to be therapeutic agents in all diseases. The majority of physicians know that self-centred thoughts are the bane of all neurotic conditions. The writer recalls many cases of insomnia, indigestion, constipation, nervous headache, sluggish, despondent, morbid mentality, and pronounced physical inertness, that were broken up and superseded by normal mental and physiological functioning through the introduction of a God-consciousness to supersede self-consciousness. Professor Miller of Columbia speaks a strong word in behalf of the force of religious suggestion for mental disorders. Physicians who devote themselves to nervous diseases admit the importance of suggestion, but some doubt the legitimacy of religious suggestion. Why, they seem to ask, should any religious ideas be introduced into suggestion? Because religious ideas are the largest, the most comprehensive, the most adequate ideas that can be found for the purpose. They are not ideas confined to the moment or to the specific ailment—they pertain to a man's whole life and its arrangement. Religion is a discipline of the desires. Its aim is to fix the allegiance of the mind upon that in which it finds its comfort and its stay. Its aim is to make certain desires and interests permanently supreme, and others subordinate. It thus composes a disquieted mind, giving peace and rest. Those who minister to nervous illness know the need of peace and rest. As regards a specific ailment, religion says that it is the good, the fair, the sound, and the healthy that are divine and that are to be forwarded in this world. It bids the soul cast in its lot, its hope, its will with these; it bids the soul cleave to these in its daily thought and imagination and live as much as may be in the

ideal. It knows that thus to live toward the ideal is to invite the ideal and tends to realize it. This is simply a law of our being. It may be expressed in the analytic language of science. I have expressed it in a language more natural to the soul itself.

Dr. Starr desires us to see that these so-called religious forces are not outside the lawful course of nature nor of immaterial and supernatural origin. His affirmation is that "the forces for good and for health are divine forces, but within you, and tend constantly toward your recovery, and that it is only necessary to turn your face in their direction and put away the fears and anxieties that fight against these inward forces." "These are all expressions," Dr. Starr claims, "in the light of religious ideas, that it is wise to direct the attention to the bright side of things and to live upon the bright side rather than the dark." Dr. Starr's championing of the clergyman's entrance upon psychotherapy, in answer to Dr. Joseph Collins' contention against such clerical coöperation, is worthy of note. Dr. Collins, who was formerly president of the American Neurological Association, asks, "What is there about the ministerial profession that gives them a peep into the human mind . . . that is not vouchsafed to the physician?" Dr. Starr claims this question implies ignorance of the fact that a large number of persons in distress, both of body and of mind, turn rather to the clergy than to the doctor for advice and comfort. The Roman Church meets the demand by the confessional. The other Christian sects have the same demand, but do not always meet it. Some pastors in the various churches, who are particularly sympathetic and are capable of putting themselves in the place of those who consult them, soon come to act as father confessors to a large number of their people, and thus acquire that intimate knowledge of conditions and circumstances which enables them to act as wise

guides for conduct and life. This—the pastoral side of the clergyman's work—necessarily gives the clergyman a "peep into the human mind that is not vouchsafed to physicians," and fits him to deal with many cases of mental uncertainty and distress in a way open to but few physicians. Now, if the same successful result can be produced by instilling religious confidence and by methods free from the dishonesty of quackery and without the mercenary element which enters into Christian Science, and mind cure, why not admit its use? I am not inclined to admit any supernatural element in this method of cure. In fact, my only criticism of this healing mission in Boston and New York is my reluctance to associate what I consider the result of the personal influence of the leaders with any supernatural element. I do not believe that the admitted miracles of Lourdes and of St. Anne de Beaupre are supernatural. But since the human mind in its weakness demands some supernatural theory to account for these miracles, why is it not legitimate for the Protestant Church, as well as the Catholic, to adopt means calculated to produce the ends desired; especially, as this means cannot be termed in any sense evil? As a physician, I have to admit that the influence of a firm religious belief is the best factor to enlist in the cure of alcoholism, and that it affords the most powerful stimulus in the conquering of evil habits and the maintaining of a moral life. There is nothing which doctors can command that compares for a moment in persistent, daily power over a man's conduct with his belief in all that the church—Roman or Protestant—stands for. Here is where the healing mission gets its power. And here is where it can accomplish many things which physicians are impotent to attain."

In fact, in the hands of a Christian minister, suggestion can be filled as full of the good tidings of the Gospel of the



Son of God as the minister has in his own mind and heart. Numberless are the testimonies of a new, fresh, vital hold upon the Christian verities through treatment for mental and physical ills. The confession even of members and officers in the Christian church is that they have, for years, been worshipping an unknown God located so many leagues beyond the stars that faith and prayer were stereotyped credal expressions, imparting no spiritual uplift and containing no vital blessing for the tempted, care-pressed, sin-cursed victim of the ecclesiastical order. Psychotherapy in the hands of a devout clergyman not only banishes present ills and leads to positive, vital union of the human life to God, but makes the Bible and the church indispensable to human welfare. I know of men who have been communicants of the church for thirty years, who now at the advanced age of seventy rejoice for the first time in the consciousness of a personal God and a living Christ, that is filling life's eventide with blessing.

The opinions of Dr. Starr and Professor Miller point in the direction of the subconscious mind being the soul, and as such the repository of a divine life that can be relied on for therapeutic purposes. They are an emphasis upon what the medical fraternity are coming more and more to rely on, under the Latin term "*Vis Medicatrix naturae*"—namely, the natural power latent in the unconscious mind. Dr. Schofield would agree with Dr. Starr "that there is nothing of supernatural power in psychotherapy, because no need of such, the depths of being containing all needed divine therapeutic agency." Dr. Wilkinson<sup>1</sup> of London exclaims: "Every thoughtful practitioner will acknowledge that when his therapeutic reserves are exhausted, by far the most reliable consultant is the '*vis medicatrix naturae*.' To ignore the fact that it is already in charge of the case

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Wilkinson, "*The Lancet*," 1897, vol. 2, pp. 15 and 18.

for days, when we first approach with our mixtures and tabloids, is at least a mistake in medical ethics. It is a power, a vital resistance to disease." Of course, it matters little whether we concede that the God-power is within or without. I, for one, hold to both hypotheses, within, as a resident, reconstructive divine energy, without, as both an imminent and transcendent power within and above the Universe. The soul needs all the spiritual reinforcement it can acquire. The diseased personality needs all the God-consciousness available. Reliance upon God as a wise and loving Father, to quiet the patient's fears and doubts, also, a consciousness of a divine life-energy resident in the Universe re-creating and vitalizing all the forms of nature, are as much needed as for the person to be introduced to the divine forces resident within his own being.

Psychotherapy has done valiant service, both in recognizing the need of coöperation between doctor and clergyman and in breaking down the hard and fast lines between the different spheres of man's psychic nature. The word of Dr. Cabot<sup>1</sup> is of value here. "I have defined," he states, "psychotherapy as the attempt to help the sick by mental, moral and spiritual methods. These methods overlap and blend into each other; indeed, I think it is proven beyond doubt that it is unwise to try to separate them, unwise, that is, to try to separate a person's mind from his soul, or his intellect from his moral life by any hard and fast lines. We must appeal to the whole personality, if we are successful in psychotherapy. This fact, I believe, has been more fully realized in America than elsewhere, and it is for this reason that the American type of psychotherapy seems to me to be something distinguishable and in many respects superior to any other type now existing. Realizing, as we do, that mental activity merges continually into moral and religious activity, we have not hesitated, here in America,

---

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Cabot, "Psychotherapy," Vol. 1, p. 7.

to associate the man of science and the man of religion—doctor and minister in a most favorable form of coöperation for the good of the sick. Out of this association has come what is known as the 'Emmanuel Movement.'” Professor Angell<sup>1</sup> also speaks strongly on the religious element in psychotherapy. His word is “It must be clear that if we can make any approach to restoration from diseased conditions by mental means, we shall be the more successful, the more powerfully we can appeal to the mind and the emotions. Now, among all the feelings to which we can appeal, few, if any, are so strong as those which we call religious. This fact is borne out by religious healing. No religion is without such phenomena, and in many of them such facts are brought forward as proof—positive of the truth and divinity of the faith. Christianity is no exception to the rule. Protestant Christianity has, however, until recently, disregarded the possibilities at hand. From the hygienic side there is a tremendous advantage to be gained from the religious appeal, wherever it can be used. Furthermore, it is to be recognized that many people will go to a clergyman with troubles which are in essence mental, that they would not think of consulting a physician about. These cases represent no small part to which human kind is susceptible. It is fortunate if the religious adviser be a man wise enough to handle these cases as they should be handled—namely, as pathological and mental, rather than primarily moral. Of course there is often a moral obliquity at the bottom of the matter, but after all the point here is that many cases sadly needing treatment and likely to get to a physician after it is too late to repair the damage, may be kept from the brink of serious mental trouble, if the clergy are alive to their opportunities and responsibilities.”

---

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Angell, “Psychotherapy,” Vol. 1, p. 67.

*The Emmanuel Movement*

Under this term this necessary union of physician and priest has been consummated. This movement was inaugurated in Boston, Mass., by Dr. Worcester, Rector of Emmanuel Protestant Episcopal Church, to put in practice the psychological and religious principles of psychotherapy. Within the three years, of its existence, it has spread rapidly through the cities of America and in Europe. All denominations are enlisted in this therapeutic work. The Episcopal Church has taken the lead, but following hard upon this initiative are the Baptists, Congregationalists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Universalists and Unitarians in such representative centres as New York, Brooklyn, Jersey City, Buffalo, Rochester, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles and many smaller cities, from seventy-five to one hundred in all. The Roman Catholic Church has recognized the importance of the subject, in "Pastoral Medicine," a handbook for the clergy written by Dr. Alexander E. Sanford, and the Rev. Walter Dunne, bearing the imprimatur of the Archbishop of New York. In England, where Milne Bramwell, Lloyd Tuckey and A. T. Schofield, physicians and neurologists, have taken a prominent part in the psychotherapy movement Canon Wilberforce has held special services in connection with the work and the Bishop of London is interesting himself in it.

Such reference shows psychotherapy to be housed even though not incorporated into the organization of the church. Every ministerial practitioner, however, relies upon the diagnosis of a physician to be sure that the malady he assails is not of organic nature. His field is not the body, except as it manifests the functional neuroses. Primarily it is diseases of personality to which he gives his attention. We mean

by that diseases that impair and hinder the working of individuality and the enjoyment of life. Such diseases are neurasthenia in different phases and degrees, psychosthenia, hypochondria, insomnia, the milder forms of hysteria and melancholia, mental and religious depression, defects of memory, inability for mental concentration, loss of confidence in self and inability to speak in public, moral degeneration, worry, shame, lying, doubts, fixed ideas, obsession, various phobias, exaggerated emotionalism, irritability, groundless suspicions, immoral propensities, abnormal diffidence and shyness, suicidal tendencies, drug habits, excessive tobacco addictions, alcoholism, and above all a neurotic self-consciousness from which many of these maladies spring.

When physiological disturbances result from any of these ills, such as headache, vertigo, dyspepsia, constipation, the action of the heart, when the trouble is not organic, impaired blood circulation, muscular contraction, remedial results may be expected, and often these physiological maladies yield before the pathological mental states that gave rise to them. Relief is given, even though cure or positive allaying of the disturbance is not realized, for where pains are not banished patience and control are imparted to bear them. Personal attitude is changed. Mental attitude largely conditions our comfort and happiness. Maeterlinck says, "We suffer but little from suffering itself, but from the manner in which we accept it." An elderly lady, eighty years of age, suffering from persistent insomnia, said to me recently, "I am better—very much better, though I cannot sleep any longer than before." Before treatment, her three hours a night sleep nearly drove her distracted, caused incessant tossing and turning and the worry that naturally accompanies such unrest, and she wondered how long she could endure without losing her mind. Now she sleeps

no better, but rests all night long and acknowledges being refreshed in the morning.

The reëducational element in psychotherapy as the Emmanuel movement represents it, is of vast importance. It possibly exerts no more necessary, and certainly no more enduring influence than this. All persons are at some point or other superstitious, and it is often, as Lessing explains, "The superstition in which we were brought up never loses its power over us, even after we understand it." We can, however, be taught and trained out of our superstitions. It is amazing how much religious superstition there is even in enlightened America, centering in the conviction of an antagonistic Deity, an avenging God, and a morbid sensitiveness concerning early vices and His unforgiving attitude in consequence. Such induces melancholia and divers neurotic troubles. The educational work here is to Christianize the life by introducing a scientific interpretation of the Scriptures, rational conceptions of God's wisdom and love, and in destroying the demon of a diseased self-consciousness. For all evil habits that hamper and destroy healthy, normal, optimistic functioning of the ego, this educational process is productive of good. Between the multitudes of mortals afflicted with abnormal self-appreciation and the large remainder diseased with an abnormal self-depreciation, the range is extended indeed, that calls for the introduction of correcting, moralizing truth principles. Self-control is needed by the father and mother in the correcting of the children in the home. Self-reliance and direction are needed for every experience radiating from individual lives. A greater need still is a deepening and broadening consciousness of reliance upon God as a regulative principle in all healthy contemplation and endeavor, becoming a precious remedial measure for diseased fancies. Dr. Worcester affirms that many persons must actually

learn over again how to live. He continues, "Among the means at the disposal of psychotherapy an important place must be given to what is technically called reëducation. If the lesson of right living had been learned and practiced in early life, there would be no need of reëducation, and we may hope that the earnest efforts which men are making to-day to improve the conditions of life will save the next generation from many of the evils that trouble us. At present, we are confronted with an alarming increase of nervous disorders and weaknesses, many of which rise from our transgression of the laws of right thinking and of right doing. Most of us are as well as we deserve to be. I mean by this that we are as well as our physical and moral habits will let us be. Reëducation is a kind of mental gymnastic. Just as an athlete can train a certain group of muscles to do his bidding, so we can train certain groups of thought, and cultivate certain healthful emotions until they dominate the mind and outgrow and overgrow the morbid tendencies which are doing us so much harm. Closely analogous to this psychic reëducation is what is known as motor reëducation. There is an organic nervous disease known as locomotor ataxia, which originates in a wasting of the spinal cord and manifests itself in a lack of harmonious action and coördination. This disease is generally admitted to be incurable. Up to a few years ago it could not even be alleviated, but now, thanks to the ingenuity of Doctor Fraenkel, it can be greatly relieved. The lesions of the cord, it is true, cannot be made good, but other motor centres can be trained to take the place of the injured part and to do its work, and the sufferer learns once more, by conscious attention and by painful effort, the art of coördination and of walking. Now in the realm of the mind we are able to set up a similar process by which mental obstructions and hindrances are taken away. A sense of

greater vigor and vitality is brought to the sufferer through the suppression of sad, morbid, debilitating thoughts. This process of soul-culture is also hard and painful, especially at first. It requires courage, patience and determined effort, but if we persevere we shall soon begin to reap a rich reward in health of mind and body. The easiest way to overcome depression and unendurable thought is by substituting for it healthful and happy thought."

As shocked as the public is over the prevalence of suicide, it would be immeasurably saddened at the revelation of the wide-spread suicidal impulse in weary lives, but no abnormal condition is more easily corrected than this. Numberless persons, thus obsessed, have confessed to shame at entertaining it, after a single half-hour's conference. When the impulse has gained rootage in the subconscious mind and is automatically prompting to the fatal plunge, a number of treatments are needed for cure, but virtuous response is certain, because, as Dr. Quackenbos<sup>1</sup> beautifully asserts "Each one of us may realize his own oversoul and its relationship to Deity and destiny. And the human being who apprehends that he is continuous with God and as cast in the image divine is measurably endowed with the attributes and powers of God—and that these powers are given him to run successfully an appointed career—that human being is incapable of all unmanly action, of fear, doubt, worry, distrust of his own adequacy, or of anger at the dispensations of Providence, but recognizes his supreme duty to be the intensifying of his spiritual life. He labors earnestly to transform his limitless capacities into practical achievement. He appreciates the act of living as the art of filling up every hour of life with beautiful thoughts and beautiful deeds." This is why the suicidal impulse that so readily suggests to the diseased soul relief from its miserable, neurotic, dys-

---

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Quackenbos, "Hypnotic Therapeutics," p. 97.



peptic, obsessed self, yields inevitably to earnest rational and spiritual educational methods. The cleric can, in this significant phase of therapeutic application, never be superseded by the physician. Moreover, the physician will ever need just such a trustworthy, psychologically educated clergy, to whom he can hand over cases that need such moralizing and Christianizing. And what gives the clergyman a unique position of helpfulness is that he represents an element of religious elucidation and correction the physician lays no claim to, and though a Christian man recognizes as being outside of his professional lines. Dr. Worcester recognizes this clerical equipment, but insists upon the necessary accompanying psychological equipment. His word is "All clerical, Emmanuel Movement workers believe in prayer, but prayer based on the conviction that he and his patients are in the presence of God, rather than that they are imploring an absentee Deity, who needs to be placated and may or may not incline His ear and lend His aid. His assurance is that God is a spirit and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth. He is, moreover, convinced that when the human spirit is calm and impressionable and open to all good influences, that the divine spirit—the spirit of all goodness enters in and possesses the human consciousness and leads the weak and erring soul into all blessedness."

It is characteristic of this clerical treatment that each person applying for treatment bring the statement of a reputable physician as to his or her condition. Here are examples of physicians' diagnoses: "Dear Dr. ——— I am sending you a patient of mine, Mr. C., whom I hope you can greatly benefit. He has no organic condition of a pathologic nature and is physically all right. With best wishes for your success with Mr. C., I am, Sincerely yours, R. F. W." Here is another—"Dear Sir: Mr. C. W. Y.

is under my professional care, suffering from neurasthenia. He has no physical ailments and in my opinion he would be a proper case for psychotherapeutic treatment, and I trust that the Emmanuel Movement will enable him to regain his health. Sincerely, J. L. M." A third reads, "This will introduce to you Miss M. H., who is suffering and has been, for many months, with neurasthenia. Medical treatment, electricity and osteopathy have all failed to give my patient relief. She comes to you seeking health and I sincerely hope she may receive it. With good wishes, Yours truly, E. E. L., M. D." A fourth reads, "This is to certify that I have treated Mr. M. W. of this city, for a number of years, for various ailments. I am certain that his nervous condition is due to no organic change, but is purely functional. F. P. K., M. D." A fifth reads, "Dear Sir: You have my full consent to give Mrs. C. any relief in your power. W. M. D."

The following list taken from the published account of Dr. Worcester's work, who sees fifty appeals for help daily, and who conducts the best organized clinic in the United States for the relief of functional maladies, shows the extent of the work in a single year, seventy per cent of which are remedied, ranging from positive cure to acknowledged relief:

Alcoholism .....	44	Hypnagogic States .....	1
Arterio-Sclerosis .....	13	Insomnia .....	33
Constipation .....	3	Indigestion .....	14
Dementia Praecox .....	11	Kidney Affection .....	7
Depression .....	53	Locomotor Ataxia .....	10
Dipsomania .....	7	Migraine .....	7
Fear Neurosis .....	6	Manic Depressive Insanity...	35
Fixed Ideas .....	2	Morphinism .....	7
Exophthalmic Goitre .....	8	Neurasthenia .....	189
Hysteria .....	23	Chronic Neurasthenia .....	19
Hemiplegia .....	2	Neurasthenia with Depression	16
Hypochondria .....	9	Congenital Neuropath .....	5

Insane, Unclassified .....	18	Senility .....	5
Occupation Neurosis .....	1	Unclassified .....	106
Osteo Arthritis .....	1	Spasm (functional) .....	6
Articular Arthritis .....	1	Lateral Sclerosis .....	1
Paranoia .....	1	Tumor .....	9
Polio-Myelitis Anterior.....	1	Reserved .....	39
Psychasthenia .....	38		

Dr. Worcester contends that this list does not include the many childish complaints, or the considerable number of patients who have been treated by various specialists outside the church at the request of the clinic and that in addition to these cases, which number 661, a large group of persons has come to the clinic from all over this country simply seeking moral and spiritual help or advice in regard to the conduct of life.

The means universally employed, is suggestion. Its application differs with the person administering it. Some practitioners avoid all technical allusion, such as reference to the specific malady, or the contrast between the conscious and subconscious minds. The practitioners, it is needless to say, avoid the use of hypnosis as an initiatory measure, inasmuch as it is only necessary to arouse the personality to the exercise of self-control and reliance upon the power inherent in the submerged depths. The Rev. Mr. Place,<sup>1</sup> of Waltham, Mass., claims that the real trouble in neurotic cases is an impairment of the coördinating faculty; that is, that there is a lack of self-control. "Self-control is to me," he exclaims, "the key to the whole situation. All the symptoms of functioning, nervous weakness of will, weakness of attention, inability, despairing fear, and so on, point to lack of self-control. To find the faults of character, to educate the will and to develop the coördinating faculty is a task which strikes at the roots of the whole subject. A few words about treatment. It seems to me, the conscious

<sup>1</sup> Rev. Chas. A. Place, "Psychotherapy," Vol. II, p. 83.

and subconscious minds are normally continuous. I have, therefore, aimed at the whole mind, seeking mastery of self and the total life of the individual. I have used explanation, education and encouragement, not suggestion in the technical sense, sleeping or waking. In some cases where the reasoning faculty appeared weak, some outside influence of power seemed necessary, especially where the mental disorder was very bad. But in all cases I have persisted in my faith that the human soul can be reached by moral and spiritual appeal and taught to come to mastery of its life." Rev. Mr. Powell,<sup>1</sup> of Northampton, Mass., reports this method of treatment: "The patient is submitted to a searching inquiry into every circumstance touching in any respect upon his mental or physical condition. The failure to reply with perfect frankness closes the discussion and makes treatment utterly impossible. Nothing is spared to secure the patient's confidence and to establish the closest spiritual relationship. Directions are given in regard to mental and spiritual hygiene and a course of reading is mapped out, and the daily reading of the books suggested have been the largest factors in the patient's forward march to health. Usually, however, after the discussion and the prescription of good books, the patient who is seated in the comfortable Morris chair before the fire, which, I take care by this time to have burning low, is taught by rhythmic breathing and by visual imagery to relax the muscles and is led into the silence of the quiet mind by tranquilizing suggestion. Then, in terms of the spirit, the power of the mind over the body is impressed upon the patient's consciousness and soothing suggestions are given for the relief of the special ills. The past year, seventy-five of the two hundred who have come to me, began to receive systematic treatment for neurasthenia, psychas-

---

<sup>1</sup> Rev. L. P. Powell, "Psychotherapy," Vol. 1, pp. 88 and 89.

thenia, false paralysis, hypochondria, melancholia, hysteria, insomnia, fixed ideas, morbid fears, suicidal tendencies, alcoholism, and other ills of soul, mind and body. On each subsequent visit, the treatment has logically followed the preceding one." Mr. Powell's<sup>1</sup> word to the nervously ill, is as follows: "Standing behind the Morris chair, my custom in ordinary neurasthenia is to begin the treatment in a gentle monotone, thus, 'You are now relaxed in body and suggestible in mind.' You are to allow your thoughts languidly to follow mine, expressed in words. You are not to question nor oppose. I shall say nothing which your mind will not at once accept and cherish. Your nerves are out of order, just because you have filled up your soul with things of less importance than the best. You have worried when you should have cast your care on Him, for He careth for you. You have yielded to small fears, forgetful that perfect love casteth out fear. In the silence of this quiet hour swing your centre out of self and put your fears and worries far away. Open wide the windows of your soul and let the spirit in of wholesomeness and love, of harmony and power. Believe the spirit will come in; wait for the incoming. And remember that 'they that wait on the Lord shall renew their strength. They shall mount up with wings as eagles. They shall run and not be weary. They shall walk and not faint.' Your special ills of mind and soul will disappear before the incoming spirit. They are going now. They are gone." Dr. Worcester's method is somewhat similar. His word is "I place the man in a comfortable, reclining chair, cut off the stream of sensation by darkening the room, and insuring quiet. Then I earnestly tell him that in a few moments he will be asleep. If he knows that hundreds of other persons have undergone

---

<sup>1</sup> Editor of Psychotherapy article in "Woman's Home Companion," April, 1909, p. 22.

this experience, he will be more certain to accept my assurance and obey the suggestion. A patient with palpitating heart comes to me. I soothe him with a few gentle and quiet words, and tell him that his nervousness is passing away and that his heart is beating quietly and regularly, and that in a few moments he will be calm and happy. He listens to me, believes me and the prediction is fulfilled."

My own method of operation is more diversified than these. It consists of three divisions of treatment, all of which are applied to every case, though varying in detail according to the temperament of the patient and the nature of the maladies treated. The person is placed in a reclining chair, while I sit in a chair in front of him three feet away, instead of standing behind him and stroking his forehead, as is generally the position of Dr. Worcester, Mr. Powell, and others. He is first instructed to close the eyes, as in prayer, not only because of the seriousness and devotionism of the treatment, but for two specific reasons,—to shut out the distracting furnishings of the room and to suggest restfulness. I place myself in sympathetic relation with the person. I then order him to draw a very deep, slow breath, holding it a few moments, then letting it out slowly, and at the last quickly, that he may have the consciousness of the chest receding, the shoulders falling, arms and hands dropping prone and heavy, every part of the body relaxing, even to the stretching out of the legs so as to sit heavily in the chair. Quite a few minutes are spent in bidding the patient to become conscious of complete lassitude, without tension in the muscles or animation in the body, and with the mind a blank. Then I begin with mild and drowsy suggestions, bidding the person fall asleep, if possible. If he say he must keep awake to hear what is said, I assure him it is not at all necessary to hear or heed my words, inasmuch as the subconscious

mind is ever alert, and more so when the conscious mind is asleep, to catch the words and use them remedially. Each person needs to be assured that we are not working with the conscious mind at all, and that our endeavor is to sidetrack it completely by making it non-attentive. Then follow the gentler suggestions which often induce the desired unconsciousness and where sleep is not realized a relaxed condition so complete is attained that all conscious attention is nullified. These suggestions are: "Now you are settling down into rest. You are thinking about nothing; heeding nothing; not even catching the words I speak; you are passive through and through, thoroughly relaxed and receptive, heavy in the chair. Now I am talking to your subconscious mind; the depths of your being; the soul within you. Then addressing the subconscious mind, I remind it of its latent remedial energy, which I desire to arouse for the person's benefit. I remind it that it can assert itself against this malady and will, because it is not only possessed of much curative power, but also has control of the organs and activities of the body. I assure it of this fact by reminding it that during sleep the lungs breathe, the heart beats, the stomach digests, the liver secretes, the kidneys act, under its control, as during rational activity. I also remind it that it is incapable of guiding itself, and is not only dependent upon reason's promptings, but that it is willing to be commanded how to proceed in its remedial work and that it always strives to do the thing asked of it. My suggestions then partake of command and encouragement—"I command you to assert yourself to realize for this person these suggestions." If troubled with indigestion, constipation, or insomnia, the command is 'Assert yourself for freedom from this limiting, distressing disturbance. Achieve normal functioning.' If the person has abnormal fears, I order it to break up those fears and

generate confidence, self-reliance and strength, giving these suggestions: 'I am losing my fears; I am gaining confidence; I am strong in the Lord. You will; you must destroy these fears and lend your strength to impart confidence.' Then follows encouragement: 'You can do this; you are the individual manifestation of the Universal mind. The limits of your latent reserve power have never yet been revealed. You are the power of God within this life. You cannot fail of achievement. God is interested in this case. He desires health for his children. This person is deeply interested in your success. I am both interested in and confident of success.' Such in the main expressed vividly and intensely, though expressed never twice alike, is the first part of the treatment."

The second part is quite different and of conscious, mental action. It is to ask the person, in this thoroughly relaxed state, to direct his mental energy upon different parts of the body, reminding him that he is to become intensely conscious of the part designated. I assure him that such thoughts directed as ordered is to flash curative thought on the part outlined, as is a flashlight directed on objects in the darkness. We generally start at the right shoulder and with his and my thought directed to the certain bodily part, sensation generally results. This is done partly to convince him of his power to dominate his body, partly to quicken the blood's circulation, when he often realizes tingling sensations or warmth in the parts concentrated upon. Then follows the treatment in some such statement as this: "See with your mental eye, the right shoulder. Follow that arm down slowly to the finger-tips. Follow down the left arm in the same way. Take the body at the neck. Follow it down slowly, flashing your attention upon the exterior of the body down to the waist, then down the right and left legs to the toes. Often exhila-



rating sensations are experienced. Then I order this mental energy turned up into the head where the brain cells are, which parts, through the projected thought, are illumined and strengthened in behalf of normal, healthful, cheering impressions from environment. If there be mental depression or headache, we jointly concentrate our mental energy upon that spot and the amazing effect is that the depression often lifts, the headache goes, sensations of peace and freedom from pain being realized. If pain be in arm or leg, or if indigestion or constipation be the bodily ailment, ready response to this energizing mental exercise is often realized."

The third part of the treatment is purely spiritual, preceded by such word as this: "While you are sitting there relaxed, remember that you are receptive to another presence than mine—namely, God's presence. God is a spirit and they that worship Him, must worship Him in spirit and in truth. Jesus said 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst.' The Eternal God is thy refuge and underneath are the everlasting arms. In Him we live and move and have our being. Say, therefore, to yourself, slowly, drowsily and with the consciousness that your life is passive and open in every part, 'I am now receptive to the presence of God. I am receptive to the Divine life energy. I am asking, therefore, I am receiving. His remedial life is just now entering in as I open to receive it. It is permeating me through and through, illuminating my mind, invigorating my spirit, banishing my fears, quieting my nerves, energizing my whole body. Every call of my body is responding to this inflow of the Divine life. His strength is being made perfect in my weakness. I am sharing the abundant life that Christ revealed. I am receiving of the Infinite source that makes me whole.' Then follows some minutes of quiet that these

meditations make their impression and become absorbed into the personality during which blessed calm I see the person in the spirit, as released from all ills. The person also is instructed to see himself identified with the spirit rather than with the body and its distressing sensations."

The reader will naturally ask how we can reconcile such diversity of treatment as different therapeutic workers practice with the remedy that all workers alike achieve. The answer to such an important and interesting question must be that it matters little what the form of treatment is. The important thing is to get the mind, or the soul, or the "*vis medicatrix naturae*" to express itself in keeping with the suggestions given, and for the remedying of the certain ills. The next important thing is to arouse the patient's confidence. The third important thing is to bring your own powerful and magnetic personality to bear upon the person's consciousness. I have in mind many cases of persons who afterwards told me that my statement that they had latent within them a submerged power that represented ninety per cent of their personality, which they were ignorant and unconscious of, while their weak and troubled self was only ten per cent of the whole, inspired a confidence that was curative. Further, that the statement that this mass of power was constantly working along the line of the suggestion, all unconscious to themselves, was the necessary incentive to new life. I recall a lady lecturer who came to me full of fear of failure each time she stood before her audience. After a few conferences, she said she was all right and more effective with her audiences than ever. In asking what accounted for the change, she said: "It was your statement that I had within me the strength of ten and did not know it." Then she said, "Whenever I arise to lecture, the thought comes automatically to my mind that I am speaking with the strength of ten. Before,

I was conscious of speaking with the strength of one, and that one my own, conscious self, weak and unequal to the task." Another, a clergyman, testified that his worries and fears of failures "in next Sunday's preaching" fled after I assured him that he had almost limitless reserves of power that he could draw on when he chose. This statement of Dr. Van Gieson's, that the "Subconscious mind is ninety per cent of our personality," may be demonstrated to be too large an assertion. Dr. Schofield's illustration that the rim of a coral island on the ocean's surface is as the conscious mind in relation to the subconscious, which, as the miles of island reaching to the ocean's bed, may be pure imagination, but until disproved both statements can be used effectively for remedial purposes, if the person treating and the person being treated believe them true.

In the meantime, let us observe that cures are being made without any such detailed treatment as outlined above. Dr. Edwin Ash of St. Mary's Hospital, London, has his patients simply concentrate attention on the area of pain, and through verbal suggestion sets, he claims, in action the natural curative powers of the patient's brain. The suggestions, he continues, may be assisted by a slight electrical stimulus. I always make passes while giving the suggestions of cure, if only to concentrate the person's mind more deeply on the experiment. Dr. Bernheim and Dr. Liebault, the founders of modern psychotherapy, immediately hypnotize the patient and give the suggestions, which they emphasize by placing a hand on the afflicted parts and call the conditions for psychical healing perfect, when the practitioner's reputation and appearance inspire confidence, allied with a sympathetic environment, and simple, trustful patients.

To show the reader, however, that it is the scientific principles used, rather than the practitioner's personality,

I may relate marvelous results achieved by a patient of mine, for her entire family. She knew not psychology, and had no insight into psychotherapy, other than that caught from our conferences. She was cured of awful head and eye-ache extending over a period of twenty-three years. For fourteen years, she had not read a book, nor written a letter, nor done sewing for herself and family. For the eighteen days from November 10th to November 28th, which was the day she came for treatment, she suffered headache from ten to twenty-four hours each day, six days of which were spent in bed with sick headache, with legs rigid, and the forearm purple to the finger-tips. She had tried every form of medical treatment, including a skilled oculist's experimentation, which necessitated the cutting of the cords of the eye. It was a long and stubborn case, but after four months, finally yielded to psychotherapy. But here is the amazing part of it: She has since then cured both of her seventy-year-old parents of insomnia, indigestion and nervous cough; her brother, a business-man, who had been for months in a sanitarium for mental depression, has been much helped, also her boy, so dull intellectually that, though sixteen years of age, was taken from school at the age of eight because he could not and would not study. In his case the treatments were given during sleep. Interest in reading has been stimulated and instead of becoming incensed when school was mentioned, he now calmly exclaims, "I would like to have an education."

Treatment in sleep is destined to become one of psychotherapy's most valued conditions for remedial work. The writer has met with no small reward in such practice with his own children. Fears of the dark have been uprooted. The use of bad words corrected. The most astonishing remedy of all and incredible to himself, had he not seen its application, has been this incident: My little boy of twelve

received for his newly-taken-up German an "F" mark each day for three months, which meant failure. The teacher, at last, complained bitterly of his indifference and emphasized the uselessness of continuing that study. I went to his bedside, reminded him of his poor work and assured him he could do as well in German as in his other studies, if he would. I commanded him to pay more attention to his German, to study it at home and at school, to show more respect to his teacher, and insisted that he get a "B" in his German, instead of so disgraceful a mark as "F." I did this two nights in succession, using not over four or five minutes in the conversation. To my surprise, he brought back, from the very next session of the school, an "A" in German. After three "A's," he dropped back to a "C," then "B's" and "A's" and received an average of "B" for the month of February, also, an average of "B" for the months of March and April. I asked him the day after the treatments how he happened to get such a good mark. His answer was, "I don't know, only I felt more like studying it. It seemed easier than it did at first. My teacher says it is not because I am such a good German scholar that she gives me good marks, but because I show more interest in my work." May I say that no amount of punishment nor of rational attempts at persuasion could have achieved this remarkable change in that little boy's studies. Punishment would have aroused his natural stubbornness; persuasion would have given him the chance he dearly loves to defend himself and argue the impossibility of learning the uninteresting stuff. The simple and easily-achieved putting of a new motive into the subconscious depths was the need, as the results show.

What psychotherapy's future is to be is problematical, only as to the destiny of its bounds, the systematizing of its rules of application, and the specifying of methods of

usage; as well as defining, possibly, the kind of person to be entrusted with the science with reference to which of the acknowledged professions he shall belong. True, much scientific definition is needed, also classification of the psychic forces employed, and the exact nature and power of the mind exercised in the remedial work. In the meantime, psychologists are turning more and more their attention to this new, open, even interminable field of research and experimentation and with the increasing assurance of a precious harvest of fruitage to reward their labors. The most orthodox and scientific psychology is not convinced, but both orthodoxy and science move slowly toward new truths and conclusions. Until a more far-reaching and consolidated mass of scholarly opinion sanctions this new field of knowledge and practice, for the skilled physicians' stock in trade, our humanity should deem itself blessed in the possession of such fearless, scientific, psychotherapeutic pioneers, as Liebault, Lloyd-Tuckey, Bramwell, Bernheim, Freud, Bleuler, Forel, Moll, Dubois and Schofield, in Europe, and Doctors Morton Prince, Weir Mitchell, J. J. Putnam, R. C. Cabot, Boris Sidis and Professors Peterson, Angell and Muensterberg in America.

# INDEX TO LECTURES

## International Congress of Arts and Science

### A

Abbe, Le Boeuf, vol. iv: 262.  
 Abbott, Nathan, vol. iii: 163.  
 Abdomen, wounds of, vol. vii: 147.  
 A century of medical progress, vol. vii: 11.  
 Adam, vol. i: 6.  
 Adams, Henry C., vol. viii: 253.  
 Addams, Jane, vol. ix: 126.  
 Addison, vol. iv: 46.  
 Administration in England, vol. ix: 74.  
 Administration, colonial, vol. viii: 301.  
 Advantages of farm life, vol. ix: 203.  
 Africa, apportionment of, vol. viii: 303.  
 Africanus, vol. ii: 34.  
 Agriculture, vol. vi: 258; vol. viii: 45, 63; stations, 68.  
 Aims of diplomacy, vol. ix: 110.  
 Alexander, vol. i: 114, 291; vol. iv: 111.  
 Alkamenes, vol. iv: 196.  
 American aborigines, vol. v: 114.  
 American farmers, problems of, vol. ix: 197; vol. viii: 50.  
 American inappreciation of literature, vol. iv: 170.  
 American Indian mounds, vol. v: 134.  
 American and German literature, vol. iv: 77.  
 Ampire, J. J., vol. ii: 54.  
 Amputation, vol. vii: 172.  
 Anatomy, human, vol. v: 251.  
 Anaxagoras, vol. i: 291.  
 Andrews, Elisha B., vol. ix: 23.  
 Anecdotes of precedents at courts, vol. ix: 91.

A new form of intellectual activity, vol. i: 3.  
 Ancient records, vol. i: 6.  
 Ansonius, vol. ii: 8.  
 A strange dispute over surgery, vol. vii: 72.  
 Anthropology, vol. v: 103.  
 Antiseptics, vol. vii: 90.  
 Antitoxins, vol. vii: 106; vol. vi: 315.  
 Apelles, vol. iv: 54, 185.  
 Apollonius, vol. iv: 3.  
 Apology of Apulius, vol. ii: 4.  
 Appendicitis, operation for, vol. vii: 140.  
 Applied mechanics, vol. vii: 236.  
 Arcesilaus, vol. iv: 248.  
 Archæology, vol. iv: 219; vol. v: 131.  
 Archimedes, vol. i: 10, 12; vol. iv: 55.  
 Architects, great, of France, vol. iv: 264.  
 Architects, great, of other countries, vol. iv: 270.  
 Architecture, modern, vol. iv: 285.  
 Architecture, its literature, vol. iv: 277.  
 Architecture, commercial, vol. iv: 293.  
 Argentarius, vol. ii: 33.  
 Aristarchus, vol. i: 9-13.  
 Aristophenes, vol. i: 90; vol. ii: 27.  
 Aristotle, vol. ii: 4, 30, 46, 71, 265; vol. iii: 16.  
 Aristotle, vol. i: 11, 53, 105; vol. iv: 43; vol. vi: 6.  
 Arnold, Matthew, vol. iv: 11, 46.  
 Art, antique, fine, vol. iv: 223.  
 Art, history of, vol. iv: 183, 201.  
 Art—Orient vs. Occident, vol. iv: 306.

- Artists of modern times, vol. x: 41.  
 Arts that are lost, vol. vii: 187.  
 Artaxerxes, vol. iv: 13.  
 Asceoli, vol. ii: 65.  
 Aspasia, vol. ii: 43.  
 Assimilation policy, vol. viii: 311.  
 Assyria, vol. 1: 6.  
 Assyrian monuments, vol. ii: 172.  
 Astrology, vol. v: 105.  
 Astronomy, celestial mechanics, vol. vi: 83.  
 Astronomy, light of the stars, vol. vi: 67; vol. i: 8.  
 Athena Lumina, vol. iv: 254.  
 Athenodorus, vol. i: 291.  
 Atmospheric electricity, vol. vi: 142.  
 Auerbach, vol. iv: 154.  
 Augustine, St., vol. ii: 254.  
 Augustus, vol. i: 110.  
 Aurelius, Marcus, vol. i: 293.  
 Autocracy and constitutional government, vol. ix: 9.  
 Attila, vol. i: 124.  
 Average of human life, vol. ix: 188.  
 Avesta, the, vol. ii: 171.  
 Avicenna, vol. iv: 18; vol. iii: 16.  
 Averrhoes, vol. iii: 16.
- B**
- Babian, vol. v: 16.  
 Babylonians, vol. i: 9; vol. ii: 172.  
 Bach, vol. x: 32.  
 Backlund, Oskar, vol. vi: 183.  
 Bacon, vol. i: 59, 300; vol. v: 108; vol. iv: 163; vol. vii: 2.  
 Bacteria inoculation, vol. x: 209.  
 Bacteriology, vol. v: 233; vol. vii: 6.  
 Bailey, Liberty H., vol. vii: 63.  
 Baldwin, Mark, vol. vi: 1.  
 Balloons for low temperatures, determination, vol. vi: 136.  
 Balzac, vol. i: 64; vol. iv: 133.  
 Bancroft, George, vol. i: 72.  
 Barrie, vol. iv: 142.  
 Bartoli, vol. ii: 63.  
 Bastien Lepage, vol. iv: 211.  
 Battles of Religion in the East, vol. i: 131.  
 Beale, Joseph, vol. iii: 225.  
 Bechtel, vol. ii: 23.  
 Becquerel, vol. vii: 204.  
 Beethoven, vol. iv: 260; vol. x: 33.  
 Bell, A. M., vol. ii: 72.  
 Bellini, vol. x: 42; vol. iv: 213.  
 Belligerent act in neutral harbor, vol. iii: 255.  
 Belles-lettres, vol. iv: 137, 157.  
 Benivieni, pathological anatomy, vol. vii: 66.  
 Beneditti, vol. i: 15.  
 Benvenuto, Cellini, vol. i: 28; vol. iv: 213.  
 Bentham, vol. viii: 101.  
 Beowulf, vol. i: 302; vol. ii: 96.  
 Berber custom law, vol. ii: 242.  
 Bergaigne, vol. i: 276.  
 Bernoullis, vol. i: 18.  
 Bhagavad, Gita, the poem, vol. ii: 183.  
 Biagi, Guido, vol. iii: 133.  
 Bichat, pathologist, vol. vii: 2.  
 Billings, Frank, vol. vi: 269.  
 Biology, recent developments, vol. v: 187.  
 Biology's relation to pathology, vol. v: 91.  
 Bjorson, vol. iv: 73.  
 Bloomfield, Maurice, vol. ii: 205.  
 Boccaccio, vol. ii: 45.  
 Bocher, Max, vol. vi: 217.  
 Bodin, Jean, vol. i: 53.  
 Boechk, vol. i: 97.  
 Boethius, vol. iv: 39.  
 Bolingbroke, vol. i: 53.  
 Bopp, vol. i: 275; vol. ii: 76.  
 Bossuet, vol. i: 53.  
 Botta, Carlo, vol. i: 120.  
 Botticelli, vol. iv: 208.  
 Botticini, vol. iv: 214.  
 Bourget, Paul, vol. iv: 153.  
 Bourne, vol. i: 195.  
 Bovey, Henry T., vol. vii: 199.  
 Brahms, vol. x: 32.  
 Brahman civilization, vol. ii: 218.  
 Brahminical riddles, vol. ii: 205.  
 Brahminism and Buddhism, vol. ii: 183.



Brandes, Georg, vol. iv: 9.  
 Brantieri, vol. iv: 142, 35.  
 Breathing, in singing, vol. x: 45.  
 Breeding, experiments in, vol. v: 215.  
 British civil service, vol. ix: 77.  
 Browning, vol. iv: 46.  
 Brucke, vol. i: 255.  
 Bruggmann, vol. i: 255.  
 Brunn's history of artists, vol. iv: 224, 184.  
 Bruno, vol. i: 115.  
 Brunton, Sir Louder, vol. vi: 305.  
 Bryce, Hon. James, vol. ix: 63.  
 Buckle, vol. i: 67.  
 Buckler, Wm. H., vol. iii: 189.  
 Buddhism, vol. i: 125, 280; vol. ii: 156.  
 Burke, vol. i: 51, 71.  
 Burgess, John W., vol. iii: 273.  
 Burne-Jones, vol. iv: 132.  
 Bury, vol. i: 82, 177.  
 Business combinations, vol. iii: 239.  
 Butterfield, K. L., vol. ix: 197.  
 Buttmann, vol. ii: 23.  
 Byron, vol. iv: 46.

## C

Cabanel, vol. iv: 203.  
 Cadmus, vol. i: 6, 93.  
 Calderon, vol. iv: 60.  
 Calvin's case, vol. iii: 170.  
 Cambridge modern history, vol. i: 35.  
 Cancer, study of, vol. vii: 86, 126, 144, 154, 180.  
 Caracalla, vol. i: 110.  
 Carlyle, vol. i: 65; vol. iv: 123; vol. ix: 35.  
 Carian civilization, vol. ii: 1; vol. iv: 203.  
 Carnegie laboratory, vol. vii: 86.  
 Caste at universities, vol. iii: 30.  
 Catholic-Protestant dispute, vol. ii: 276.  
 Cato, vol. i: 299.  
 Cause and Effect, vol. v: 9.  
 Cellular theory, vol. v: 48.  
 Cervantes, vol. ii: 45.  
 Cestius, vol. ii: 33.  
 Chamberlain's fiscal policy, vol. viii: 209; vol. iv: 129.  
 Champollion, vol. i: 94.  
 Changes in geography, vol. v: 87.  
 Changes in grammar and speech, vol. i: 244.  
 Charlemagne, vol. iv: 172.  
 Chateaubriand, vol. iv: 263, 68, 88.  
 Chaucer, vol. i: 302.  
 Cheaper insurance, vol. viii: 275.  
 Characteristics of ocean beds, vol. vi: 122.  
 Chartist movement, vol. iv: 123.  
 Chemical processes in living organisms, vol. v: 188.  
 Chemistry, vol. vii: 237; vol. viii: 23.  
 Chemistry, inorganic, vol. vi: 29.  
 Chemistry, physiologic, vol. vi: 53.  
 Chenier, Andre, vol. iv: 43.  
 Chezy, vol. i: 269.  
 Chevallat, vol. ii: 54.  
 China, vol. viii: 204; vol. i: 134.  
 Chloroform, first use of, vol. vii: 92.  
 Christ and Buddha, vol. ii: 156.  
 Christianity and Buddhism, vol. ii: 200.  
 Christianity, its origin, vol. ii: 262.  
 Christianity and Hellenism, vol. i: 298.  
 Christian archæology, vol. iv: 233.  
 Christian Science, vol. x: 221.  
 Christy, Sam'l B., vol. vii: 278.  
 Church infallibility, vol. ii: 153.  
 Church influence on art, vol. x: 92.  
 Cicero, vol. i: 296; vol. ii: 9, 34.  
 Cimabue, vol. iv: 212.  
 Civil engineering, vol. vii: 224.  
 Civilization of the Greeks and Romans, vol. i: 98.  
 Classical literature, vol. iv: 27.  
 Classification, problems of, vol. v: 117.

- Classification of books of the world, vol. iii: 149.  
 Cocaine for anæsthesia, vol. vii: 93.  
 Code Napoleon, vol. iii: 193.  
 Codification of laws, vol. iii: 232.  
 Coelho, vol. ii: 55.  
 Cohnheim, Otto, vol. vi: 51.  
 Coke, Lord, vol. iii: 164.  
 Coleridge, vol. iv: 131.  
 College discipline, vol. iii: 96.  
 College fraternities, vol. iii: 101.  
 College of Surgeons, vol. vii: 83.  
 Collignon's Greek sculpture, vol. iv: 185.  
 Colonization schemes of nations, vol. ix: 31.  
 Colonization of America, vol. i: 206.  
 Color values in painting, vol. x: 97.  
 Columbus, vol. i: 12.  
 Comedy, vol. x: 153.  
 Comets and meteors, vol. vi: 95.  
 Commercial by-products, vol. viii: 35.  
 Commodities, foreign, vol. viii: 206.  
 Common law, characteristics, vol. iii: 163.  
 Comparative grammar, vol. ii: 52.  
 Comparative literature, vol. iv: 36.  
 Compound fractures, vol. vii: 161.  
 Compulsory insurance, vol. viii: 272.  
 Comte, vol. i: 49, 180; vol. ii: 287.  
 Conquests in Asia, vol. i: 125.  
 Constitutional amendment, vol. iii: 277.  
 Constitutional law, vol. iii: 273.  
 Constitution of the church, political, vol. ii: 257.  
 Consumer, the, vol. viii: 177.  
 Contraband of war, vol. iii: 248.  
 Control of reproduction, vol. ix: 264.  
 Cooper, Jas. F., vol. iv: 88.  
 Copernicus, vol. i: 13.  
 Cordier, Henri, vol. i: 121.  
 Corneille, vol. iv: 146; vol. x: 68.  
 Corregio, vol. iv: 203.  
 Cortes, H., vol. i: 200.  
 Cosmical physics, vol. vi: 141, vol. v: 84.  
 Country schools, vol. viii: 78.  
 Courtney, W. L., vol. x: 131.  
 Credit confidence, vol. viii: 236.  
 Creuzer's mythology, vol. ii: 170.  
 Croiset, vol. iv: 31.  
 Crookes, Sir William, vol. x: 195.  
 Cures by suggestion, vol. x: 280.  
 Currie, Madam, vol. vi: 42.  
 Curtius, vol. i: 67.  
 Cyrus, vol. iv: 13.
- D**
- Dabney, Chas. W., vol. viii: 45.  
 D'Annuncio, vol. iv: 153.  
 Dante, vol. i: 64; vol. ii: 48.  
 Daphne and Chloe, vol. i: 91.  
 Darius, vol. iv: 13.  
 Darnell, Henry J., vol. iv: 58.  
 Dark ages, vol. i: 301.  
 Darwin, Chas., vol. ii: 286; vol. v: 205.  
 Daudet, vol. iv: 146.  
 David Emeric, vol. iv: 262.  
 Da Vinci, vol. iv: 213.  
 De Brosse's fetich gods, vol. ii: 169.  
 Degeneracy, vol. v: 120.  
 Delacroix, vol. iv: 311.  
 Delphic oracle, vol. i: 27.  
 Demming, W. A., vol. ix: 1.  
 Demosthenes, vol. ii: 40.  
 Dennis, Frederick S., vol. vii: 81.  
 Dependent Group, vol. ix: 271.  
 De Quincey, vol. iv: 165.  
 Descartes, vol. vii: 2.  
 Determination of sex, vol. vii: 22.  
 De Tocqueville, vol. ix: 50.  
 Development of Diplomacy, vol. ix: 107.  
 Development of educational ideas, vol. iii: 227.

- Development and heredity, vol. v: 192.  
 Development of humanity, vol. i: 5.  
 Development of jurisprudence, vol. iii: 227.  
 Development of our new possessions, vol. viii: 323.  
 De Vries, Hugo, vol. v: 207.  
 Diagnosis and prophylaxis, vol. vii: 3.  
 Diaz, Bernal, vol. i: 199; vol. ii: 51; vol. iv: 53.  
 Dickens, Charles, vol. iv: 124.  
 Dilke, Sir Charles, vol. iv: 127.  
 Diocletian, vol. i: 110.  
 Diogenes, vol. i: 291.  
 Dionysius, vol. ii: 16, 30.  
 Diplomatic representatives, vol. ix: 85.  
 Diplomatic service, vol. ix: 87.  
 Direct selling, vol. viii: 179.  
 Discoveries in Greece, vol. i: 84.  
 Discoveries of the 17th century, vol. vi: 270.  
 Disease is mental, vol. x: 231.  
 Dissecting room, vol. v: 255.  
 Dissection, vol. i: 16.  
 Diphtheria antitoxin, vol. vii: 109.  
 Distribution problems, vol. v: 125.  
 Divorce, its causes, vol. ix: 189.  
 Dogma of infallibility, vol. ii: 154.  
 Domestic markets, vol. viii: 167.  
 Donaldson, Henry H., vol. v: 251.  
 Donatello, vol. iv: 21.  
 Donizetti, vol. x: 42.  
 Dorpfeld, vol. i: 80.  
 Drama, American and English, vol. x: 107.  
 Drama, French, vol. x: 111.  
 Drama and literature, vol. x: 123.  
 Drama, modern, vol. x: 105.  
 Dryden, vol. iv: 10, 133.  
 Dualistic transition, vol. vi: 8.  
 Dumas, vol. iv: 153.  
 Duprie's origin of cults, vol. ii: 169.  
 Duris of Samos, vol. iv: 198.
- Duruy, vol. ii: 64.
- ### E
- Ebbinghaus, vol. i: 174.  
 Ecbatana, vol. iv: 16.  
 Ecclesiastical and general history, relation of, vol. ii: 253.  
 Economics, vol. vi: 265.  
 Economics of farming, vol. viii: 71.  
 Economic science, vol. viii: 85.  
 Education, vol. iii: 1.  
 Educational methods, vol. iii: 25.  
 Effects of industry upon family life, vol. ix: 185.  
 Effects of ocean currents on temperature, vol. vi: 125.  
 Eggleston, Edward, vol. i: 38.  
 Egypt, vol. i: 6.  
 Electric lighting, vol. viii: 8.  
 Electric traction problems, vol. viii: 3.  
 Electric train equipment, vol. viii: 3.  
 Electricity as a curative agent, vol. vii: 102.  
 Elliott, A. Marshall, vol. ii: 70; vol. iv: 56.  
 Eliot, George, vol. iv: 146.  
 Elixir of life, vol. i: 16.  
 Ely, Richard T., vol. ix: 251.  
 Emerson, vol. i: 297.  
 Empedocles, vol. ii: 30.  
 Engineering, vol. vi: 254.  
 Engineering, civil, vol. vii: 224.  
 Engineer, development of, vol. vii: 264.  
 Engineering, electrical, vol. viii: 1.  
 Engineering, mechanical, vol. vii: 248.  
 Engineering sciences, vol. vii: 230.  
 English language, vol. ii: 95, 117.  
 English literary history, vol. iv: 109.  
 English verse problems, vol. ii: 122.  
 English writers and the classics, vol. iv: 46.  
 Enlart, C., vol. iv: 261.  
 Epic poetry, vol. x: 76.  
 Epictetus, vol. i: 293.

Eschylus, vol. iv: 40; vol. x: 61.  
 Eskimo, origin of, vol. v: 132.  
 Ether, first administration of, vol. vii: 92.  
 Ethical and religious problems, vol. ix: 213.  
 Ethics, vol. vi: 199.  
 Ethnographic parallels, vol. v: 169.  
 Ethnology, vol. v: 153.  
 Euclid, vol. i: 7.  
 Euripides, vol. x: 138.  
 European concert, vol. ix: 100.  
 Eusebius, vol. ii: 254.  
 Evans, Arthur, vol. i: 79.  
 Examples of Grecian art, vol. i: 91.  
 Exchange, stability of, vol. viii: 246.  
 Executive and legislative functions, vol. iii: 294.  
 Expenses of the Science Congress, vol. i: xxx.  
 Experimental biology, vol. v: 203.  
 Explorations in Italy, vol. i: 99.  
 Extravagance of ambassadors, vol. ix: 100.

## F

Factory workers, vol. x: 6.  
 Farinelli, vol. x: 41.  
 Farming scientifically, vol. viii: 51.  
 Farm labor, vol. viii: 69, 74.  
 Farmers' organization, vol. ix: 205.  
 Farnese Diadumenus, vol. iv: 251.  
 Fertilizers, vol. viii: 25.  
 Fichte, vol. v: 54.  
 Fielding, vol. iv: 47.  
 Financing the Science Congress, vol. i: xvii.  
 Finance and jurisprudence, vol. viii: 262.  
 Finance, science of, vol. viii: 253.  
 Finsen light, vol. vii: 99.  
 Flambert, vol. iv: 146.  
 Footsteps in spiritual discovery, vol. x: 223.  
 Forest conservation, vol. viii: 34.

Foreign speakers at the Congress, vol. i: xxix.  
 Fossils, an index of geologic time, vol. v: 82.  
 Fortier, Alcee, vol. iv: 53.  
 Foster, John W., vol. ix: 85.  
 Four laws of nature, vol. v: 110.  
 Franklin, Benjamin, vol. i: 27.  
 Fraternal insurance, vol. viii: 279.  
 Freeman, vol. i: 49.  
 Free school incentives, vol. iii: 45.  
 Free thinkers, vol. i: 49.  
 Free thought, vol. v: 42.  
 Freights, long and short hauls, vol. viii: 144.  
 Freight rates advancing, vol. viii: 153.  
 French influence on the English language, vol. ii: 124.  
 French language has no synonyms, vol. ii: 40.  
 French municipal system, vol. x: 10.  
 French and Spanish literature, vol. iv: 61.  
 French poetry, vol. x: 63.  
 Freytag, vol. i: 168.  
 Frisians, vol. ii: 97.  
 Froude, vol. i: 58; vol. iv: 129.  
 Fuchs, August, vol. ii: 61.  
 Function of the family, vol. ix: 181.  
 Function of the ovaries, vol. vii: 34.  
 Furtwangler, vol. iv: 194, 204, 219.  
 Fustel, vol. i: 54.

## G

Galen, vol. vii: 52.  
 Galileo, vol. i: 15, 115.  
 Gallatin, Alfred, vol. v: 113.  
 Gambling, vol. ix: 135.  
 Garbe, vol. ii: 218.  
 Genesis of the Greek conscience, vol. i: 99.  
 Generation and inheritance, vol. v: 299.  
 Genre painting, vol. x: 94.  
 Geographical position, vol. vi: 103.  
 Geology, vol. vii: 236.

- German and American literature, vol. iii: 77.  
 German folk-lore, vol. ii: 172.  
 German methods of scholarship, vol. iv: 55.  
 German philology, vol. ii: 75.  
 Germination, the process of, vol. v: 305.  
 Germ theory, vol. v: 237.  
 Ghiberti, vol. iv: 212.  
 Gibbon, vol. i: 51; vol. iv: 9, 54.  
 Giesebrecht, vol. i: 169.  
 Ginzler, vol. i: 99.  
 Giordano, vol. iv: 203.  
 Giotto, vol. iv: 212.  
 Gladstone, vol. iv: 126.  
 Gluck, vol. x: 43.  
 Goethe, vol. i: 302; vol. ii: 37; vol. iv: 1, 152.  
 Gold certificates, vol. viii: 223.  
 Gold and silver question, vol. viii: 220.  
 Goldziher, Ignaz, vol. ii: 223.  
 Good—what is it? vol. vi: 212.  
 Government regulation of railroads, vol. viii: 160.  
 Grammatical perplexities, vol. i: 231.  
 Granville, vol. iv: 126.  
 Graphophone libraries, vol. iii: 149.  
 Gray, vol. iv: 46.  
 Great voyages and results, vol. vi: 106.  
 Greek grammarians, vol. i: 253.  
 Greek language, vol. ii: 1.  
 Greek legends, vol. i: 77.  
 Greek sculpture, vol. iv: 241.  
 Greek semasiology, vol. ii: 120.  
 Gregory, Charles, vol. iii: 243.  
 Grein's poetical lexicon, vol. ii: 120.  
 Grimm, Jakob, vol. i: 249; vol. ii: 24, 76.  
 Grote, vol. i: 77.  
 Growth of Greek study, vol. i: 76.  
 Gurlitt, C., vol. x: 90.  
 Gutenberg, vol. i: 13.
- H**
- Haddon, Alfred C., vol. v: 153.  
 Hadley, vol. viii: 128; vol. iii: 25.  
 Hafiz, the Persian poet, vol. iv: 24.  
 Hals, Frans, vol. iv: 212.  
 Hamlet, vol. iv: 110.  
 Hamlin, Dwight F., vol. iv: 285.  
 Hammerabi, the code of, vol. ii: 155.  
 Hannibal, vol. i: 114.  
 Hardy, vol. iv: 151.  
 Harnack, Gustav, vol. ii: 253.  
 Harris, W. T., vol. iii: 1.  
 Harrison, James A., vol. iv: 1.  
 Harte, Bret, vol. iv: 154.  
 Harvey, vol. vii: 2, 84.  
 Hawthorne, vol. iv: 146.  
 Healing by faith, vol. x: 227.  
 Hedonism, vol. viii: 106.  
 Heeran, vol. i: 56.  
 Hegel, vol. i: 57, 182; vol. ii: 152.  
 Heine, vol. iv: 45.  
 Hellenic nationality, vol. ii: 10.  
 Hellenistic inspiration, vol. iv: 50.  
 Helmholtz's experiments, vol. v: 285.  
 Hemple, George, vol. ii: 116.  
 Henderson, Chas. R., vol. ix: 271.  
 Henry VIII's matrimonial conduct, vol. i: 65.  
 Heraclitus, vol. iv: 48.  
 Herakles myth, vol. i: 98.  
 Herder, vol. i: 57; vol. ii: 279; vol. iv: 1.  
 Hernia, strangulated, vol. vii: 68, 138.  
 Herodotus, vol. i: 83; vol. iv: 16.  
 Herschel, Sir William, vol. vi: 69.  
 Hertwig, Oskar, vol. v: 299.  
 Hieroglyphic writing of Central America, vol. v: 139.  
 Hill, David J., vol. ix: 107.  
 Hippocrates, vii: 52, 84; vol. iv: 39.  
 Hirschfeld, vol. i: 107.  
 History, a course recommended, vol. i: 197.  
 History of language, vol. i: 31, 227.  
 History of the library, vol. iii: 87.

- History by synthetic coöpera-  
tion, vol. i: 35.  
Hoffman, vol. ii: 56.  
Hohn's history, vol. i: 92.  
Hollander, vol. viii: 121.  
Homer, vol. ii: 13, 176; vol. iv:  
42.  
Hooke, vol. vii: 2.  
Hoops, Joh., vol. iv: 109.  
Horace, vol. i: 296; vol. ii: 15;  
vol. iv: 44.  
Horne Tooke, vol. i: 256.  
Hospitals, vol. vii: 85.  
Howard, George E., vol. ix: 181.  
Howell, Wm. H., vol. v: 271.  
Howison, George H., vol. v: 1.  
Hugo, Victor, vol. x: 80.  
Human antiquity, vol. v: 129.  
Humanization, vol. v: 128.  
Human mind not regenerative,  
vol. x: 233.  
Humboldt, vol. ii: 2, 14.  
Hume, David, vol. ii: 151; vol.  
viii: 95.  
Hume, Martin, vol. i: 197.  
Hunter, vol. vii: 2, 84.  
Huxley, vol. iv: 144.  
Hyde, W. D., vol. viii: 87.  
Hysteria a mental disease, vol.  
x: 245.
- I
- Ibsen, Henrik, vol. iv: 73, 141;  
vol. x: 145, 158.  
Idealistic philosophy, birth of,  
vol. ii: 278.  
Imperialistic movement, vol. iv:  
128.  
Imperial policy of the United  
States, vol. iii: 309, vol. ix:  
21.  
India land of wonders, vol. iv:  
114.  
Individual rights, vol. iii: 237.  
Individualism, vol. ix: 174.  
Indo-European Chauvinism, vol.  
i: 273.  
Indo-European language, vol. i:  
257.  
Industrial evolution, vol. ix:  
251.  
Industrial group, vol. ix: 237.  
Influence of farm machinery on  
labor, vol. ix: 259.
- Influence of physicians on pa-  
tients, vol. vii: 15.  
Inoculation prevention, vol. vi:  
275.  
Inoculation treatment, vol. vii:  
9.  
Insanity, operation for relief of,  
vol. vii: 117.  
Instinct and consciousness, vol.  
v: 195.  
Insurance policies, vol. viii:  
269, 283.  
Intercourse between Egypt and  
Greece, vol. i: 78.  
Interests of the powers in the  
East, vol. i: 148.  
Intermediate markets, vol. viii:  
174.  
International congress, vol. i:  
xii.  
International law, vol. iii: 230,  
243.  
International university meth-  
ods, vol. iii: 116.  
Interstate commerce, vol. iii:  
300.  
Irving, Washington, vol. iv: 88.  
Islamic science, progress of, vol.  
ii: 223.  
Islamic superstitions, vol. ii:  
247.  
Isocrates, vol. iv: 153.
- J
- Jackson, A. V. W., vol. iv: 13.  
James, Henry, vol. iv: 153.  
Japanese, their rise, vol. i: 142.  
Japanese painters, vol. iv: 315.  
Jastrow, J., vol. ix: 219.  
Jefferson vs. Jacksonian democ-  
racy, vol. iii: 3.  
Jenner, vol. vii: 4.  
Jerome, vol. i: 296.  
Jespersen, Otto, vol. ii: 95.  
Jesus and Buddha, vol. ii: 193.  
Jewett, Miss, vol. iv: 151.  
Jones, E. D., vol. viii: 167.  
Jones, Henry A., vol. x: 105.  
Jones, William, translation of  
the Cakuntala, vol. i: 268.  
Jonson, Ben, vol. iv: 46.  
Jordan, David S., vol. vi: 243.  
Jordan, Edwin O., vol. v: 233.  
Joret, vol. ii: 70.

Josephus, vol. i: 298.  
 Jurisprudence, vol. iii: 225.  
 Jury of Awards, vol. i: xi.  
 Juvenal, vol. iii: 216; vol. i: 297.  
 Juvenile Courts, vol. ix: 146.

## K

Kakuzo, O., vol. iv: 305.  
 Kant, vol. i: 57; vol. ii: 151, 279.  
 Kant's analysis, vol. v: 27.  
 Keats, vol. iv: 131.  
 Keller, Von, vol. ii: 55.  
 Kempis, Thomas à, vol. i: 302.  
 Kenticisms in Chaucer, vol. ii: 118.  
 Kipling, vol. iv: 129, 147.  
 Kittredge, Geo. L., vol. ii: 117.  
 Knapp, Bliss, vol. x: 221.  
 Koch, Robert, vol. x: 207; vol. vii: 5, 111.  
 Koran, the, vol. ii: 154, 227.  
 Krause, vol. i: 182; vol. ii: 90.  
 Kretchmer, Paul, vol. i: 81.

## L

Lachmann, Karl, vol. ii: 88.  
 Laboratories and libraries, vol. iii: 123.  
 Labor and Capital, vol. ix: 241.  
 Ladd, Geo. T., vol. v: 187.  
 La Farge, John, vol. iv: 309.  
 Lamertine, vol. ii: 13; vol. iv: 72.  
 Lamprecht, Karl, vol. i: 157.  
 Landor, vol. iv: 46.  
 Lane, Edward, vol. ii: 236.  
 Language changes, vol. i: 234.  
 Language derivatives, vol. ii: 112.  
 Laparotomy, vol. vii: 145.  
 La Place, vol. i: 94.  
 Las Casas' appeal for the Indians, vol. i: 209.  
 Latin language, vol. i: 285.  
 Laughlin, James L., vol. viii: 231.  
 Law and art, vol. iii: 219.  
 Law and Government, vol. i: 24.

Law of Hammerabi, the oldest code, vol. i: 122.  
 Law and literature, vol. iii: 216.  
 Law and politics, vol. iii: 202.  
 Legends of King Minos, vol. i: 80.  
 Legislative encroachments, vol. iii: 305.  
 Legislative and judicial functions, vol. iii: 185.  
 Lenan and Sealsfield, nature interpreters, vol. iv: 87.  
 Leonardo, vol. i: 10, 12.  
 Lessing, vol. iv: 45, 118.  
 Levi, Silvain, vol. i: 267.  
 Library of the future, vol. iii: 143.  
 Liebnitz, vol. i: 17.  
 Life of the ancient Greeks, vol. i: 89.  
 Linguistic result of the Norman Conquest, vol. ii: 133.  
 Lipps, vol. i: 174.  
 Lister, vol. vii: 61, 95.  
 Literature of the Middle Ages, vol. iv: 161.  
 Literature, its evolution, vol. i: 239.  
 Literature of the Restoration, vol. iv: 116.  
 Literary vitalities, vol. iv: 1.  
 Littre, vol. ii: 55.  
 Livy, vol. i: 56.  
 Locke, vol. vii: 2.  
 Locke's theories, vol. i: 205.  
 Loeb, Jacques, vol. v: 187.  
 Logic, the field of, vol. vi: 171.  
 London county council, vol. ix: 149.  
 Longfellow, vol. iv: 141.  
 Lope de Vega, vol. iv: 60.  
 Lord Acton, vol. i: 39.  
 Lost languages of India, vol. ii: 186.  
 Louis Napoleon and the American civil war, vol. ix: 27.  
 Lounsbury, T. R., vol. i: 227.  
 Lowell, vol. iv: 144, 173; vol. ix: 161.  
 Lucan, vol. ii: 35.  
 Lungs, diseases of, vol. vii: 120.  
 Luther, vol. i: 13; vol. iv: 3.  
 Lysippus, vol. iv: 199, 255.  
 Lysistratus, vol. iv: 258.

## M

- Macaulay, vol. i: 22, 57, 63.  
 MacDonald, Robert, vol. x: 241.  
 MacDonald, Duncan, vol. ii: 226.  
 Machiavelli, vol. i: 119.  
 Machine stage of production, vol. ix: 255.  
 Madagascar superstitions, vol. ii: 244.  
 Magic among primitive peoples, vol. v: 105.  
 Mahaffy, John, vol. i: 71.  
 Mahan, vol. iv: 129.  
 Mahomet's sepulchre, vol. ii: 225.  
 Mahomet's teachings, vol. ii: 233.  
 Maistre, De, vol. iv: 32.  
 Malarial parasites, vol. v: 248.  
 Malformations, causes of, vol. vi: 296.  
 Manufacturer, the, vol. viii: 167.  
 Marine deposits, vol. vi: 119.  
 Markets, foreign, vol. viii: 194.  
 Mark Twain, vol. iv: 147.  
 Marquardt, vol. i: 107.  
 Mathematics, vol. vi: 217.  
 Matrimonial laxity, cause of, vol. ix: 186.  
 Matthews, Brander, vol. iv: 137.  
 Maupassant, De, vol. iv: 151.  
 Mayow, vol. vii: 2.  
 McGee, WJ., vol. v: 103.  
 McKinley, vol. iv: 129.  
 Meaning of activital coincidences, vol. v: 122.  
 Mecca's gates open to the world, vol. ii: 251.  
 Medical science, progress of, vol. vii: 3.  
 Medical literature, vol. vii: 84.  
 Medical practice a century ago, vol. vii: 73.  
 Medical schools, vol. vii: 87.  
 Medicine, internal, vol. vii: 1.  
 Medicine and surgery, vol. vii: 49.  
 Medicine, vol. vi: 260, 269.  
 Mediæval history, vol. i: 160.  
 Mechanical engineering, vol. vii: 248.  
 Merkel, vol. i: 254.  
 Metallic money, vol. viii: 241.  
 Metallurgy, primitive, vol. vii: 265.  
 Metaphysics, vol. vi: 151.  
 Meteorology, vol. vi: 133.  
 Methods in Jesus' teaching, vol. x: 229.  
 Methods vs. theories in therapeutics, vol. vii: 2.  
 Metternich, vol. ix: 3.  
 Mexican civilization, vol. v: 144.  
 Meyer, B. H., vol. viii: 269.  
 Meyer, Edward, vol. ii: 6, 31.  
 Meyer, Paul, vol. ii: 47.  
 Michel Angelo, vol. iv: 212, 54.  
 Michelet, vol. iv: 71.  
 Miller, Adolph, vol. viii: 85.  
 Milton, vol. i: 64; vol. iv: 11, 46.  
 Miner, the practical, vol. vii: 283.  
 Mineral wealth, vol. vii: 278.  
 Mining engineers, the training of, vol. vii: 278, 307.  
 Mining laboratory, vol. vii: 297.  
 Mining schools, vol. vii: 281.  
 Miracles of the Orient, vol. iv: 113.  
 Misfortunes of Arthur, vol. iv: 48.  
 Missionary effort in China, vol. i: 130.  
 Mitchell, Mrs., Greek sculpture, vol. iv: 191.  
 Mithra, vol. iv: 15.  
 Mme. de Stael, vol. iv: 68.  
 Modern German literature, vol. iv: 86.  
 Modern history, vol. i: 177.  
 Modern art education, vol. iv: 319.  
 Modern painting, vol. x: 100.  
 Modern social upheaval, vol. ix: 248.  
 Modification of animal life, vol. v: 95.  
 Molecular movement, vol. x: 204.  
 Moliere, vol. iv: 7, 144.  
 Mommsen's history, vol. i: 39, 49, 95.  
 Monetary problems, vol. viii: 231.



- Monographs on the classics, vol. iv: 49.  
 Monopoly in modern industry, vol. ix: 268.  
 Monroe doctrine, vol. ix: 57.  
 Montaigne, vol. iv: 68.  
 Montesquieu, vol. ix: 50; vol. i: 53.  
 Moore, Thomas, vol. iv: 121.  
 Moore, George, vol. ii: 167.  
 Moral judgments, vol. vi: 207.  
 Morality of Ibsen's plays, vol. x: 167.  
 Morelli, vol. iv: 252.  
 Morley, John, vol. i: 71, 49.  
 Morris, William, vol. iv: 125.  
 Mortality of surgical operations, vol. vii: 113.  
 Mosheim, vol. ii: 256.  
 Mozart, vol. x: 33.  
 Mrs. Eddy's discovery, vol. x: 226.  
 Mrs. Eddy's text-book, vol. x: 238.  
 Müller, Max, vol. ii: 53, 158.  
 Multiplication of books, a prophecy, vol. iii: 140.  
 Municipal administration, vol. ix: 129; vol. x: 1.  
 Municipal systems of England, France, Germany and America, vol. x: 8.  
 Münsterberg, vol. i: 174; vol. ix: 295.  
 Murray, Sir John, vol. vi: 117.  
 Muscular activity, vol. vi: 56.  
 Music, frivolous, vol. x: 34.  
 Music, organ, vol. x: 32.  
 Music, operatic and instrumental, vol. x: 29.  
 Musical art, vol. x: 23.  
 Musical instruments, their expression, vol. x: 25.  
 Muther, Richard, vol. x: 89.  
 Mycenaean tombs, vol. ii: 172.  
 Mykenaeen civilization, vol. i: 78.  
 Myron, vol. iv: 245.
- N
- National administration, vol. ix: 63.  
 National banking system, vol. viii: 132.  
 Nationalism and socialism, vol. ix: 12.  
 National theater, vol. x: 117.  
 Naturalism, vol. i: 192; vol. vi: 16.  
 Natural selection, vol. x: 216.  
 Nature of reality, vol. vi: 164.  
 Nature worship, vol. ii: 168.  
 Nazami's tragic love poem, vol. iv: 24.  
 Negro problem, vol. viii: 132.  
 Neo-Romanists, vol. iv: 133.  
 Neutral blockade runners, vol. iii: 243.  
 Newcomb, Simon, vol. i: 1.  
 Newton, vol. i: 17, 94; vol. iv: 54, vol. vii: 2.  
 Nicator, vol. ii: 34.  
 Niebuhr, vol. i: 55.  
 Nietzsche, vol. iv: 83.  
 Nihilism, vol. iii: 6.  
 Niké of Simonthrace, vol. i: 9; vol. iv: 185.  
 Nineteenth century liberalism heroes, vol. ix: 6.  
 Nine worthies of the world, vol. iv: 168.  
 Nitrogen from the atmosphere, vol. viii: 28.  
 Nitrous oxid gas discovery, vol. vii: 90.  
 Nutrition, problems in, vol. vi: 51.
- O
- Obstetrics, vol. vii: 21.  
 Oceanography, vol. vi: 117.  
 Oldenberg, H., vol. ii: 17.  
 Oldham, Henry T., vol. vi: 103.  
 Old Provençal, language of the troubadours, vol. ii: 67.  
 Omar Khayyam, vol. iv: 17.  
 Oriental philology, vol. iv: 228.  
 Origin of religion, vol. ii: 177.  
 Origin of species, vol. v: 205.  
 Oriental subjects in Elizabethan literature, vol. iv: 114.  
 Oriental studies, vol. iv: 120.  
 Ormond, Alex. T., vol. vi: 151.  
 Orth, Joh. vol. vi: 283.  
 Our insular possessions, vol. viii: 317.  
 Our monetary equilibrium, vol. viii: 215.

Ovariectomy, vol. vii: 148.  
 Ovid, vol. iv: 39.  
 Oviedo, vol. i: 199.  
 Ownership of retail establishments, vol. viii: 187.

## P

Painting, modern problems, vol. iv: 305, vol. x: 89.  
 Pais, Ettore, vol. i: 95.  
 Paleontology, vol. v: 81.  
 Pantheism, vol. iii: 21.  
 Paper money, vol. viii: 248.  
 Paracelsus, vol. i: 14; vol. vii: 70.  
 Parasites and infection, vol. vi: 273, 289.  
 Paris, Gaston, vol. ii: 48; vol. iii: 53; vol. iv: 162.  
 Participation, Scientific Congress, vol. i: xxvii.  
 Pascal, vol. iv: 54.  
 Passing of the age of books, vol. iii: 143.  
 Pater, vol. iv: 165.  
 Paul, Hermann, vol. i: 261.  
 Paulding, James K., vol. iv: 88.  
 Pathogenic bacteria, vol. x: 208.  
 Pathology, vol. vi: 283.  
 Pausanias, vol. iv: 190, 204.  
 Pedagogic problems, vol. iii: 51.  
 Pelasgians, vol. i: 99.  
 Pellissier, vol. iv: 59.  
 Pericles, vol. i: 25.  
 Perrot, vol. iv: 205.  
 Perry, Edward, vol. iii: 107.  
 Persia, language and literature of, vol. iv: 13.  
 Persian Diana, vol. iv: 17.  
 Persian great men, vol. iv: 19.  
 Persian influence on English poets, vol. iv: 25.  
 Personification of the powers of nature, vol. ii: 158.  
 Perugino, vol. iv: 213.  
 Peruvian civilization, vol. v: 145.  
 Pestalozzi, vol. iii: 52.  
 Petrarch, vol. i: 64, 287; vol. iv: 41.  
 Petronius, vol. iv: 153.  
 Pfeiderer, Otto, vol. ii: 149.  
 Phidias, vol. iv: 190.  
 Phillips, Stephen, vol. iv: 135.

Philodemus, vol. ii: 34.  
 Philolaus, vol. i: 13.  
 Philosophy, vol. v: 1.  
 Phoenicians, vol. i: 9.  
 Photography in Astronomy, vol. vi: 76.  
 Phrasing in singing, vol. x: 55.  
 Physical science, vol. i: 10.  
 Physical structure of living matter, vol. v: 190.  
 Physiocrats, their theory of production, vol. viii: 97.  
 Physiologic processes, vol. v: 198.  
 Physiology, vol. v: 271.  
 Pickering, Edward C., vol. vi: 67.  
 Pinero, vol. iv: 153; vol. x: 154.  
 Piping times of papyrus, vol. iv: 33.  
 Placenta, function of, vol. vii: 44.  
 Plan of the Science Congress, vol. i: xxi.  
 Plato, vol. i: 286; vol. ii: 38.  
 Plato's republic, vol. v: 20.  
 Plautus, vol. i: 64.  
 Plehn, Carl, vol. viii: 194.  
 Pliny, vol. iv: 185, 197.  
 Plutarch, vol. iv: 199; vol. i: 86; vol. ii: 33.  
 Poet of Paradise, vol. iv: 23.  
 Poetry, law in, vol. x: 61.  
 Poets of modern Italy, vol. iv: 43.  
 Poets, novelists and dramatists of France, vol. iv: 75.  
 Pogatscher, A., vol. ii: 99.  
 Poggio, vol. i: 287.  
 Polar origin of life, vol. v: 86.  
 Politian, vol. i: 287.  
 Political economy, vol. viii: 121.  
 Politics of the 19th century, vol. ix: 1; vol. viii: 208.  
 Polybius, vol. i: 92, 114; vol. ii: 9-38.  
 Polyclitus, vol. iv: 244.  
 Pope, vol. iv: 46, 132.  
 Popular legends, vol. iv: 169.  
 Porpora, vol. x: 40.  
 Positivism, vol. vi: 19.  
 Pott, vol. i: 258.  
 Praxiteles, vol. iv: 185.

Pre-Raphaelite brotherhood, vol. iv: 132.  
 Prescott, vol. i: 64.  
 Primary of first cause, vol. v: 3.  
 Problem of poverty, vol. ix: 295.  
 Progress of the history of language, vol. i: 249.  
 Pronunciation in singing, vol. x: 54.  
 Proudhon, vol. iii: 7.  
 Psychic powers of cure, vol. x: 243.  
 Protogene, vol. iv: 185.  
 Psychology, vol. v: 48; vol. i: 173.  
 Psychotherapy, vol. x: 252.  
 Ptolemy, vol. i: 10; vol. ii: 6.  
 Public and private agencies of relief, vol. ix: 285.  
 Pueblo Indians, vol. v: 86.  
 Pupin, M. J., vol. viii: 1.  
 Pythagoras, teachings of, vol. ii: 192; vol. i: 9, 13; vol. iv: 198, 244.

## Q

Qualification for public office, vol. ix: 70.  
 Queen Victoria's opinion of statesmen, vol. ix: 39.  
 Quintiléan, vol. ii: 8; vol. iv: 40.

## R

Rabelais, vol. i: 302; vol. iv: 44.  
 Racial and community hygiene, vol. v: 239.  
 Racine, vol. iv: 44, 146.  
 Radio activity, vol. vi: 42.  
 Radium, uses of in disease, vol. vii: 101; vol. vi: 44.  
 Railroad consolidation, vol. viii: 157.  
 Ramsey, Sir William, vol. vi: 29.  
 Ranke, vol. i: 49.  
 Raphael, vol. iv: 11.  
 Raw materials, the struggle for control of, vol. viii: 170.  
 Raynouard, vol. ii: 49; vol. iv: 54.  
 Reality—what is it? vol. v: 38.

Reciprocity of first cause, vol. v: 3.  
 Reformation, the, vol. ii: 272.  
 Registers in singing, vol. x: 52.  
 Reinsch, Paul S., vol. viii: 301.  
 Relations of literature to history, vol. iv: 167.  
 Relations of Rome to the Greek, vol. i: 288.  
 Relation of diplomacy to history, vol. ix: 112.  
 Relation of diplomacy to jurisprudence, vol. ix: 117.  
 Relation of diplomacy to economics, vol. ix: 122.  
 Relations of diplomacy to ethics, vol. ix: 124.  
 Relation of diplomacy to education, vol. ix: 126.  
 Relations between Roman and English law, vol. iii: 195.  
 Religion and archæology, vol. iv: 231.  
 Religions of ancient India, vol. ii: 183.  
 Religion an outgrowth of magic, vol. v: 173.  
 Religious intolerance, vol. i: 204.  
 Religions contrasted, vol. iii: 8.  
 Religion, philosophy of, vol. ii: 149.  
 Religion and the church, vol. i: 29.  
 Religions in the 19th century, vol. ii: 167.  
 Religion, its relation to morality, vol. ii: 161.  
 Religion, its relation to science, vol. ii: 162.  
 Religion in psychotherapy, vol. x: 277.  
 Relief measures for the poor, vol. ix: 300.  
 Remsen, vol. iv: 140.  
 Rembrandt, vol. iv: 207.  
 Renaissance, poetry of, vol. x: 83; vol. i: 25.  
 Renan, vol. i: 49; vol. ii: 284.  
 Reproduction of infusoria, vol. v: 301.  
 Retail prices, vol. viii: 185.  
 Reuter, vol. iv: 151.  
 Réville, Jean, vol. ii: 275.

Rhetorical vs. grammatical speaking, vol. i: 229.  
 Ricardians, vol. viii: 104.  
 Ricardo-Mill controversy, vol. viii: 106.  
 Richardson, vol. iv: 153, 183.  
 Rig-Veda hymns, vol. ii: 175.  
 Ripley, W. Z., vol. viii: 139.  
 Ritual borrowed from the Romans, vol. iii: 212.  
 Roentgen, vol. vii: 5, 98, 204.  
 Rollins' universal history, vol. i: 54.  
 Romance literature, vol. iv: 53.  
 Romance philology, vol. ii: 47.  
 Roman and Athenian communities, vol. ix: 225.  
 Roman law, vol. iii: 189.  
 Roman workingmen's clubs, vol. iii: 210.  
 Rome under the republic and empire, vol. i: 110.  
 Rousseau, vol. iv: 153.  
 Rossini, vol. x: 42.  
 Rotch, Abbott L., vol. vi: 133.  
 Round Table romances, vol. ii: 56.  
 Rural education, vol. ix: 208.  
 Rural isolation, vol. ix: 201.  
 Ruskin, vol. i: 26, 30; vol. iv: 126.  
 Russia in the far East, vol. i: 139.

**S**

Sadler, M. E., vol. iii: 67.  
 Sahagan's Ancient Mexico, vol. v: 136.  
 Saint Simon, vol. i: 180.  
 Sallust, vol. ii: 9.  
 Sand, George, vol. iv: 68.  
 Sandy's compendium, vol. iv: 48.  
 Sanitation, vol. x: 18.  
 Sanskrit literature, vol. i: 249, 267.  
 Sappho, vol. iv: 33.  
 Sarcoma, vol. vii: 180.  
 Sauer, August, vol. iv: 73.  
 Scandalous scenes over questions of rank, vol. ix: 96.  
 Scarlatti, A., vol. x: 39.

Schelling, vol. ii: 2.  
 Scherer, William, vol. ii: 80.  
 Schiller, vol. i: 302.  
 Schlegel, Von, vol. i: 249.  
 Schleicher, vol. i: 254.  
 Schliemann's discoveries, vol. i: 78; vol. iv: 206.  
 Schmidt, Joh., vol. i: 225; vol. ii: 82.  
 Schmuller, vol. ii: 89.  
 Schofield, W. H., vol. iv: 157.  
 Scholasticism, vol. i: 11.  
 School methods of the past, vol. iii: 78.  
 Schopenhauer, vol. x: 135.  
 Schuchardt, Hugo, vol. ii: 60.  
 Scientific aim of medicine, vol. vii: 65.  
 Scientific method in belles-lettres, vol. iv: 142.  
 Scientific study of law, vol. iii: 241.  
 Scientific explanation of Christian Science, vol. x: 236.  
 Science vs. dogmatic theology, vol. vi: 246.  
 Scott, Walter, vol. i: 270; vol. iv: 130.  
 Sculpture, Greek and Roman, vol. iv: 193.  
 Seeley, Sir John, vol. iv: 129.  
 Seler, George, vol. v: 131.  
 Senates a survival of mediaevalism, vol. iii: 284.  
 Seneca, vol. i: 296.  
 Serum therapy, vol. vii: 103.  
 Serum treatment, vol. x: 207.  
 Sex questions, vol. ix: 194.  
 Shakespeare, vol. i: 240, 302; vol. iv: 6, 110; vol. x: 39, 142.  
 Shaw, Bernard, vol. iv: 126; vol. x: 1.  
 Shelley, vol. iv: 46, 131.  
 Sheridan, vol. iv: 135.  
 Shifting population, vol. x: 3.  
 Shorey, Paul, vol. iv: 27.  
 Siberian railway, vol. i: 146.  
 Sievers, Edward, vol. i: 254; vol. ii: 75.  
 Singing as an art, vol. x: 39.  
 Singing masters, vol. x: 47.  
 Skeat's English etymology, vol. ii: 102.  
 Skopes, vol. iv: 192.

- Slavery, danger of revival, vol. viii: 309.
- Sloane, W. M., vol. i: 49.
- Smith, Adam, vol. viii: 96.
- Smith, Albert, vol. vii: 248.
- Smyth, Herbert, vol. ii: 1.
- Snouck, vol. ii: 237.
- Socialism, vol. ix: 17, 41.
- Socialist movement, vol. iv: 126.
- Social regulation, vol. ix: 161.
- Sociology's relation to paleontology, vol. v: 101.
- Social culture, vol. iii: 1.
- Social problems of the farmers, vol. viii: 71.
- Sociology of Ibsen, vol. x: 167.
- Socrates and psychology, vol. vi: 5; vol. iv: 30.
- Sombart, W., vol. ix: 237.
- Sommenschein, Edward, vol. i: 285.
- Sophocles, vol. ii: 37.
- Southey, vol. iv: 130.
- Sovereignty among the states, vol. ix: 57.
- Spalding, Jno. L., vol. iii: 37.
- Spanish and French literature, vol. iv: 61.
- Spanish and American history, vol. i: 199.
- Specie resumption act, vol. viii: 217.
- Spencer, vol. i: 180, 240, 303; vol. iv: 29, 46.
- St. Augustine, vol. i: 296.
- Stifter, A., vol. iv: 83; vol. i: 296.
- St. Mark's rest, vol. i: 27.
- Stock yards strike, vol. ix: 138.
- Stoicism, vol. i: 291.
- Stories that inspired, vol. iv: 172.
- St. Paul, vol. i: 296.
- Strabo, vol. ii: 33.
- Strikes and boycotts, vol. iii: 239.
- Structure of the ovary, vol. vii: 26.
- Sudermann, vol. iv: 153.
- Sumner Maine's researches, vol. i: 104.
- Superstitions, vol. i: 5.
- Surgery, history of, vol. vii: 81.
- Surgery, methods old and new, vol. vii: 54.
- Surgery and medicine, relations of, vol. vii: 49.
- Surgery of the bones, vol. vii: 155.
- Surgery of the genito-urinary system, vol. vii: 174.
- Surgery of the bladder, vol. vii: 178.
- Surgery of the kidneys, vol. vii: 179.
- Surgery of the heart, vol. vii: 118.
- Surgery of the liver, vol. vii: 130.
- Surgery of the nerves, vol. vii: 171.
- Surgery of the spine, vol. vii: 166.
- Surgery of the vascular system, vol. vii: 168.
- Surgery of the stomach, vol. vii: 123.
- Surgical therapeutics, modern, vol. vii: 97.
- Surgical operations, mortality of, vol. vii: 114.
- Surgery—what it has accomplished, vol. vii: 192.
- Swinburne, vol. iv: 41.
- Symphony music, vol. x: 36.

## T

- Tacitus, vol. i: 110; vol. iv: 40.
- Taine, vol. i: 49.
- Tarbell, Frank B., vol. iv: 241.
- Tariff reform, vol. viii: 212.
- Taylor's Primitive Civilization, vol. ii: 158.
- Technical agriculture, vol. viii: 66.
- Technical biology, vol. v: 199.
- Technical education, vol. viii: 39.
- Technology, vol. vii: 199.
- Telegraph problems, vol. viii: 18.
- Telepathy, vol. x: 195.
- Telephone problems, vol. viii: 10.
- Tennyson, vol. iv: 30.
- Territorial division of railroads, vol. viii: 147.

Territorial expansion problems, vol. iii: 313.  
 Tertullian, vol. i: 296.  
 Thayer, W. S., vol. vii: 1.  
 The college, vol. iii: 87.  
 The decline of Rome, vol. i: 110.  
 The Elberfeld system of relief, vol. ix: 307.  
 The embryo of modern economics, vol. i: 53.  
 The Emmanuel movement, vol. x: 284.  
 The family function, vol. ix: 181.  
 The Homeric Age, vol. i: 79.  
 Theism, vol. iii: 12.  
 The library, vol. iii: 133.  
 Theocrites, vol. iv: 47, 153.  
 Theory of prices, vol. viii: 237.  
 Theosophy, origin of, vol. ii: 205.  
 The pardoner's tale, vol. iii: 110.  
 The petrie payri, vol. i: 88.  
 Therapeutics, vol. vi: 305.  
 The Romanticists, vol. x: 78.  
 The saloon in politics, vol. ix: 135.  
 The school and national life, vol. iii: 67.  
 The scientific investigator, vol. i: 1.  
 The subconscious mind, vol. x: 276.  
 The three ideals, vol. v: 26.  
 The three unities, vol. x: 71.  
 The unconscious mind, vol. x: 262.  
 The university, vol. iii: 107.  
 The urban community, vol. ix: 219.  
 Thomson, vol. iv: 46.  
 Thorwaldsen, vol. iv: 155.  
 Thought transference, vol. x: 197.  
 Thrail's Social England, vol. i: 35.  
 Thucydides, vol. i: 54; vol. iv: 31.  
 Tiberius and Sylla, vol. i: 113.  
 Ticknell's life of Addison, vol. iv: 46.  
 Time and space, vol. v: 17.  
 Timotheus, vol. i: 86.  
 Titian, vol. i: 27.  
 Tolstoi, vol. iii: 73, 146.

Tombs of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, vol. i: 78.  
 Torricelli, vol. i: 15.  
 Traction problems, vol. viii: 3.  
 Trading base in the Orient, vol. viii: 198.  
 Tragedy, vol. x: 131.  
 Transcendentalism, vol. v: 63.  
 Transportation problems, vol. viii: 139.  
 Trans-Siberian railway, vol. viii: 201.  
 Treatment of disease by psychotherapy, vol. x: 290.  
 Troubadours, vol. x: 65.  
 Troy and Tirus, vol. i: 79.  
 Tuberculosis, treatment of, vol. vii: 111, 136.  
 Turgenev, vol. iv: 146.  
 Typhoid fever, vol. vii: 145.

## U

Uhland, L., vol. ii: 56.  
 Unity of the human mind, vol. v: 123.  
 Unity of history, vol. 1: 21.  
 Unity of nature, vol. v: 6.  
 Upanishads, the, vol. ii: 198.  
 Uterus, removal of, vol. vii: 153.  
 Utilitarian science, vol. vi: 243.

## V

Vacaresco, Mlle., vol. iv: 159.  
 Vacarius, vol. iii: 192.  
 Van Dyke, John C., vol. iv: 201.  
 Van Eyck, vol. iv: 210.  
 Vedic literature, vol. i: 274, 277.  
 Verdi, vol. x: 42.  
 Verga, vol. iv: 151.  
 Verner, Karl, vol. i: 255; vol. ii: 84.  
 Veronese, Paul, vol. iv: 216.  
 Vespasian, vol. i: 109.  
 Vico, vol. i: 51.  
 Vikings, vol. ii: 100.  
 Virchow, vol. vii: 5.  
 Virgil, vol. i: 3; vol. iii: 42.  
 Vising, John, vol. ii: 101.  
 Vivisection experiments, vol. vii: 37.  
 Volta, vol. i: 18.  
 Voltaire, vol. i: 51, 274; vol. ii: 168.

## W

- Waddell, Alex. L., vol. vii: 224.  
 Wadsworth, vol. iv: 10, 131.  
 Waitz, vol. i: 49.  
 Waldstein, vol. iv: 203.  
 Walker, W. H., vol. viii: 23.  
 Wealth of nations, vol. viii: 101.  
 Webster, John C., vol. vii: 21.  
 Wheeler, Benj. Ide, vol. i: 249.  
 Whistler, vol. iv: 211.  
 White, Andrew, vol. ii: 268.  
 White, Horace, vol. viii: 215.  
 Whitman, Charles O., vol. v: 205.  
 Wicksteed, P. H., vol. x: 158.  
 Wievel, H. G., vol. ii: 106.  
 Wilkins, Miss, vol. iv: 151.  
 Wilkins, Charles, vol. i: 268.  
 William the Conqueror, vol. iv: 172.  
 Wilson, Woodrow, vol. i: 21.  
 Wincklemann, vol. iv: 45, 188, 220.  
 Windish, vol. ii: 98.  
 Winsor, Justin, vol. i: 35, 195.  
 Wireless telegraphy, vol. viii: 14.

- Wister, vol. iv: 151.  
 Witchcraft in New England, vol. i: 203.  
 Wolf, Ferdinand, vol. ii: 56.  
 Women as teachers, vol. iii: 49.  
 Wood a source of human food, vol. viii: 31.  
 Woodbridge, F. J., vol. vi: 171.  
 Woodward, Arthur S., vol. v: 81.  
 World politics, their tendencies, vol. ix: 23.  
 Wundt, vol. i: 174.

## X


- Xenocrates, vol. iv: 198.


## Z


- Zarathustra, the prophet, vol. ii: 154.  
 Zend-Avesta, vol. ii: 154.  
 Zeno, vol. i: 291.  
 Zeuxis, vol. iv: 185, 212.  
 Zoroaster, vol. i: 269; vol. ii: 172, 188; vol. iv: 14.  
 Zwierzina, vol. ii: 90.













SEP 13 1988  
DATE DUE

			1
GAYLORD			PRINTED IN U.S.A.

GAYLORD

PRINTED IN U S A.



AA 000 778 570

